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**National Resources for Conflict Short of Declared War**

Remarks by

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to the

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**Perspective**

Monday, we in Charlottesville celebrated the anniversary of Thomas Jefferson's birth; and this year all of us present are observing the bicentennial of the Constitution of the United States.

Jefferson, and the other Founding Fathers with whom this nation was graced, patently equated peace with the "pursuit of happiness", and viewed declaration of war as a grave step to which Congress would only rarely and reluctantly have recourse. While they set up mechanisms "to provide for the common defense", the document they drafted reflects their revolutionary abhorrence of standing military forces, and their faith that militiamen and privateers could shield the nation from unforeseen martial dangers.

They little reckoned that the eighteenth century practice of quartering troops on the populace, and the other antecedents of their anti-military bias, might dwindle as a basic threat to civil liberties, and that their presumptions, and those of the first several Congresses, effectively disarmed the United States for dangers then lying in the near future. Nor did Jefferson or any of the other Founders abandon their biases when

insurrections and Indian uprisings on land, and the French Navy and Tripolitan pirates at sea, thrust upon the new nation the necessity to use military power outside the framework of declared war. Instead, they modified their views to provide for circumstances for which mobilizing the nation by calling up the militia or issuing letters of marque were clearly inappropriate, and carefully legislated a modicum of peacetime preparedness by regular forces. Setting up the Department of the Navy, as distinct from the War Department, is one case in point. Another is Jefferson's action, early in his presidency, to establish the United States Military Academy.

When the United States went to war with England again, most American leaders had accepted in principle the doctrine that "he who wishes for peace prepares for war," and if performance of US forces in the War of 1812 left much to be desired, the experience confirmed the need for a peacetime military establishment which would both act as the precursor for mobilization in the event war were declared, and deal *ad interim* with any martial emergencies which might arise.

Our nation is, in these respects, still very much in the posture in which Jefferson and the other Founders left it, notwithstanding the unprecedented costs and the large size of the peacetime defense establishment. Our political doctrines and our laws preserve the peace-war dichotomy of the Founders. As to doctrine, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in setting forth criteria which must be met before our military forces can be committed to combat operations, is wholly consistent with our heritage. As to law, I would point to the continuing dialogue between the Congress and the President over the War Powers Resolution, and the suits pending challenging the right of the Active Component to use the National Guard overseas without mobilization. And it is entirely possible that authorities like Arthur Hadley and John Keeley are correct in saying that the recent decision by the

Congress to set aside peacetime conscription have, in effect, damaged that fundamental notion behind the Constitution that all citizens were also soldiers. But as Jefferson and the other leaders of two centuries ago had to adjust to a changing world, so too, I believe, must national leaders of today be prepared to adapt our defenses to meet threats to our interests different in kind from those we have had to face before, interests threatened by groups and developments for which the declaration of war may be neither politically practical nor operationally useful.

This institution, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, is, of course, the preeminent national center for thinking about how the nation should transition from peace to war, and I applaud the focus of this year's conference. I also agree with your agenda: it is useful to question whether we have provided a process to carry out such a transition, in circumstances with enough probability to deserve serious contingency planning by the National Command Authorities and the military services. But before you proceed to look for process, I enjoin that you might usefully inquire into the nature and likelihood of undeclared wars today, and into the resources which the United States might appropriately bring to bear upon them. Then, and only then, I believe, can you conceive cogently of a "process" for mustering those resources.

What I will assay in these remarks is to frame your inquiry by outlining my own notions of the salient features of undeclared wars already underway or portended, and to suggest briefly what they entail for force structure, for materiel acquisition and industrial preparedness, for personnel policies, and for national doctrine and law.

But let me urge at the outset that you set aside precedents as any sure guide to these matters. The conflicts of today and tomorrow little resemble the wars in Vietnam or Korea,

and I think it would be a serious mistake to see a future "mobilization" as a modern version of the ramp-up to 1953 or 1968.

Now it is the privilege of old soldiers to regale audiences with war stories, so I want to take advantage of the occasion to tell you about my experience with mobilization during the Korean war.

