DLRO Force Management

The Problem of "Peace-gaming"

Ken Long — Wed, 17 Feb 2010 21:56:00 GMT

During one of our staff group brainstorming sessions, we were considering the shortfalls of conventional wargaming when it came to examining/understanding Stability operations, and the transition to them.

The conventional wargaming methods didn't feel right in helping us try to visualize our situation and solve our problem.

We weren't sure that it made sense to take a technique that has been optimized for force-on-force conventional fighting, between "units" of capabilities operating with a common frame of reference in terms of time, space, purpose, capability, and criteria for success that is well understood by both sides, and somehow try to translate that into a process that features multiple players, partial and complete, with varied interests, shifting loyalties, degrees of commitment, different problem definitions and scopes, criteria for success etc.

It emerged from our discussions that conventional wargaming, is an attempt to model warfighting as a game of chess, with defined terms, rules, pieces, outcomes, predictability and control; a game in which it makes sense to act-react-counteract; where actions can be known, and results reasonably forecasted, and effects to be reasonably calibrated, and future actions evaluated on the basis of doctrine.

It didnt seem that this kind of model and approach was suitable for evaluating, analyzing, understanding and appreciating the nuances and complexities of Stability or nation-building.

It occurred to us that we might need a "peace-gaming" model that was more like Poker or the old parlor game of "Diplomacy" to capture the right feel; a game where multiple parties could be modeled or represented; where actions, reactions, counteractions and the results that occur as a result of how and when they are mixed, are neither deterministic or definitive.

We spent some time puzzling through how such a game might be modeled by a staff trying to evaluate or appreciate a complex game plan.

Somehow it seemed that we needed more than just the Black & White of enemy and friendly forces. Somehow the game must reflect the complexities, the anthropological nuances of modern social reality in a major city or populous region. This begged the question of how we could assemble an expert panel that could "judge" the outcomes of potential policy mixes. The idea of Human Terrain Teams and Red Teaming were inevitably considered.

The only thing harder than that seemed to be what to do with the output of any such process, and how serious to treat it, with what degree of confidence, and how to describe the limits of its applicability, and how to turn that into actionable orders

These are essentially many of the same cognitive challenges that associate with Design itself.

It intrigued us so much in 24 C&D that examining these ideas will carry over in to some independent research during the upcoming elective period.

If you have some thoughts about this or can recommend some resources or a research/cognitive strategy, we'd like to hear it so it can inform our own efforts.

Haitian relief operations planning excursion in staff groups 24 C & D

Ken Long — Thu, 11 Feb 2010 15:22:00 GMT

during the O200 block in AOC, Staff Groups 24C&D conducted student driven inquiry on Haitian relief operations, and a 1 hour wrap around discussion of their findings. As part of this inquiry the students built a wiki page on our Force Generation blackboard as a repository for research findings and reference material. It can be accessed by going to the Force Generation wiki and finding the page entitled "Haiti"

We followed this up with a voluntary exploration by interested students into the InterAgency planning group planning process in cooperation with a DoD sustainment planner embedded in the J4 planning team who is working with the IA team. These students reviewed planning documents and made substantive comments that have been introduced into the ongoing IA planning process with respect to the planning for transition of sustainment operations from DoD back to Govt of Haiti and NGOs,

The students are examining how to apply the visions of endstates and transition criteria developed by a real world IA planning team in Haiti to inform their class work on transition planning for Phase IV of the GAAT scenario.

Students report high levels of satisfaction for all pieces of the this planning excursion, and it is satisfying to see that we were able to add value to a real world mission

contact me if you are unable to access the Blackboard Force Generation wiki

Update on the Force Generation wiki and Student Text 525

Ken Long — Tue, 02 Feb 2010 16:29:00 GMT

Our informal feedback from officers in the classroom is that ST 525 (Force Generation) is a welcome addition to their kitbag. We'd like to do more though, and so we are eager to have officers recommend what they would like to see added, dropped, extended in the ST for future cycles. We are having it posted on CALL's website and will continue to keep the most current version available there for the field's reference going forward.

On the subject of the Force Generation wiki we built to support the O200 (Force Generation) block, MAJ Levy observed prior to the block that:

...I submit that not many students are aware of this resource...though that may change as instructors "spread the word" during O200. The wiki seems user friendly, and helpful. I'd direct students to the site for their info gathering during this block of instruction. Some may actually go there. Heck, I may even go back, especially if I'm expected to learn something about ARFORGEN this week...

We agree. We are examining the usage data now, and while we had thousands of hits, my sense is that it was not used as much as it could have been, but that those that did, found it to be a helpful resource. See the attached file below on how to access the Force Generation wiki

Wikis offer a much broader application for developing collaborative knowledge, producing an artifact that can support future cycles of learning as well as the current one. I hate the idea of having to pay for the same cognitive ground twice, and a wiki is one way to build a deeper appreciation for a problem/opportunity set.

As an exampleI: i our staff group, you will recall, we assembled a Haiti HA resource page on the fly with student input to develop some situational awareness. It now includes the working slides (unclassified) of how DoD is thinking of making the transition from DoD sustainment to national control. This offers some useful insights into how our campaign planners in the field are conceptualizing the challenges of designing campaigns. The slides can be found on the ARFORGEN wiki on blackboard, on the "Haiti" page, under "Sustainment.

If you are an officer interested in those slides or this discussion, we are eager to hear your input on ST improvements in particular. We will also be looking with care at the student feedback from the O200 block; the survey should be on the street shortly.

We have digested student comments from F100 and are preparing to use the many constructive comments in our upcoming Post-Instructional Conference & Curriculum Design Review process with the command group. When decisions are made for next year's curriculum we will post a detailed sumamry of how we used student feedback from this cycle and how it affected the design for next year. We take your feedback very seriously, and we owe you an answer on how it affected the system.

