

## Focus of Career

35 years commissioned service, 4 years as cadet, 1 year in Navy: 40 years in uniform

Of the 35 years as an officer:

One third on the TO&E of a division or in a unified command position; one third with schools as a student.

Service schools, and my low opinion of them.

See my testimony before Skelton Panel, H.A.S.C. No. 100-125, pp. 814-844.

Why did the question of "undervaluing schools" emerge? Probably because, as I see it, Skelton et al (including the horde of former officers on the committee staff) as OVER valuing the schools.

Skelton: Marshall was the prime example of the great strategists turned out by the military profession's schools for World War II. Gorman: Marshall was less a product of the Army's schools than a severe critic of same. He taught himself to be what he became. Cf., Forest Pogue's Education of a General, p. 347.

Infantry in Battle, written by Marshall's faculty at Benning in the early 1930s and an antedote to school instruction which had become, as Marshall put it in his introduction, "increasingly theoretical," was one of the first books I bought as an officer, and a source of many a tactical illustration in my teaching over the years.

I read Pogue's book shortly after I was graduated from C&GSC, and Marshall's convictions about Leavenworth circa 1930 were very much like mine of 1960. Pogue's book led me to seek out the Marshall-Heintzelman correspondence of December 1933, a reading of which should be required of every officer concerned with professional education. My post-graduation [1962] comments on Leavenworth were like Marshall's, in tone at least.

The National War College taught me to be wary of "strategists," who turned out, more often than not, to be men pursuing a scholasticism centered on the Principles of War. Often there came to my mind Infantry in Battle's enjoinder: "The Art of War has no traffic with rules...." My NWC year was another mark against the professional school system. See my 1966 critique.

When I got to Benning in 1971, to assume the Assistant Commandant position that Marshall had held forty years earlier, I found myself confronting the same problems he had to face: the tyranny of combat experience; preoccupation with detail; propensity to complicate and obfuscate; inability to transcend technique; emphasis on form over substance; lack of realism in tactical instruction. But where Marshall was allowed five years to work on these, I had barely five months. Needless to say, I failed.

Four years later I led a TRADOC general inspection of USAC&GSC [I remember the date as being May, 1975; Maj. Gen. Cushman was Commandant]. I found little evidence of progress. In fact, we interviewed students at the very end of their year, and found that they were only then participating in their first free-play, opposed battle simulation. Most students were bored and disappointed in the course, and combat arms officers tended to be much more critical than others.

Institutional training? I regard it as a necessary evil of the profession, more often an opportunity botched than capitalized upon, and a potentially dysfunctional element in readiness for war.