I was a First Lieutenant serving with the 32nd Infantry in Korea. We were in static positions opposite a well entrenched Chinese army. Most of the activity of the 32nd at that time was concerned with night patrols, which found it was easy enough to get within virtually eyeball distance of Chinese sentries at night. But it was equally easy to bring down the full weight of firepower available to that Chinese army by letting loose a shot at one of those sentries. So after due consideration a couple of colleagues I and I sent off to a mail order house and got a steel crossbow. We devised a cross between the crossbow and a sniper-scope, which was an active IR device with an aiming telescope. We rigged the crossbow bolts --its short, heavy projectiles-- with little fortune cookie-like messages for the recipients and trained our lads how to shoot them accurately. In fact we prepared them to go out silently without showing any light or making any noise, and to eliminate the row of sentries along the whole front of that Chinese army, each intended to expire with a little message from the 32nd Infantry plunked in the center of his breast. I brought down the regimental commander to show him what we were up to (we were about to go into full scale production on that weapon system, aiming for an early IOC), only to get the lecture of my young career from the old colonel. He said (expletives deleted) do you realize, you young fool, what is going on back in Washington? They've got those Congressional hearings underway; they've brought up George Marshall, Omar Bradley, every great soldier of World War II, and they're beating them over the head because we have launched

an Army into war against the Chinese communists equipped largely with weapons from World War I." And you may know that at the time it was true that the 32nd Infantry had water-cooled machine guns which were in fact, from World War I --still being used for indirect fire to enfilade approach trenches. I myself was carrying an M-1911, .45 caliber pistol. Much of the ammunition that we were using had been manufactured during World War II. Indeed, some ammo shortages had developed, hence the hearings. My Colonel reminded me that those generals back home were getting the tar beat out of them because of the inability of the United States to put into the hands of soldiers at the front enough modern weapons, and here I was, for God's sake, about to send troops off into No Man's Land armed with crossbows.

If there is a point to that story --and I claim as a matter of privilege that there does not have to be one-- it is simply that mobilizing for the war in Korea was a relatively simple matter: we just used the sort of forces we had, and what materiel we had from previous wars. In Vietnam there was a need for more ingenuity. But today we are up against very different circumstances. Both the wars in Korea and Southeast Asia, in their large-scale uses of materiel, are poor models for addressing the kinds of contingencies to which the nation is likely to have to respond in the immediate future.

I hold that the most likely sort of warfare confronting us will be waged against us by saboteurs, terrorists, paramilitary criminals, and insurgents. The United States considers itself at peace. But all over the world there are individuals, groups, and even nations at war with us, even now preparing to visit violence upon our citizens, our property, or our armed forces.

Our nominal state of peace buys us no security against these sorts of threats. Others have declared war on the United States, and by word and deed conveyed their

intention to prosecute war by the means at their disposal. In most instances our declaring war in response would be entirely dysfunctional. Nonetheless, some form of mobilizing of the nations resources may be required --which is very much to the point of our discussion here this morning.

What are the implications for mobilization? The term of art for the threat we face, now enshrined in legislation mandating a new Assistant Secretary of Defense charged to concern himself with such phenomena, is "low intensity conflict." I hold that there are three verities concerning readiness for such conflict which bear on your deliberations at this conference:

First, our national security strategy should center on helping other nations to deal, under indigenous law, with those wedded to such violence within their borders. The United States can also organize collective support for our threatened allies from those countries who abhor such violence as do we.

Second, our Active Component General Purpose Forces, for which we spend 80 percent of our defense dollars, are only marginally useful in prosecuting such a strategy.

Third, prosecuting that national strategy should not be, indeed cannot be, an undertaking solely of the Department of Defense, let alone one of its Assistant Secretaries. It is has to be, rather, a broad, government-wide undertaking involving many members of the President's cabinet, and their departments or agencies, to conduct a form of war not contemplated by the founders of our nation, nor yet adequately provided for by the Congress.