ARFORGEN wiki on Blackboard for O200 (a snapshot in time)

Ken Long — Fri, 18 Dec 2009 17:39:00 GMT

Background: Blackboard wiki for ARFORGEN (in support of O200)

1. we (DLRO) are preparing to deliver O200, the one of the biggest change in AOC curriculum since ILE was implemented. We are neck deep in preparing faculty to deliver that instruction. I have reason to believe we won't screw it up, based on the quality of the faculty

2. the ARFORGEN wiki is an experimental educational resource we have been building in house to capture resources and ideas as we have been developing the O200 block. It is hosted on Blackboard, from the reachback tab (see attached file to show where to go and how to reach it)

3. The Blackboard wiki, which is an in-house solution, is well suited for CGSC education, was intended to serve as a prototype; it works fine for our department as an intelligent file storage area with some possibilities as an annotated bibliography for students interested in following up, going deeper. It can be accessed by all students and faculty now on Blackboard (see attachment)

4.The faculty has shown little interest or activity in developing the resource beyond about 2-3 instructors. As an experienced instructor, I can say that the wiki is already an excellent resource for in class instruction, ARFORGEN research, and for integrating and linking classes and materials.

5. It is fair to say that the faculty, preparing for this major new block of instruction have significant work to do to be prepared just using the existing "normal" resources available to them, and that it wouldn't surprise me if they saw the wiki (if they think of it at all) as a gadget or even a distractor from their normal way of prep. Is it old dog syndrome? I don't know. I can say that traffic stats don't suggest a lot of people outside of those faculty who have been helping populate the site have been going there.

5. For the Blackboard wiki to be a success it must be used as a normal educational resource by a broad array of faculty and students. A win would be for them to use it as a handy, comprehensive resource storage and retrieval area. A major win would be for faculty and students to develop information products that could supplement the wiki. A strategic win would be for faculty to use areas of the wiki, or even other wikis to develop collaborative educational products

6. The CAC G6 offered a CAC Sharepoint wiki as a solution to the DC's stated intent of publishing the wiki to the broadest audience. We are pursuing that project

F100: (Force Management): why we teach it

Ken Long — Wed, 18 Nov 2009 18:58:00 GMT

Two perennial F100 student feedback themes are:

(1) above average levels of dissatisfaction with understanding the purpose of F100 and

(2) the use of the argumentative essay as an assessment.

Year-over-year scores are improving consistently and are at the highest levels since ILE began.

The F100 course improves as the faculty gain experience, we adopt a more collaborative, flexible classroom approach and lesson design, and connect the theoretical material to student experience.

Of course, this is invisible to students who come here annually with their own background and experience, usually dominated by company-level, tactically oriented, field operations. It is not intuitively obvious why force management should be in the curriculum, with 18 hours of core instruction, with the topics chosen, and assessed the way it is.

Although we have high levels of satisfaction, as measured by QAO, statistics don't tell the whole story. There remain a significant number of student voices though that deserve our best answer on these two issues. Students deserve a formal response to the formal feedback we "invite" them to submit.

The attached slides are the core of an argumentative essay in progress, and a slide visualization of the argumentative essay I've used with success to help students see the requirement while reinforcing ST 22-2.

Here are the arguments for F100 and the argumentative essay:

Why force management? Why those topics? Why are they relevant?

• Professionals know how their Army runs

• How does the Army perform key functions?

• form strategy as part of the joint force?

• create capabilities to meet strategic requirements?

• decide on an optimum force mix?

• plan and resource to implement the force structure in a changing world?

• modernizes at each decision point along the way?

• creates ready forces?

• Professionals understand, visualize, describe and direct their organization:

• What are the fundamental debates?

• What are the core, contemporary issues?

• How does the Army adapt to change?

• How can we do it better?

• How do we/ should we apply the process in individual, evolving circumstances?

· Says who? Congress; generations of senior leaders; experienced field grade officers from all career fields; force managers; recent graduates every year;

• To argue otherwise is evidence of the need for the education (which logical fallacy is this?)

Why write an argumentative essay?

• Writing is thinking, and thinking is hard

• Writing to persuade is hard

• Force management is hard

• Writing an argumentative essay is not routine staff work, like point papers and EXSUMs.

• An argumentative essay exercises many field grade officer competencies

• Identifying an important topic in a complex field

• Conducting focused research that is appropriately broad and deep

• Organizing an argument on a complex topic

• Developing and supporting an argument

• Demonstrating respect for opposing views

• Understanding your audience

• Effectively communicating in writing

• Combining creativity and critical thinking

• Analyzing and synthesizing

• Managing time

Claim 1: Exercising these skills deliberately will improve your ability to operate under time constraints, in the same way that the best planners under time pressure are those who have mastered the formal planning process.

Claim 2: The combination of an argumentative essay and force management is a high level blend of complex professional knowledge and field grade officer competencies.

My own observations (anecdotal)

· I have found these claims invariably to be an important part of each lesson; they keep me focused on why we are in the classroom.

· I have found that the more students connect these claims to specific points inside F100 lessons, the more satisfied and engaged they are as adult learners.

· I have become more effective when I ask the students to help me find these connections in prep materials and in the classroom. I ask them a lot of questions about how I can help them make the connections to support these claims.

I will write an argumentative essay on the subject for consideration for inclusion in our F100 reading book as a way to engage students earlier with these central ideas.

I invite you to understand and improve the argument.

I'm writing a separate set of answers for ALL the student questions, comments and complaints that surfaced in the F100 feedback process as a way to address the common complaint that we never do anything with the feedback students give us.

I am convinced we do a lot with it, but that we haven't communicated to students as if they were humans.

By my count, we have spent 200 man hours carefully examining the student and faculty feedback, as we do every year, and have a number of change initiatives coming directly from what officers have offered. We think this year’s recommendations will help us continue to improve the F100course design by:

· Tighter integration of F100 lessons

· Stronger connection to DJIMO strategy lessons

· Improved assessment plan that links an info paper to an argumentative essay to a group case study

· Adapts to new trends in modernization and equipping strategies, and ARFORGEN developments

We do listen to student voices. It’s past time that we acknowledge that we have heard you and demonstrate that you have a Voice in course design.

Officers: Thanks for your attention and your service. You are the reason we are here.

