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INFANTRY JOURNAL

Vol. XVII

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Infantry¹

Its Role, Capabilities, Limitations and Relation to Other Arms

By Colonel Robert McCleave, Infantry

I SHALL set forth for you as clearly and briefly as I can the general principles governing the use of infantry as an arm. The lecture is not the fruit of my own reflections alone, but the material is gathered from many available sources.

HISTORICAL STATEMENT

In considering the tactics of any army the mind must be kept supple to keep pace with the changing conditions and inventions. Napoleon said, "Tactics must change every ten years." The history of infantry tactics has been one of constant change. The Greek phalanx was supplanted by the Roman legion. Later infantry sunk to its lowest ebb in the Dark Ages, to be revived by the battles of Crecy, Postiers and Agincourt, in which the fire power of the English bowmen was decisive. The introduction of firearms established the infantry as the basic arm, and increased the necessity for mobility and fire power. Discipline grew steadily in importance. Infantry tactics were developed by Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon, and during the past century many changes have been wrought by improvements in fire-

arms and by revolutionary inventions. *Infantry tactics never stabilize, and one must keep well abreast of developments in science, art and industry to foresee the effect of new devices upon the infantry as an arm.*

IMPORTANCE OF SUBJECT

The subject is of primary importance in the study of war and battle, because just so surely as the campaign is certain to terminate in the shock of battle, just so surely will the infantry have to bear the brunt of the battle. While not losing sight of the fact that all the other arms are absolutely necessary members of the military team, it cannot be gainsaid that the infantry bears an undue share of the hardships and dangers, the mental, moral and physical strain, and the losses. It has so long been recognized that infantry is the dominating arm, and that all military organization is grouped around the infantry arm, and that all battle plans are based upon insuring success to the infantry that we may accept these facts as self-evident. It is therefore necessary for each of us to understand thoroughly the powers and limitations of this arm and the general method of

¹A lecture delivered at the School of the Line, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

handling the arm itself and of supporting it with the other arms, remembering clearly: Given the necessary grouping of arms and weapons for maximum fire effect, *the planning of infantry action and the handling of infantry partakes more of art than of science, and that the particular pattern of action best suited to a particular case is almost entirely a matter of art.* General rules cannot be given or supplied.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

All writers on the World War emphasize the fact that *moral force is preponderant in war.* Napoleon said, "The moral is to the physical as three to one." "Even with the most thoroughly warlike and careful individual training of the soldier fighting power will only be fully developed when ample scope is given to the moral and mental factors—the immutable foundations of all military achievements."

We find in war the most extraordinary instances of victory produced by moral causes. The most numerous army is by no means the most likely to conquer, but that which is the most highly endowed with moral and physical qualities, and is the best trained and disciplined. There are many different motives which tend to produce the moral power that enables men to overcome the natural instinct of self-preservation; feelings of duty, fanaticism, enthusiasm for some object or leader, love of country, pride, reputation of the unit, and even more sordid motives such as desire for promotion, self-interest, love of plunder, or even in rare instances, love of bloodshed.

It is not too much to say that a leader of any grade who fails to build up or to sustain under all conditions of success, failure, or hardship, the moral

force and determination of his troops loses one of the most effective elements of warfare.

On account of the unequal share of the hardships, dangers, and losses borne by the infantry, the principle is more important to this arm than to any other.

During the winter months of 1917-18, the German Army had been very carefully trained and instructed in offensive warfare; they were anxious to go in the spring of 1918, confident in the destiny of Germany to rule the world, confident in the ability of their chiefs. "What Hindenburg demands, the field gray will give him," replied a prisoner. The German Army, inspired by the highest ardor for attack, struck first the British, who notwithstanding immense losses of men, matériel and terrain, yet exhibited the proverbial tenacity of the British race; and then the French, inspired by unmatched love of country, determination that the enemy should not pass, faith and confidence in their leaders and willingness to die rather than uncover their homes and firesides, and become a subject race; they struck unsuccessfully the Americans, full of native-born self-confidence, combative spirit, and stubborn power of conflict, inspired largely by the spirit of the crusader, and determination to put the job across. Never in the history of warfare was the importance of the moral factor in war better illustrated. No better way of raising the morale of the infantry exists than by general recognition, not only by the army, but by the public at large, of the preeminent rôle of the infantry in battle.

War is the shock of two wills, and the allied will proved the stronger. Moral force is the soul of battle.

In connection with this question of

morale, we may touch on the question of the limit of loss that infantry will stand. The war demonstrated clearly there is no limit save in the moral of the troops and their leaders, and that no troops are beaten until they admit the fact.

NECESSITY FOR MECHANICAL SUPPORT

A Japanese observer wrote this: *"The most important factors of successful battle are the spirit of ardent attack and the support of mechanical power." Skill in practical application is more important than ever.* An unskillful, tactless method of attack does not succeed. A resourceful, vigorous and constant attack carries the field. In the war was shown to the fullest extent the value of a formation susceptible of free change, of flexible movements, of bold plans, of initiative attained with resolution, and of close cooperation of the different arms. To sum up, the greatest teachings of the war are: the attacking spirit, not rash, but ardent; the utilization of mechanical power; the necessity of resourceful command; and the necessity for initiative on the part of even the lowest commander.

Moral force then is as important as it ever was, but alone can win only in exceptional cases, even when accompanied by great individual initiative. It must be supported by mechanical power and the whole handled by skillful command.

FIRE AND MOVEMENT

The infantry drill regulations state clearly that *the principle elements of infantry success are fire and movement.* Movement begins far in advance of the shock of battle and it is necessary to understand and bear clearly in mind what infantry can and cannot do on the

road. War is largely a question of moving and maneuvering masses of troops. The larger the mass the slower the movement. The greatest forced marches in history for small bodies have averaged 33 miles a day, but this is exceptional. For small bodies of infantry the best to be expected is from 20 to 25 miles a day. For large bodies it is impossible to do more than from 12 to 15 miles, and the former figure (12 miles) is considered normal. Small infantry forces cover 3 miles an hour, but in heavy columns $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles is a safer estimate, and it is useless to expect more. *It is well to gain a correct conception of the slow, painful effort involved in campaign marches under full pack and of the loss of offensive power involved in each mile of the march. Assigned tasks must remain within the range of human possibility.*

NECESSITY FOR INFANTRY ACTION BEYOND ARTILLERY SUPPORT

Battle is gained by movement and the threat of personal assault, and continued movement is only possible under the cover of effective fire. In the early stages of battle the preponderant part of fire power develops on the artillery, and infantry movement is largely dependent on the efficacy of the artillery fire. To a lesser extent protection is sought by the selection of covered routes, the general cover of the terrain and by the least vulnerable formations. Cover against aeroplane observation is of the utmost importance and will result in the utmost use of woods and forests. A great increase in night marches, and on open ground, the use of broken and irregular formation as the most difficult to observe as well as the least vulnerable to artillery fire. The artillery and infantry must work

hand in glove in the closest cooperation during this stage of battle. Later as the movement continues, and the artillery begins to work forward over shell-torn terrain, ruined roads, destroyed bridges, and natural obstacles, which exist everywhere across country, there will come a time when the artillery is left temporarily beyond supporting distance. During this period, the infantry is dependent on its own fire power, and the war afforded numerous instances of efficient infantry action under this condition. The infantry then works under the protection and cover of the artillery as long as the latter can keep up; beyond that point it can and must progress for an appreciable time and distance with its own weapons; when the limit is reached it will be necessary to assume the defensive until artillery support can be brought up. The limit possible for infantry will vary, in all situations, but it should be borne in mind that initial success is assured when the first infantry impulse carried it through the hostile light guns.

FACTORS AFFECTING INFANTRY MOVEMENT

The extent and continuance of infantry movement is dependent on certain factors; the mission of the force, the concentration of the necessary means at the desired time and place, and a well-conceived plan of maneuver to take full advantage of the cover of the terrain, and positions for fire action. I emphasize the necessity for the plan of maneuver, as too often in our late operations, to bulge straight ahead was the only plan of action apparent. This method often succeeds if the attacker is in necessary strength and possessed of the offensive spirit, but it always entails appalling losses against

modern fire power. The power of maneuver is necessary for all commands from the section up. In addition, in deciding upon the plan of maneuver, by which term we mean one or a combination of the two general applications, either an outflanking operation or a passage of lines or continuous pressure of fresh troops, it is essential that the probable hostile resistance and the possible reaction of reserves be considered, as well as the succeeding influence of the terrain; in other words, the plan of maneuver must be based on a logical estimate of the situation and deliberate weighing of all the factors concerned.

ALL COMBAT ARMS ASSIST THE INFANTRY FORWARD MOVEMENT

It must be remembered that as the infantry movement is the deciding factor, the action of all other arms, once battle is joined, is based on assistance to the infantry movement.

The air service gains information, stops the arrival of reserves, and uses direct actions against ground troops. The cavalry secures the flanks and acts as a mobile reserve. The artillery batters and holds down the opposing fire both of infantry and artillery; the tanks open the passage through the obstacles, and demoralize the opposition, often entirely supplanting the artillery preparation, but cannot occupy and hold terrain without immediate infantry assistance; the chemical warfare branch screens the movement, assisted by the use of gas and special shells, but *in the final analysis the object is common to all, to assist in the forward infantry movement, which alone is decisive.*

INFANTRY ACTION AGAINST FORTIFIED AND UNFORTIFIED FRONTS

The infantry action in the face of fortified positions, and in front of un-

fortified or only partially fortified positions is different only at the start, the primary object against fortified positions being to disrupt the hostile front. Thought of general rules and normal formations must be dismissed from the mind. The means must be employed in accordance with the situation and the situation will usually differ widely on different parts of the front. All leaders of all grades must estimate the situation, reflect upon the different modes of action open and make a judicious choice of troop disposition and maneuver. Against the fortified position we employ the powerful but limited artillery preparation particularly concentrated on vital points, the successive infantry lines rigid and dense, with reserves echeloned in depth to continue the movement to a break through, or to maneuver against the flanks of strong points, with minutely regulated artillery and machine-gun barrages and the most careful and detailed arrangements of every kind as contrasted with attacks against unfortified or partially fortified positions, with artillery concentrations on known or suspected centers of resistance, with the assailing infantry disposed for flexibility in small columns seeking infiltration and flank maneuver against strong points, and with the audacity and personal initiative of junior leaders as a decisive factor, it will be admitted that infantry action covers a wide range and that control has become more important and more difficult than ever before. It must be remembered that in such cases the defense is without minutely regulated barrages of machine guns and artillery, and without detailed arrangements for communication, and time is an essential element to prevent his perfecting these

matters. As the attack pushes in, hostile salients and local flanks appear, against which the assailant should bring force to bear. The modern attack in any situation must be based on continuous fighting for several days. Whether the ground is organized or not the defender will be disposed in great depth at least equal to the range of his light guns, today 15,000 yards. The infantry attack must fight through this depth in a continuous action.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF COMMAND

Well-regulated and complete lines of signal communication with all the various means are essential. It is necessary that the higher commands do not abdicate their functions of command and direction under the guise of affording liberty of action to the junior commanders. The latter must, it is true, show initiative and take all proper liberty of action within their proper zones, but control, direction and command must be maintained from above. Command posts are to be established far forward at the start, move only by long bounds and preferably complete communications should first have been established in the new command post.

SURPRISE AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR

Turning again to the essential factors of infantry success, morale, mechanical effort, fire and movement alone will not suffice. Surprise in some form must be added. Against a weak enemy overpowering force against vital points may win, and the bringing of strong force against vital points is to be sought in every infantry action, but against strong force in position, surprise is indispensable, if we would avoid appalling losses. It is well to remember that in-

fantry must seek the maximum of effect with the minimum of loss, if the morale of the troops is to be sustained. The collective intelligence of a large number of troops will spot unnecessary losses and mistakes unerringly, and when confidence in the leader goes, the morale thermometer is near zero.

QUOTATION FROM FRENCH SOURCES

A French authority says:

Surprise the enemy—that is, in a general sense. Lower his morale by striking him in the face with a situation he has not foreseen and which will accrue to our advantage without his having the power to prevent. Surprise by new weapons, tanks or gas—surprise by the hour of attack, which submerges an ever confident enemy—surprise by fire, by the powerful, overwhelming but brief concentration particularly against vital points, of artillery and machine guns, surprise by secret concentrations of troops by night and under cover of the terrain, giving insufficient time for the action of hostile reserves—and surprise by the rapid, audacious infantry forward movement which strikes, envelopes, and destroys the opposition without giving time for recovery. Do not fail also to seek surprise by the direction of attack.

All these surprise effects should be sought as the easiest means of attaining the maximum of effect with the minimum of loss, but it is to be clearly realized that the most effective surprise will be a failure unless combined in all grades of the infantry with an audacious spirit, spirit of decision, with prompt and fruitful maneuvers, particularly of small units, exploiting to the full favorable circumstances of the combat. Fleeting chances, where it is necessary to profit without delay if we would avoid having the enemy, momentarily weak and demoralized, completely recover. We may take it as sound that while the application of unlimited force along direct lines may at times be called for, the power of flexi-

ble maneuver able to meet changing conditions and situations must be always present and especially among the smaller units, and in troops held in reserve or support of front-line elements.

SITUATIONS CONFRONTING INFANTRY
IN BATTLE

Infantry in battle will find themselves confronted by—

Nests of resistance,
Hasty organizations,
Continuous fortified positions,
Discontinuous fortified positions.

ACTION AGAINST POSITIONS NOT
COMPLETELY ORGANIZED

Against these first, actual combat situations, discontinuous trenches, hastily dug by troops who cramp the terrain and dig in without the possibility of flanking fire, without minutely regulated barrages of artillery; without communicating trenches in rear for supply and evacuation our infantry cannot avail itself of a long, intense preparation.

There accrues the possibility:

For the chief, the possibility of making his attack with the minimum of time,

Of masking the positions strongly, holding and paralyzing the enemy, by the fire power of infantry and of artillery.

Of insinuating, through the intervals or behind the tanks which have opened the door, following and accompanying and sustaining parties of infantry.

But, the first resistance surmounted, passing rapidly by the flanks without any idea except to penetrate very deep, without regard to alignment, each seeking to be the most advanced element, the entire line of combat, sustained and supported by the reserves, press on without respite.

Gain time; it is economy of blood.

Each position which is easily carried, if the enemy retires, requires a new attack if he is given time to recover, to reform under the protection of the elements of the second line which he oc-

cupies. If unhappily the reaction of the enemy is too strong, if the pre-arranged counter-attack penetrates our advance, it is the moment for our infantry to remember that with their own weapons they may win the game; machine rifles, machine guns, rifle grenades, one pounders, mortars, rifles, they are sufficient to hold their ground, to break by their fire the power of the enemy till the moment when equilibrium reestablished, a new attack rapidly made permits the whole line to progress anew.

ACCIÓN AGAINST STRONGLY FORTIFIED POSITIONS

Altogether different is the situation of infantry before continuous fortified positions. There, its offensive power is nothing. One cannot attack with men against matériel. The infantry can do nothing without concentrations of artillery and tanks.

But the impotence is momentary and ceases the moment when the hostile position is dislocated in many places by the combination of the actions of force and the effects of surprise. The line of battle becomes disconnected. Then will appear in the hostile dispositions flanks against which we will be able to maneuver and attack, without which it will be necessary to assemble the mass of artillery or tanks to break the front and open the door.

Then as well as before, an infantry, ardent and well commanded, supported by accompanying artillery, from which it never separates, its action being ultimately joined and always employed to profit by the disarrangement of the line of the enemy by the first rupture, seeks by maneuver to break those portions of the line which hold and arrest our progress.

Audacity, spirit of decision, these are the words that recur. Also: troops instructed and disciplined. It is maneuver that wins the battle. It is necessary for the leaders to see, to follow, to direct, ready to seize the fleeting occasion, an outfit infinitely supple and powerful, well in hand.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

An idea clearly stated will be clearly understood, and from this will result mutual confidence and respect, hence the necessity for definite decisions, and for crisp, concise, complete orders. And above all, the faith in victory, magnificent fruit of the moral preparation of the troops, pursued untiringly by the leaders, guaranteeing the energy which forces success. Battle, pursued day and night, uses man up terribly, wears out the physique and nervous force. Some days of rest suffice to refresh the muscles, some weeks or months are necessary to restore to the normal, the nervous influx which constitutes the personality of the individual. To stop before the limit is reached, that is the problem which should be the constant care of the command.

But where is that limit? Before the battles of 1918, it was believed that infantry must be relieved after each great attack in which it lost a third of its effective combatant strength. Afterwards this calculation was greatly changed, and a case is cited on Mangin's army of battalions reduced to 120 combatants responding magnificently to the appeal of their general, attacking on the Ailette, attaining all their objectives and capturing many prisoners. *The only limit is the morale of the troops and that of their leaders.*

The measures taken depend for a good part on the knowledge of the chief, on the instruction and discipline of the troops. *The chief endeavors always to choose the least dangerous routes, the least vulnerable formations.* The instructed and disciplined soldier carries out instantly the order received, giving free rein to his individual initiative within the zone of action of his unit.

