Know many of you have read the article from last week's NY Times.  For those of you who have not, I have attached it here.  With this report, what are the implications for developing leaders to operate in a decentralized manner to see and exploit opportunities for the challenges and copmlexities of the operational environment?  

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NEW YORK TIMES
Reprimands Expected in 2008 Battle
By Thom Shanker  12 Mar 10

WASHINGTON — A military investigation into the 2008 battle of Wanat, one of the deadliest days of the war for American forces in Afghanistan, is expected to result in serious letters of reprimand for three officers who were in command positions, Pentagon and military officials said Friday.

Senior officials briefed on the inquiry said that the disciplinary action, in the form of letters of reprimand signed by a general, would be issued to a captain, a lieutenant colonel and a colonel who were serving as the company, battalion and brigade commanders.

All three would have several weeks to appeal before any punishment is final, so the Army’s official comment was that the inquiry remained open. Such letters could end an officer’s chance for promotion, effectively ending a career.

The three officers are being held responsible for decisions before the attack, in particular for failing to properly prepare defenses at the Wanat outpost in eastern Kunar Province. The three officers were identified by Pentagon and military officials as Col. Charles Preysler, Lt. Col. William Ostlund and Capt. Matthew Myer.

The battle at Wanat in July 2008 was a four-hour firefight in which the 48 American soldiers and 24 Afghan soldiers in the outpost were outnumbered nearly three to one. In its ferocity and high casualty count — nine Americans died and 27 American and Afghan soldiers were wounded — the battle has been described as the “Black Hawk Down” of Afghanistan.As first reported by CBS News, Captain Myer was awarded a Silver Star for his leadership during the vicious fight, as the American and Afghan soldiers at the outpost were almost overrun by insurgents. Now, though, he faces disciplinary action for decisions he and his superiors made before the firefight.

“That a guy could get the Silver Star for bravery in the fight, but be blamed for not being ready for the fight, speaks volumes to how tough these modern military operations are,” said a senior Pentagon official. “It illustrates the complexity of the mission.”

Officials briefed on the inquiry said the review had examined decisions about organizing the physical defenses of the outpost, which was located along a suspected insurgent transit route from Pakistan. The placement of mortars also was reviewed.

A significant factor, officials said, were the decisions made by the more senior officers to place the outpost in an isolated valley among hostile villages. They also said questions were raised about whether the soldiers deployed there had received proper support — not only building and construction supplies to build defenses, but also overhead surveillance aircraft to warn of enemy movements.

Senator Jim Webb, Democrat of Virginia, had been among those pressing for an inquiry.

Mr. Webb cited a 248-page history of the battle written by the Army’s Combat Studies Institute, at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., which noted that surveillance aircraft had been withdrawn from the skies over Wanat and assigned to other missions — even though there was intelligence that insurgents were gathering to attack the outpost.

“This action, with a platoon deployed at high risk, is on its face incomprehensible,” Senator Webb wrote in a letter of complaint to the military.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/13/world/asia/13military.html

To follow the origial thread see  http://bit.ly/ckbFjH and original article at  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/04/AR2010020404752.html  

There is an ongoing debate on the over-use of and over-reliance on PowerPoint in our Army.  Most of us agree that we use too much PowerPoint, and in many cases presentations are too long and struggle with both focus and clarity.  In short, PowerPoint has become a crutch, and historically has not encouraged clarity, brevity and precision.  In TRADOC, we are moving quickly to use more simulations and case studies to support our adult learning model.  This will result in two important adjustments.  First, students must come to class prepared to discuss the content rather than rely on a PowerPoint presentation/lecture.  Second, when developing presentations, we will require more rigor, precision and skillful formulation of the slides that are prepared.   

Further, I believe that the presentation of complicated data in a simple, visually meaningful manner is a critical skill that must be learned and practiced.  Let me illuminate one case when the lack of such skills led to a tragedy.  Think of the challenger disaster -- in this case, the NASA scientists had volumes of available data which unequivocally warned against the launch, but the information was so poorly presented to senior leaders that the decisions they made were based on data that was obscure and not clearly understood.  If a picture is worth 1000 words, we must strive for the same rigor and relevance in developing presentations as we do with expertly authored written products. 

Interested in your thoughts, as always.

This past Sunday, GEN Petraeus was interviewed on 'Meet the Press'.  Rather than talk about the content of his interview, I want to discuss the skillful way by which he presents himself and the information during all such engagements. 