Ken Long

DLRO Curriculum Developer

The Pentagon’s Revolving Door: When Theory Meets Reality

LTC Eric Hollister — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 21:00:00 GMT

An article in the Washington Times today reports that once again one of President Obama’s nominees for a DoD post appears to fall short of the intent of his “Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel” Executive Order. While he is technically not a lobbyist, Frank Kendall III, the nominee for principal deputy undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, received $75,000 in consulting fees last year from SAIC Inc., and fees totaling $8,500 from Centra Technology, both defense contractors. This, combined with the fact that Kendall worked in the Pentagon from 1986-1994 before becoming vice president of engineering at Raytheon would seem to exemplify the “Revolving Door” that is said to exist between the Department of Defense and Industry—the door the President’s executive order was designed to shut.

This is not the first time a nominee of the President’s has run counter to the order. William J. Lynn III, former Vice President of Raytheon, was nominated as the deputy secretary of defense 12 days before the executive order was signed. Although confirmed, Lynn’s nomination raised a considerable fuss and cries of hypocrisy.

The order, however, doesn’t actually ban lobbyists. What it does is set conditions that make one question how effective former defense industry personnel will be able to do a DoD job, especially at the highest levels. Below is an excerpt from the executive order:

"2. Revolving Door Ban -- All Appointees Entering Government. I will not for a period of 2 years from the date of my appointment participate in any particular matter involving specific parties that is directly and substantially related to my former employer or former clients, including regulations and contracts.”

"3. Revolving Door Ban -- Lobbyists Entering Government. If I was a registered lobbyist within the 2 years before the date of my appointment, in addition to abiding by the limitations of paragraph 2, I will not for a period of 2 years after the date of my appointment:

(a) participate in any particular matter on which I lobbied within the 2 years before the date of my appointment;

(b) participate in the specific issue area in which that particular matter falls; or

(c) seek or accept employment with any executive agency that I lobbied within the 2 years before the date of my appointment.”

What does this all mean? Well, for Kendall, it could mean recusal from some fairly significant areas, according to the SAIC website. According to their website, SAIC is involved in:

“SAIC's support team plays a key role by integrating electronic equipment into [MRAPs] and transporting them to Iraq to ensure our troops have the best equipment available. The MRAP program is one of the DoD's top acquisition programs. “

“As the Lead Systems Integrator for [Future Combat Systems], the Boeing-SAIC team is working to speed delivery of crucial network-centric capabilities to the current force.”

“ SAIC helps lead integration of the network's cornerstone - the Global Information Grid-Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) program. GIG-BE is bringing an optical mesh network with 10-gigabyte-per-second connectivity to about 100 DoD bases, posts and stations. Moreover, GIG-BE achieved initial operating capability in only 20 months.”

“To exploit the bandwidth capabilities provided by GIG-BE, SAIC is supporting the DoD Net-Centric Enterprise Service (NCES) initiative. NCES will provide the software services framework to enable information sharing and collaboration by future command and control, business, and intelligence systems.”

“Simulation software developed by SAIC promises to be the new "gold standard" in both areas: training and software design.”

“Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology can help fulfill the promises of total asset visibility and in-transit visibility. At the Fleet Industrial Supply Center Norfolk, SAIC implemented one of DoD's first fully integrated passive RFID installations. The system provides real-time visibility for the more than 150,000 tagged pieces of material that flow through this ocean terminal annually.”

“For the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, SAIC is helping deploy nearly 3 million "smart cards" to all active duty personnel and selected reservists and civilians. The cards, incorporating PKI and digital signature technology, will replace existing ID cards and will be required to access buildings and computer networks.”

That is just a sampling. If the ethics pledge is enforced, Kendall will theoretically not be able to be involved in the decision-making process for any of the areas above for two years. What makes this more interesting is that Kendall’s would-be boss, Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Ashton Carter, received money from Raytheon and Mitre Corps, two other defense contractors. Technically, that would mean he would need to be removed from making decisions in the same areas as his boss, Mr. Lynn. You can see how this can quickly become complicated.

So is this a question of “Do as I say, not as I do,” or one of good intentions running smack-dab into reality? Has the door been revolving so long that the only qualified applicants are either currently in Government or the defense industry? Is this executive order enforceable, and if so, is it being enforced?

Washington Times article by Jim McElhatton

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/10/defense-nominee-wont-reveal-potential-conflicts/

SAIC Website

http://www.saic.com/

Executive Order

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Ethics-Commitments-By-Executive-Branch-Personnel

Links to related blogs:

http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/dlro/archive/2009/02/24/the-pentagon-s-new-weapons-buyer.aspx

http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/dlro/archive/2009/01/09/senior-raytheon-vp-nominated-for-pentagon-s-number-two-spot.aspx

Army Enterprise Task Force: potentially greatest in-house management re-organization ever

Ken Long — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 15:19:00 GMT

1. Purpose: To provide background information on the Army Enterprise Task Force (ETF)

2. Facts:

a. ETF is a response to the need for transformational organizational change in the way the Army runs. Under the direction of the Chief Management Officer (CMO), the ETF leads the adaptation of Army culture, organizations, and processes to adopt a holistic approach to running the Army, and more effectively and efficiently generate trained and ready force for full-spectrum operations. The Director of ETF is an LTG serving as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army.

b. Charter highlights: ETF is a small coordinating staff supported by DA staff, Army commands and other organizations and activities. Their recommendations go through the Senior Review Board to the Army Review Board for approval. Charter expires and ETF will be dissolved NLT 30 Sep 2011.

c. Need: The senior leaders of the Army's Generating Force need an in integrated (cross functional) assessment capability comparable to that of the Operating Force (who routinely conduct Campaign Assessments, fully informed by mature rigorous analysis of data collected consistently and broadly over time. The Generating Force consists of those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the Operational Army's capabilities for employment by Joint Force commanders as outlined in FM 1-01

c. 3 elements of Army institutional adaptation are needed to complete Army transformation, which began with a campaign quality expeditionary force, through modularity and organizational change to the present need for an Army on a rotational cycle in an era of persistent conflict..

(1) Improve institutional support to a revised ARFORGEN model . The ARFORGEN ROC Drill June 2009 was part of this, a step towards moving day to day operations from DA staff to Army 4-star field commands.