Let me cite some examples. Recently, a Colombian citizen by the name of Carlos Ledher Rivas was extradited to the United States. He was the head of one of the consortia in Colombia which deal in narcotics on an international scale. He has also been in the business of promoting political assassination, sabotage, terror, subversion, arms smuggling, and insurgent warfare. Ledher once appeared on Colombian television, depicted in the midst of M-19 guerrilleros in a camp in the hills above Medellin. The M-19 guerrillas are a group which has been at war with the government of Colombia since the early 1960s, have been supported by the Cubans, and more recently have established links with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The tapes of Mr. Ledher's appearance, which were shown to the President's Commission on Organized Crime, has Mr. Ledher making an impassioned speech to the youth of Colombia to join him in a war on the United States. He said the United States has rained poisons on the crops of Colombia, and has threatened to incarcerate Colombians in American jails, both allegations true, at least to the extent that we have assisted in the government of Colombia in eradication programs involving the spraying of marijuana and coca fields, and that we have an extradition treaty with the government of Colombia. In his speech, Ledher threatened to kill five Americans for every Colombian extradited to the United States, and he urged his countrymen to join in attacking Americans wherever and whenever they could be found. His was a declaration of war, a not incredible declaration, given the capability of his criminal group to assassinate cabinet officers in Bogota, despite all the security forces of the Colombian state, and to reach overseas to murder a Colombian diplomat behind the Iron Curtain, despite the security that existed in that country. And, of course, the ability of the same criminals to cause the M-19 to attack the Colombian Supreme Court itself, an attack which you will recall, killed 12 of the justices and over 70 other people.

Colombia is very much at war, and the Presidents of Colombia, both former President Betancur and the current president, have repeatedly asserted that the very existence of democracy in Colombia is at stake because of the activities of these narcotraficantes. These same criminals are pirating the United States.

I was speaking to a group in Fall River, Massachusetts, about a year ago, just at the time that the Rhode Island legislature passed a measure enjoining President Reagan's Administration from further intervention in Latin America. I was asked by my listeners what I thought of that legislation. I remarked that it was strange that the citizens of Rhode Island would adopt a measure against US intervention in Latin America when the Latins had plainly intervened in Rhode Island. There was I said, just 20 minutes or so from Fall River, the little town of Central Falls, Rhode Island. There in the early 1980s the Hispanic population had been something like a few percent. The town is now 25 percent Colombian, mostly illegal aliens. In the midst of these mostly innocent and useful contributors to American society, there was a small cell from the drug traffickers. According to the Chief of Police of metropolitan Boston, those few narcotraficantes moved 100 million dollars in cash out of the United States in 1984 alone, all plundered from cocaine sales in the coastal strip from Boston to New Haven.

The other night I spoke at a meeting in Charlottesville of the Sons of the American Revolution. Also on the agenda was an award by the Sons of the American Revolution to a local police officer who had been engaged for the past several years in a campaign to reduce the use of cocaine in Charlottesville, Virginia. He remarked that the number of arrests for cocaine use had gone up by a factor of five in the past year, and that it was his sensing that there was very much more cocaine available in Charlottesville at lower prices than previously. Some of you may be aware that in Orange, Virginia, just north of

Charlottesville, there was recently discovered a cocaine processing laboratory manned by Colombians. These Colombians had had a Washington Realtor buy a horse farm, and had equipped the barn with the wherewithal to process coca paste into cocaine. Had it not been for an alert member of the New Jersey State Police who spotted some of the precursor chemicals on an 18-wheel truck on the New Jersey Turnpike, whence it was traced to the farm, they might be spewing poison into American society today.

Nor should we believe that these people are not prepared to visit violence upon us in the United States. One of Mr. Lehder's fellow drug king-pins, a criminal by the name of Ochoa, who was photographed in 1984 by US agents in Managua, Nicaragua, loading an aircraft with cocaine for movement into the United States, and who had an indictment brought against him in federal court in Florida, and extradition proceedings pending, caused the chief witness against him, a doubled smuggler by the name of Seal who was the pilot of the Managua aircraft, to be machine-gunned to death on the streets of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. We are being pirated here, and the threat to our our security is far more serious than that posed by the pirates of Tripoli back at the outset of our experiences with foreign threats.