Here is the question:  Should the goal for all professional military officers to be as deft at handling interviews as GEN Petraeus? 

Although the majority of us will never be faced with the number of interviews, or the comprehensive nature of such interviews, believe we should recognize the ability to interact with the media as a useful skill that transfers into other leadership areas.  Since the future is both uncertain and unpredictable, rather than using the "hope" method, and keeping our fingers crossed that we are never asked a tough question that is recorded and released on a national level, should we better prepare ourselves to operate in this environment?.  In my view, GEN Petraeus provided us an amazing example of how to appropriately handle at least a couple questions that could be deemed 'fastballs.' 

So how prepared are you to handle such difficult questions?  Ask yourself if you have taken full advantage of some of the media training opportunities here at CGSC.  Interested in your thoughts, as always.

V/r EC

All, this article was recently published in the Washington Post, written by Greg Jaffe.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/04/AR2010020404752.html  

I think this has the potential of engendering tremendous discussion across the Army.  I ask that you take the time to read it and am very interested in hearing your thoughts on its implications.  Reflecting back on your time as former company grade leaders, both as commanders and staff officers, and looking forward as you assume positions as field grade officers including battalion command, this article articulates several topics that are important to discuss as part of our profession. 

V/r BG Ed Cardon

All, have posted two documents on the DC's corner on Student Sharepoint.  Am interested in your feedback!

https://partis.leavenworth.army.mil/sites/student/Lists/DCs%20Corner/DispForm.aspx?ID=76

v/r EC

This past week, we have seen the catastrophic devastation of the earthquake in Haiti, an event which has been extensively covered in the media.  A significant and visible portion of our Nation’s humanitarian response has been the deployment of servicemen and women from all branches of our military to help with securing and delivering the humanitarian aid.  Several times over the past ten years we have been called upon in support relief both domestically and abroad, such as after Hurricane Katrina, the earthquake in NW Pakistan, the tsunami in Thailand, and the Red River flooding in North Dakota.

This year CAC is on target to publish 3-28, Civil Support Operations.  This doctrine is the counterpart to FM 3-07 Stability Operations, but written for the very different environment of domestic operations.  It provides tactical guidance for Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve units providing support to civil authorities.  Unique to all Army doctrine publications, it distinguishes between the Army National Guard and other components of the Army.  It also explains how this manual fits into the National Incident Management System, and how this becomes a comprehensive approach to domestic operations.

Though our current efforts in Haiti fall under the category of Stability Operations, this international humanitarian response shares a similar framework with Civil Support Operations.  But as the draft introduction to FM 3-28 points out:

Stability operations and civil support are cousins, not twins. Both revolve around the civilians on the ground within land areas of operation. Both stability and civil support tasks require Army forces to provide essential services and work with civilian authorities. Civil support operations in the aftermath of a disaster may pose complex challenges initially that rival those confronted in Afghanistan or Iraq. However, the domestic operational environments are quite different from foreign environments from in terms of law, military chain of command, use of deadly force, and the interagency process.

In thinking this over and watching the events unfold in Haiti, I wonder two things:

1- What lessons are we learning to better posture ourselves for future stability and civil support operations?

2- Has our doctrine adequately captured the interoperability challenges and opportunities in these inherently multinational operations?

You may have seen the base document posted on the student sharepoint (DC’s Corner).  But, wanted to bring this up here, too.  OSD Public Affairs recently released a summary of the latest quadrennial report by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press entitled, "U.S. Seen as Less Important, China as More Powerful." (http://people-press.org/report/569/americas-place-in-the-world)

The Pew Research Center examines a wide range of topics to ascertain Foreign Policy attitudes between the public and the Council on Foreign Relations. This report focuses on Afghanistan; China; America’s role in global affairs; torture to gain information from suspected terrorists; Pakistan and Iran.

Your common core studies in C200 exposed you to strategic-level policies and the impacts on national strategy. This report provides you an opportunity to look at strategically relevant discussions and attitudes on foreign policy at a time when we have been largely focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This will also provide you insights to the American public’s perception of current events and world affairs.

For example, the report states that “while the public and Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) members generally agree on three of the major threats facing the United States…the public views China’s emergence as a world power as a more serious threat than do CFR members.” 

Want to focus your attention on this last key point:  How serious is China’s emergence as a world power and what are the potential impacts on the United States in the near and far term? 