(2) Adopt an enterprise approach in an Army-wide strategic management system with improved governance rules and a supporting assessment system. (ETF)

(3) Reformed requirements and resource processes that inculcate a cost culture and incentivize good stewardship

d. Support to the Army Enterprise Board: (AEB) Support the decision-making of the Army Enterprise Board (AEB). AEB members are the Sec Army, CSA, Army Asst Secretaries, General Counsel, Commanders of: FORSCOM, TRADOC, AMC, IMCOM

e. Goals: support Army rebalancing, do not disrupt ongoing operations, improve efficiency and effectiveness in generating agile forces for full spectrum operations.

f. Endstate: the VCSA defined procedural improvements in 4 areas

(1) Analysis: Senior leaders are supported by dedicated, objective and qualified analysts.

(2) Content/Metrics: outcomes, objectives and metrics are aligned to assess results and proposals.

(3) Data: reliable, cohesive, transparent and accessible

(4) Tools: A disciplined approach, leveraged to ensure alignment and availability of appropriate tools to enable assessment and analysis.

3. Additional resources: located on the CGSC Force Generation wiki, including charters, briefings, multimedia-presentations concerning institutional adaptation.

A deceptively simple management "game" for appreciating Force Management

Ken Long — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 17:16:00 GMT

Peter Checkland's Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) describes the use of models to help us frame questions to ask of the world, and which help us become explicit about our world views, assumptions, frames of reference, theories of cause and effect, values, and desired outcomes.

Checkland, P. (2006) Learning for action: A short definitive account of soft systems methodology and its use for practitioners, teachers and students. Chichester, England, Oxford Press

We’ve developed a deceptively simple Force Mgt PE in the form of a card game. The complete rule set is attached (takes 5 min to scan and understand).

Rapid rule summary:

1. Students buy forces (5 cards) from a production table (a limited deck) and in each of 5 rounds, deploy them into 5 regions to compete for Victory Points

2. Win: first one to 51 victory points OR most points after 5 rounds

3. Game: lasts up to 5 rounds

4. Each round has 5 hands , each hand is worth Victory Points (VP)

5. Hand 1 is worth 6 VP, hand 2 is worth 5 VP etc…

6. Player 1 buys from the red deck, player 2 from the blue deck)

7. After you buy your 5 cards, you place 1 card face down in each region (hand)

8. Once all cards are placed, cards are flipped over and you determine results

9. If your card wins the hand you get the victory points and keep you card; if you lose the hand, you get no victory points and lose your card. If it’s a tie, you keep your card and no one gets points.

10. Each player has an identical deck to buy from.

It turns out that the development of strategy and then fielding an appropriate force really matters, AND there are distinct choices that are meaningful, available and feasible.

If you are interested, we’d like you to review the rules, and :

1. Buy your first round of forces

2. Deploy them into the 5 regions for turn 1.

3. Send your “Round 1” move to long-kenneth@conus.army.mil, along with a short description of your strategy

We are interested in examining the variety of forces and the strategy employed in round 1. Do you, for example:

1. Buy 4 ea 10s and a Joker to kill any enemy aces and retain max budget flexibility to see what he has remaining?

2. Buy aces early to get a lead on victory points and then protect them?

3. Buy Jacks to kill 10s while still preserving SOME budgetary flexibility?

4. How do you balance economy of force with winning victory points? (efficiency vs effectiveness)

5. Variations?

And then tactically employing forces, do you:

1. Put aces against 6 and 5 victory point regions?

2. Put 10s against 6 and 5s to hunt aces?

3. Aim for maximum victory points each round?

4. Aim to capture 11 of the 20 available points each round? (ie bluff on 6 and 3, but try to win 5,4,2?)

In the actual play of the game we’ll look for adaptability and learning, and how strategies change after teams have played each other a couple times etc.

We’ve play tested it enough to know there is a rich source of insights available in the game and that it is simple to play. We’ll play it with decks of cards in the classroom

We prototyped the game in our Force Management elective and are satisfied that that we generate student interest and insight into broader questions of Army force management in an interesting way.

Here are some student insights gleaned from our playtesting:

1. Round 1 results dominate the rest of your strategic choices, so getting Round 1 is crucial.

2. Round 1 strategies are dominated by uncertainty because you have no information about your opponent’s strategy or adaptive style yet.

3. You have to decide when you want to buy strength: early and aim for quick wins, or later after you have seen pieces of the opponents forces and strategy.

4. Forecasting your opponents moves is problematic and make this more like poker than chess or bridge.

5. Aces are like the FCS: dominating until low-cost alternatives found the weakness. It wasn’t unit Aces were developed that the 10s became meaningful, so be alert to deep flaws in complex technologies.

6. Kings are costly but dominate the field; An opponent with Kings drives you to buy Aces but make you vulnerable to 10s.

6. Jacks (J) are a low cost success strategy against 10s, but can be incrementally be defeated by other mid-weight forces.

8. The costs of transforming cards between rounds is significant but manageable and may lead to strategic advantage. Scenario: You buy Aces on the first round and are successful, opponent buys 10s to kill your aces in the second round, but you trade down to Kings which dominate, and which remain difficult to defeat in subsequent rounds.

9. Deciding where (in what regions) to selectively deploy strength

10. Tactical results can overcome strategic insights and strategic failures. Tacrtics can be game changing.

11. What if the enemy has different victory conditions? Price points? Has different rules?

12. What if new cards are introduced after the first rule set is established?

13. How much would you pay to see the opponents’ hands?

14. What if there are partial wins? Or more than 2 teams playing?

15. Simple games can be powerful learning strategies

Conclusions: the game serves as a way to dramatize very clearly many of our force management challenges and is a useful way to create rapid, deep awareness of prime issues in this domain.

Here are some insights from a dedicated gamer and management game modeler:

I suspect that for most people's first play they are strongly influenced by a form of Confirmation Bias: the As are priced higher, therefore new players conduct their analysis from the assumption that As are more valuable. Depending on the goals of your concrete experience, that may be the best argument for keeping the current price structure. However, an ace of spades loses to seven cards, including four cheap ones, where a KH loses to only four cards that are both expensive and vulnerable -- the KH is easily the strongest card in the deck.

