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Keynote Address

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I begin by observing that it's a terrible day for a conference. I think this center is remarkable for it's ability to put together conferences that invariably occur in weather in which Washington traffic is in a snarl.

But it's a good day for a conference on foreign military leadership. You have only to pick up today's Washington Post and take a quick perusal through it to understand what I'm driving at. It certainly gave me ample fodder for my remarks here this morning. The front page article on the Ortega brothers and their fraternal dialogue, and their dialogue with the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, with both of the Ortegas running around in uniforms at least pretending to be military leaders. On the Op Ed page we have a discussion under Mark Hatfield's byline of Salvadoran aid, and the mix between military and other forms of U.S. aid as an instrument for influencing the ideas and actions of the Salvadoran military. Here we have an article on the delivery of the F5Es to the Honduran air force. There is an article on the controversy over aid to the Afghan guerrillas. Page by page, it's difficult to open that paper without finding in some way or another a reminder that ours is a violent era. Military men, whether we like the military or not, whether we regard the circumstance as right or wrong, are prominent in political affairs in the world. And the prospects are that the current state of affairs is but a pale shadow of what is likely to obtain in 20 years.

The Commission to which Dr. Endicott made reference at the outset is a group of prestigious Americans which includes three former National Security Advisors; Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Judge Clark. One of the articles in the paper to which I made reference gives notice of the Congressional hearings on whether Colin Powell, Lieutenant General of the U.S. Army,

shall be permitted to retain his position as National Security Advisor, or whether he shall be stripped of his military rank. Presumably, therefore, when he is defrocked, he loses all of the ideas which he has acquired between his ears, all of his predispositions, and experience and, thus cleansed, be permitted to serve the President of the United States.

I think that we all ought to join those Commissioners for a moment and listen to the kind of perspective that the various study groups who served the Commission provided them as a view of the world at the turn of the century. Obviously to many of you some of this will not be exceptional, and some of you may even take issue with it. Nonetheless, by way of a report of what the Commissioners were told of what is likely to happen at the turn of the century, we will be in a world in which there will have been a major shift in wealth. East Asia will have emerged by that time as the other center of wealth. The gross national product of China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in that era will be approximately the same as that of the United States. The Soviet Union and East Europe will have fallen to fourth place. The wealth of the United States and East Asia will be about twice that of Western Europe and three times that of the Soviet Union. In short, the prognosis--that advanced at least for the Commissioners--is for a formidable new influence upon world affairs. While most of the focus was on economic matters, it was very clear that this will put a country like China into a very different politico-military position vis-a-vis the Third World than it has heretofore enjoyed. We've already begun to see the emerging influence of China as a supplier of arms, and I suspect that other forms of military influence will materialize as the ability of the Chinese to provide same increases.

Certainly it seems true that the complex problems that the United States is facing today make a good argument for our seeking in the future new forms of cooperation with friends and allies around the world, in order to come to grips with what

appear to be very much larger societal and political military problems in the offing. Let me mention a few of those.

I think many of you are familiar with the prospective "youth bulge" in the Third World. The demographers are predicting that by the turn of the century most of Third World countries--for example, those in Latin America--will be composed of populations half of which will be fifteen or younger. In most of these countries for lack of productivity, most of the working-age population will be unemployed. Unemployment rates in most of the populous countries in the regions to our south have been rising rapidly and there appears to be no help in sight.

Further, the phenomenon of urbanization which we noted several decades ago has exceeded the gloomy prognosis then accorded it. Large urban centers such as one finds in Mexico City or Lima, Peru are growing beyond any capability of government to provide for the inhabitants, in terms of public health, education or security. It is estimated by some that by the year 2000 three out of four Latinos will live in such large cities. Our notion of Latin America as being a predominantly campesino, rural society is mistaken. We're going to have to be thinking of those people in terms of their being exposed to all of the advantages and disadvantages that accompany uncontrolled urbanization. From the point of view of the intelligence analysts, large unemployed youth groups are a ready recruiting ground for political activity and violent political activity in particular. Therefore, as a generalization on what those kind of demographic projections might mean, there would certainly be pronounced problems in internal and, conceivably, external security in all of the countries where this phenomenon is likely to occur, which is most of the Third World for that matter.

Accompanying all of this there is a developing public health crises that is most usually referred to in terms of the HIV or AIDS phenomenon. In countries like Haiti or Kenya, HIV has already approached epidemic proportions. Some estimates on the Haitian population have 40% affected. Some of the estimates of

the Army Surgeon General's office would predict that by the year 2000 substantial portions of Central Africa will be depopulated by the disease. These sorts of impacts are bound to have politically and militarily destabilizing influences.