Instructed troops should march, should route march and attack with the minimum of fatigue and loss. But with battles that last not for hours, but for days, for weeks and for months, *the relief of units is necessary, more or less early, but inevitably.*

It is a simple problem in the period

of stabilized sectors, but more difficult in the course of battle, unless there exists a disposition in depth, wisely arranged. A relief is made by replacement, by leap frogging, by day or by night, according to the necessity of the case, but in any case one has the double object.

Place the relieving unit under the best conditions for sustaining the shock, or pursuing the battle. Place the troops relieved as rapidly as possible in a condition to constitute an immediate reserve if the situation requires, or to recover their good form. Always, however, events must occur with the minimum of loss and maximum of security.

Infantry is rapidly used up, so there is absolutely necessity for economizing it to the utmost.

Everything humanly possible should be done to win with the minimum of casualties.

But it would be unpardonable not to use the effectives as demanded by the situation, or to gain your conceptions by the blood of men where your personal preparation is not sufficient.

Equally culpable is he who before or after the battle does not do everything possible to conserve under the best conditions the human capital for which he is accountable. From the Germans comes the sorrowful honor of the title—human matériel—but our constant effort must be to conserve our men by trying to obtain the maximum of useful effect with the minimum of effort and loss.

But to carry out well the orders, all decisions being based on the mission to be carried out, is the function of those having knowledge of the enemy.

Upon the manner more or less exact in which the chief sets forth the obstacle to be conquered, position to be carried, will depend in great measure the success of the operation. An idea clearly stated will be clearly understood. All the means of information should be used for the profit of the leader, but if he would perfect his information, he must not omit his personal reconnais-

sance. *No report has the value of direct observation.*

The leader, but of what grade? We should be precise in words. Before the war, it was said that "the chief of section handles the battle."

In the course of the war in 1916, it was affirmed that "The regular unit of combat is the section." It was further explained that regular groupings by section or half section should be made where possible, but that every group should have a leader, even a private soldier stepping out to assume command, to lead forward the hesitating, and to seize the terrain and hold it against counter attack. We say then that the valor of the troops, above all their morale, depends in great measure on the valor of the leaders, including in this term those who seize on their own initiative the perilous honor of "commander of men," to lead them in battle.

The above rules as to leaders apply from the lowest to the highest.

There are no schemes, there are no unchangeable rigid rules, there are no methods for all solutions, but there are changing situations, which are not capable of solution except by methods variable to infinity.

Reflection—knowledge—will. These are essential. Reflection to determine all given points of the problem. Knowledge to assist reflection by experience, science, skill. Will, on the one hand to make the decision, on the other to carry it through to best advantage.

SUMMARY

To summarize briefly: Infantry will suffer and inflict from 80 to 90 per cent of the casualties. Infantry must be highly trained and disciplined to a degree that leaves no breaking point. It must be physically trained for endurance and weight carrying, and to withstand severe hardships. The offensive spirit must be ingrained as a characteristic of individuals and units. Training must be based on the offensive. Infan-

try requires good and continuous leadership and direction. Infantry gains flexibility of maneuver from the use of columns. In marches of development and deployment local commanders are charged with advance and flank reconnaissance and protection. Troops cannot maneuver to advantage in line formation, but must assume column formation. Such columns may be as small as squad columns. For fire action line formation is essential, and all auxiliary weapons should be brought into action. Real flexibility of maneuver necessitates ability to change rapidly from line to column formation and the reverse. For success in battle, surprise and fire and movement are all essential, and if the hostile front be continuously fortified, it must be broken and ruptured by artillery preparation. Remember that strategical and tactical solutions are only sound when they insure at all times either superiority of fire or protection from it.

In the early stages of battle infantry will gain protection by the cover of the artillery fire, and from aerial observation, by formation in depth and check-boarded, by choice of routes covered by the terrain, under cover of night, fog or smoke. It is essential to minimize losses. After closing to effective rifle range the best protection is their own superiority of fire against riflemen and effective fire and maneuver against machine gun nests.

Battle fronts are always discontinuous from the start or soon become so, consisting of successful salients and unsuccessful reentrants. Success in attack and defense depends on flank maneuver and action by reserves against the hostile salients without ceasing the forward movement. Successes must be

exploited to the fullest extent, and mutual flanking assistance is of the greatest importance. Straight on reinforcement of held-up front lines is to be avoided; reinforcements should push up past the flanks and enfold the hostile resistance. Bear in mind as a convenient point of departure the assigned frontages for attack—platoon 125 yards, company 250 yards, battalion 500 yards, 1,000 yards for a regiment, 2,500 yards for a division. These are subject to constant variations, and but seldom will the density be uniform across the front. Strong ground for our purpose needs fewer troops, weak ground greater strength, also the art of command, in large forces, requires concentration against vital points. Mental alertness, speed of decision, and promptness in issuing and distributing orders are essential to art of command. In small combat forces, art of command will require the bringing of heavy fire power against strong points and outflanking action by infiltration past these. Straight forward pushing without well considered plan of action gains nothing but casualties. All available force should be employed, but reserves are essential at the start. All efforts will fail without a carefully pre-arranged scheme of supply of food and munitions, reaching front-line elements. Under modern conditions, the supply from division headquarters forward must be largely under cover of night.

Any battle front can be broken by the effect of surprise, fire, and force. Defensive strength then requires echelons in depth: prevent hostile exploitation. The defensive strength is in a zone, not in a line, and the zone will be maintained by counterattacking with reserves rather than by preservation of

front or intermediate lines intact. Prevention of a breakthrough of the main line only is the principal object of the defense. Command posts should be close up at the start and long bounds are preferable to short ones; signal communications are vital; control and personal observation must be maintained; loss of control entails loss of higher direction of affairs. Direction, leadership and control are more important than they have ever been before. The use and combinations of infantry weapons will be covered in detail in future conferences. Battles are won largely by combinations of arms and weapons and the principles governing combinations should be mastered by the student.

The importance of maneuvering ability cannot be overstated, and such maneuvering ability must be exhibited by infantry under the most difficult, diverse, and unforeseen circumstances, and often on the initiative of commanders of small units. Foch says: "He who speaks of maneuver, speaks of combination, direction, impulsion for the mass, preparation, suppleness, aptitude and resistance to the march, superiority of fire, tactical sense, employment of the terrain conditions necessary for solidity of combinations, to make head here against the enemy while we attack him elsewhere with superior force, to engage on unimportant ground with inferior force while bringing crushing force to bear on the vital points of the field. The victory is to the army which maneuvers, that is to say, which is the

best instructed." His words, while applied by him to large forces, seem peculiarly adapted to the infantry, around which the battle revolves, and in whose assistance all the other combat arms and services are employed.

Discipline, training, offensive spirit, leadership, control, and direction, individual initiative, flexibility of maneuver, economy of time and men, signal communications and personal observation, simplicity of plan, surprise, mechanical support, fire, movement, maneuver, the constant increase of fire power and man power and a well-arranged scheme of supply of food and munitions brought up from the rear; these are the points that form the groundwork of infantry success. All are essential. Seek to use artillery to insure infantry success at one or more points. This is most surely effected by well-considered artillery concentrations. Bring all auxiliary weapons possible into action to increase the volume of infantry fire. Finally bear in mind that motor transport now permits infantry reserves to be held available many miles from the actual conflict. Only one class of infantry can hope to succeed in modern battle, good infantry, and good infantry can no more be improvised than can highly trained troops of any other arm. These are the beacon lights for the student following the changing course of modern infantry tactics, and a remarkable concurrence on these opinions is observed in the writings of all the principal authorities.



Organization Recruiting

By Captain Clarence P. Evers, 14th Infantry

ORGANIZATION recruiting can be successful only when every officer and enlisted man put forth their best efforts. With this idea in mind, I set out to see what could be done in the way of recruiting, in order to build up my own company. My company was so small that each and every man was on some kind of duty practically all of the time. I had in my company a man whose home was in the town near which our camp is located. This man was sent out on recruiting duty in addition to his other duties. He succeeded in getting one man in about five days' work, when he was taken from the company and placed on special duty at camp headquarters. A new man was sent out to replace him, and he succeeded in getting another one. Their success seemed to enthuse the men in the company, and at this time I called in each man and talked to him, explaining my plan to them and giving them all data necessary for successful recruiting. As our regiment was stationed in a territory which was allocated to other organizations, it was, of course, harder to get results. Every man in the company became interested, and was trying to get a recruit, not only for the furlough which they would get, but for their interest in the service generally, and for their company particularly.

When this campaign started, the company consisted of 12 men, and six weeks later when I left the regiment, the company had 27 men, and every man was going strong to get more. This was particularly true of the re-

cruits who succeeded in bringing in about 50 per cent of the new men.

The first step, as stated above, was to get each man in the company interested in building up his own organization. Each man was talked to personally, even to the new recruits who were questioned as to anyone they knew who might like to be in the service, and whom they would like to have with them. Letters were written to these men and, if the prospects were good, the man giving the name was given a short furlough to go after the man. The next step was to get the necessary permission to recruit by organized parties in the nearby towns, which was readily obtained.

At this time I was appointed recruiting officer for the battalion and one man was detailed from each company to secure recruits for his own organization. A station was placed on the lawn in front of the post office in the town. The interest was keen, and as every one was working hard for his own organization, good results were obtained, although, at times, it was very discouraging.

The regimental commander at this time appointed me recruiting officer for the regiment. The supply company was down to rock bottom for teamsters, and as only about three good drivers had been obtained for them, a four-line, mule-drawn escort wagon was used as an aid to my party. This team had previously won first prize in the quarterly transportation show at the camp and caused exceptional notice. A party

of about ten men were taken to the circus in this wagon, and in a one-day stand they received twelve applicants, ten of which were accepted for the regiment. Six of these men were teamsters and went to the Supply Company. Capt. C. H. Jones, who was also doing organization recruiting, accompanied me on this trip, but as the circus was late in arriving, other duties forced him to leave before actual work began. The record made by this party entailed hard work for each and every man. The

equipment taken by the party consisted of a four-line, mule-drawn escort wagon, machine gun and automatic rifle.

Most of the recruiting was done in addition to other duties, as we had so few men their services could not be spared, and our regular recruiting parties were working in Connecticut. Recruits cannot be obtained by loafing. The officers must be on the job, as many times their presence and interest help to finally persuade men to enlist.

I

A Successful Ruse

At least one German aviator was the victim of a clever ruse of the British expeditionary force in Saloniki. This particular airman was especially expert in bringing down observation balloons.

A charge of 500 pounds of high explosive was packed in a water tank and placed in the observer's basket attached to an unserviceable balloon. Deteriorators were placed in the charge with wires leading down the anchor cable to the ground.

The German aviator attacked the balloon and when he came close to it the charge was fired with a terrible explosion.

The concussion broke the German machine in half close behind the pilot's seat and the parts crashed to the ground. Documents found on the pilot identified him as the famous Lieutenant Von Eschwage, who had, according to the Germans, twenty machines to his credit.

A Tank Discussion

By Captain D. D. Eisenhower (Tanks), Infantry

THE ARMY Reorganization Act of June 4 provides that hereafter tanks will be a part of the Infantry Arm of the Service. It therefore becomes increasingly important for infantry officers to study the question of tanks; their capabilities, limitations, and consequent possibilities of future employment.

The tank, as a self-propelling, caterpillar type of weapon, was a development of the late war. Many officers who served with fighting divisions never had an opportunity to take part in an action supported by these machines, and their knowledge of the power and deficiencies of the tank is based on hearsay. Others took part in such combats when the tanks were improperly used, poorly manned, or under such adverse conditions that they were practically helpless in trying to lend efficient aid to the Infantry. As the number of American-manned tanks that actually got to take part in the fighting with American divisions was very small, the number of officers of the Army who are openly advocates of this machine as a supporting weapon is correspondingly few.

As a result of these circumstances a great many officers are prone to denounce the tank as a freak development of trench warfare which has already outlived its usefulness. Others, and this class seems to be in the majority, have come into contact with the tank so infrequently, and have heard so little either decidedly for or against it, that they simply ignore it in their calculations and mental pictures of future battles.

Believing that the man that follows this course of thinking is falling into a grievous error, this paper is yet no brief to try to convince a skeptical reader that tanks won the war. Tanks did not, and no one knows this better than the officers who commanded them. And just as emphatically no other particular auxiliary arm won the war. The Infantry, aided and abetted by these various arms, did, however, and it is safe to say that, lacking any one of them, the task of the Infantry would have been much more difficult. The sole purpose then of any discussion along these lines is to place such facts before the officer as will enable him to determine by sane and sound reasoning whether in future wars the tanks will be a profitable adjunct to the Infantry.

Briefly, the general capabilities and limitations of the tank are as follows:

- (a) It can cross ordinary trenches and shell-pitted ground.
- (b) It can demolish entanglements, and make lanes through wire for our Infantry.
- (c) It can destroy by gunfire or by its weight pill boxes, machine-gun nests, etc.
- (d) It can, by gunfire, force opposing Infantry to seek shelter in dugouts, etc., until our Infantry can come up and occupy the position.
- (e) It provides protection to its crew from small-arms fire, shrapnel, and anything except direct hit from any sized cannon.

Limitations:

- (a) It cannot cross deep, unbridged bodies of water, rocky cliffs, nor deep bogs.
- (b) It cannot penetrate forests of large trees, although it can break down isolated trees of great size.
- (c) It has no power of holding a position it has taken.
- (d) Its radius of action is limited by the amount of fuel it can carry.

The arguments usually advanced by those who believe there is no future for tanks are three, namely:

- (a) Tanks are of value only in trench warfare.
- (b) We will probably never again be engaged in truly "trench warfare."
- (c) The tank is mechanically untrustworthy, and therefore unfit to be depended upon in a crisis.

Making every attempt to avoid a partisan attitude in the discussion of these arguments, let us take them up in the order they are set down above.

The idea of the tank was conceived and the first steps taken in its development during the progress of trench warfare. For this reason alone they are likely to be condemned as one of the necessary evils of that class of combat and sentenced without a hearing to eternal oblivion, as far as any other type of battle is concerned. Of course, it is true that tanks can cross trenches. Our small type can cross a 6-foot ditch and the large one a 15-foot. But this does not mean that they operate best in crossing trenches, nor that their usefulness is limited to the stabilized condition that "trench warfare" implies.

Their ability to cross trenches is gained only by their much greater ability to negotiate less difficult ground. An automobile with chains is usually able to get through any mud road that it may encounter, but a good pavement enhances its mobility many hundred per cent.

As a matter of fact, bad trenches demand the utmost care in the manipulation of a tank, and, barring artillery, are their worst artificial enemy. In their efforts to aid the Infantry in its forward movement, their greatest use is the discovery and destruction of machine-gun nests. To do this, the faster they can move, the better, and, consequently, the better the condition of the ground, the greater the efficiency of the tank. Their ability to cut lanes through wire is of course not confined to trench warfare. As a military obstacle, wire has been used for many years, and undoubtedly will be so used in the future. The fact, then, that they were the only machine or weapon devised with the ability to cross the elaborate systems of German entrenchments should not be used as an argument in favor of the statement that they are of no value except in crossing such trenches.

The second argument is based on the grounds that probably never again will there be a battlefield occupied under the conditions that made a continuous and flankless line throughout its whole length possible. With Switzerland and the North Sea on the flanks, and a dense population on each side of the line capable of manning it to such depth that a break through was not possible until one side had secured a preponderance of numerical strength, it is easily possible that the battle conditions of 1915-1917 will remain a peculiar type,

and never be duplicated in future wars. We must admit, however, that in all wars, trenches and entanglements will be as invariably a part of an army's defense as the rifle of the infantryman. Their efficiency and elaborateness of detail will be limited only by the time available for their construction.

In the large armies that will always be the rule in wars between two first-class powers, the Infantry must invariably expect to have to penetrate belts of wire and difficult system of trenches in the last stages of its assault. Under such conditions, what infantry commander is not going to thank his stars that he has at hand a number of tanks to lead and to support his unit through this stage of the attack? And on the way up to this main line of resistance, as he passes through the enemy outpost position and intermediate lines, composed in the main undoubtedly of hundreds of machine guns and automatic rifles; as he sees the tanks dashing back and forth in front of his assault battalions, crushing and obliterating those stinging pests, won't he be convinced that the tank was not a weapon that had both its conception and end of its usefulness in trench warfare?

And now we come to the soundest, and therefore the most difficult to answer, of all the arguments used against the tank, namely, the mechanical inefficiency of the tank. In the European War more tanks were put out of action, due to mechanical difficulties, than by all the measures of defense taken by the enemy. The general answer is this: The tank, in point of development, is in its infancy, and the great strides already made in its mechanical improvement only point to the greater ones still to come. Let us briefly review the

progress of the large British tanks along these lines. The first ones were practically helpless. They carried a cumbersome and useless wheel on the tail for the purpose of steering the tank. In the next model this was abandoned and the principle of steering by alternate use of the driving tracks adopted. This series of tanks required four men for driving alone. In the next model this was corrected, and the controls and mechanism so altered that one man could drive the tank. It was then discovered that the tank was too short for the successful crossing of the Hindenburg system, and in the next model the length was made 6 feet greater. The principal defects noted in this type were:

- (a) Lack of power;
- (b) Engine interfering with the crew in fighting compartment;
- (c) Breaking of track plates;
- (d) Faulty shape of track housing.