I assume trade-ins are secret -- in fact that for all practical purposes players are operating behind a screen during their setup phase -- because knowing whether your opponent has made any trade-ins is very valuable information. You may want to specify that in the rules.

Given the prevalence of 10s in everyone's first turn strategies, it seems like the second-cheapest strategy is far more optimal than the cheapest -- that is four tens and a jack of spades. That marginal $15 gives you a pretty good shot at a victory somewhere, and a decent chance of carrying more net capital forward.

Here are a selection of previously submitted moves for Round 1: (* = Joker)

Strategy 1
Region	Cards	Strategy: Cost: 102 Carry forward: 48
6	10h	I'm trying to kill aces while creating and deploying one, but putting it where it is unlikely to run into an ace-killer unless the other guys is trying an ace-killer strategy like mine. I've got cheap on the ace I bought, which is a risk that may not be worthwhile. I'm expecting to kill an ace in either 6 or 5, win 4 outright, and lose in 3 and 2. Expected results are thus 9.5 points to me, 10.5 points to the bad guys, I will lose approx $35 worth of cards and kill approx $70 worth. The enemy is expected to have spent rather more than me, so I will have more cash with which to restructure in light of what I find out. Cost: 102
5	10c
4	As
3	10d
2	10s
Strategy 2
Region	Cards	Strategy: Cost: 150 Carry forward: 0
6	10s	10 is the ace killer on 6, then we try to overpower each successive category on the way down. Assumes aces go to 6, which rapidly becomes a tail-chasing assumption.
5	As
4	Ks
3	Qs
2	Js
Strategy 3
Region	Cards	Strategy: Cost: 123 Carry forward: 27
6	Jh	Hunting the ace-killers, retaining some flexibility, winning early points
5	10h
4	Ah
3	Jc
2	*
Strategy 4
Region	Cards	Strategy: Cost: 150 Carry forward: 0
6	Ah	Maximum strength in every region
5	Ac
4	Qs
3	*
2	*
Strategy 5
Region	Cards	Strategy: Cost: 145 Carry forward: 5
6	Ah	Maximum strength in main regions, try to hunt an ace and kill 10s; accept risk in small region
5	Ac
4	10s
3	Js
2	*
Strategy 6
Region	Cards	Strategy: Cost: 149 Carry forward: 1
6	10s	Hunt aces and accept risk in regions 5,6, steal points with aces & J in regions 2,3,4
5	*
4	Ah
3	Ac
2	Jc

A thought experiment for revolutionary leadership

Ken Long — Tue, 04 Aug 2009 16:32:00 GMT

I had an opportunity to participate in a thought experiment on leadership in times of revolutionary change in the operational environment. I was struck by how the discussion resonated with the concept of “transparency”. Here is a summary of the key points that emerged:

Conventional times:

· The Commander is the most senior and experienced in the unit.

· His experience is directly relevant to the current situation.

· He knows what else he needs to know from the staff to complete his vision and concept.

· By exception the staff may bring things to his attention.

· The staff reports the needed information.

· The commander is smart and experienced; wise; the final authority; the director.

· We look to him for certainty, and would consider his “confusion” or "not knowing" to be a sign of weakness and concern

AFTER THE REVOLUTION...

Exceptional times:

· Situations are new, dynamic, unique and evolving.

· Experience is not directly applicable, and may actually be harmful (constraining, confining, blinding).

· Commander doesn't know what he needs to know because his frame does not fit or is unformed.

· Subordinate staff and subordinate commanders, who are CLOSER TO THE SITUATION, have more direct exposure & experience .

· Staff and subordinate commanders MUST push their vision and interpretation and "framing" higher.

· The senior commander must actively seek, and encourage their input to drive the collaborative process of team learning.

· The Commander MUST be open and emotionally vulnerable to share the limitations of his knowledge. His values must be solid, but he must be transparent, and finally, perform the role of final judge and ratifier of the process.

· He must be wise, not smart; open and questioning, not clear and decisive (until it is time for action) .

· This places a premium on intellectual humility, a commitment to inquiry and subordinate empowerment.

· Must be willing to be the least informed guy in the room, AND the best critical thinker.

· Must have an empathetic, loyal staff who supports his vulnerability

Implications:

· If you believe we are inside a revolutionary shift in battlefield requirements, then how do we live and educate to these new ideas?

· How much of a transition would this shift in perspective and culture represent to our warrior profession?

· How would YOU go about the leading the transition?

· What are you DOING about it?

Here is a link to an 8 minute video at YouTube which presents these ideas visually: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=veTsjHu0F7I

Attached file are the PPT slides used in building/recording/supporting the roundtable narrative

Reflecting on the Art and Science of Sustainment in Army Education

Ken Long — Sun, 02 Aug 2009 04:12:00 GMT

I had the privilege of being a reader on MAJ Jason Murphy's SAMS monograph from 2008, an inquiry into the art and science of sustainment and sustainment education. Throughout his career, MAJ Murphy had held every critical assignment you could want a tactical logistician to hold, and he did very well in them. He attended every school and then some, having earned his Masters in Logistics Science in conjunction with his graduation from Logistics Executive Development course. In short, he was as skilled int he science of logitics as you could reasonably hope based on his education, experience and aptitude.

Yet, when he found himself in Afghanistan, he quickly discovered that the challenges he faced extended immediately beyond the boundaries of pure science and calculation. In order to make things work at the operational level, he had to navigate the uncharted waters of the art of sustainment, incorporating the richly nuanced human dimension. He found that success usually came from an artful application of solutions tailored to a dynamic chaotic situation, one in which he found himself constantly surfing on waves of change. In time he developed a feel for the flow, and an intuition for what might work, and an innate appreciation for risk and risk management.

He came to CGSC and found more science than art in our curriculum and decided to make a more formal study of the situation, powered by the memory of his cognitive dissonance. Over the course of his year in SAMS he developed a number of insights into the relationship between art and science, comprising equal measures of tension, friction and mutual support. we've taken his insights to heart and engaged in deep reflection into how to accommodate a balanced treatment of sustainment as both art and science, working within the iron constraints of curriculum. This is work still in progress, and a work that ought to always be in progress, and in conjunction with other Army schools on our left and right, informed by the needs as reported by field commanders and our students upon arrival. Adapting is like systems thinking: once you start, you never stop.