Finally, as one attempts to predict what the year 2000 might present American leadership it seems clear that whether one agrees with the terminology employed, the phenomenon that Congress and the Administration have been referring to as low intensity conflict will certainly be of paramount concern to American policy makers. They are referring by that rubric to saboteurs, terrorists, paramilitary criminals, and insurgents, etc. There appears to be on the horizon sets of circumstances that are going to call the military of the third world into new prominence, provide new rationales for their being, and thereby it seems to me create new urgency for the kind of analysis and record keeping that is the subject of this conference.

Now, how does one think about military institutions? Not a popular subject in the United States, and I think that is reflected in the neglect that it has received in the United States intelligence community. Yet it seems to me it is as crucial an undertaking, particularly with respect to Third World affairs, as is the Bank of Boston's analysis of Latin American debt, or Japanese investors' analysis of prospective markets in Southwest Asia. Most analysis, particularly scholarly analysis, here in the United States tends to start with what's observable and at hand, our own military, and then extrapolate outward. I suggest to you that, such extrapolation is a dramatically wrong way to proceed. Our own military institutions are, in my view, anomalous, unusual in the world. To imagine that a Philippine Marine is somehow or other a shadow or homologue of the American Marine, that a Honduran Army person is the same thing as an American Army professional, is to make a mistake. The latter may have gone to the same school at Leavenworth, they may wear similar uniforms, and they may indeed study the same texts, but they have, obviously, very different ideas, outlooks and

attitudes. So the problem facing the collector, the analyst and the intelligence community is how to sort what is relevant from what is not relevant, particularly when one goes to impute motives or attempt to predict behaviors. It goes without saying, however, that it helps a little bit to understand something about the background of these people, particularly when it comes to those that have been exposed to our own military institutions.

I have in other speeches that I have given here, used the term "culture" to describe the American services, because I believe that that word better describes the corpus of superstition, tradition, obstinacies, and stupidities that taken together make the difference up among Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard. In any event, hopefully, without going through that whole analysis, it's worth making the point right at the outset that our own services are certainly not homogeneous. It is very difficult to generalize about the American military, because an American Naval officer has a fundamentally different outlook on a variety of issues, including leadership style and management practice, from an American Army officer. If you were to look for logical groupings (and this always raises hackles in the Naval Service) I see, in terms of ideas, leadership styles, management styles, I see much greater affinity between the Air Force and the Navy, and more affinity between the Army and the Marines, than I do in any other sort of relationships among the services. The Army and the Marines tend, by and large, to be decentralized, to put a great deal of emphasis on hierarchy and to extol detailed planning, whereas the Air and Sea Services tend to be very much more centralized, personalist and expedient in their planning. I can, I think, defend that idea. In a recent study of U.S. army leadership style, an analyst at Rand had the temerity to observe that the Navy and Marine Corps worship at the altar of tradition, the Air Force at the altar of technology, and the Army at the altar of service. Whether that's right or wrong (he was on contract, obviously, with the United States Army). We are

dealing with certainly very different cultures, and you need to understand those cultures to grasp what is at issue here.

So, I believe, is the case in virtually every Third World country that I know of. The Peruvian Navy is a distinctive culture, very different from the Peruvian Air Force, and, that in turn, is very different from the Peruvian Army. When the United States intelligence community began to think about, in the late 60's and 70's, how to abide by the strictures of the Nixon doctrine, and all of that U.S. strategic contraction that was then underway, the notion emerged in the Pentagon that in every country there is a dominant military service. Therefore, we'll make the U.S. Defense attache of the same U.S. service. So, if you look down at Honduras, for example, obviously, (the thinking went), the Air Force is the dominant service, and the U.S. Defense Attache should be an Air Force officer. Sure, he takes care of collection on some of the other services, but the collection that counted was air. Now that may be a convenient way for passing out assignments, but it seems to me that there is implicit in all of that a judgment about the way those countries work, and the way things are likely to go politically and militarily which is dramatically wrong. It's a wrong-headed idea. It is as wrong-headed as assuming that the military in some cultures will always be a force on the right, or assuming that somehow or other the conservatives and the military always have some kind of common goals and will always be in league with one or another. The United States has been caught out in that kind of trap again and again.