The next series (American and British design, Mark VIII) corrected these faults. This is the type of heavy tank with which the American Tank Corps (Infantry) is equipped today.

Now, consider the conditions under which tanks to date have been built. After the conception of the idea, it became necessary to secure engines, transmissions, armor plate, guns, tracks, and all the special and particular material peculiar to the new machine. A suitable place for building and assembling had to be found, and the problem of placing the whole thing into production had to be met. Necessarily it was important to utilize as many parts as possible that were already in production, in order that the tank in any numbers at all could soon take the place for which it was designed, on the Western Front. This inevitably resulted in

the frequent sacrifice of the ideal article in favor of one already in production that would probably answer the purpose. In other words, the tank of the present is not a product of years of development of the ideal article for each part of itself, but rather the emergency result of emergency methods.

It is believed by those most intimately acquainted with the tanks that the one model, Mark VIII, is too weighty, unwieldy and cumbersome. It is regarded as by far the best type of the heavy tank yet built, but not the ideal one for the varied conditions to be met in the next war we will have to fight. On the other hand, our small type, the Renault, is believed to be too short, underpowered, and deficient in fire power. The ideal type as expressed by these officers will be one of sufficient length to cross a 9-foot trench, a maximum weight of 15 tons, a fire power of one 6-pounder and two Browning machine guns, sufficient power to run cross country at a speed of 12 miles per hour; and on good roads, with treads dismounted, at a rate of 20 miles per hour. Study, observation and correction of faults will easily place this tank on a level of mechanical efficiency with the best of our motor trucks of today. There is not the slightest doubt that such a tank can and will be built.

If the mobility and mechanical efficiency of such a machine will be admitted, let us try to see whether a weapon of this sort would properly fit into the organization of the division without any reduction in the mobility and flexibility of the whole.

As a basis from which to start, suppose we try to replace the Divisional Machine Gun Battalion by one company of these tanks. In making such a suggestion it should be understood that

the idea is limited to the Motorized Battalion of the division. It is in no way meant to disparage the value of machine guns, and is not in conflict with the idea supported by some officers of enlarging and unifying the machine-gun units in the division. Neither is it to be understood that it is proposed to limit the use and organization of tanks to one company per division. There must always be a large unit of tanks as army troops which can be used at the point or points most desired. Further, it is not contended that the replacing of the Divisional Machine Gun Battalion is absolutely necessary in order to include the company of tanks in the divisional organization. But by making such a proposition, it gives a ground for comparison with an organization and weapon with which officers in general are more or less familiar.

The Motorized Battalion has 393 men and 57 motor vehicles of all kinds. It is available to the division commander for emergency use in strengthening a suddenly menaced part of his line; for fire of position, barrage fire, etc., in supporting his attack; for protection of his flanks or any other use to which he wishes to put its ability for concentrated small-arms fire. For transportation it has motor vehicles, mounted on wheels, which means that its transportation is of use to it only so long as it has the opportunity to use unobstructed roads. Thereafter it must abandon transportation and proceed to any selected position dismounted, a slow and tedious process at the best. It is of value in action only as it can bring its fire to bear upon the target selected. Any considerable changes of position in a short time are practically impossible.

The Tank Company would have a total of 220 officers and men and 26 motor vehicles of all types, which number includes 15 fighting tanks and 1 reserve. First of all they are available to the division commander as a powerful supporting arm to his infantry attack, as discussed above. With the type of tank we are now considering, each one can cover a frontage of at least 100 yards in assault, and furnish efficient protection from machine-gun nests to the Infantry attacking behind it. Allowing one platoon of five tanks in the second line to demolish nests missed by the front tanks, and for replacement of casualties, 1,000 yards of front would receive this aid in the assault.

But in using the tanks in this way, the division commander would not necessarily be sacrificing all the particular type of fire power that the Machine Gun Battalion afforded him. Each tank can carry one spare Browning gun complete, and on the outside of the tank a standard mount for the same. The personnel of the tank company, 200 enlisted men, is so devised as to provide the necessary personnel for these guns fighting separately. Thus the division commander would have a total of 16 machine guns, in addition to the strength of the Tank Company as a fighting unit to replace his old strength of one machine-gun battalion. Furthermore, in the question of mobility the 16 guns would be superior to his old battalion. In each tank company there will be unarmored tanks surmounted by large cargo platforms. In action two of these, after unloading their cargoes at the specified dumps, can be made available for the use of the 16 machine guns. Always remembering that on good roads the speed of

this tank is equal to the best motor trucks, the instant it becomes necessary to leave such roads there is no comparison in the mobility of the two units. The unarmored tanks are enabled to proceed at a rate of approximately 12 miles per hour to any threatened or other point at which their fire power is desired. The ammunition supply of these guns is automatically solved, due to the enormous carrying power of the cargo tanks.

It has been practically an axiom that tanks are of use only on the offensive. With the improved tank now under discussion, it seems reasonable that this limitation will be removed in part, at least. The charge of a German cavalry brigade at Vionville, in 1870, against the flank of the advancing French infantry, saved an army corps from certain annihilation. In the same battle, on another flank, the charge of a squadron saved a brigade. There is no doubt that in similar circumstances in the future tanks will be called upon to use their ability of swift movement and great fire power in this way against the flanks of attacking forces. In making local counterattacks, the tank has already proven its worth, and the new tank will greatly increase the opportunities and effect of such actions. The clumsy, awkward and snaillike progress of the old tanks must be forgotten, and in their place we must picture this speedy, reliable and efficient engine of destruction.

One main point remains to be covered. It has been argued that this tank will be of such weight that many of our bridges and culverts in this country will not stand their crossing. The danger of breaking through the flooring of any bridge will be less with such a

tank than with a loaded 5-ton truck. The weight is very evenly distributed by means of the tread, and the pressure bearing at any one point is less than with the truck. Bridges of such unstable character that a weight of 15 tons is liable to break the supports and stringers are generally the kind that span small ravines and dry creek beds. Under such conditions the tank needs no bridge. It is perfectly able to run off the bridge, cross the stream bed and rejoin the column, leaving the use of

the bridge to the more helpless vehicles. Even granting that occasionally the tank company will be forced to construct its own temporary crossing over an isolated stream, such incidents are not insurmountable difficulties and are constantly being met in some form in warfare. Certainly if we are convinced of the truth of the arguments above, we cannot afford to allow the possible difficulty of crossing occasional poorly bridged streams to deter us from the use of these machines.

I

France's Reconstruction Task

The following facts regarding the magnitude of the reconstruction task confronting the French Minister of the Liberated Regions were given out by M. Labbe, Director General of Technical Services. Building work alone would require 22,000,000 tons of material and the labor of 700,000 people for one year; 100,000 houses are to be entirely rebuilt, requiring 5,000,000,000 bricks 3,000,000 cubic meters of sand, 1,000,000 tons of lime, 13,000,000 square meters of tiles, and 3,000,000 cubic meters of wood. Reconstruction of highways and railroads would require 3,000,000 tons of materials and the labor of 15,000 men for one year. An addition of 20,000 trains and 5,000 trucks would be required.

Old-Time Drill Regulations

By Major H. A. Finch, C. of E.

IN THESE days of sobs over the single list and curses at the high cost of flivvering, it is distinctly good for one's disposition to visit the General Staff Library down at Washington Barracks and browse for a bit among the hundreds of books on military subjects there displayed.

The collection of old Drill Manuals is particularly fascinating, and in a way restful, to the bedeviled officer of today, for there he can find regulations for our army for all periods dating back to 1779, written for the most part in quaint English, which he may enjoy all the more fully for realizing that here at last is something that he need not memorize. Here he will find no allusions to the League of Nations nor to mandates for Armenia; no moralizing on morale, nor versions of the benefits of vocational training. Neither will he see any references to machine-gun barrages, gas masks, or German propaganda, while the Bolsheviki get off with simply a curt remark concerning "certain seditious persons"—all of which is very restful and, in some respects, reassuring to us, for it begins to dawn on us after some inward digestion that it will make no great difference a hundred years hence whether we now stand with our heels or our toes together in the ranks, provided our spirit is right.

We come by this conclusion after noting how rigorously the regulations of the period 1780-1815 insist upon the

observance of certain features that today strike us as quaint if not queer. But there is no denying that in those days they were just as much in earnest as we are in this year of grace, 1920. In fact, the army people of a hundred years ago seemed to be much more sure of themselves than are their present-day descendants; life was not so complex with them nor did the "simple" soldier demand such a quantity of sympathy. Morale? Discipline? Leadership? These were matters easy enough to comprehend. Why, is not Marshal Saxe himself quoted in one opening chapter to the effect that "All the mystery of military discipline is to be found in the legs, and he who thinks otherwise is a fool!" There you have it straight. Rather a neat way the marshal has of disposing of his opponents, is it not? But alas, poor Yorick! What would the good marshal think if he should return today and be introduced to the Camp Upton school curriculum or have a week of welfare workers? Yes, we have stepped on the gas *some* since his time!

More than one mystery is cleared up as we read. For example, that term of opprobrium, "highbrow," so often plastered on the Engineers, is justified when we note that in 1815 and even later the 63d Article of War read:

The functions of the Engineers being generally confined to the most elevated branch of military science, they are not to assume, nor are they subject to be ordered on any duty beyond the

line of their immediate profession, except by special order of the President of the United States; but they are to receive every mark of respect to which their rank in the Army may entitle them respectively, and are liable to be transferred, at the discretion of the President, from one corps to another, regard being paid to rank.

In one delightful manual we read of movements that must be executed "with the greatest vivacity"; we are introduced to "company ensigns armed with espartoons," to majors who wished the command of the battalion off on the colonel; we are also told of "colonel's companies," and, most marvelous of all, we read with unbelieving eyes of lieutenant colonels who had a job and a post in line assigned to them!

It appears that in those times the bonds of discipline between the rank and file were, to say the least, a bit more rigorous than those of today. On the one hand we gather that the lieutenants and other junior officers were not counted as expendable as they are now rated with us (unless the ensigns with the espartoons might have been so classed), while on the other hand we note that it is not recorded that even the "freshest" recruit so far broke all precedent as to challenge his colonel with, "Halt! Look who's here!" It simply wasn't done, that's all! They had hard heads, did those ancient K. O.'s, our great-great-grandfathers, and doubtless some of them also had the austerity of the Pilgrim Father who declined (solely on the grounds of religion, of course) to kiss his wife on Sunday. With them discipline was secured by one well-known method only—when they spoke somebody jumped or was jumped on—and yet, and yet, there are fair grounds for a suspicion at least that among them

the man who could not carry a quart on his own legs was more or less of an infant who was more to be "pickled" than censured!

A manual dating back to 1779 bears on its title page:

Regulations
for the
Order and Discipline
of the
Troops
of the
United States

To which is added Rules and Articles
for the better Government of the
Troops raised and to be raised and kept
in pay by and at the Expense of the
United States of America

Printed and published agreeable to an
Act of the Assembly of the State of
North-Carolina.

We then proceed to "Chapter I—Of the Arms and Accoutrements of the Officers, Noncommissioned officers and Soldiers," in which it is set forth that "The officers who exercise their functions on horseback are to be armed with swords, the platoon officers with swords and espartoons, the noncommissioned officers with swords, firelocks and bayonets, and the soldiers with firelocks and bayonets." After some paragraphs devoted to the "Objects with which the officers should be acquainted," such as "the dress, discipline and police of the troops and with everything that relates to the service," we are advised that

A company is to be formed in two ranks, at one pace distance, with the tallest men in the rear, and both ranks sized, with the shortest men of each in the center. A company thus drawn up is to be divided into two sections or platoons; the captain is to take post on the right of the first platoon, covered by a sergeant; the lieutenant on the right of the second platoon, also covered by a sergeant; the ensign four paces behind the center of the company; the

first sergeant two paces behind the center of the first platoon, and the eldest corporal two paces behind the second platoon; the other two corporals are to be on the flanks of the front rank.

Proceeding, we learn that,

A regiment is to consist of eight companies, which are to be posted in the following order, from right to left:

First captain's
Colonel's
Fourth captain's
Major's
Third captain's
Lieutenant colonel's
Fifth captain's
Second captain's.

Where the regiment consists of more than "one hundred and sixty files it is to be formed in two battalions with an interval of twenty paces between them . . . the colonel fifteen paces before the center of the first battalion; the lieutenant colonel fifteen paces before the center of the second battalion; the major fifteen paces behind the interval of the two battalions."

That all-absorbing business, the training of recruits, is treated in Chapter V:

The commanding officer of each company is charged with the instruction of his recruits; and as this is a service that requires not only experience, but a patience and a temper not met with in every officer, he is to make choice of an officer, sergeant, and one or more corporals of his company, who, being approved of by the colonel, are to attend particularly to this business: but in case of the arrival of a great number of recruits, every officer, without distinction, is to be employed on that service.

The commanding officer of each regiment will fix on some place for the exercise of his recruits, where himself or some field officer must attend to overlook their instruction.

Words are great things; the present-day colonel who "overlooked" the instruction of his recruits would be "canned" rather than commended for his industry!

We now proceed to the process of making the individual soldier: "The Position of a Soldier without Arms," being the first step: "He is to stand straight and firm upon his legs, with the head turned to the right so as to bring the left eye over the waistcoat buttons; the heels 2 inches apart; the toes turned out, the belly drawn in a little, but without constraint; the breast a little projected; the shoulders square to the front and kept back; the hands hanging down the sides, with the palms close to the thighs." It further appears that at the word, "Attention," the "Soldier must be silent, stand firm and steady, moving neither hand nor foot (except as ordered), but attend carefully to the words of command." At "Rest," the "soldier may refresh himself by moving his hands or feet; but must not sit down or quit his place unless permitted to do so."

After learning "To the Right" and "To the Left—Dress!" the recruit was to be taught the facings as follows: "To the Right—Face! (two motions): (1) Turn briskly on both heels to the right, lifting the toes a little, and describing the quarter of a circle. (2) Bring back the right foot to its proper position, without stamping." "To the Left—Face! (two motions): (1) Turn to the left, as before to the right. (2) Bring up the right foot to its proper position." For the "About Face" the commands were: "To the Right about—Face! (three motions): (1) Step back with the right foot, bringing the buckle opposite the left heel, at the same time seizing the cart-

ridge box with the right hand. (2) Turn briskly on both heels, and describe a half circle. (3) Bring back the right foot, at the same time quitting the cartridge box."

These facings "briskly on both heels" being assimilated, the recruit's education was enlarged to include the "Common Step," which "is 2 feet, and about 75 in the minute," and then the "Quick Step," which "is also 2 feet, but about 120 in the minute."

The "rookie" was thereupon entrusted with a "firelock" and was taught its intricate manual, involving in some cases, such as "Prime and Load," as many as fifteen operations. It appears that the firelock was "carried on the left shoulder, at such height that the guard will be just under the left breast, the forefinger and thumb before the swell of the butt, the three last fingers under the butt, the flat of the butt against the hipbone, and pressed so as that the firelock may be felt against the left side."

The limits of this article forbid our going into company and battalion maneuvers or the "Formation and Displaying of Columns with the Methods of Changing Front," neither can we linger for the "Inspection of the Men, their Dress, Necessaries, Arms, Accoutrements and Ammunition," but a partial quotation referring to the latter will suffice to "shew" that there were men in those days who did not spare the rod. "The oftener the soldiers are under the inspection of their officers the better; for which reason every morning at troop beating they must inspect into the dress of their men; see that their clothes are whole, and put on properly; their hands and faces washed clean; their hair combed; their accoutrements properly fixed, and every

article about them in the greatest order." "Those who are guilty of repeated neglects in these particulars, are to be confined and punished," while "those who are remarkable for their good appearance" are to be "publicly applauded."

So much for the troop "exercises." In the matter of calls, we learn that our old enemy "Reveille" is beat at daybreak, and is the signal for the soldiers to rise, and the sentries to leave off challenging. "The Parley" is beat to "desire a conference with the enemy," and it is significant that this call is also used to summon the troops to church! In our fife-and-drum-less companies it comes as a surprise to note that "To Go for Wood" consists of a "poing stroke and a ten-stroke roll," while water call is "two strokes and a flam." For the "Front to Halt" it required all of "two flams from right to left, and a full drag with the right, a left-hand flam and a right-hand full drag!"

As we have seen, our ancestral K. O.'s were fairly expert at telling the junior "Where he could head in." They had no such easy philosophy as that based on "what are a few regulations amongst friends?" Perhaps they were too hard, but it is certain that they had a conception of duty and of humanity which is a wonderful credit to any body of men devoted to the profession of arms during their period.

We are told that "There is nothing which gains an officer the love of his soldiers more than his care of them under the distress of sickness; it is then he has the power of exerting his humanity in providing them every comfortable necessary, and making their situation as agreeable as possible."

The colonel couldn't fail to be a

better colonel for reading the "Instructions for the Commandant of a Regiment." "The state having entrusted him with the care of a regiment, his greatest ambition should be to have it at all times and in every respect as complete as possible. To do which he should pay great attention to the following objects." Then follows certain advice as to the preservation of the soldier's health, after which we read: "The only means of keeping the soldiers in order is to have them continually under the eyes of their supervisors," to which end "the commandant should use the utmost severity to prevent their straggling from their companies, and never suffer them to leave the regiment without being under the care of a noncommissioned officer, except in cases of necessity."