The attached slide is a simplified representation of many hours of our discussions around MAJ Murphy's thesis, and the YouTube link:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=avrIJrOUb60

provides about an 8 min discussion of the material. We in DLRO are happy to engage in further discussions, believing that the heat and light that emerge from dialogue will help to keep us warm while letting us see a little deeper into the darkness.

An experiment in digital education

Ken Long — Sat, 25 Jul 2009 07:10:00 GMT

I should have done this a long time ago. I created 2 new pages on my personal blog to collect an indexed list of the videos of mini-lectures for my Army classroom professional stories. These will be a more organized way to layout a menu of choices for students and interested parties to view my stuff in the areas of force management and force sustainment.

I have probably a hundred refined little speeches I tend to give in various classes that reflect my best practices from my active duty service, as well as things that have emerged as refinements in the schoolhouse through engagement with the great officers who share their perspectives of war and peace and discuss theory and practice.

I find myself in class hurrying at times to squeeze these in, out of a sense of duty. It’s not always good pedagogy and it would be nice maybe to let the students know about them ahead of time so that we can engage in dialogues of their chosing based on their needs instead of always doing what I want to do.

Time to relinquish the mike a little more? here is a way to offer my humble “greatest hits” and let them follow their interest.

There maybe some value add for my fellow instructors too on my areas of competence, since our departmental faculty are responsible for a wide range of areas; so wide in fact that they don't have direct personal experience in all of the fields. Example; our faculty teach sustainment lessons at strategic, operational and tactical levels of war; they cover maintenance, transportation, supply, medical, personal, explosive ordnanace disposal, band, finance, personnel, contracting, and all elements of force management; design, plans and operations; Joint and army support operations; plus whatever their elective course specialties are. faculty development programs are an important area of concern for us.

that’s a pretty full plate, so perhaps these videos can be of some help to them as well.

here is an initial sample of videos hosted at YouTube, to describe the idea. I should probably have these on a college server as part of my C.V.? in a searchable index so students could preview me to see of they want to sign up for my electives? I learn so much from the hallway conversations with our faculty that i wish i had a camera going all the time to share their stories with others.

Army Force management series

Army management series (Logistics for XOs: Management strategies & "Tribal Wisdom")

Problem & Opportunities: A structured approach to managing complexity (9:00)

A sense-making session: appreciating the design-plan relationship through group discussion

Ken Long — Sat, 25 Jul 2009 06:55:00 GMT

A number of faculty and officers gathered around a whiteboard to try to create their own practical sense of the distinction and relationship between design and planning. The series of diagrams in the attached image file r unfolded over a discussion of several hours as we tried to connect the doctrinal and scholarly terms to our own words and experiences, to forge a link of meaning between doctrine and practice.

Next steps, connecting our "constructed knowledge" back to the newest handbook edition to how it reads after outr discussions

if design is a reflective and reflexive learning process, (Schon, Weick) then this represents "a way" to develop our personalized understanding the design process; discovery learning through dialogue followed up by more research. the cycle of diagnose, act, measure, reflect is in the action research tradition

RESET ROC Drill summary notes

Ken Long — Mon, 22 Jun 2009 16:04:00 GMT

RESET ROC Drill summary notes (FORSCOM hosted conference in Atlanta,17 Jun 2009). More detailed notes and slides available from DLRO. These notes capture the highilghts from the Introductory remarks and from the crucial "Turn 1") or "In theater tasks" for units to accomplish to set themselves up for success

Information:

GEN Campbell intro:
1. CSA directive to conduct ROC drill as a forcing function to institutionalize operational processes within the Enterprise construct
2. Refine roles & responsibilities to create ready units
3. Key tasks:

i. Analysis for processes, friction points (3 types: within & between enterprises, and with the ARSTAF)

ii. Common framework for all organizations, action officers

iii. ID governing models for synchronizing processes

iv. ID operational tasks to migrate to CEs (core enterprises) from HQDA

v. Transition planning

1. End state: set initial conditions for transition from HQDA to CE; more synch to meet future demands
2. ARFORGEN Is/IsNot:

i. supply based model, demands based process.

ii. A process of systems (that are not self-synchronizing)

iii. Event based (a series of pulses)

iv. Adaptable/dynamic, evolving, continuous, progressive readiness

1. Resource/Readiness challenge: synch the curves of personnel and equip
2. Tri-chart is one of the important artifacts of this conference: purpose: to educate and inform, and capture the central challenges of the lines of effort
3. Cooperation between CEs and ARSTAF principles for satisfying friction points
G-3/5/7: stage setter (Mr Egbert)
1. Out of balance force ->4 imperatives (sustain, prepare, reset, transform)

i. Reset, repair, recap

ii. Retrain

iii. Re-integration soldiers and families

1. CSA: move responsibility to FORSCOM as Readiness CE
2. 3 phases:

i. In theater Return minus 180 to Return

ii. RESET Phase Return to return + 180/365

iii. Train-Ready Return + 180/365 to LAD

1. Lessons learned:

i. Leadership throughout

ii. Mobile training teams

iii. Training plans must be submitted while in theater

iv. Property accountability, end to end

v. MUST do ARI in theater in detail in theater

vi. Mobile repair teams, esp small arms

vii. De-synch of personnel and equip (possibly a 3 month unit set fielding window at installations?)

viii. In theater tasks are crucial to success (isn't this bad design?or simply a reflection of OPTEMPO)

ix. Long term shortage of CPTs/MAJs remains a challenge

1. FORSCOM (COL Tedesco) (Chief of Plans, FORSCOM)

i. Army Sourcing Laydown FY10 completed prior to new administration

ii. New RFF every 2.5 days

iii. Many external drivers/variables on ASL

iv. Army Synchronization Tool will be an essential management tool available on SIPR for operational HQ as well as installation and unit level planners

