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Chairman Skelton on Interagency Reform and National Security

As Yogi Berra once said, this is déjà vu all over again.  The United States Government has many talented employees with critical skills and expertise, but its departments and agencies don’t always play well together.  Even when they share common interests and common goals, they often fail to coordinate effectively, if at all.  This can cause agencies to duplicate efforts, or worse, to work at cross purposes, which hardly makes the most of our resources to achieve our strategic objectives.

While not a new problem, the issue has lately taken on new urgency, particularly in the area of national security.  The post-9/11 challenges that confront our nation – such as fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, combating terrorism, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – require strategies that embrace the capabilities of all government agencies.  Unfortunately, eight years into the twenty-first century, our institutions and policies maintain a lot of Cold War organization and thinking, but lack the common focus of the Soviet threat.

The few existing mechanisms to bring together the departments that should play a role in developing national security policy and translating that policy into action are weak.  These mechanisms are usually the ad hoc efforts of those directly engaged in the challenge of the moment, and not the result of a broader deliberative process.  The experiences of U.S. service members and civilians working with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan are prime examples that show how interagency solutions can be forged by necessity in the field.  But there must be a better way – we shouldn’t have to reinvent the wheel each time agencies need to join forces.

In historic testimony before the House Armed Services Committee last April, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice agreed that interagency cooperation is absolutely essential to our national security.  And they both made the point that many issues between their respective departments are resolved because these two secretaries work well together – a fact that is understood by their staffs.  Although that reflects well on these public servants, experience in our not-too-distant past tells us that it is unrealistic to expect that our nation will always have cabinet officers in place who make it a priority to work well with each other.  Until our government reforms the interagency process, we will continue to have problems.

In years past, Congress has led the way on similar monumental reform efforts.  During the early 1980s, the House Armed Services Committee learned through testimony that our military services were dysfunctional when called upon to work together.  It took four years of hearings and debate, but legislation to bring jointness to the operations of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps became law with the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986.  Goldwater Nichols made fundamental changes to the culture of the military services, and the legislation faced strong institutional opposition, but today there is broad consensus that these reforms changed the Pentagon for the better. 

Keeping in mind the lessons learned from these earlier efforts to promote military jointness, I believe we can make a success of interagency reform, but I am under no illusion that this will be easy.  As with Goldwater Nichols, interagency reform will require significant cultural changes within federal departments.  It will require budget coordination across agencies as well as the development of strategies that can be executed comprehensively.  There must also be incentives to reward personnel who embrace opportunities to work in an interagency manner.  An additional challenge is the need for significant cooperation between numerous committees of Congress.

As interagency reforms are introduced, some people will resist new ways of doing business.  And yes, a few choice words may even be exchanged.  But interagency reform is a serious task that will improve the way federal departments and agencies work together in the long run.  Although this is unlikely to be the kind of effort that generates exciting headlines, done right we may avoid the kinds of headlines we don’t want to see.  As my friend the late Sheriff Gene Darnell always told me, the best politics is doing a good job.  A strong commitment to interagency reform definitely falls into this category.

U.S. Representative Ike Skelton, D-4th Dist., MO., Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee

Only published comments... Aug 18 2008, 03:30 PM by Anonymous

Comments

 

Grant Martin said:

I loved reading the story behind Goldwater-Nichols as told in the book "Prodigal Soldiers".  What a great effort that seemed to overcome long odds!  Unsung heroes, surely- hopefully similarly unselfish and sharp representatives will lend the country their time and effort and get a similar fix through to law for the rest of the executive branch.

I would also recommend Congress re-look how DoD does business with respect to Goldwater-Nichols and other legislation enacted to facilitate working together.  Specifically, I think the way SOCOM interacts with the rest of DoD might need to be re-thought and incorporated into any new "Interagency" efforts.  It seems to me that the SOCOM creation at about the same time as the rest of DoD became joint might have left something to be desired as to everyone getting along within DoD.

Lastly, I wonder if the structure of the Regional Commands needs to be re-looked, in light of the way CENTCOM is prosecuting COIN in OIF and OEF.  I took part of Goldwater-Nichols to be a way to fix the complicated C-2 we had in Vietnam and to put one military commander in charge on the ground.  With the CENTCOM Commander not deploying forward, there seems to be multiple military (as well as non-military) agencies and units deployed forward answering to commands back in the states.  If GEN Schwartzkopf did it right in Desert Storm (deploying forward and being in charge of all units in country), would an Interagency "fix" for COIN in OEF and OIF be Interagency "commanders" (military or not) in charge in both Afghanistan and Iraq- in control of all US executive agencies in-country?