"The choice of noncommissioned officers is also an object of the greatest importance. The order and discipline of a regiment depend so much on their behavior that too much care cannot be given in preferring none to that trust but those who by their merit and good conduct are entitled to it. Honesty, sobriety, and a remarkable attention to every point of duty, with a neatness in their dress, are indispensable requisites; a spirit to command respect and obedience from the men, and expertness in performing every part of the exercise, and an ability to teach it, are also absolutely necessary; nor can a sergeant or corporal said to be qualified who does not read nor write in a tolerable manner."

"The major is particularly charged with the discipline, arms, accoutrements, clothing, and generally with the whole interior management and economy of the regiment. He must have a watchful eye over the officers,"

and "he must endeavor to make his regiment perform their exercises and manoeuvres with the greatest vivacity and precision." Here we see our old friends "Pep" and "Snap" disguised as gentlemen!

As for the captain, "He cannot be too careful of the company the state has committed to his charge. . . . His first object should be to gain the love of his men by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their complaints, and, when well founded, seeing them redressed. He should know every man in his company by name and character. He should often visit those who are sick, speak tenderly to them, see that the public provision, whether of medicine or diet, is duly administered, and procure them besides such comforts and conveniences as are in his power. The attachment that arises from this kind of attention to the sick and wounded is almost incredible; it will, moreover, be the means of preserving the lives of many valuable men." In these striking words did the old regulations register the fact that the captain's commission is the most vital in our service. Good advice this, and worth much re-reading, since the "incredible attachment" between men and their leaders is the heart and soul of any army.

The instructions continue down through the lieutenants, first sergeants, sergeants, and corporals until the private soldier is reached. Among many other things, he is urged to "dress himself with a soldier-like air," and "to accustom himself to dress in the night." Also, "In action he will pay the greatest attention to the commands of his officers, level well and not throw away his fire." "When arrived in camp or quarters he must clean his

arms, prepare his bed, and go for necessaries, taking nothing without leave, nor committing any kind of excess." As if this were not enough for any man, he is told in the form of a final word of counsel that he must always have a stopper for the muzzle of his gun in case of rain!

When all is said and done we come through our survey of these old guide books for our army with a conviction that matters of carriage and dress are of small consequence. They are but fashions, and no man knows whence

they come nor whither they go. But in questions affecting the spirit, the morale, these old volumes are sound. Although the methods of man-handling prescribed by them may fall short of the constructive standards obtaining in our service of today, reflection will surely suffice to show that the principles there laid down by our forefathers constitute the foundation on which our army has built its remarkable reputation for dependability and devotion to duty.

I

New Aero Wireless Record

What is believed to have been a record in the transmission of wireless messages from an airplane in flight to a land station has been reported by the army air service. Recently during maneuvers of the 37th Infantry at Fort Mackintosh signals sent from a plane were recorded at Del Rio, Tex., a distance of 175 miles.

An altitude of 300 feet was maintained during the most of the time and a general north and south course was flown. The messages were received without a break, although the operator stated that at times they became faint and the distinctions varied, due likely to the direction of the flight.

Operations of a Whippet

The following is an account of the operations of a British whippet during the battle in front of Amiens and Villers Bretonneaux on August 8, 1918. It will be remembered in this great battle that a large number of tanks, both heavy and light, were employed. The attack was launched after a very short bombardment and was a complete surprise to the Germans.

ON AUGUST 8, 1918, Whippet *Musical Box*, under command of Lieutenant Arnold and with a crew of two men—Driver Carney and Gunner Ribbans—proceeded into the battle.

Lieutenant Arnold writes:

The machine had gone about 2,000 yards when we came under direct shell-fire from a four-gun field battery, of which I could see the flashes, between Abancourt and Bayonvillers. Two Mark V Tanks, 150 yards on my right front, were knocked out. I saw clouds of smoke coming out of these machines and the crews evacuate them. The infantry following the heavy machines were suffering casualties from this battery. I turned half left and ran diagonally across the front of the battery, at a distance of about 600 yards. Both my guns were able to fire on the battery, in spite of which they got off about eight rounds at me without damage, but sufficiently close to be audible inside the cab, and I could see the flash of each gun as it fired. By this time I had passed behind a belt of trees running along a roadside. I ran along this belt until level with the battery, when I turned full right and engaged the battery in rear. On observing our appearance from the belt of trees, the gunners, some thirty in number, abandoned their guns and tried to get away. Gunner Ribbans and I accounted for the whole lot.

After a short halt Lieutenant Arnold again advanced, his report reading:

I proceeded parallel with the railway embankment in an easterly direc-

tion, passing through two cavalry patrols of about twelve men each. The first patrol was receiving casualties from a party of enemy in a field of corn. I dealt with this, killing three or four, the remainder escaping out of sight into the corn. Proceeding farther east I saw the second patrol pursuing six enemy. The leading horse was so tired that he was not gaining appreciably on the rearmost Hun. Some of the leading fugitives turned about and fired at the cavalryman, when his sword was stretched out and practically touching the back of the last Hun. Horse and rider were brought down on the left of the road. The remainder of the cavalymen deployed to the right, coming in close under the railway embankment, where they dismounted and came under fire from the enemy, who had now taken up a position on the railway bridge and were firing over the parapet, inflicting one or two casualties.

I ran the machine up until we had a clear view of the bridge and killed four of the enemy with one long burst, the other two running across the bridge and so down the opposite slope out of sight. On our left I could see, about three-quarters of a mile away, a train on fire being towed by an engine. I proceeded farther east, still parallel to the railway, and approached carefully a small valley marked on my map as containing Boche hutments. As I entered the valley (between Bayonvillers and Harbonnières) at right angles many enemy were visible packing kits and others retiring. On our opening fire on the nearest many others appeared from huts, making for the end of the valley, their object being to get over the embankment and so out

of our sight. We accounted for many of these. I cruised round. Ribbons went into one of the huts and returned, and we counted about sixty dead and wounded. There were evidences of shell-fire amongst the huts, but we certainly accounted for most of the casualties counted there. I turned left from the railway and cruised across country, as lines of enemy infantry could be seen retiring. We fired at these many times at ranges of 200 yards to 600 yards. These targets were fleeting owing to the enemy getting down into the corn when fired on. In spite of this many casualties must have been inflicted, as we cruised up and down for at least an hour. I did not see any more of our troops or machines after leaving the cavalry patrols already referred to. During the cruising, being the only machine to get through, we invariably received intense rifle and machine-gun fire.

The tank was now advancing under difficulty. An extra supply of petrol had been stored on the roof of the fighting cab—an act almost as foolish as carrying oil fuel on the deck of a battleship. Several tins had been perforated by bullets and the petrol was trickling into the cab. The report continues:

At 14.00 hours or thereabouts I again proceeded east, parallel to the railway and about 100 yards north of it. I could see a large aerodrome and also an observation balloon at a height of about 200 feet. I could also see great quantities of motor and horse transport moving in all directions. Over the top of another bridge on my left I could see the cover of a lorry coming in my direction. I moved up out of sight and waited until he topped the bridge, when I shot the driver. The lorry ran into a right-hand ditch. The railway had now come out of the cutting in which it had rested all the while, and I could see both sides of it. I could see a long line of men retiring on both sides of

the railway and fired at these at ranges of 400 yards to 500 yards, inflicting heavy casualties. I passed through these and also accounted for one horse and the driver of a two-horse canvas-covered wagon on the far side of the railway. We now crossed a small road over the main railway and came in view of a large horse and wagon lines, which ran across the railway and close to it. Gunner Ribbons (right-hand gun) here had a view of the south side of railway and fired continuously into motor and horse transport moving on three roads (one north and south, one almost parallel to the railway, and one diagonally between these two). I fired many bursts at 600 yards to 800 yards at transport blocking roads on my left, causing great confusion. Rifle and machine-gun fire was not heavy at this time, owing to our sudden appearance, as the roads were all banked up in order to cross the railway. There were about twelve men in the middle aisle of these lines. I fired a long burst at these. Some went down and others got in amongst the wheels and undergrowth. I turned quarter left towards a small copse, where there were more horses and men, about 200 yards away. On the way across we met the most intense rifle and machine-gun fire imaginable from all sides. When at all possible we returned the fire, until the left-hand revolver port cover was shot away. I withdrew the forward gun, locked the mounting, and held the body of the gun against the hole. Petrol was still running down the inside of the back door. Fumes and heat combined were very bad. We were still moving forward, and I was shouting to Driver Carney to turn about at it was impossible to continue the action, when two heavy concussions closely followed one another and the cab burst into flames.

Arnold and the two men rolled out of the burning tank. Carney, the driver, was unfortunately killed immediately afterwards, and Lieutenant Arnold and Gunner Ribbons were made prisoners by the enemy.

Strategy of the Western Front

By Frank R. Schell¹

AS IN all great conflicts in history, the strategy of the western front in the recent war was based, to a very large extent, upon the natural features of the country encountered in the theater of war, and to gain a clearer insight into the reasons underlying the major operations in France, an analysis of these features is essential.

In such an analysis no attempt will be made to go into detail in any of the individual battles, nor will the ethical side of the question be considered; but we will approach the problem from a purely strategical standpoint and endeavor to ascertain, in a broad, general way, what motives actuated the opposing commanders in writing history, as it was written, in the greatest of all wars.

When the rulers of the German Empire made that momentous decision which was to plunge the world in war, the plan of campaign adopted by the Great General Staff of Germany was to crush France in a few weeks and then, before the Russian mobilization had progressed sufficiently to endanger the German eastern frontier, to withdraw the larger part of the armies in France and, with all her forces, to defeat the armies of the Czar; thereby establishing the supremacy of Germany on the continent of Europe, if not in the world.

For this reason the governing factor in the invasion of France was the element of time, and the route to be adopted must therefore be the one which would produce the greatest results with the least delay and which, at the

same time, would insure an uninterrupted supply of munitions of war to the invading armies.

What, then, were the military reasons which impelled the German General Staff to disregard a treaty that their government had agreed to uphold and, in spite of what such an action might involve, violate the neutrality of Belgium?

If a cross-section of France is taken in an east and west direction running through Paris, it will be found that the geological formation is very similar to six saucers placed one upon the other, each one larger than the one above, with their rims at practically the same elevation and with the city of Paris at their center. The first one of these saucers extends but a short distance to the east of Paris, the second to the Champagne, the third to the Marne, the fourth to the Meuse, the fifth to the Moselle and the sixth to the Rhine. Consequently a hostile force advancing from the east would find themselves in the same relative position as an army of ants approaching a pile of saucers, who would be forced to climb the rim of each as they reached it.

In the battle zone of eastern France all of the principal rivers flow from south to north. Starting from the German frontier we find them in the following order from east to west. The Meurthe and the Moselle, rising in the Vosges Mountains and uniting a short distance northwest of Nancy, form the Moselle, which then flows in a general

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northerly direction through Metz until it joins the Rhine at Coblenz. The Meuse, rising in the foothills of the Vosges Mountains, flows in a northerly direction through St. Mihiel, Verdun and Sedan, and then, cutting through the Ardennes Mountains by a deep gorge, joins the Scheldt near the frontier of Holland. The Aisne, rising northwest of Bar-le-Duc, flows north to the west of the Argonne forest, then turns west to Soissons, where it is joined by the Vesle River, and empties near Compiègne into the Oise River which joins the Seine beyond Paris. The Marne, rising near the city of Langres, flows north to St. Dizier and then turns west through Chalons, Epernay and Chateau Thierry, joining the Seine near Paris. The Seine, rising south of Chatillon, flows northwest through Chatillon and Troyes and then west and northwest to Paris.

Consequently an army advancing from the east would have had to cross six or seven rivers before reaching Paris. Furthermore, this rolling country of eastern France, admirably adapted for defense, had been fortified after the Franco-Prussian War by the construction of the fortresses of Belfort, Epinal, Toul and Verdun, with a secondary line of forts running through Dijon, Langres and Rheims.

Bearing in mind the character of the terrain, as outlined above, let us now examine the frontier from the Swiss border to the North Sea.

The town of Belfort, on the Swiss border, located in a narrow pass of the Vosges Mountains, presented one possible line of advance for an invading army, but such an army would first have had to capture the fortress of Belfort and, ascending the heights to the west, pass the forts near Langres.

If successful in these operations, it would then have had to depend upon a narrow pass, outflanked to the north, for its main line of communications and would have been in the position of entering a large bottle through a very narrow neck which might be closed, at any time, by the enemy. This naturally eliminated the question of a serious advance from this direction.

The Vosges Mountains, extending north from Belfort, imposed an insuperable obstacle to an attack in force, because of the fact that no railroad line crossed them for more than 100 kilometers, and the construction of such a railroad line, in war time, would have been out of the question. Furthermore, if an army had been successful in crossing here, their way would have been barred by the fortress of Epinal, a short distance to the west.

But the most serious objection to either of these routes was the fact that, even if all natural features such as mountains, rivers and cliffs had been overcome, a march of several hundred kilometers would have been necessary before capturing anything of vital interest to the defending nation, which would have been Paris itself.

After leaving the Vosges Mountains we come to the large territory extending from Toul to Sedan, which was the route that the French expected the Germans to take upon invading their country, and consequently it was defended by the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, together with the forts between them, and backed up by the greater part of the French army.

From Sedan to the Belgian frontier extends the region of the Ardennes, a rocky, mountainous country cut by the gorge of the Meuse River, presenting difficulties of the first magnitude to the

advance and supply of an invading army.

Thus far in our journey along the frontier we have encountered great obstacles to advance and supply, due to the natural features of the terrain and the indefatigable efforts made by the French after the Franco-Prussian War. Let us now look at the other side of the picture.

The territory of Belgium and northern France was comparatively level and low lying, with the rivers flowing parallel to an advance from the northeast, with excellent railroad facilities, an unfortified frontier with the exception of the uncompleted fort of Maubeuge, and the principal iron and coal region of France within a very few kilometers of the Belgian border; while the great manufacturing cities of Belgium and northern France were within a few days march of the German frontier. When it is realized that one of the largest rifle plants in the world was located at Liege and that Lille was the center of the steel and iron industry of France, the importance of their capture may be appreciated.

The Krupp works at Essen, across the Rhine, were on the direct railroad line running through Cologne, Liege, Namur, Charleroi and Brussels, while the great German iron region of Briey and the coal mines of the Saar valley, both protected by the guns of Metz, were on another main railroad line extending through Metz to Sedan, Mezieres, Maubeuge and Brussels. This line, running northwest from Metz, furnished a system of supply which would be approximately parallel to the battle line, if an advance were made from the northeast, making it of enormous advantage to the German army.

With all of these features on both

sides of the frontier before them, and supposing that Belgium would offer no resistance to the overwhelming numbers of the German army, that England would remain neutral, and that the French would mobilize the greater part of their armies between Toul and Sedan, the decision was reached to make the main advance through Belgium, pivoting the movement of the marching armies on the fortress of Metz so that it would resemble the opening of a large door with Metz as the hinge.

By reaching this decision the major difficulties of the terrain would be avoided, the supply of munitions of war would be assured, the French war industries would be crippled, and the armies of France would be outflanked and defeated within a short time after the opening of hostilities.

With this plan of campaign before them the German armies began their advance to overrun Belgium and crush France. A sufficiently large force was sent to the south, through Luxembourg and Metz, to hold the battle line from Metz to Belfort, so that its left flank would rest on the Swiss border—for the German General Staff realized that the terrain which prevented their advance in this region would be a powerful ally in holding the French.

The unexpected resistance of the Belgian forts of Liege and Namur and the intervention of the British army allowed the French and English to fight that famous rearguard action from Mons to the Marne, which gave time for the mobilization of the French army, the transportation of French troops from the east, and prepared the way for the first battle of the Marne—in which the breaking of the German center by General Foch and the rolling up of Von Kluck's right flank forced the

advancing hosts of Germany to retrace their steps to the Aisne.

With the completion of the battle of the Marne began the race for the sea, which had as its objective the turning of the flanks of the opposing armies and the capture of the Channel ports, so essential to the supply of the armies being formed by the British Empire. This race, which was won by the allied armies in so far as the capture of the Channel ports was concerned, established an unbroken battle line from the Swiss border to the North Sea and ushered in the years of trench warfare that followed.

Realizing that her plans for crushing France in a few weeks had failed and that the millions of the Czar were in motion against her eastern frontier, Germany was forced to examine her defenses in the west and found herself confronted with the following situation:

The Ardennes Mountains existed as a great barrier between her northern and southern lines of communication, and if the allied armies should cut the southern railroad line in the vicinity of Sedan, they would split the German armies in half, would threaten the chief supply of German coal and iron at Saarbrücken and Briey and, by turning the left flank of the northern armies, could compel their withdrawal from northern France and the greater part of Belgium.

This, then, was the weakest point in Germany's defensive armor.

To strengthen this vulnerable point the armies of the Crown Prince made their bloody and futile drive on the fortress of Verdun, where the French were almost within sight of the Metz-Sedan railroad and were actually within range of part of the iron mines of Briey. Unsuccessful in their attempt to capture

Verdun, although it was practically surrounded, the Germans constructed two strong lines of defense, known as the Hindenburg line and the Krehmilde Stellung, upon the naturally defensive country of the Meuse-Argonne and, upon completing them, being satisfied that their position was impregnable, they turned their attention to an offensive campaign elsewhere.