1. FORSCOM G-3/5/7

i. Impacts of “variable dwell” on model

1. do long-well units require longer for Materiel? Proposal: Driven by RCE (Readiness Core enterprise)

2. GEN Dunwoody comment: variable, unit-based driver would be both more efficient and effective, in order to synch materiel with personnel at best cost

3. Get the people there first, then do a comprehensive NET, unit set fielding.

a. What's lacking is a good understanding of the constraint that is driving the train: personnel or equipment (Theory of Constraints analysis needed)

4. Surgeon General: it takes 24 MONTHS to return to psychological baseline :O:O:O

5. LTG Thurman: agree not achievable at R +180; Joint Manning Documents have increased by 15% a year since 2001. We must tell the CSA that +180 is unachievable

6. LTG Stevenson: effect on AR220-1?

Turn 1 (In-theater)
1. Requirements stage setter
2. Human Capital Enterprise (HCE) (COL Gilman, HRC)

i. LTG Thurman: USF-A will go ahead of Iraq, and fill to 100%

ii. GEN Campbell: aggregate level of fill is not granular enough; its the wrong metric

iii. HRC: our goal is to fill to 80% (Note: P2 range is 80-89%)

iv. Senior level guidance on leader development strategy

v. Surgeon General: UK doesn't experience the turmoil and suicide rates as our forces, probably due to regimental system

vi. LTG Durbin: need analytical support to determine what are effective/useful

vii. Difficulty in identifying undocumented requirements LTG Thurman: by name requests are killing us; CSA does not recognize requirements to provide LNOs

viii. NGB: lack of TTHS forces NG into cross levelling requirement (1/3 of the NG units must crosslevel 25-33% routinely to meet P2 for deployment)

Reflecting on scenario support to CGSC, TRADOC and the Army

Ken Long — Fri, 01 May 2009 17:44:00 GMT

POC: Ken Long, DLRO

Notes from DC Scenario brainstorming session, 01 May 2009, CCR

Summary: In a brainstorming session with some curriculum designers and scenario meisters, the DC asked us to think about a challenge from GEN Dempsey concerning improving the overall quality of scenario-drivers and products across TRADOC. After a review of how our GAAT scenario robustly supported our educational outcomes in the core, AOWC and AAPs, our discussion extended into a broader discussion of scenario support to Army schools with a special emphasis on the CPTs Career Course, which is in a redesign project regarding a “common core” that would/could/should support all 17 disparate courses. Follow-on meetings and projects with training developers from schools and centers are probably coming. Andy Nocks excellent briefing available on request to DLRO.

These are my thoughts and comments from the discussion:

1. I think an ideal scenario should have:

a. Constraints in all dimensions in order to generate challenging problems: information, geography, time-distance issues, political, time, culture, language, infrastructure, competing goals and outcomes, support from multiple theaters and CONUS.

b. Multi-echelon challenges: can exercise from strategic through operational to tactical simultaneously, as well as supporting examination of transitions.

c. Fully exercises simultaneous FSO

d. A complex and complicated context that has rich human terrain, multiple cultures, languages, religions, non -state and quasi state actors, friendlies, neutrals, enemies.

e. Rich data set to support the deepest analytical needs as well as broad, intractable qualitative issues that don’t allow for clear solutions

f. A connection to vital national and international goals

g. Realistic requirements and drivers for joint, combined interagency involvement

h. Our GAAT scenario offers a rich target set for any number of aiming points: We can go deep into a theme if needed, or broadly with a shotgun for a comprehensive campaign design/plan

2. Aiming point analogy: this is a useful analogy to describe specific targets we want to focus on at a specific moment with a specific audience, but we should recognize how the analogy is already constraining our thinking.

a. Our doctrine and visions describe a world in which we EXPECT the aim point to shift, because the enemy learns quickly that if he stays in one spot in the engagement area we kill him dead. Today’s aim point is the one we will be lifting and shifting from tomorrow.

b. We need schools that can deliver tight shot groups but also lift and shift fires quickly and accurately too.

c. The Tennessee chart represents a rich target array that we must be able to engage as directed from the tower. Sometimes we need a shotgun blast approach that broadly engages across multiple phases and themes in a comprehensive campaign. Other times we need a sniper-like precision to engage deeply and accurately into a specific theme.

d. When we brief a precise aim point, we should also ask “And how do we also engage broadly and through transitions?”

e. When we brief a broad campaign plan of educational outcomes, we should also ask “And how could we/can we go deep if needed?”

f. In the same way we build engagement areas to service a thinking enemy, we want to make sure our scenarios and curriculum plan are broad and filled with control measures that allow us to focus fires, where, when and as needed. The GAAT scenario is rich enough to do that.

g. Our AIS and curriculum design process must continuously demonstrate that we are agile enough to adapt to the next set of educational outcomes and “aimpoints”. We must be both active and reactive in proper measure.

3. The data sets should allow for the outputs of various Army schools to be used as inputs for later iterations at other schools. Examples I’d like to see:

a. War College DMETLs, strategic goals and command messages inform our campaign designs

b. MI school IPB products incorporated into CGSC staff processes

c. CGSC designs and orders driving CCC planning and execution processes

d. DAU and AFMS contracting support concepts and appendices supplementing CGSC sustainment annexes

e. CGSC operational planning backbriefs to SAMS campaign designs (to check on communication and content quality and shared understanding)

f. TLOG school TSC concepts of support that provide infrastructure and support to CGSC divisional orders

4. Use of STAMIS in exercises and classroom

a. There are times when STAMIS are true educational outcomes and we should be clear on who, what and how we are training. Every use of STAMIS brings resource considerations and overhead costs that make trade-off decisions a high priority. Clarity is essential in order to avoid nickel-and-dime good ideas from allowing exercise and curriculum mission drift and creep.