It is my contention that the US response to this sort of activity will have to involve a very broad program which deals with the problem clinically here in the United States, and which addresses the domestic jurisprudence designed to deter and punish. But part of this program will have to involve a response abroad, to aid in the defense of countries like Colombia who are attacking the narcotrafficantes at the source. This latter effort will have to engage the assets of the Department of Defense.

The foregoing discussion underscores an important point about responses to contemporary threats abroad: in a time of nominal peace, the Department of Defense is not

in charge of our security interests. The Department of State is the preeminent authority. The Country Teams, headed by US Ambassadors who are frequently political appointees, peopled with Foreign Service Officers many of whom are unfamiliar with the military establishment and its modus operandi, or the several law enforcement and intelligence agencies, again manned by individuals who really do not understand the military establishment, have to be coordinated for very difficult assistance undertakings. This is a challenge for any regional Commander in Chief who must provide advice and support to the Country Team.

The strategy of the United States for low intensity conflict, enunciated by the White House in January of this year, is to avoid direct engagement of US military forces, but to provide assistance, acting indirectly through the supported friend. Security Assistance is to be the primary instrument of that response. I regard our current Security Assistance system as a clumsy tool, and as Admiral Crowe stated in his recent testimony before the Senate, we cannot come to grips with this form of warfare unless we are prepared to readdress the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and to make security assistance a more meaningful instrument for prosecuting national strategy in places like Colombia or Bolivia, let alone places like El Salvador or Honduras, or the Philippines.

In my testimony to the same Senate Armed Services Committee that Admiral Crowe addressed, I pointed out that the kinds of forces needed for low intensity conflict would be in about the following priority: intelligence, communications, transportation, construction, medicine and logistics. I am hesitant to reel off that list to the ICAF student body. But what the list says is that in low intensity conflict --particularly if one is pursuing a national strategy of helping somebody else do the job-- the shooters come last. The combat forces, the fire support, and the maneuver forces are backup, as Bill Crowe put it, backup to the

rest of the establishment. So even in a military sense, we have to approach the implementation of that national strategy for dealing with low intensity conflict in a way very different from the operations described in our national war plans for larger contingencies involving better understood adversaries. It literally entails an inversion, a turning around of the traditional thinking of the US military.

I remind you that much of the US force structure that provides for capabilities in the areas I have just cited lies in the reserve components. That is where the engineers are, where the bulk of doctors are, where the real capabilities in logistics lie. And so the suits pending in the courts today which would inhibit the use of reservists overseas are really very serious matters. I do not see how we can proceed to implement our announced strategy without much broader use of reserve component forces.

Let me point out, for example, that terrorists have already mined the approaches to the Suez Canal in the Red Sea. They used a very advanced bottom mine with ship counters and multiple fusing, which were probably obtained in Italy or France on the world arms market, where such devices manufactured in the USSR are available. The approaches to the Suez Canal, the Red Sea approaches, where this mining took place, are relatively deep and therefore less amenable to the use of bottom mines. Such mines on the approaches to Panama Canal could cause a very serious problem for the United States. I have had a continuing discussion over the years with CINCLANT about how the Navy might complete a proper bottom survey to locate metallic anomalies, then periodically patrol with mine sweepers to ensure that we have some kind of deterrent action underway, and have in place a response in the event that such terrorist incidents occurred. I suspect that ultimately the answer is going to be to take one of the new US Navy mine sweepers, position it in Panama, and man it by rotating crews of reservists. You're going to see more and more of

that use of reservists in the years to come. There are tough decisions to be made throughout our force structure which you can debate or discuss in your conference, and indeed, well beyond the conference. Carry back to your professional pursuits the notion that structuring for major war or structuring for a regional war of some proportions may not be the right way to think about how we would come, let us say, to the aid of Madame Aquino, should that situation in the Philippines deteriorate.

The implications of low intensity conflict for materiel procurement are, I submit, as profound. We have dealt with security assistance in years past largely by providing old or unused equipment of the US forces to foreign clients. That is no longer a strategy worth pursuing, because the materiel that is in the hands of American forces is often inappropriate, too expensive, too complicated for most of friends abroad.