To discover and attack the weakest points in the allied defensive system was now the problem before the German General Staff, and their solution to this problem was shown in the operations that followed.

The British armies were supplied, for the greater part, through the ports of Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne and Havre, and the stream of troops and munitions of war passing through them was so continuous that a delay of several hours on any one of the main roads leading to the front was felt back in the ports of embarkation in England. The possession of these ports by Germany would seriously cripple the English supply system and would place a strong weapon in Germany's hand, in that they would be excellent harbors for German submarines and the best possible points of departure for an invasion of England. So, in order to bring about these most desirable results, the German General Staff issued orders for an attack, having their capture as its objective. But the repeated German efforts to this end being unsuccessful, results had to be looked for elsewhere.

The Calais-Amiens-Paris railroad, paralleling the Allied front, was the main system of supply for the British armies, being defended by the British from Calais to Amiens and by the French from Amiens to Paris. If a German thrust through Amiens should succeed,

it would cut this railroad line, divide the British and French Armies and offer the possibility that, each being outflanked, might be rolled up and defeated individually. Plans were formulated for such a drive, and how nearly it succeeded is now a matter of history.

The Germans had never given up the idea of capturing Paris because of the effect they thought it would have upon the morale of the Allies in general, and the French in particular, to say nothing of the tremendous impetus it would have given the waning spirit of Germany. Furthermore, its capture would cause a further retirement of the allied line between Paris and Verdun and might succeed in dividing the armies of France. Blocked in their attacks on the Channel ports and Amiens, the German General Staff decided to gather their forces for a final assault on Paris, making their drive between Soissons and Rheims. This offensive was so successful, and Paris was in such danger, that the young and untried troops of the new American army were rushed to the front and succeeded in stopping the victorious Germans at Chateau Thierry.

This marked the high tide of German advance and proved to be the turning point of the war. From this time the offensive definitely and finally passed to the allied armies.

The attacks made by the Germans on the Channel ports, Amiens and Paris had created three large salients in the battle line and offered the opportunity to Marshal Foch which he was quick to grasp. In rapid succession, by the attacks of the British, French and American armies, the sides of these salients were broken through, compelling the retirement of the Germans from each of them in turn.

By this time a sufficiently large num-

ber of American troops had arrived in France to justify the formation of a separate American army. The question was then presented to the American General Staff where this army could be used to accomplish the greatest results. The weakest point in Germany's defensive system soon became apparent to the American General Staff, and the decision was reached to launch an attack having as its objective the cutting of the Metz-Sedan railroad with all the results, incident thereto, which the Germans feared. Upon a study of the situation it was found that the St. Mihiel salient, which had existed since the early part of the war, would outflank the American army making an attack on either side of it, so, as a preparatory measure, orders were issued for the capture of this salient. This operation was eminently successful, and, if the objectives had not been limited to outrange the guns of Metz, it might have produced far reaching results. When this salient had been reduced the American divisions were assembled west from Verdun for the drive on the Metz-Sedan railroad through the country of the Meuse-Argonne.

To properly appreciate the battle of the Argonne, the greatest ever fought by an American army, a knowledge of the outstanding features of the terrain over which it was fought is essential. The country between the Meuse River and the Argonne forest may be likened to a wide corridor with its center elevated, the sides of the corridor being formed by the river on the east and the forest on the west. The country between the river and the central elevation, the ridge of Montfaucon, was commanded by heavy German artillery on the heights to the east of the river, while that between the forest and the ridge

of Montfaucon was within range of artillery and machine guns on the hills of the forest to the west. The Aire River, flowing at the eastern edge of the Argonne, presented a considerable obstacle to any attack from the east, while the Meuse River fulfilled the same function in protecting the heights of the Meuse from an assault from the west. On the military crests of the rolling hills, in an east and west direction, had been constructed the Hindenburg and Krenhilde Stellung lines of defense. These were protected by enormous bands of barbed wire, enfiladed by machine guns and fortified by every method learned in four years of trench warfare. Over such a country was the First American Army, a large part of which had never been in action, about to attack the veteran troops of Germany.

How correctly the American General Staff had picked out the most vulnerable point in the German line may be deduced from the fact that, during the course of the battle, twenty-one German divisions were withdrawn from the northern front to stem the tide of the American advance. So that it may be truthfully said that the First American

Army, in the battle of the Argonne, drew down upon itself the greater part of the German army and enabled the British and the French to make big gains in the north. In spite of this desperate resistance, which the German troops offered to the smashing of the hinge of their whole battle line, the American army was finally successful in cutting the Metz-Sedan railroad line in the vicinity of Sedan, and, as had been long foreseen, Germany was forced to surrender.

If the armistice had not been signed at the time it was, the Second American Army, in conjunction with a number of French divisions, was prepared to go over the top, to the east of Verdun, on the morning of the fourteenth of November, on a drive for the coal and iron resources of Germany, with the possibility of cutting the northern line of German communications to the east of the Ardennes. As the Germans had less than six divisions to meet this overwhelming force, the complete victory which Marshal Foch resigned by granting the armistice, may be appreciated.

I

When the boys assembled for their game of ball, Bobby, the pitcher, was missing. Jimmy was sent to investigate.

"Is Bobby at home?" he asked the sister who answered his knock.

"Course he is," she answered. "Don't you see his shirt on the line?"

Infantry Signal Communications

By Captain C. N. Sawyer, Infantry

THE PROBLEM

To provide the Infantry under existing conditions with trained signal men who can furnish effective communication.

A SOLUTION

Policy:

1. To establish and publish—

(a) The minimum requirements for a trained infantry signal officer for a brigade, regiment and battalion.

(b) The minimum requirements for a trained chief of section; that is, message center, wire, radio, and visual section as well as for the balance of the personnel of the signal detail.

(c) The methods and schools through which training to meet these requirements may be obtained.

2. To test in the field with troops in problems the organization, the methods, and procedure taught.

3. To test in the field with troops in problems the equipment provided, to determine its weak points and where improvements and changes should be made from the Infantry point of view.

To carry out this policy:

1. An officer in the office of the Chief of Infantry with necessary assistants and the following duties:

(a) To fulfill the requirements of paragraph 1 above.

(b) To establish a training plan for the signal units within the brigade.

(c) To prepare the necessary texts and instructions to carry out this training plan.

(d) To supervise the training of selected infantry signal officers at an Infantry Signal School at Camp Benning who are to become instructors in the infantry brigade signal schools.

(e) To see that these methods and standards are carried out in the brigade schools.

(f) To supervise the training in the Signal Branch of the Infantry R. O. T. C. summer camps.

(g) To organize signal sections in the colleges having Infantry R. O. T. C. units. Provide schedules of instruction and the necessary texts. To recruit for the summer R. O. T. C. camps from these college signal sections.

2. The officers on this duty to comprise the Infantry Signal Training Section and this section to have a representative in the personnel section of the office of the Chief of Infantry.

DISCUSSION

A brief review.—Throughout the past nations have been at war a considerable portion of the time. The battle tactics of all recorded wars have been minutely studied by military leaders of succeeding generations. Each new advance in battle tactics has been the subject of searching study. Beginning with the Japanese war the

armies began to be of such size and spread over so much terrain that one officer could no longer control the largest tactical unit with his voice or actually see enough of the battlefield to control his unit with his staff from personal observation. This distant control required battle or combat communication and there began to be an increase in its amount and effectiveness. But no such critical study of the tactical use of battle communication by military leaders was undertaken, as has always been the case with the rifle, machine gun, and artillery. We can see the results of this lack of careful study in our own manuals just prior to the World War, in the manuals of other countries of the period, in the military literature of that period and in what follows.

The United States entered the World War with ideas of battle communication not much advanced beyond those of the period of the Japanese war. Throughout the progress of the war, the Allies had been making rapid strides in developing battle communication along certain lines. When this country entered the war advantage was taken of the technical knowledge which the Allies possessed and our organization to operate communication equipment in the battle area was modeled upon American needs and methods plus ideas from the Allies. Our organization for operation of communication within the brigade, unlike our equipment, was radically different from that of either the French or British. For divisional work we used a field battalion of Signal Corps troops, which our pre-war regulations prescribed, but within the infantry brigade a mixture of Signal Corps and infantry signal men was organized, the whole latter

organization being entirely new in our service. Within the artillery brigade, however, only artillery signal men were used.

During the war infantry signal men were trained in France in schools conducted under the supervision of the Signal Corps and these men served at the front alongside of Signal Corps troops within the infantry regiment. In the United States they were trained in a somewhat different manner in each division depending upon conditions and officer material available and their initiative. The Infantry, therefore, does not fall heir to a standard practice for training its signal men. Moreover, the principles of applied signal communications, unlike the technical use of the rifle, machine gun, and artillery, have not been studied in all their details, because the principles have only been recognized in their application to the organization of American infantry since we entered the war and there has not been much time for such study. Also there has been a sort of dual control within the brigade which has been changed by a recent order. There is an appalling lack of literature on the subject, and the manuals of the war, like "Liaison for All Arms" and "Signal Communications for All Arms," are now obsolete. Nor has there ever been a drill regulations for the infantry signal troops. Available information must come largely from mimeographed sheets, the product of war schools, and officers who took those courses are probably now signal officers in the infantry.

The present situation.—The organization for handling signal communications within the Infantry Brigade has been changed by a recent order, G. O. No. 29, W. D., May 18, 1920, which reads as follows:

Infantry troops will install, maintain and operate all lines of information within the infantry brigade, including Infantry Brigade Headquarters. . . . The Signal Corps will have charge, under the direction of the Secretary of War, of the development of all signal equipment, of books, papers and all signal devices; of the procurement, preservation and distribution of such of the before mentioned supplies as are assigned to the Signal Corps for procurement and distribution by existing orders and regulations. . . . It will be the duty of all signal officers. . . . to call to the attention of the appropriate commanders all violations of technical rules and regulations as to the use and operation of signal equipment, which may come to their attention. All commanders will make the fullest use of the technical knowledge of their signal officers to the end that uniformity shall obtain throughout the service. The Signal Corps will further be responsible . . . for general supervision of radio operations, enforcement of operation regulations, coordination and standardization of all radio operations and assignment of call letters, wave length systems and audible tones.

The Signal Corps support having been withdrawn from the infantry regiment under the new order it would be well to ascertain how many men are to be trained. Formerly the regiment was allotted 76 infantry signal men, plus a platoon of Signal Corps troops. There were no troops authorized for the brigade and this usually resulted in the brigade communications being handled in a different manner in each division. Under the above order the necessary number of infantry signal men will be assigned for the regiment, and provision also made for brigade headquarters. Assuming for the moment the size used at the Leavenworth schools in their problems if the battalion has 27 signal men, the regiment 40 men,

and the brigade 40 men, and assuming further three regiments to a brigade, we will have 403 men in the signal details within the brigade. Assuming 63 regiments of Infantry, organized as above the total enlisted signal personnel will be 8,463 and if there is one officer for each detail, including battalion, we will have a total of 273 officers on signal duty. Supposing these totals to be cut 50 per cent, it will not affect in the least the solution of the problem which the Infantry faces in training this personnel.

Under the present organization, and unaffected by the above order, we have a division signal officer, a signal corps officer on the staff of the division commander who is charged with the coordination of the signal training, installation, maintenance, and operation of all communication within the division. For this officer to so function he should be a technical expert as well as a qualified instructor in technical work and should be an expert in applied signal communications with respect to divisional, infantry and artillery communications. Under this division signal officer there is a field battalion composed of Signal Corps troops who handle divisional communications as far as the brigade. From the brigade down, the communication is to be installed, maintained and operated by the infantry and artillery signal men. Being charged with this duty, the Infantry and Artillery are necessarily responsible for the proper training of their signal men under their own officers.

There are obviously three methods of handling this training, one to permit the division signal officer to coordinate training within the division without any expert advice on infantry and artillery communications and without the assist-

ance of the infantry signal training section, which until all the division signal officers are from a common source will result in nonuniform training among the various infantry brigades in different divisions. The second method is for an infantry signal training section to write the specifications for the desired signal training and the textbooks and instructions and leave it to the division signal officer to obtain the results. If this method is used it should be borne in mind that there will be few competent instructors at the disposal of this signal officer. The third method is for the infantry signal training section to not only write the specifications, texts and instructions, but also to supervise the training of the officers and men via the division signal officer and provide him with trained instructors for each infantry brigade. Knowing that the number of infantry signal officers and men within a brigade will be approximately the same as the Signal Corps troops with a division, can there be a question as to which method will sooner produce the required efficiency within the brigade?

If the signal training of the signal corps divisional troops, the infantry and the artillery signal troops is to approximate the efficiency of that of other combat arms, then the methods of such training should be established by the coordinated training sections of the various corps, the officers of these training sections to be specialists in communication for their own arm, and also have a common higher technical and tactical training under the Signal Corps which as a corps is responsible for communication within the Army. Training sections so constituted and coordinated will provide a constant group of experts in each arm responsi-

ble for keeping communication in their respective arms on a par with the progress of the art. This plan will also obtain a uniform system throughout the Army.

The details of the solution.—The solution of any commercial problem must "prove in" on a basis of cost. The solution of army problems cannot be checked as accurately as commercial problems, but the rule is, that if a certain quantity and quality of product must be turned out sufficient means must be used to insure the result desired. The overhead charges in this solution are the officers of the infantry signal training section and the officers on duty at the signal training school which we will assume to be located at Camp Benning. Surely the insurance value of good communication for the Infantry is worthy this overhead. Suppose in peace or war tests the infantry communication system breaks down because of lack of organized training, what then?

The Infantry from the standpoint of professional pride cannot permit the other corps to have better communication, besides the Infantry needs the best. In point of numbers should the estimates used above be cut 40 per cent there would still be more signal men for the Infantry to train than is allotted to the entire Signal Corps. The Signal Corps has a training section. The disadvantage to the Infantry, if they do not have one, may be imagined. The Artillery in France operated their own signal school at Saumur. There is precedent, then, for both a training plan and a signal school.

The infantry signal details should have an advantage in training under present conditions, for in the case of the infantry rifleman his vocational train-

ing is largely outside of pure infantry lines, while the signal men within the brigade could have applied communication in the morning and "technical vocational signal training" in the afternoon. Full advantage of this fact cannot be taken without a proper training plan. This presupposes, of course, that all men in the Infantry who desire vocational training along communication lines, telephony, telegraphy and radio, have been transferred to the infantry signal details.

Not only must the training section plan for the necessities of the moment, but they must also care for future developments. For instance, it has been planned to issue radio equipment to battalions and this would require an increase in the number of trained radio operators within the brigade in excess of the requirements of the late war. Just as more was required of the infantryman in this past war, so will more be required of the infantry signal man in the next war, as the art of communication progresses. The message center, originally under the Chief of Staff, grew during the war in some of our larger units to be a Signal Corps function. Under the new order, the message centers within the brigade will be operated by infantry signal men. They will necessarily contain code and routing experts familiar with the load on, and the capacity of, the different communication nets. One of the reasons why radio was not more used during the war within the division was because the coding of messages was not done by a soldier trained in that work assigned to a message center which should have been under a signal officer for obvious reasons. When radio equipment is issued to battalions it will therefore not only require more opera-

tors, but also will require more of the battalion message center. It is readily seen that it is not safe for the Infantry to assume that there will be no other advances in the art of signaling. Their signal men must be well trained or advances in the art may leave them far behind, hence under present conditions some overhead directing body is required.

This directing body can also exert a profound influence on the development of signal equipment for the Infantry by acting as a clearing house or information center on this subject. To this body might be sent for observation and study the recommendations of line officers and the suggestions of signal officers and men who daily use this equipment. It might be of considerable assistance in building up an *esprit de corps* in the infantry signal service if they knew there was a group studying their interests. This body would also serve to consolidate in useful form the general infantry opinion concerning their own signal service.

Signal training has two phases, the purely technical training required to install, maintain, and operate equipment, and applied signal training or the tactical handling of communications on the battlefield. Sound training in the small as well as large details of both phases is essential to good communication. The variety of signal equipment to be handled by infantry signal men makes this attention to details of both phases the more important. The tactical application of communications is one of the arts of war concerning which there is little published in available form and still less known by those who are now responsible for communication within the brigade. The permanent infantry and signal corps officers with a

knowledge of technical and applied communication in the infantry brigade are now largely of the rank of captain or higher. The rank of these infantry officers may prevent their detail as signal officers within the brigade. This will mean that almost a complete set of infantry signal officers will have to be trained.

The problem of the training of these officers and men is not that of large numbers nor in that they are somewhat scattered but—

(a) To provide competent instructors for each brigade.

(b) A policy regarding the selection of the signal officers.

(c) How long he remains on this duty (that he is not relieved before training is completed because of some minor duty).

(d) That suitable arrangement is made for his detail to line duty upon relief from signal duty otherwise signal duty will militate against his line standing with respect to other officers. The ideal way would be to have all junior line officers serve a tour as signal officers but the percentage of such officers to line officers is too small considering the time necessary to train them to expect that all officers in a grade can rotate in signal duty.

(e) To provide that these officers receive standardized technical and tactical training.