All, read this the other day on the EB and am interested in your thoughts.   How does this apply, or does it to the military?

v/r EC

http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20091207720902.html

Read an article recently in Harvard Business Review on Innovation by Andrew Hargadon and Robert Sutton illustrating how “…generating innovative ideas does not have to be a mysterious process.”  Makes one think -- how we as an Army encourage innovative thinkers…or do we? Do we as an institution foster a climate that facilitates innovation, and systematically capture ways to generate innovative ideas?  And is there a compelling reason to do so?

Let’s take the last question first:  Our Army Leader Development Strategy describes an operational environment in which, “increasing competiveness exists in an environment of increasing complexity requiring leaders who are confident, versatile, adaptive, and innovative.” even more uncertain, complex, and competitive as hybrid threats challenge us across the full spectrum of operations.  GEN Dempsey stated in a recent speech to the Joint Warfighting Center, “Think of it this way…if, as conventional wisdom suggests, necessity is the mother of invention, then, in our terms, complexity is the mother of innovation.” Seems to me this is a call to emphasize innovation in our Soldiers, our practices, and within our institutions.

Innovation takes place every day at the tactical level during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  We see it in equipment modifications, interactive approaches with the local populace, and doctrinally-based practices.  Innovation is not limited to the battlefield… its relevancy also extends to our garrison environments.  Examples may include updated staff processes, organizational changes, or experimenting with new techniques.  The question becomes whether these instances of innovation are encouraged, tracked, and disseminated to the benefit of the entire Army.  Have we created a culture of innovation?

We built an AAR culture that includes formal systemic practices for capturing new ideas and best practices, such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Sharepoint-enabled sites, institutions like PKSOI, and the ubiquitous After Action Review format.  Informal means include networking, chat room dialogues, think tanks and a host of other forums.  TRADOC Research and Analysis (TRAC) elements experiment with different concepts. 

But separate of these forums, do we truly encourage and reward those with innovative ideas that challenge our institutional thinking?  

One of the schools in the Combined Arms Center is uniquely contributing to the education of our military – the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at Monterey, California.  This school has the mission of providing “culturally based foreign language education, training, evaluation, and sustainment for DoD personnel in order to ensure the success of the Defense Language Program and enhance the security of the Nation.”

DLI was created almost 70 years ago, first starting as a language school just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.  The school currently teaches 24 languages – at any one time about 3,000 students are taught by about 1,700 civilian faculty and staff.  Ninety-eight percent of the instructors are native speakers of the languages they teach.

Language classes at the Monterey campus are taught as extremely intense “mini-immersion” experiences for six or seven hours a day in the target language.  Depending on the language, the courses are between 24 weeks for the "easy" languages for an English speaker to learn -- and those would be essentially the Romance languages: French, Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese -- to 64 weeks in length for the most difficult languages for an English speaker to learn: Chinese, Arabic, Korean and Japanese.

In addition to teaching classes at Monterey, DLI also offers mobile training teams to teach language classes throughout classes throughout the world.  Today, there are mobile training teams from DLI in 13 different locations, including Dari and Iraqi familiarization classes at CGSC.

For more information about DLI, the American Forces Press Service published a story recently entitled “Language Emerges as Element of National Security” that outlines some of the changes at DLI.  Colonel Sue Ann Sandusky, the Commandant of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Langue Center, also participated in a “DoD Bloggers Roundtable” on March 30, 2009 where she discussed the mission of DLIFLC.

We have a large number of international students – are we doing everything we can to leverage their experiences?   If we accept the fact that we always want to operate as part of a larger alliance, coalition, or multinational effort (and the host nation), then our ability to understand other cultures is critical.  We often focus on national caveats as a hindrance (which they are), but we do not look at the opportunities with the same rigor.  We can build on strengths while accounting for shortfalls rather than focus on shortfalls and discount the value of their efforts.  This also means we may not always have an optimal solution in our own eyes, but we will have a more acceptable and enduring solution.  One way to work these issues is to build relationships, or as General Casey has said, a culture of engagement.  We can build on this here at the College.  How many of our international students do we really know; have we built a level of trust here that can withstand all the challenges and rigors of operations? Why is this so important?  Because operations today move at the speed of trust…trust between our partners, host nation, and each other. 

Today’s operational environment requires officers to devote even more time to self-education.  We all do this in different ways, but we share common desires for useful information that is readily available and relatively easy to internalize.  Self-education resources include the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), books, articles, blogs, S3-XO Net, the Company Command Forum, and Command Net, and many others online.