Look at the case of a modern version of the old DC3, or C47 transport. When the first difficulties between Chad and Libya materialized some years ago, the United States presented Chad two ancient C-130 aircraft. We did the Chadians no favor with that gift; flying one for a week would consume the entire defense budget of the country, and an old C130 was beyond the capability of the Chadians to maintain. C130 aircraft, moreover, require airfields which are in many instances more elaborate than many countries might have available. A figure of merit worth mentioning in this respect is that the old C7, the Caribou which we had in the Vietnam era for fixed-wing intra-theater airlift, has something like six times more usable airfields in Central America than do C130s. So looking at mobility in terms of accessibility, the C7 is a better solution there than the C130. C7s, of course, are no longer available--there aren't any to give away, and one couldn't support them with parts if there were.

We should have long since developed a Third World airlifter, but the law of the United States is that services cannot develop equipment exclusively for the use of foreign nations. In any event, how would one muster support in Congress to launch such a development program?

Our approach to antiarmor weapons shows similar flaws. Armor is a problem worldwide, and it will be increasingly a problem for nations we support. You may be aware that Brazil has now surpassed Israel as a provider of arms to the Third World, and that among the items selling well for the Brazilians are armored vehicles --good tanks incidentally. There is a lot of Soviet-made armor out there too, as the recent war in Chad made evident. Worldwide, defenses against armor are very much in demand. They are in demand in Central America today where the Hondurans, Costa Ricans, and Salvadorans are confronted by the equivalent of a Soviet motorized rifle division of Soviet armor in Nicaragua. It is old armor, not very good armor, but a tank is a relative threat, very daunting if you don't have any response at all. The T55 tank is a formidable adversary to the Central Americans. Armor is a destabilizing force there, and some sort of countermeasure is very much needed.

Is the response, therefore, to lavish upon these countries the kind of anti-armor gear that US forces have--high-tech, guided missiles? Such weapons would entail the same problem as the C130: How would they afford them? How would they maintain them? Would they be able to use them? Aren't there more relevant responses? I think there are. Many years ago General Shy Meyer and I talked about having the Army Materiel Command figure out ways of upgrading the anti-armor systems already in the hands of Central American friends. We could take the 106 recoilless rifle, which is a perfectly good T55 killer, and apply some modern aiming devices. That conversation was in 1982, and,

as far as I know, we have yet to get any such upgrade into the field under our Security Assistance Program. Again the problem of constituency obtrudes, and, conceivably, a problem of law.

Let me mention one other aspect of materiel development. I believe we ought to look seriously at our weapon systems for mid- and high intensity conflict to consider how we might use versions of these in dealing with low intensity conflict. Prototype, even bread-board, versions of these systems might be good enough for low intensity environments, which are must less demanding than those for which they are eventually intended.

Take, for example, the Navy AWACs airship. That is a long endurance, mid-altitude platform with good radar capability, and good communications which could make a major difference in the war in Colombia today. But getting the Navy and getting the Congress to think about an application like that (incidentally, it might be manned by the Coast Guard or some agency other than the Navy) is problematic. Inducing the institutions of government to think in terms of using low intensity conflict to prototype systems for mid- or high intensity applications may be a development strategy worth considering in your deliberations.

There are implications in all of this for personnel policy which are also worth more discussion. Prosecuting the work of the government in implementing a national strategy based on security assistance is increasingly cruel and demanding work. It is dangerous work, particularly if it involves bumping up against terrorists or narcotraficantes. The assassination of Commander Schaufelberger in San Salvador, the murders of the Marine guards in San Salvador, are as poignant and important kind of war casualty as the death of Sgt. Fronius the other night from mortars in the attack on the Salvadoran brigade

headquarters near the Honduran border. Low intensity conflict often requires career-long specialization, preferably acquired lingual skills and cultural familiarity, which as many of you know, are hard to come by and difficult to reward within the institutions of the Department of Defense.