(f) To make efficient use of existing Signal Corps facilities for higher technical training of selected officers.

(g) To have the best of the officers in (f) sent to the Army Signal School for higher tactical training.

(h) To provide through the means of the R. C. T. C., signal officers with sufficient technical and tactical training

to take care of the necessary expansion in event of war.

Duty as signal officer within the brigade should be made as attractive as possible. If it is not, the Infantry will obtain poor signal officers and poorer communication. It should be made attractive because of the conditions that surround such service. There is no higher grade in the infantry signal service than that of the brigade signal officer with the rank of captain at best. So if an officer does specialize in communication in order to obtain that service in a higher grade the officer must transfer to the Signal Corps. But his usual ideal is to command a company or battalion. A signal officer to be efficient must specialize while on that duty and if he does become efficient he may be kept on such duty as long as he remains in that grade. This is precisely what happened in France in many cases. Lieutenants in charge of regimental signal details were in some cases so proficient that they could not be spared and they served through the war in that grade and duty while their comrades of like grade and service became captains or higher. This condition cannot exist in peace service without serious injury to the infantry signal service. Of one thing we may be certain the detail should be for a fixed period. If too long the officer will not want the detail and if too short the officer will not be properly trained. If progressively trained as outlined above there will be no opportunity for technically and tactically untrained infantry signal officers going to the army signal schools who cannot absorb the training given there and this training will be reserved for those who merit it. This sort of training means an additional source of offi-

cers for the Signal Corps nor are such officers lost to the Infantry for their training is invaluable in divisional signal work. The detail of these officers within the brigade, the period and character of their training, the relief and selection for higher training cannot be left to chance unless the Infantry desires to risk the breakdown of their communications in preference to providing an overhead directing body.

With respect to (h) above, we have now in some of our schools and colleges Infantry R. O. T. C. units. A certain portion of these units should contain a signal section, receiving training during the school year and also in the summer camps. But this field cannot be worked without a definite section some place charged with this duty. Professor Parker, of the Electrical Engineering Department of the University of Michigan, stated in an address to the S. C. R. O. T. C. students at Camp Vail recently that the colleges and universities must ascertain in what way they can best serve the R. O. T. C., that at the outbreak of the war they were helpless, not knowing what to do or how to do it. The Infantry Signal Training Section could assist the colleges in aiding the R. O. T. C. by writing for them the specifications of what an R. O. T. C. student in the signal section of the Infantry R. O. T. C. unit should know before he arrives in camp based on the present college course.

This Signal Training Section should therefore furnish—

(a) Brigade instructors both officers and enlisted men.

(b) Instructors for the Infantry Signal School at Camp Benning.

(c) Instructors for the signal sections of Infantry R. O. T. C. college units.

(d) Instructors for signal sections in Infantry R. O. T. C. summer camps.

(e) Officers and enlisted men for higher technical training at Signal Corps schools.

(f) Officers for the course at the Army Signal School.

This requires a record of the attainments of these officers and hence some connection with the personnel section in the office of The Chief of Infantry.

RÉSUMÉ

The mission of infantry signal troops under the new order is to provide the technical and tactical installation, the maintenance and operation of communications within the brigade. Equipment alone will not provide communication for the Infantry. There must be excellent team work between the Infantry, Artillery, and Signal Corps operators and installers of the complicated communication nets common to all three corps, between those common to the Infantry and Artillery alone, as well as team work among those responsible for the purely Infantry nets. This team work will assist the Artillery to more efficiently serve the Infantry in battle. A training policy for the infantry signal men and means to make this training effective is essential or the largest link in the battle communication system may break down, and in a war of any magnitude trained Infantry without proper communication will be helpless. Under the above-mentioned order the correct training of infantry signal details is one of the most important problems that confronts the Infantry to-day.

Field Service Regulations

Study of the Combat Principles

OUR Field Service Regulations is a book which presents to its reader the elementary principles of warfare as drawn and selected from the teachings of all the great masters of the military art. The book is of necessity boiled down and condensed, and therefore each principle or truth as stated therein is capable of unlimited expansion and amplification. No less an authority than Napoleon has stated that in his opinion the "great military captain" is developed by constant study of, and application of oneself to, the principles as laid down and pointed out by the real masters. He gave Turrene as the only commander who constantly improved with experience in the field as a commander, maintaining that study, and not the number of battles fought, is the main pillar upon which success as a military leader is built. It follows, then, that the faithful study of the Field Service Regulations should go a long way toward developing the capabilities of any military commander.

But it must be remembered that the word "study" implies the visualizing, understanding and the grasping of the subject, and not simply the memorizing of it. Here is where actual experience on the battle-field enters as a great aid to the man on the ladder of military learning, no matter what his relative position thereon may be. Such an officer is enabled to quickly and correctly visualize the situation which is so sketchily blocked in by the statement of the book, thus enabling him to easily and thoroughly understand the principle under discussion. The student who

lacks this battle-field experience is, on the other hand, severely handicapped. Only by having good instructors, by participating in maneuvers at every opportunity, and by the free use of his imagination can he attain this visualization of the situation which is so necessary to its proper understanding. It is with the study of the book by this class of officers that the following paragraphs will deal, particularly taking up the relations of instructors in the Field Service Regulations to such bodies of officers.

In a garrison school, given students of the mental caliber of which our officers must be composed, the success of the course will depend mainly upon the instructor. Not by simply listening to recitations over a certain part of the book can he do his class a particle of good. Neither can he afford to daily ask whether there is anything in the day's lesson which is not thoroughly understood. The words of the book are simple and the language clear, so that any man of intelligence understands them perfectly. The part the student misses is that part he does not appreciate, namely, the mental picture of the situation. The instructor in this course, to do justice to the class and to the service, must step by step present in these imaginary pictures the principles enunciated, which will then never be forgotten.

Taking a concrete example, we will suppose that the subject of rear-guard action is under discussion. The class reads that under such conditions the cavalry and light artillery are valuable

arms. The instructor then must make each student see the rear-guard commander deploying his artillery in a favorable position to use it at the greatest possible ranges, breaking up the enemy formations and forcing him off the road. He must picture for them the Cavalry detachments dashing into position, opening up with their automatic rifles over a broad front, seemingly offering battle, but mounting up and rushing back to another position when the enemy has pressed close enough to force them either to accept the battle or retire. He must make them feel the commander's responsibility as he anxiously awaits his report of the progress of the main body and watches the advance of the enemy. He must make them understand the reasons that finally decide the commander to make a determined stand for the day, and why he chooses a particular place to do it. When he has finally brought his students to a keen realization of the many problems that face the commander, he should turn to his military history and, selecting a good example of such an action, read to the class how such a mission has been successfully accomplished by a military leader in the past.

And when the subject of *rencontre* action comes up the instructor must not dismiss it with the statement that in such an action success mainly depends upon efficient troop leading. The student has read this in the books, but to many it means very little. To the inexperienced reader, *recontre* action will probably mean that two forces, moving in opposite directions on the same roads, rather casually and unexpectedly run into each other. The term "troop leading" to such a reader probably conveys the idea of the quick opening of rifle

fire, with no definite picture of how men were gotten into position for this purpose. The student in general will not picture the preliminary clashing of the advance cavalries, with the desperate attempts to force each other back. He will not see the support of the infantry advance guard gradually drawn into the action, with the ever-increasing volume of fire, with the superiority now on this side and now on that, as supports and reserves are hastily gotten into position. He will not visualize the hurried marches of the leading infantry as it toils and sweats its way through brush, woods, and open fields, struggling to reach the position to which its anxious commander is hurrying it. He will not appreciate the vexations and difficult problems of the advance guard commander as he endeavors to enhance his own strength on the firing line to overwhelm the opposition, at the same time that he is struggling with every means at hand to discover the enemy's flank, his intentions and disposition, in order that he may communicate this to the supreme commander. All this reality of the situation must be brought home to the class by the instructor and this once accomplished no regard need be paid as to whether or not the student will remember it. It is now so fixed in his mind that he cannot forget it.

Or the student reads the paragraphs dealing with enveloping movements. As he goes over the book, to him it is comparatively easy to say, "Oh, yes, we extend our line to this flank, and bring more pressure on the enemy here." He doesn't place himself in the shoes of the commander whose unit has been directed to hurry from its place in the rear to extend the line in the desired

direction. He does not appreciate the anxiety of the leader as he sends up his advance and flanking groups to protect his own movement into action, and to discover the flanks of our own lines. He is more liable to think of our front as a smooth and even line, ending abruptly at a certain point on which he is going to guide as he moves to the front. He doesn't realize that he is now operating in a zone beaten by rifle, machine gun, and artillery fire. It doesn't occur to him that the actual getting of his troops into the position directed will be one of his most difficult problems of the day. An appreciation of the reasons that caused this flank to be extended, the responsibilities and duties of the commander of this unit, and the proper way to meet his difficulties, must all be pictured to the students by the instructor.

Following the methods of instruction as outlined in the above discussion and brief examples, it will be found that the portion of the book covered daily is very small. But as the instructor gets his class to studying the text along these lines, he will soon discover that repetition and review are unnecessary, and that students are now eagerly absorbing every bit of the classroom work. Further, when the course is finished he will not have a body of officers that have simply memorized the portions of the book indicated as being very important, with a view of passing a written examination. Instead he will find that his students can not only pass examinations on the subject matter, but are rapidly becoming able to apply to map problems, war game, terrain exercises and maneuver, the principles he has labored so hard to instill.

I

Advocates Universal Military Training

It adds nothing to the obligations of citizenship to prepare the citizen to render the services which are required of him at all events. On the contrary, such preparation is a positive blessing to the individual as well as the nation.

The opposition does not and cannot meet the fundamental propositions that universal military training is the only insurance of adequate defense under all circumstances, and that the only insurance against the antiquated and barbarous practice of using raw troops and needlessly sacrificing inexperienced men, where training would give them a chance.—*Spokane (Wash.) Spokesman.*

Musketry Training

By Lieutenant Colonel G. de G. Catlin, U. S. Army (Retired)

IN JULY of 1912 a provisional war strength regiment was organized out of parts of four regular regiments of Infantry. The place of mobilization, as many will remember, was Dubuque, Iowa, and the march that the regiment made was from that town to Sparta, Wis. Arrived at Sparta, musketry problems on a scale involving never less than a battalion and usually ending with all three battalions and the machine-gun company on the firing line were entered upon. We had an unlimited supply of ammunition. General Morrison, who directed these problems in person, invariably had the larger part of the targets hidden in the underbrush with here and there one or two exposed. This was the first musketry problem of any kind that the larger number of us present had ever seen, where actuality was in any way approached. It was my first musketry school and it demonstrated to me to a degree never forgotten the necessity of training for such an occasion off the target range. I will attempt shortly to tell the lines upon which I trained my company thereafter.

Reaching Scofield Barracks, Hawaii, in 1913, during garrison training, and having there a war strength company, I began immediately to daily designate a target to my company, following the manner prescribed in the then drill regulations. This target designation was always done by everyone in the prone position and the data, always emanating from me, went to the platoon leaders and from them to their squad leaders. From the beginning I required

every man on the firing line to be told the right of the target and also its left. In view of the perfection that we later obtained, the target first used was grotesque. It was, I believe, over a mile away, a long line of trees (not so common on that immense plateau), within whose length fully a regiment could have been deployed side by side. However, it fitted in with our raw ideas and training, was easily found and was more suitable perhaps than a normal target. Presently one of my superiors came along, noticed my drill, informed me that the period was for garrison training and told me to take up garrison training during garrison training period. Very shortly thereafter a War Department order was received designating that the technic of extended order and the firings was to be included in garrison training.

Later came the rain, and it rained in Hawaii—on occasion—for days at a time. One particular window was available in barracks which had a fine outlook and within whose frames two men could look out at the same time. This window forced into my mind the lesson of my life. It forced me to *individualize* the instruction in target designation, not because I saw the virtue in so doing, but because there was only room for myself and one man there. To this one man—usually the corporal of the squad—I gave the target data; he gave it to another man, quietly, this latter to the next and so on through the squad. Usually I stood near, biting my lips deeper and deeper, the comparison between my original

instructions and what the last man understood as the target was edifying, also disconsoling, but demonstrated fully the necessity of the instruction going on in just that form, that is, the data being translated by one individual mind to another, and so on.

In order to bring another example to the attention of the reader, it is necessary at this point to jump six years in time and go to a cold, white-clad cantonment in Massachusetts. There, last winter, I found a similar window from whose embrasure one looked out on a similar fine view, but the eye instead of resting on the pregnant guava bush of Hawaii, rested, without excess of pleasure, on a virgin snow field. Here in the snow we caused to be planted two white flags exactly twenty-five yards apart. Against their background these flags could be seen only with field glasses, and once having located their position (one being the right, the other the left, of the target) with reference to a well-defined reference point and in terms of a unit of measure, the corporal laid down the glasses, not to take them up again until he finally checked the correctness of the man who was the last individual link of information in his squad.

In Hawaii I spread the necessary dope on the 50-mil unit of measure in this fashion: Standing on the sill of a door looking over my musketry rule, I found that 50 mils thereon just fitted into the space between two windows in the opposite barracks. I caused each man to get his forefinger the necessary distance from his eye (while standing on the same sill and fitting his finger between the same two windows) and then to cinch it his corporal adjusted the length of his identification tag ribbon around his neck to the distance to his

finger, so that he stood there with the outstretched ribbon looking at a distance much like a boy with a sling shot. The proof that 50 mils thus measured found its counterpart in the extreme width of the raised rear sight, when looked at by an eye peering from a point above the comb of the stock, was easily verified from the same sill. The reader will, of course, undersand that had I built up the present article on a strictly logical basis instead of presenting it narratively, the study of the unit of measure, being, as it were, the common symbol which all trained infantrymen must use in description of firing data, should be the very first detail mastered.

In 1901 the writer and another lieutenant of the same regiment reigned supreme in two neighboring towns—each town, in Luzon, on the coast of the China Sea, and each ruler full of dignity and callow youth. One day his padre informed the other lieutenant that a certain insurrecto captain with just 24 riflemen and plenty of ammunition waited without, anxious for combat. The other lieutenant took a few men—he was afraid if he took many there would be no fight—and made for the captain's lair. He found the insurrectos on an island, landed his little detachment, and said, "Men, follow me," and started. The advance was short lived. His numbers were too few, the insurrectos had too much ammunition, and the lieutenant had provided for no covering fire. He got his men and himself back in their bancas and rowed sadly home. The next morning he started in on the church plaza and every day thereafter drilled remedial measures into his company. Presently the padre came with another invitation from the captain. Without de-

lay the lieutenant started out with six men more than he had had the last time. He also took the surgeon. The following afternoon, as the head of his single-filed column emerged from the recesses of a gloomy forest into a field which sloped abruptly up and away, those men at the head suddenly felt themselves made an unwilling shield between a hail of insurrecto bullets (fired down from the hill) and the rest of the column. Two men fell wounded. Those in front commenced firing, those in the forest kept coming on to get into things. The result was a pandemonium of noise and much confusion of movement. The lieutenant acted thus: He had his gallant bugler sound "Cease firing." The men obeyed instantly—a beautiful piece of fire discipline. Thereupon—he told me a few days later—the insurrectos let out an exultant yell of triumph that ought to have reached my town. They thought he meant surrender. Next, the lieutenant got his men out in the open field, deployed and, facing the enemy, cut his line quickly into two parts, sang out, in our good old verbiage of long ago, "First platoon fire three rounds, second platoon forward." The movement, he told me, worked like a charm and never stopped until it carried them to the late insurrecto position. Here two insurrectos lay, one of them, with sixteen bullet holes in him, had his handkerchief wrapped around his rifle barrel to keep off the heat and yet so rapidly and continually had he fired that the dead hand holding the barrel was charred.

The incidents of this little fight are full of meat for an infantryman, but the lesson I wish most to bring home is to be found in the sixteen bullet holes

in the one dead insurrecto. He and his dead comrade were both in more exposed positions, and the old axiom of Bunker Hill, "Don't fire until you see the whites in their eyes," was, very evidently, the principle of fire discipline which controlled the action of that fine little bunch of regular infantry—and, of course, the principle under the circumstances was wrong. Therefore, I counsel that, in whatever formula you use for giving out your firing data, you include *both* the right of the hostile target and the left of the hostile target and that you do this from the very beginning of your instruction. By this means you place at once in the mind of each man the principle of fire distribution as well as the technic of target designation, and, moreover, you are giving him a sense of the unity of fire, of the team work, of his own unit, whether it be squad, section, or platoon. You will find that each man so trained instinctively lives up to the principle that he shall fire at that part of the target opposite him.

Let us return to Hawaii for a few minutes. In company target designation problems there, when we deployed the entire company and handed out the firing data to the platoon chiefs, we used the following means of checking the correctness of its transfer. All the squad leaders having signaled that their men were ready, one man (the man being specified as No. 2, rear rank, for example, so that a corporal could not send out his prize pupil) from each squad was ordered forward exactly 20 paces—here again a long distance was prescribed so that there could be no coaching—and there he put down one bayonet to sight over, and *only* each to designate the right and left of the tar-

get. I believe that both the bayonets and their owners resented the use they were put to, so presently it dawned on me that two sandbags, on each of which rested a rifle, could better be used by that member of each squad undergoing examination. I found that 50 per cent of the usefulness of these problems laid in their being thus checked up.