August 19, 2008 10:23 PM
 

Bobby Patterson, MAJ, USA said:

I agree (totally) with Honorable Ike Skelton.  Inter-agency, given motivation, can execute the required functions in order to:  (a) meet a strategic end-state, (b) manage and produce effective crisis-managment, and the like.  Having worked with USAID, US Treasury, US Embassy (and international agencies (IMF, foreign country Central Bank, NATO Treasury))---as  an Army Finance officer in support of Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (and earlier in my career - KFOR Theater Finance Officer)...I saw first hand the result of team-work--a deliberate collaborative effort.  Team-work spurred on by a common purpose and understanding...to achieve a common goal.  Although it may be difficult, I offer the following:  Cooperative understanding promulgates team-work and therefore, synergy.  I am baffled at the inablity of some 'professionals' to work together in order to accomplish the bottome-line.  The bottom-line in this case is the end-state as identified by the Chief of our Executive Branch, governing body, or other citizen representative.  As a professional, I believe that each person is part of the solution to a problem.  I believe that leaders are responsible for what occurs in their respective organizations.  Subsequently, it is the leader's responsibility to ensure their staff's work with other agencies to ensure the goals (albeit strategic or otherwise) of the US are accomplished and met in an efficient manner.  Rule 1 is for the department head, secretary, etc...to ensure our way of life and protection of citizens..as the first priority; and therefore...whatever it takes to ensure achievement of this objective must happen.  As such, inter-agency coordination and cooperation is a by-product of achieving our most basic strategic goals:  (a) physical protection of US citizens, (b) economic prosperity, and (c) protection of our values and beliefs (democratic ideals).

August 25, 2008 2:55 PM
 

Frank said:

Smart people working( Coordination and Cooperantion ) That The key!

It will be easy!!

Thanks for keeping us Updated!

September 4, 2008 6:17 PM
 

MountainRunner said:

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October 3, 2008 11:43 PM
 

Gary Lyke, MAJ, USA said:

Your insight into the critical function and necessity for active interagency cooperation is right on target.  Having seen the process first-hand in Iraq, interagency cooperation can lead to remarkable success or frustrating failure.  The margin of error for success is small and requires many things to fall into place quickly, such as a common understanding of intent and end-state without disjointed vocabulary slowing the process.  Personal interaction and relationships (trust) also seem to play a pivotal role in gaining momentum on any project or commitment.  Being capable of building those relationships early and fostering a mutually beneficial environment is sometimes challenging, but yields results with a constant and dedicated effort.

I am curious as to why we look at the interagency role only through the lessons gained from operations like OEF or OIF.  It seems as though we (collective military and civilian organizations) focus on the larger, three-headed monster with multiple variations of complexities instead of smaller, less complicated operations, such as civil-support missions (not implying that civil-support missions are easy).  There are certainly many areas of improvements here at home that would be easier to control.  During times of domestic response to floods, hurricanes, etc; the military is working side-by-side with many agencies in order to accomplish some of the identical missions abroad focused on rebuilding governmental capacity.  A major lesson learned from Katrina -- a rapid, unified response is critical to meeting the needs of the populace.  

Solving the issues domestically and nesting the agencies for similar international response seems to provide a tangible, national demand for these organizations (leading to funding and support) while providing a mechanism to train and refine procedures and policy before introducing more complicated variables like force protection against a violent, persistent enemy.

The interagency enrollment at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), which provides institutional development and interaction, is making large gains in the collective understanding and cooperation of multiple services; however, there is still a requirement for more support to increase the number of civilian representatives.  Small gains in the investment of training interagency personnel and focused effort on nesting the agencies with domestic functions will provide the knowledge and experience needed to succeed in building capacity and stability abroad.  

November 11, 2008 10:16 PM
 

MAJ Dave Youngblood said:

Establishing the protocols for the interagency to function in a unified manner within the United States is more difficult than many realize.  Most agencies were developed to treat symptoms of a problem rather than taking a holistic approach to solving the problem.  The Department of Homeland Security is a prime example.  Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement are two agencies that fall underneath DHS, but work against each others.  CBP declares success if individuals attempting to enter the US illegally are turned back at the border.  ICE declares victory if individuals are arrested within the US.  If CBP used an increase in the number of “turn aways” to justify an increase in their budget ICE could end up being the bill payer because there are fewer people being arrested.  Or the same numbers could be used to indicate ICE is not as effective as they should be when in fact DHS overall is being successful.  

Lack of funding prevents the interagency from participating in training exercises with organizations such as USNORTHCOM.  Agencies have to decide where to spend their limited resources which leads to friction between DoD and the interagency community.  DoD has programmed money to conduct training exercises and has a mindset of always training.  Interagency does their “real world mission” everyday and doesn’t necessarily agree with the idea that they need additional training.

I believe there is a desire at the higher levels in the interagency to work together, but there is some fundamental changes that will need to occur first.

November 29, 2008 8:17 AM
 

COL Kent Jacocks said:

Much like what the Joint Staff did for the Services, consideration should be given to creating a similiar organization to coordinate the efforts of the inter-agency. This new organization would work directly for and be subordinate to the National Security Council (NSC).  Like Joint Staff positions, the organization would be populated from the existing Executive Branch Departments and Agencies.  Its charter would fall along the lines of the day to day execution and implementation of Strategic Foreign and Defense Policy.

On a related note, the NSC is in need of another independent stimulus. What about a Foreign Policy Board.  The challenges and complexity of the world we live in today, and the world we would like to live in tomorrow, exceeds the current capacity of our government to adapt and influence to ensure the continued peace and prosperity for all Americans.  The role of the Foreign Policy Board would be to develop and recommend Strategic Foreign and Defense Policy that would transcend administrations.  The Board would be required to report to Congress and collaborate with the existing Foreign Policy and Defense Committees.  Its recommendations would go through the NSC for Presidential for approval.  

Comments and thoughts...?

March 19, 2009 9:13 AM

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