The recent legislation in Congress focused not only on Low Intensity Conflict, but also on Special Operations Forces. The latter resulted from Congressional concern that these forces were not receiving sufficient attention by the Department of Defense. The Congress has mandated the creation of a Special Operations Command with a CINC and with all of the claptrap of a unified command, even dictating that the commanders of Special Operations Forces in the Pacific and Europe would be general officers. The hazard is that Congress was and is operating on the misapprehension that Special Operations Forces are the answer to low intensity conflict. They are not. Special Forces are a partial answer; they are important, but in many respects what we need to meet these kinds of problems are the sort of individuals that are sitting here in this auditorium--logisticians, ADP experts, public affairs experts, intelligence experts, not the kind of folks that one finds readily in the Special Operations Forces. So I am concerned that we have a national conceptual gap that is yet to be closed.

This brings me at last to the question of national will. I have used the terminology "doctrines or laws" because those are useful ways of talking about the issues. There is, for example, the Reagan Doctrine, which is construed to mean that the United States is prepared to support freedom fighters against Marxist-Leninist regimes. Personally, I am very suspicious of doctrines. I would tell you that there are such fundamental differences between the wars in Afghanistan and Nicaragua that it is difficult to imagine how one could construe one strategy, or a set of policy measures to implement such a strategy, to fit both

circumstances. It may be helpful, in a kind of a public relations sense, to have that "doctrine" kind of shorthand phraseology in vogue, but I would say after listening carefully to members of Congress that those of kinds of generalizations may cause as much confusion as they muster support.

I would also tell you that this country has very poorly thought through the kind of a military response that might be needed to implement such a doctrine. We now have the CIA broadly and openly engaged in paramilitary operations. Are covert operations under the public scrutiny of the press and Congress the proper way of proceeding? With a cadre of individuals who have only the foggiest idea of how to prosecute unconventional warfare? That is not a criticism of CIA; it is a reporting of fact. When their current mission in Central America was thrust upon them, the Agency went out and called back people from retirement because all of their paramilitary people had long since left service. And as we look downstream, if there is a possibility that the United States will engage in future such undertakings, I will tell you we have neither the legal basis for proceeding, nor an adequate force structure, nor a germane materiel development process, nor personnel policies that would permit us to implement such a doctrine.

Or take this business of low intensity conflict. I believe that many who voted for the recent legislation establishing the Assistant Secretary of Defense --God knows, ladies and gentlemen, that the last thing this country needs is another Assistant Secretary of Defense-- did so believing that we could fob off all further responsibilities for low intensity conflict by giving the green beanies a pat on the back, give the SEALs a push on the po po before you set them off to do their thing, and then forget about it. Let the elites deal with it. Again I tell you, low intensity conflict, whatever else it is now, it is not just Special Operations. It is certainly much, much broader. Pursuing any protracted strategy for

dealing with low intensity conflict will require the sort of informational effort of which only the Office of the President is capable, and the development of a bipartisan consensus in Congress.

Finally, there is the issue of law. The Arms Export Control Act, the Posse Comitatus Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, all of these laws severely constrain the implementation of a strategy predicated upon the use of security assistance as a primary instrument of policy. The National Defense University will sponsor this fall a workshop on security assistance --a very important kind of service to national strategy, very directly related to the subjects that you are going to consider.

Looking around this auditorium, I can see a number of familiar faces who, I am confident, are thinking that up there in front of us is an interventionist . Well it may be. I tell you, however, that although some might believe that we could today decide that the United States does not need to be involved in Third World conflicts, we will discover in years ahead that involvement is inescapable. Moreover, I think we will find it necessary to have offensive as well as defensive capabilities at the disposal of the President. In other words, whether or not one decides today that the present policies vis a vis, Iran, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, Central America, or the Philippines are right or wrong, future Presidents need to have the capabilities to respond to comparable, but heightened, threats. Unless we begin to take steps today to mobilize the resources of this country to better address the circumstances that those Presidents will face, they will have their hands tied. I think, indeed, that mobilizing the nation for response to low intensity conflict is an essential step to preserve the government of "we the people" described in the Constitution of the United States, an essential step in assuring the blessings of peace for our posterity. I thank you for your attention.