In the spring of 1919 the writer, during the preliminary training in musketry of an infantry regiment, used practically the same method as the one above described. All the companies of the regiment (they were merely skeletons) were marched up near the point designated for the problem. Here was placed a long row of tripods, close together, four pairs to each company. One man from each squad was called up to one pair of tripods (on the sandbag of each there rested a rifle), the rest of the regiment was faced about, the director gave a signal and on a distant shrub-covered hill appeared two flags, designating the right and left of the hostile line. The man at the tripods fixed these flags with reference to a reference point, using the rear sight as a unit of measure (or sometimes the 50 mils transcribed on the field glasses),

and then the flags were lowered. The next man—who of course had during this time been faced away from the target—was called up and, the first having transmitted his data, No. 2 aimed the two rifles on what he considered the right and left of the target. The director again signaled and up came the flags. The errors in giving and receiving the data were then checked up and criticised. The distance between the flags was known and they, the flags, were always held facing the aimers. The result of these two latter facts was that it enabled the officer with each company (by means of the formula on his mil scale) to immediately determine the range. Thus the correctness of the distance estimated by the soldier at the tripods was definitely checked.

The lessons that the writer derives from his experience in this particular phase of musketry training are three:

1. To individualize the instruction.
2. To require each man to know both the right and left of the target covered by his unit.
3. To follow each problem with a check on the correctness of knowledge of at least one man in each squad.

Accompanying Gun

By Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Dougherty, Infantry

I HAVE read with interest the article by Lieut. Col. O. L. Spaulding, General Staff, in the September JOURNAL. That part of the article referring to the "accompanying gun" and to 37-mm. gun is of absorbing interest and vital importance to the Infantry and merits full discussion. Let us consider evidence of officers who have had personal experience in France. Col. C. H. Lanza, Field Artillery, in a lecture delivered to the students at the Army Center of Artillery Studies, May 12, 1919 (A. G. File 35.05 EE), states:

12. The 75-mm. gun has been used as an accompanying gun. Its use for this purpose has led to most opposite recommendations. After conclusion of hostilities in November last the First Army called for reports from officers who had actually served with an accompanying gun, with a view of finding out just what had happened. Forty-five officers made 61 reports covering 143 days' service with accompanying guns. In only three cases was the movement of the guns forward successful. In all other cases the guns either never got started, were put out of action by hostile artillery, or on account of thick woods, ditches, broken bridges or other obstacles, were unable to keep up with the infantry.

13. In the three successful cases, two occurred on November 1. These were batteries that moved forward early in the morning under cover of smoke and mist, which protected them from the enemy view. They could not themselves see to fire for the same reason, and did not fire until the infantry advance had stopped and the day later became clearer. The third case was on November 5, when a single gun moved

forward several hours after the infantry, no opposition having been encountered.

14. It appears, therefore, that the 3-inch gun as an accompanying gun has not been successful in our service, no example being found where it actually kept up with the infantry, firing from time to time. This experience is apparently the same as that found among our Allies, and also the German Army.

These failures certainly were not due to lack of bravery; what was humanly possible was done. Brig. Gen. H. E. Ely, in his report of operations of the 3d Brigade, 2d Division, covering his operations from September 10-18, 1918, including the St. Mihiel drive, says: "No guns (artillery) were able to keep up with the infantry. The trenches were broad and deep and very numerous. It is believed the artillery did as much as was practicable to keep up with the infantry. The front line received no artillery protection from 2 p. m. on the 12th to daylight on the 13th" (St. Mihiel). The commanding officer, Battery A, 313th Field Artillery (Lieutenant Peppard), in a report dated November 21, 1918, said: "Movement of artillery in daylight on open roads in view of the enemy and expecting guns to approach a close position to the front line, is near an impossible feat to accomplish." And Lieutenant Peppard is a gallant officer who handled his battery with skill and bravery. Witness the following: "Peppard's battery, in the face of direct fire from the enemy's guns in Vilosnes, and at the same time under heavy fire of German artillery on his left flank, this

officer moved two of his guns *forward by hand* up to the crest of the ridge and with direct fire put out of action the enemy guns in the town of Vilosnes."

In answer to questions sent out by the Historical Branch, General Staff, we find the following. This information has been carded by Maj. C. B. Elliott, Infantry, and is now on file in the office of the Chief of Infantry:

Q. "What has been the greatest difficulty with handling the 75-mm. gun as an accompanying gun?"

A. "The teams soon became disabled by machine-gun or artillery fire and the advance of the gun was checked."—Col. Harrell, 16th Infantry, 1st Division. Would pack animals fare any better?

Colonel Harrell, with reference to 37-mm. gun transportation, says: "I am confident that a pack mule would be entirely unsatisfactory." "Too heavy and is difficult to conceal" (Major Lee, 28th Infantry, 1st Division). "The guns have been destroyed early in the action" (Major Frasier, 26th Infantry, 1st Division). "Too great visibility. Too heavy" (Brig. Gen. Frank Parker, 1st Division). "Impossible to maintain liaison between the battalion commander of the assault battalion and his guns" (Colonel Hunt, 18th Infantry, 1st Division). "The greatest difficulty has been to get it into position and then establish a quick liaison" (Lieutenant Colonel Huebner, 28th Infantry, 1st Division).

Q. "Does the 75-mm. gun offer too much of a target when well forward?"

A. The unanimous answer from ten field officers of infantry of the 1st Division is in the affirmative.

The above experience would seem to indicate that the 77-mm. gun failed as close support accompanying an infantry battalion: First, because of too great

visibility. Second, the animals were soon killed, leaving the guns to be transported by man power. Third, because the guns are too heavy to be man-handled over obstacles encountered. Fourth, because of lack of liaison. This was not due to lack of training, but to lack of training *together*, which can be secured only when the gun is a part of the regiment.

Maj. John Nash, 2d _____, 313th Field Artillery, an officer who had an exceptional experience with accompanying guns, reports: "In my opinion the mission of the accompanying gun cannot properly be performed by the battery as a unit. Two guns handled entirely by man-power is the only method, and the infantry one-pounder is really the weapon for this kind of work."

Now, let us examine the testimony with reference to the one-pounder gun (37 mm.). Quoting again from Major Elliot's compilation of reports:

Q. "Do you believe the one-pounder gun to be a necessary weapon for infantry?"

A. "It is and it should be a part of, and remain with, every battalion of infantry *at all times*."—Colonel Harrell, 16th Infantry, 1st Division.

"Yes."—All field officers of 1st and 2d Divisions.

Lessons learned: "A front-line battalion and its accompanying arms (37-mm. and Stokes mortar) should be inseparable."—Lieut. P. B. Parker, 56th Infantry, 7th Division.

"The battalion commander should be taught to think of his battalion as composed of four infantry companies with accompanying auxiliary troops, and they should remain under his command *at all times*."—Colonel Harrell, 16th Infantry, 1st Division.

Q. "Is the caliber of the 37-mm. gun the right size?" "Yes, approximately. A little heavier gun would probably be better."—Colonel Harrell, 16th Infantry, 1st Division.

"A bigger shell would be more effective, but this would decrease the mobility of the piece; therefore, it is thought the gun should remain as it is."—Major Frazier, 26th Infantry, 1st Division.

All other officers of the 1st Division answered "Yes."

"It is about as large as can consistently be fed with ammunition during an advance."—Captain Woodworth, 6th Marines, 2d Division.

"Yes. A larger caliber would be better if it did not decrease portability and maneuverability. I cannot see how this can be done, however."—Colonel Van Horn, 9th Infantry, 2d Division.

"I think so. The larger caliber and heavier projectile would detract from its mobility."—Colonel Lee, 6th Marines, 2d Division.

All other officers of the 2d Division answer "Yes."

The above evidence conclusively proves that the 37-mm. gun, easily man-handled, with ammunition light enough to be brought forward, fairly inconspicuous, gave valuable service. Infantry officers of experience insist that proper liaison requires this gun to be absolutely under the battalion commander, not only in battle, but also in training. The majority of officers consulted are satisfied with the present caliber. Those who desire a "little heavier" shell are careful to insist that any increase in caliber shall not increase the size, weight and difficulty of transportation of the present 37-mm. gun. The above experience of the A. E. F. indicates that the infantry regi-

ment must have some light guns manned by its own personnel and trained as an integral part of its fighting unit—the battalion; that this gun must be as light as possible, certainly not heavier than the present 37-mm. and much lighter if practicable; that this gun must be as inconspicuous as possible; that it must be capable of being easily man-handled and moved by hand over forward battle areas; that its ammunition must be light enough to insure possibility of adequate supply when the gun is with the front-line battalion; that in the area of activity of the front-line battalion the gun and ammunition must be handled by man power; that a shell of slightly greater power is desirable, but not at the cost of mobility; that the shell have sufficient velocity to make it effective against tanks; that no decrease in accuracy be permitted.

The Ordnance Department is now working on a gun built to comply with these characteristics. This gun will throw a 3-pound projectile. No single piece of it will weigh over 100 pounds and the gun assembled on its wheels will weigh about 300 pounds. It will be effective against tanks and as accurate as the present 37-mm. An attempt will be made to use high-angle fire from the same gun, employing a projectile weighing about 5 pounds, of the same diameter, but with greater length. The testing of this gun is awaited with great interest. If they are successful this gun will probably replace both the 37-mm. and light mortar equipment. Failure to get necessary results will mean a new attempt with a smaller caliber and possibly attempts to improve the accuracy and mobility of the light mortar.

In connection with the necessary mobility, experiments are now under

way looking to the provision of a very light hand cart, probably weighing 100 pounds, or less, mounted on motorcycle or similar wheels, which can be used for carrying ammunition for the advance troops or trucks to the firing position. It is interesting to note here that these carts promise a solution of the same ammunition supply problem for the rifle and machine gun.

There remains the question of assignment of these guns.

Major General Hines, 3d Corps, says on October 13, 1918: "The 37-mm. gun must be employed with first-line battalions for its legitimate mission."—Brig. Gen. H. E. Ely, 3d Brigade, 2d Division, September 10-18, 1918: "By brigade orders four Stokes mortars and two 37-mm. guns were assigned to each leading battalion. This is believed to have worked to the best of advantage." Colonel Harrell, 16th Infantry, 1st Division, says: "Every infantry battalion should have at least two of these guns as part of its permanent equipment.

Battalion commanders who retain control of these guns and use them are able to produce the greatest effect in advancing their lines and in stopping attacks by tanks." Colonel Huguet, 28th Infantry, 1st Division, says: "Against machine guns and tanks, it is the most effective weapon the infantry has." Brig. Gen. Frank Parker, 1st Division, says: "Should be four to each battalion." General Darrah, 2d Division, recommends "twelve per infantry brigade." Colonel Van Horn, 9th Infantry, 2d Division, recommends "two guns to battalion of infantry." Major McCulloch, 9th Infantry, states: "I have found it (present number) insufficient on two occasions needed 37-mm. gun very badly, requested one from regiment, informed that all were busy."

There would seem from the above evidence to be need for at least six of these guns in each regiment (two per battalion), and this was the recommendation of the superior A. E. F. Board.



A Blow at Alien Draft Evaders

No citizenship papers will be granted foreigners who sought deferred classification in the draft because they were not fully naturalized at that time, if the precedent established by Justice Nolan in the District of Columbia Court is followed. The justice refused the final papers to a young man of draft age when he learned that he had made his lack of citizenship the basis of evading military service during the war.

The French Army of Tomorrow

By Captain George N. Trioche, French Army

AT a time when all nations are endeavoring to reduce what is termed "the burden" of a large military establishment, it seems both interesting and useful to note the opinion on this subject of well-known French generals and military critics.

In the wide-awake and progressive review, *L'Action Nationale*, of Paris, Lieut. Col. Emile Meyer¹ has started an investigation whose object is to ascertain the views of noted military authorities in his country concerning the future of the French Army. In the October, 1919, number of that review, Colonel Meyer asked for answers to the following questions, which apparently are of great import to our comrades of the French Army:

1. What should be the type of the military establishment—a regular army raised by conscription like in France nowadays, or a militia after the Swiss system, or else an army of volunteers like in England?

2. Are foreigners, colored men and ticket-of-leave men to be enlisted?

3. Is it necessary to keep up the institution of courts-martial in time of peace?

4. If the service is compulsory, would it be advisable to grant exemption to some professionals, such as physicians,

civil engineers, in time of peace, and call them under the colors, in case of war, as specialists?

5. Is civilian and even female labor to be used in barracks as it was during the war?

6. To what extent should the nation's resources be used for military instruction? Should the university participate in the instruction and education of recruits?

All these questions are new ones in France, and the very fact that they are made the object of discussions among regular army officers is certainly characteristic. It may be hailed as the sign of the advent of a new era in French military institutions.

Some of these points have been taken up in the leading periodicals of France by military critics² simultaneously with the *Action Nationale's* investigation. However, opinions widely differ, especially as regards the *type of military establishment*. The militia system of Switzerland finds no favor with the regular army officers, who are well aware of the shortcomings of such an institution. Volunteer forces like those of the United States or England have a few lukewarm supporters in the younger element. In fact, the real discussion

¹Colonel Meyer has, for a number of years, contributed military articles to leading periodicals of France and Switzerland. He is the author of many essays, some of which are published under the *nom de plume* Abel Veuglaire. Colonel Meyer, who had been retired as a major of field artillery, reentered the service when the war broke out and commanded for some time two battalions of artillery with the rank of a lieutenant colonel. He is not only a learned officer but a brilliant and witty writer.

²Such as Colonel Romain, in *L'Eclair*; Colonel de Rouvre, in *Le Figaro*; General de Lacroix, in *Le Temps*; General Maitrot, in *Le Correspondant*; General Roques, in *L'Avenir*, etc.

concentrates itself upon the strength of the standing army. Two schools are opposing each other. The first one, whose leader seems to be Colonel Meyer, advocates a liberal use of the reserves, this term including the oldest classes, known as the "Territorial Army." According to these officers, the standing army should be merely a big training school for reservists; consequently the length of active service in that army must be short. General Sarrail, of Saloniki fame, expresses the same opinion. He was never in favor of the famous "Three years law," and his faith in the reserves has been strengthened by his war experiences. Yet he has in mind "the army of tomorrow" only, and like General Lanrezac, the unlucky fighter of Charleroi, he believes that nothing *definite* can be said about the number of men till we know more concerning the efficiency of the League of Nations. It is worth noticing, by the way, that none of the officers who replied to the *Action Nationale's* queries shows much optimism in the matter. General Sarrail reminds us that, notwithstanding the work accomplished by the Peace Conference, the Germans have and ever will have twice as many trained soldiers as France in case a new war should break out. Nor do Colonel Meyer and General Lanrezac entertain much faith in the possible help of England and America, should France have trouble with Germany. That is to say, these officers notice with much concern

the rapid demobilization of the British and American forces. Both remark that the teachings of the great war seem to be strangely overlooked by the English and their transatlantic cousins. Says General Lanrezac:

If England had had seven or eight army corps organized in 1914, Germany would not have dared to invade Belgium.³ From these considerations, which apply still more strongly to the United States, one may infer that we (the French) would have to bear alone, for a long time, the whole brunt of an aggression, and would be practically the only ones to take the field if it were necessary to enforce the clauses of the treaty. . . .

Colonel Meyer, in the *Action Nationale* for December, 1919, speaking of the United States and England, writes:

. . . And if the lesson seems not to have borne any fruit for them; if they put themselves again in such a situation that, should the emergency arise, it would be impossible for them *without any delay* to take part in a world's war, perhaps we must explain this by their desire to have an excuse, when the hour has come, to shun the task.

These words may not be very pleasant for an American to hear; they nevertheless express what can be said to be a pretty general opinion in French military circles.

Gen. H. Le Gros, too, believes it not possible, for financial and economic reasons, to keep the peace footing of the army as high as before the war. He wants a first line force with a powerful

³Incidentally, the general recalls the fact that it took England a long time to enter the war in earnest. Quoting from the "Memoirs" of Marshal French, he mentions the first orders issued by General Kitchener to the Commander of British troops in France:

"You will act independently and never be under the orders of a French general. . . . You must cooperate with the French; but never lose sight of the fact that your effectives are limited and will not be increased. . . . Therefore, one must spare the men. . . . Should the French try to draw you into an offensive when they are not strong enough numerically to succeed, hold your troops back and report to the War Office. . . .!"

matériel, well trained, consisting of about five Army Corps with an effective of 30,000 to 40,000 men each, *i. e.*, 150,000 to 200,000 in all. These troops would be stationed in the danger zone and form *the only standing establishment*. According to this general officer, the force must be made up, as far as possible, of volunteers, who can reenlist; the balance to consist of drafted men.

As a second line he wants a militia—even a purely local one—raised by conscription. These militiamen undergo a training period of six months—four in barracks and two in a training camp. The militia of the danger zone might have a special organization.

General Le Gros' system is the result of what he considers the two great lessons of the war, namely (a) the resisting power of fortified fronts *that cannot be "turned,"* or, in other words, *the wings of which cannot be attacked;* (b) the readiness of the French to adapt themselves to new tasks. He thinks that uninterrupted field works should exist in peace time across the danger zone.