For example, the Hatfield article argues we can break the stalemate in El Salvador. You may want to take a look at it. Senator Hatfield joins with Miller of California and Leach from Iowa in arguing that we ought to cut military aid, increase the economic component of U.S. aid, and thereby, pressure the Salvadorans into doing the human rights thing correctly. He cites as rationale for this a statement by the Salvadoran Army Chief of Staff to the effect that, "I'll be frank though some

don't want to admit it; the conditions the United States placed on us helped." Now Hatfield, Miller and Leech think that the conditions that our Salvadoran friend is talking about were those stipulated by the Congress of the United States. I am here to tell you that, no, that's not the case. It was rather the strong persuasion exerted on the Salvadoran military by the Ambassador in the first instance, and by others, including myself, in the second instance, that brought about some of the salubrious shift in Salvadoran military policy. It brought about the creation of the National Plan, which is a plan for economic and social development. Fundamentally, what the military were asked to do in that plan, is to provide the security within which that economic and social development could proceed: restore the teachers to the country schools, get the cooperatives open again, and have the land plowed again. Those were measures of effectiveness that I used with my Salvadoran military colleagues, as I'm sure Ambassador Pickering agreed with them. At the time, it was a revolutionary idea. Now these Congressional leaders would throw all of that out, and walk it backward, and put us back in a business where we would, in effect, I believe, thoroughly undercut President Duarte in his attempt to make the Salvadoran military a responsible member of their society. Now I would readily agree that the Salvadoran military are in many respects not carrying their load, but, I can assure you that my arguments would be all in the direction of working with them, attempting to influence them, rather than cutting them off, or attempting to starve them out of politics.

One of the proscriptions of Hatfield and company would be, for example, to deny U.S. aid for working with the Salvadoran police. One of the points that Tom Pickering and I made again and again to the Congress of the United States was that the police are paramilitary, and part of the problem, so long as we continue to play hands off with the Salvadoran police, we are missing a prima opportunity for intelligence collection. We are missing a major opportunity to influence the civil rights

performance of the Salvadoran government. You cannot play the game with your hands tied behind your back. If you want to identify this country with a democratic outcome in El Salvador, then you have got to give the people in the field all of the instruments that can make that kind of outcome possible, let alone probable. This is one more example of how badly we are understood up here in the Congress of the United States, and a good example of the baleful influence of our legislature on the questions of dealing with the foreign military. (This is the sort of thing that the Long Range Strategy Commission ought to address themselves to. God willing, they will. So far they've been very amenable to the business of taking a crack at our security systems policy).

Now there is an interesting issue here which goes very much to the heart of your business. It is collecting and keeping records on people who could make a difference in a given society, for good or for bad. This applies particularly to military leaders. There has been a tendency in this country to resist all of that "bookkeeping" for a variety of political reasons. Some of it is just belief that the more we know about foreign societies, the more likely we are to become involved, and it's none of our damn business. Some of it is a kind of abhorrence of police state mechanisms in general. Some of it is the high costs to date of keeping the records, the complexity, the dead ends, the lack of payoff, the lack of demonstrable return on people and time investments. I have been struck in the work that I did for the Commission with the elegant work underway in the FBI in keeping track of organized crime in the United States. They now have mechanisms for collecting biographic information, in exhaustive detail, on criminals, including prospective comers if you will, within the Mafia organizations. They have computer networks which can make this information available to the six field offices of the FBI, so that in effect, local analysts can elicit from the national data bank information on casework. They keep track not only of bio

information, but also of contact information. So they know which Mafioso associate with other Mafioso, how often they talk on the telephone, how often they meet, where, on what occasion, and who else was there, so that they can begin to ask those questions about how does this organization hang together. Literally, who is it that this guy goes to when he's in difficulty, etc. This is an operationally oriented capability, in that it is designed through the use of expert system technology to provide to the field agent advice as to what the occurrence of specific sets of events might imply in terms of either the intent of the subject, and even make recommendations regarding his collection plans. There is a similar FBI program for terrorists here in the United States. Both of these are domestic programs, not foreign intelligence. But, Helene, I told the technical director of the FBI that as far as I was concerned we could take the software for those two programs, the counterterrorist program and the organized crime program, transfer them, as is, to El Salvador, and thereby make enormous progress in dealing with the problem of keeping track of associations within the five guerrilla groups there, let alone the numerous splinter terrorist-cum-criminal organizations in the cities. If you want to talk about organized crime, El Salvador is one large organized crime.