5. Educational outcomes drive curriculum, exercises, scenarios, products.

a. We must be clear in the use of our language to re-affirm that education outcomes are the real drivers of scenarios, curriculum and exercises.

b. Efforts to create economies of scale and effort should be driven by an analysis that demonstrates convincingly that there exist common overlapping educational outcomes. The overhead and tradeoffs that come from trying to force multi-player cooperative exercises can be relied upon to cost too much and deliver lower performance. It always has.

c. Adding one additional student population to an exercise increases the complexity using the formula 2^n-1, and lowers performance to the least common denominator.

d. Simulations and STAMIS support the accomplishment of the outcomes, not the other way around.

e. Left unsupervised though, simulations and STAMIS can easily and all too often become the real drivers of curriculum and exercises, and it is always at the expense of student outcomes.

f. Normally takes the form of trying to answer the question of “How can we make the game better?” rather than keeping the focus on the quality of accomplishing the stated educational outcomes.

6. TRADOC-wide solution strategy?

a. Should not start with the idea of a top-down, 1 size fits all, real-time connected, fully immersive continuous gaming environment. There is no evidence that is a method that is suitable, feasible or acceptable for achieving school specific educational outcomes. There is plenty of evidence to the contrary.

b. Should look for low hanging fruit like incorporating best products and practices from CGSC student developed outputs to drive CCC common core.

c. Should use tiger teams of scenario and curriculum developers from army schools to provide direct assistance to schools and centers with identified needs for improving the support to achieving specific educational outcomes. Sniper shots, not shotgun blasts. Start with many pilots, build on success.

7. Broader Army-wide needs:

a. Army should resource an AKO hosted free-play World of Warcraft style fully immersive , individual soldier focused game that rewarded excellence and had culture, language and strat comm. Messages organically integrated in design.

b. Should also resource competitive Civilization style campaign plan development tournaments with interviews and debriefings of the thought processes and strategies developed by the winning TEAMS , who self-select their own members.. Should run some tournaments for staffs of ASCCs and corps to drive their deep thinkers to rich analysis and descriptions, with invites to teams and players from State, Commerce and Justice

Are we at war or not?

LTC Eric Hollister — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 15:07:00 GMT

On February 24^th, President Obama spoke to a joint session of congress for the first time since his election. According to the transcript on the White House Web Site, his speech was 5,902 words long. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are not mentioned until word number 4,681. The President did say, however that "For seven years, we have been a nation at war... We are now carefully reviewing our policies in both wars, and I will soon announce a way forward in Iraq that leaves Iraq to its people and responsibly ends this war. And with our friends and allies, we will forge a new and comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to defeat al Qaeda and combat extremism. " 212 words of the speech were devoted to the wars we (the Nation's Military) currently fight.

On March 25^th a Washington Post article revealed that a Pentagon office sent out a memo stating "this administration prefers to avoid using the term 'Long War' or 'Global War on Terror' [GWOT.] Please use 'Overseas Contingency Operation.' " This memo was subsequently dismissed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) director, who said there has been no such guidance, although according to the article, senior administration officials had been using the phrase "Overseas Contingency Operations" during the month prior to the memo's release. According to a Wall Street Journal article less than a week later, Secretary of State Clinton stated "The administration has stopped using the phrase...I haven't gotten any directive about using it or not using it. It's just not being used."

Perhaps if we don't use the word (war) it will go away?

Today, the Hill reported that Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wants to take a look at Defense Company Executive Compensation. "I'd like to take a look at that [defense executive pay] as part of the overall executive compensation question rather than separate it out," Levin told reporters on Tuesday. "The executive pay in this country is so totally out of whack."

According to the article: "Lockheed Martin's CEO got $1.6 million in salary and $3.9 million in bonuses in 2007...Boeing's CEO made a bonus of $1.5 million for 2008, down from $4.3 million in 2007...General Dynamics, in 2008 gave its CEO a 15 percent increase in his total compensation package, which amounts to nearly $18.5 million."

How is this related to the topic at hand? Well, it speaks to the point of what a nation at war means. Part of what it used to mean was industrial mobilization. I have been reading a fascinating book from 1939 called "A Study of World War I Procurement and Industrial Mobilization." Staggering to us in this day and age were the price fixing practices adopted during World War I to "avoid inflation, to reduce war profits, to equalize the burdens upon the people during the conflict, and to minimize post-war readjustment."(171) Obviously the point we are addressing here is the reduction of war profits (and, I suppose, equalizing the burdens upon the people). Section 120 of the National Defense Act of 1916 stated:

"...any individual, firm, association, company, corporation or organized manufacturing industry...who shall refuse to give the United States...preference in the matter of execution of orders, or who shall refuse to manufacture the kind, quantity or quality of arms or ammunition or the parts thereof, or any necessary supplies or equipment, as ordered by the Secretary of War,...at a reasonable price as determined by the Secretary of War, then...the President is authorized to take immediate possession of such plant or plants and...to manufacture therein in time of war...such material as may be required. The compensation to be paid...shall be fair and just."(172)

Additionally, a Price Fixing Committee was appointed on June 14^th, 1917, to study the need for control of prices during the war. They found a "large majority of American business interests in favor of Federal legislation to authorize Government price fixing during the War." (172)

And then there is this: "In January 1918, the Fuel Administrator, because there was a shortage of coal for shipping, directed all manufacturing plants east of the Mississippi, that were not engaged in war production, to shut down for a period of five days and for ten successive Mondays."(165)

It seems to me that if we were really a Nation at War (and had been from the start, under the previous administration), this entire ‘Overseas Contingency Operation' might have gone quite differently.

One last note: Another portion of a Nation at War is for everyone in the Nation to make sacrifices for the cause ('equalize the burdens of the people'). Again from World War I:

"A request of the Government to forego the use of gasoline on Sundays was met by a whole-hearted response of the people at large."(163)

Can you imagine?

Related Blog: Reflections from Dr. Jack: GWOT or OCO: What's in a Name?

http://usacac.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/reflectionsfromfront/archive/2009/03/26/gwot-or-oco-what-s-in-a-name.aspx

President Obama's Address

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-of-president-barack-obama-address-to-joint-session-of-congress/

Washington Post Article

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html

Wall Street Journal Article

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123845123690371231.html

The Hill Article

http://thehill.com/business--lobby/sen.-levin-considers-defense-exec-pay-cuts-2009-03-31.html

Longino, James C. A Study of World War Procurement and Industrial Mobilization. Washington, D.C.: Army Industrial College, 1939.