My main question is which self-education resources have you found most useful in preparing yourself?  What resources do you check for answers first?  What are some of the strengths and weaknesses of the resources you have used?  How could the Army make these resources better? 

Last week MAJ Daniel Hart posted a blog entitled “Pardon my Cancer – the Army and Suicide” on the CAC student blog.  At the time I felt compelled to comment because of my own personal experience with suicide.  While several on the thread disagree with MAJ Hart’s premise that length and frequency of deployments is a major contributor to our rising suicide rate, I applaud his initiative in starting a dialogue on this important topic.  As I noted at the time, we as leaders are only going to come to grips with this issue if we openly discuss and acknowledge this  fact – suicide rates in the military are rising.    

It is especially timely that the College is hosting a panel discussion on comprehensive Soldier fitness this Friday.  BG Rhonda Cornum will speak first, and she will be followed by a panel of experts on Soldier health issues, including aspects of mental and spiritual fitness that contribute to our overall well being.  For those participating in the session, I encourage you to ask the hard questions and take advantage of the time these professionals are spending with us.  BG Cornum will also address spouses in a separate session, so want to encourage their participation as well. 

Finally, I am attaching a passionate article written by the deputy director of the Army’s Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic, LTC Joe Doty.  He explores the concept of empathy as a leadership trait – a concept I find especially intriguing as I have always seen leader attributes as the fundamental building block of our profession.  But, the question I have is, can you truly learn to be empathetic?  Or if you try to employ the tactics LTC Doty mentions, do you run the risk of seeming insincere and therefore less effective?  Welcome your feedback on this important issue.

Is it possible to address contemporary, real-world problems while still upholding our learning requirements?  Let me give you an example.

From November 2008 to January 2009, the Command and General Staff College conducted a pilot special research study with two staff groups in the 09-01 ILE course to analyze the impact of the “surge in Afghanistan.”  The plan was to study the time period from December 2008 to August 2010, a critical time for operations in Afghanistan, in part because of the election of a new administration and the subsequent shift in focus for the United States military from operations in Iraq to operations in Afghanistan. In this 18-20 month time frame, a critical planning factor was to show “discernible progress” in the security of Afghanistan.

This pilot study was intended as an alternative approach to achieving the same purpose, outcomes, and learning objectives as the common curriculum AOWC 1 block.  The study focused on the intangible aspects of battle command -- understanding and visualizing – using current and emerging doctrinal concepts.  Additionally, the pilot study targeted the following objectives: pilot the use of real world topics to meet learning objectives in the CGSC classrooms; provide research products to the operational force through specialized studies to enhance CAC as the "Intellectual Center of the Army;” shift focus from Iraq to Afghanistan within the leader development community; conduct parallel strategic engagement opportunities.

Among both our faculty and students this study demonstrated the potential to break traditional educational paradigms and explore progressive methods.  This is in line with a shift in CGSC to refocus on the leader development in ways that will be vital to winning this war…and the next one. We are always looking for new and unique ways to educate our students with practical, contemporary issues.  The pilot study demonstrates what is possible – is this methodology appropriate for our Field Grade education?

We had a great session with General Dempsey on Monday.  It is clear he is bringing an operational focus to TRADOC.  Everything he has set out for us to work on is grounded in the recent publications FM 3.0 Operations and FM 7.0 Training.  So what is changing?  Like the operational force, TRADOC is becoming a commander centric force.  We are going to use our new doctrine CMETL & DMETL to provide focus -- we need to prioritize both "What we're going to Do" and "What we're not going to Do."  These questions include a discussion among commanders on associated risks for decision.  It is a recognition that we have finite resources, both time (on-duty and off duty) and money, to accomplish our missions (win the war; preserve the force).  It is a recognition that we have to consider the entire impact of our actions on our organization.  For example, if DMETL does not require a FCX, but the commander decides to do one anyway because he can, and with all the additional time to meet all the training gates disrupts both balance and predictability, and the ultimate impact of that decision is a frustration where Soldiers and officers leave the Army; and deploy tired, are we really honest with ourselves?  And why do we continue to struggle with this?  It is about risk...all different types of risks.  This is where character matters...to make the hard call.    We must become more ruthless in management of time and resources both in our training and in our predictability.  We have been tasked to bring this same discipline to professional military education.  The implications of this change...transformational.