We need that kind of an analytical capability. Now these are the sorts of analytical techniques which base themselves fundamentally on amassing information. You don't know what the information means at the time you collect it, but you've got to have some feel for what ought to go into the data bank. That says something about the quality of your collectors in the field. You collect a lot of it, and you don't throw anything away. We can do that now, given our information storage and retrieval capabilities. Moreover, our storage and retrieval capabilities will improve dramatically over the coming years. In the next decade, the capacity and speed of computers will increase by at least a factor of ten, and the cost will be probably reduced by a

factor greater than ten, maybe two orders of magnitude. It says that it's going to be possible for us to do in the intelligence community a great deal more of the kind of work that I think lies at the heart of the concerns of this conference.

Let me conclude by offering some general observations on the subjective aspects of all of this business. I'm not going to go through the usual analysis of why the military are prominent in the Third World. I think most of you know more about that than I. I think it is, however, worthwhile observing that among the influences that bear on the Third World military, there are the exogenous influences of the exemplar, the professional organizations, the military organizations of the United States, of the Soviet Union or other countries. If I were to tell you, for example, that the German military establishment continues to be influential in the Third World, you might not believe me, but you have only to go to Chile and go through an honor guard ceremony down there to understand that the Chileans still revere what they acquired from the German Imperial Service. And that same influence was equally evident in Iran up until the fall of the Shah. If one were to suggest to you, for example, that France plays a prominent role in the Third World you wouldn't be surprised. But I wonder how many of you have thought through the Israeli role--a pernicious one, in my view, at least in Central America. This is not an influence that the United States ought to readily encourage. They have been a prominent factor in the Guatemalan military and in the Panamanian military, much to my dismay, but to the great glee of many of the policy makers in this country who encourage the Israelis into these countries, and then later live to rue it. In any event, the exogenous influences on a military of a given country need to be analyzed, and we need to ask very hard questions about what those influences are, because they are not at all in many instances trackable just in terms of whose been abroad and who's been to what schools. Those latter data are useful indices, but they're by no means conclusive.

There is, moreover, the simple fact that most Third World countries have a perceived external threat. There is no country in Latin America, for example, that doesn't have one or more deadly quarrels with neighbors. I have been to many sessions with academia in which questions are asked or speeches are made, in the form of a question by individuals who are absolutely convinced that the Latinos have no right to have armies or air forces or navies because they face no military problem down there. Well, that's not the history of their continent, and that's not the history of their country, as they understand it. Whether or not the United States becomes involved with them, they're going to have military institutions, and those institutions will probably grow, given the kind of violent future that I've painted for you. There is more likely to be an increase in political influence from the military rather than a decrease over time. The question is, therefore, can we, and to what extent is it useful for us, to attempt to influence or shape that kind of development. I think the level of violence, in short, will create a need for a professional military in most of these Third World countries, and that speaks for itself as a requirement for U.S. policy, and U.S. intelligence.

Finally, there is the question of the indigenous motivations. Upward mobility, societal role playing, the warrior image, Muslims with their religious premium upon the warrior role, the role of the Muslim military in reformist and modernist campaigns such as those undertaken by Kemal Ataturk, Gamal Abdul Nasser, or the Shah of Iran. And finally, there is nationalism. In many of these countries, the army is the only national institution. It is the only institution that goes across tribal, racial and territorial divisions and puts people into some sort of direct contact, sacramental contact, if you will, with the idea of nation. Then there is the usual sort of personal motivations such as simple venality, criminality, etc. into which many of these people readily fall given the opportunities that open to them.

It's a very complex issue which you've undertaken, one for which there are no easy answers. It certainly is the kind of an issue that requires dedication in the collection and analytical field which we have not given it in the past. I truly hope that out of this conference there will come some new attention for all of this.

I'm going to conclude by reading you two quotations because I think they are strikingly similar. The first quotation is as follows: "Obedience is due a government when it's power is derived from the people, and for the people, pursues the constitutional precepts set forth by the people. This obedience in the last instance is due to the constitution and to the law and it should never be the result of mere existence of men or political parties who may be holding office because of fate or circumstances." The second quotation is: "If this government is ready to give up power in the hypothetical case that it loses an election, what it would give up would be the government, but not the power. In the hypothetical case that the people became deranged and an opposition party were elected this opposition party would govern as long as it respected the established power and we would be ready to defend respect for this established power. But, in any case, all parties are obliged to respect the constitutional order and we are the guardians of that constitution." The first quotation is General Juan Carlos Onganía of Argentina, a key figure in Argentine politics, speaking before he assumed the Presidency of the country in June of 1966. The second quotation is that of Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua just this past weekend, quoted in the Post. We're dealing here with sets of ideas, in short, which can leap long distances in this continent, and I suggest to you, the world at large. Thank you.