It may not be out of place to mention here that the principal objection of these French officers against the adoption of the Swiss system is the impossibility to obtain, in France, militia officers as efficient as those of Switzerland. The latter country is so thoroughly impressed with the importance of national defense that the entire population accepts most cheerfully and proudly the duties, however heavy they may be, inherent to their military institutions. General Lanerzac is quite right when he observes that the military spirit of the Swiss does not exist in France. Anyone who has witnessed, even so little, the working of the Swiss system, is well aware of the seriousness, the self-denial of the militia

officers of the little republic. Notwithstanding the very large amount of work which is required of these men, in addition to the duties of their profession in civil life, there are always more applicants for officers' schools than vacancies to fill. This would not be the case in France should that country adopt the Swiss plan of military establishment.

Upon the whole, the investigation made by *L'Action Nationale* shows conclusively that there is a strong trend of opinion in military circles towards a reduction in the peace strength of the regular army and a corresponding increase in the second line troops (*les forces de complement*)—the latter to consist of reserves, or militia, or both. This system, let us not forget, is inspired not by a belief in the speedy advent of an era of pacifism but by the obvious necessity of lessening the military burden of the nation. That necessity, according to Colonel Meyer, must be taken as a basis for the strength of the army:

We must not say: "So many men will likely be needed; therefore let us adopt the organization which will give us these men." What we must say is: "We do not know how many soldiers will be necessary in the next war. Consequently let us train as many as we can without drawing too heavily upon the nation's economic resources. . . ."

Colonel Meyer and the school he represents firmly believe in the efficiency of the reserves. Generals Lanrezac and Sarrail concur with him in the opinion that this kind of troops did well during the war; and that, if they did not accomplish more, it is because the general officers under whom they served were prejudiced against them. In several books published on the war by regular officers, the latter make fun of the territorials especially, who were "afraid of

damp grass," "never in a hurry," "unable to cross plowed fields without leaning upon their gun," etc., etc.⁴ Yet, these men fearful of rheumatism, these *pépères*⁵ "stiff and stout," fought well whenever they were allowed to do so. General Le Gros—the advocate of a large militia as second line forces—points out in one of his books⁶ that the territorial divisions stationed in northern France at the beginning of the war were "merely a juxtaposition of units," without cohesion or "pep"; badly trained, with indifferent "*cadres*, and an insufficient supply of field and machine guns."

This is true. But whose fault was it? Those who are to blame for it are cer-

tainly not the reserves, but the men who should have organized and trained them.⁷

The officers' problem is apparently considered less difficult to solve for the reserves than for a militia. General Lanrezac, in the *Action Nationale* for November, 1919, expresses the opinion that reserve officers are not to be used as *instructors*; all they have to learn is how to use, on the battlefield, men already trained. This simplifies to a great extent the instruction of these officers, who could begin their training for instance, in courses organized at some universities.

⁴Similar criticisms were formulated already in 1913 by General Gallieni (*Action Nationale*, December 1919).

⁵"Little fathers," the nickname of territorials in army slang.

⁶*La Genese de la Bataille de la Marne*.

⁷Colonel Meyer, who was with one of these territorial divisions, remarks that, if the latter retreated in some disorder from Amiens to Rouen the reason for this was that nobody made any effort to utilize them as fighting units; to use the colloquial expression, they were not "given any show."



Try it on the Dog

There is absolutely nothing to prevent the Socialists, the Syndicalists and Communists from experimenting with their own medicine before urging others to try it. The American people would like to see a wholly socialized, democratized steel mill in action, and there is nothing to prevent the Socialists, Syndicalists and Communists from starting one. The people are willing to learn, but they refuse to be talked into change unless there is some evidence other than mere abstractions that a definite goal lies ahead.

A Course in Police Training

A NUMBER of circulars, reports and catalogues covering the scope of training offered at the Army Vocational Schools throughout the service have come into our hands. A study of them indicates that the Infantry is overlooking one of the subjects that might well be included in the curriculum with a view to making the Infantry Service more attractive to a certain class of desirable prospective recruits.

The subject in mind is one designed to give a man a thorough course of training in police work; in other words, to fit him for appointment on the police force of any city or town.

Several of our larger cities maintain special schools where the members of their police force are given a thorough course of training before they are placed on full duty. They are sent back to the school for refresher courses as the occasion demands.

There are thousands of the smaller cities and towns who have to pick up the members of their police force from whatever source may be available. These men have no special training for the work and are, as a general rule, notoriously inefficient.

A great part of the police service is foot service and there seems to be no reason why the Infantry—the foot service—should not be the leaders in providing a course of training for this work.

In the course of a very short period it is confidently believed that the graduate of the infantry police schools would be in demand and there will be a good position waiting for every soldier-

graduate on his discharge. When they see the product of our schools, the city authorities will certainly be glad to give preference to our graduates.

Such a course of training would include:

1. A thorough physical examination having in mind the special requirements for admission to the police service as to height, weight and chest measurement, expansion and mobility; sight and hearing; effects of previous use of stimulants, narcotics, etc.; general organic condition; and medical history and previous condition of health. No man should be selected for the course unless he can pass this examination with a good percentage to spare, for we do not want to waste time training a man for this work and then have him turned down physically on his initial application for appointment to a police force.

The New York City police regulations require that a prospective patrolman shall measure up to the following minimum specifications:

Height	Weight	Expand- ed Chest	Chest mobility
	<i>Pounds</i>	<i>Inches</i>	<i>Inches</i>
5 feet 7½ inches	140	36½	3
5 feet 8 inches	140	37	3
5 feet 9 inches	145	37½	3½
5 feet 10 inches	150	38	3½
5 feet 11 inches	155	39	3½
6 feet	160	39	4
6 feet 1 inch	165	39½	4
6 feet, 2 inches	170	39½	4
6 feet 3 inches	175	39½	4
6 feet 4 inches	180	40	4½
6 feet 5 inches	185	40	4½

The candidate on original appointment must be between the ages of 21 and 29.

2. *Physical Training:*

- (a) Setting up exercises. Designed with a view to developing the student's general physical condition.
- (b) Humane handling of prisoners by Jiu Jitsu methods.
- (c) Hand-to-hand fighting.
- (d) Boxing.
- (e) Running; climbing obstacles; swimming.

3. *Firearms:*

- (a) A course of training in handling and firing the automatic pistol and revolver. Training in handling of pistols that may come into the possession of a policeman at the scene of a crime.
- (b) Methods of disarming an opponent.

4. *General subjects:*

- (a) Department: The relation of the policeman to the community; his personal conduct and official activities. Personal appearance.
- (b) Patrolling: The general rules and regulations prescribed by police practice in the best regulated forces throughout the country.
- (c) Observation: Methods for developing the faculties of observation and reporting upon the incidents observed. Prevention of crime. "If a policeman, by using his powers of observation, can prevent the commission of a crime, he renders better service to the city than if he detects it" (Police Practice and Procedure).

(d) Criminology: Classification and definition of crimes; methods employed by criminals in plying their trade; thievery; confidence games; gambling; disorderly places.

(e) Arrests: Authority of the law for arresting persons; methods of making arrests; warrants for arrest and search warrants; handling of demented persons; precautions to be taken in effecting the arrest of criminals.

(f) Traffic control; Methods employed; rules and regulations governing.

(g) Fires and accidents: Methods of giving alarm; action to be taken in case of fire; methods of first aid in case of accident; method of summoning medical assistance for injured persons.

(h) Court procedure: Reports; assembling and production of evidence against criminals; classes of police courts; procedure of police courts; moot courts.

(i) Criminal identification: Making report of description of criminals; identification of criminals from photographs; types, etc., and their particular method of operation; identification by means of finger prints; preservation of finger prints at scene of crime; physical peculiarities of criminal types.

This course of training in the general subjects may be given by lectures and practical demonstration. It may be possible to give the members of the class practical training for short pe-



A DOUGHBOY OUTPOST IN THE HECKEN SECTOR, ALSACE—OCCUPIED BY MEN OF THE 32D DIVISION.



BRINGING UP THE "CHOW"—COOKING IT AS WE GO ALONG.



CAVE DWELLINGS—FRENCH DUGOUTS.



IN THE FRONT LINE.



German General Staff Picture. Furnished by Lt. Col. J. C. Wise.

THE GERMAN END OF THE ROAD TO YPRES.




German General Staff Picture. Furnished by Lt. Col. J. C. Wise.


A GERMAN LIGHT MACHINE-GUN TEAM GOING INTO ACTION.




RIFLE
GRENADE





ONE
POUNDER



LIGHT
MORTAR



AUTOMATIC
RIFLE



INFANTRY SPECIAL WEAPONS.

riods by the police force of some nearby city. They can be taken to sessions of the police court, and may be given practical experience in traffic control work.

The Police Department of New York City conducts a splendid school for the training of the members of their police force. They have a manual on police practice and procedure that may be used as a text-book in our infantry police schools. This book was prepared by Inspector of Police Cornelius F. Cahalane and published by the Police Department. No doubt a supply of

these books can be procured by the E. and R. Branch for the use of our schools.

It would be well for our infantry commanders to look into this subject and work out the details to fit the particular local conditions. The plan outlined above may easily prove a great drawing card for the Infantry and be productive of wonderful results.

The INFANTRY JOURNAL will be glad to assist in this work in whatever way may be practicable and will be glad to have your suggestions in order that they may be passed on to the service.

I

Result of Bolshevism

Responsibility for such calamities as the New York explosion and for the recent bomb plots rests with the radicals. Rarely, if ever, do the leaders openly preach violence. They do not directly urge their hearers to plant bombs or kill or burn. But they sow the seeds of discord and class hatred. They instil into the minds of their hearers the vicious germs of hatred, which grow and multiply until some ill-balanced person gives vent to his passions in the form of a terrible crime. Many a parlor Bolshevik who would shudder at the sight of human blood has by his specious arguments and his appeal to the hate and prejudice of class against class inspired deeds of revolting ferocity.

Machine-gun Known Distance Practice

By Captain C. A. Willoughby, 24th Infantry

A CONTINUOUS record of scores is indispensable in preliminary and record practice.

In small-arms target practice a popular type of score card has been developed which is extensively used throughout the service, apparently supported by a practical and general need.

The considerations which compelled the adoption of that particular score card for use with the rifle are equally valid in machine-gun practice.

At present, however, there are no official or commercially published record cards or score sheets for that arm.

It is undesirable, of course, to leave the method and manner of keeping score to the limited inventiveness of the company clerk or first sergeant.

The machine-gun known distance course suggests immediately certain score cards and record sheets, viz., (a) Record-sheet, instruction practice; (b) record-sheet, combination, for preliminary practice, record practice, annual target report; (c) score-card, individual.

Inasmuch as the machine-gun instruction practice differs materially from the "preliminary" and "record practice," it is advisable to keep a distinctly separate record.

The record sheet for the preliminary practice is equally adaptable to the record practice as the courses are identical and can finally be used for the annual target report.

The individual score card is a certificate of qualification, to serve as an insert to the service record, and can

also be used at the firing point as an ordinary score card.

It will be noted that a differentiation is made between "sheet" and "card."

The type of record blank is determined by the methods obtaining at the firing point.

In rifle practice the fire is distinctly individual; in machine-gun practice, however, the service of the squad as a team is almost indispensable to firing; there is No. 2 to assist at the gun (at least in the preliminary phases), No. 3 to replace ammunition boxes, other numbers to pull the target trucks on the 1,000-inch range or to space the proper number of rounds on the belts, etc., etc.

In practice, everything points toward maintaining the integrity of the squad as a unit.

This naturally leads to a collective record sheet for the entire squad, especially in instruction and preliminary practice, where the progress in scores of the individual is not of as great interest as in record practice.

This simplifies clerical work considerably inasmuch as only sheets corresponding to the relatively small number of squads need be prepared, with a typewritten list of names ready for the entry of scores.

This is indeed an advantage, as the order of firing is determined in advance, at leisure, in the company office, and the element of confusion is entirely absent.

This involves, however, the strict use of squads as units within the organization. If the squad is disrupted and firing details are run alphabetically, an individual score card must be used.

Yet a collective sheet will have to be used in rendering the annual target report or in supporting requests for classification in marksmanship.

In the interest of fire discipline it is believed impracticable, however, to use any other but the squad unit at the firing points. It is amazing, though, how little use is made of squad units in the performance of military duties in spite of logical and inherent advantages; there seems to be a preference to juggle with odd-hundred names instead of with a few compact groups.

The individual record card has its use; it can serve as a valuable insert to the service record, to accompany claims for classification, etc. Made of stiff paper, it can be used at the firing points as a typical score card.

It cannot replace the collective sheet, however; this is obvious if the sequence of fire and the corresponding minimum numbers of rounds are analyzed, viz:

INSTRUCTION PRACTICE, 1000-INCH RANGE

	<i>Rounds</i>
M. G. Target A.....	100
M. G. Target B.....	100
M. G. Target C.....	100
M. G. Target D.....	200
Total.....	500

PRELIMINARY PRACTICE

	<i>Rounds</i>
M. G. Target E.....	250
Target E.....	30
M. G. Target F.....	100
Target E.....	50
Target A.....	50
Target B.....	50
Total.....	530

RECORD PRACTICE

Same as preliminary practice
Grant total (rounds).....1,565

With a total ammunition allowance

of 2,200 rounds per individual, the instruction practice can be fired once and the preliminary (record) practice three times, or twice only if the instruction course is fired twice. There is no preference for either procedure.

Obviously, an individual record card, to accommodate such a repetition of courses, would become too large or require at least two pages, in the form of a folder.

On the other hand, the record sheet of one page is very practicable; the same blank form can be used for preliminary and record practice as many times as these courses are intended to be fired.

The sheets are of standard type-writing paper with twenty-five name spaces.

The upper portion is panelled to differentiate between the various targets and to indicate the class of fire, the minimum number of rounds and the proper sight or mil setting; this is believed to be of assistance because of the rapid change in type of fire as a sort of reminder for fire control, to insure proper fire orders.

These sheets can be typed in the company office, mimeographed or printed at slight expense.

The clerical effort involved is slight; 6 carbon copies can be gotten at one typing. A company of 12 squads, *i. e.*, 172 men, requires the following number of cards and record sheets for one target season, viz.:

	<i>Sheets</i>
Instruction practice.....	12
Preliminary practice.....	24
Record practice.....	12
Annual target report.....	6
Annual target report, copy.....	6
Total.....	60

Machine-gun Known Distance Practice

INDIVIDUAL RECORD CARD

M. G. QUALIFICATION TESTS

PRELIMINARY PRACTICE

Targets	Range	Group or Series	Minimum No. Rounds
M. G. Target E	1000 yards	G1	60
" "	"	G2	90
" "	"	G3	80
" "	"	G4	20
Target E	600 yards	S1	30
M. G. Target F	"	S1	100
Target E	1000	S2	50
Target A	600	S2	50
Target B	1000	S2	50
Total			

RECORD PRACTICE

Targets	Range	Group or Series	Minimum No. Rounds
M. G. Target F	1000 yards	G1	60
" "	"	G2	90
" "	"	G3	80
" "	"	G4	20
Target E	600 yards	S1	30
M. G. Target F	"	S1	100
Target E	1000	S2	50
Target A	600	S2	50
Target B	1000	S2	50
Total			

Classification.....

EXPERT QUALIFICATION TESTS

Determination of Ranges	Sec.	%	Points
1st Range			
2d Range			
3d Range			
4th Range			
Total			

MATERIEL

	Sec.	Value
1 Head-space Adjustment		
2 Stripping-Assembly		
3 Principal Stoppages		
4 Immediate Action		
5 Mechanism		
6 Points B. D. & A.		
7 Nomenclature		
Total %		

FIELD FIRING

Target Groups	Max. Pts.	Points
1 Machine-gun Target	14	
2 Skirmish Line	6	
3 Column	3	
Total		

.....
 This is to certify that the Expert Qualification Test was conducted in accordance with Sec. 23, M. G. Serv. Regulations.

Presd't Exam'g Board

.....
 This is to certify that the entries in the Qualification Tests are correct and that the bearer of this record card qualified as Marksman, Sharpshooter, Expert in M. G. Known Distance Practice.....192.....

Preliminary	1000-inch Range				A		Range			Total Score
Record Sheet M. G. Qualification Tests192.... Squad No.....	M. G. Target E				Target E	M. G. Target F	Target E	Target A	Target B	
Group or Series.....	G1	G2	G3	G4	S1	S1	S2	S2	S2
Minimum No. of Rounds.	60	80	80	30	30	100	50	50	50	530
Elevation and Range....	750	1000 1250	600 700	800 900	600	600	1000	600	1000

Instruction Practice	1000-inch Range										Stoppages	Total Score
Record Sheet M. G. Qualification Tests192.... Squad No.....	M. G. Target A			M. G. Target B		M. G. Target C		M. G. Target D				
Type of Fire. Group. Series.	Grouping			Distr.		Search'g.		Oblique Travers'.				
Minimum No. of Rounds.....	15	30	60	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	505
Sight settings. Elev.....	600	1000	1300	750	1200	18m	18m	600	600	1000	1000

If individual score cards are used: The number of records to be handled in one season is evidently larger if individual score cards are used.

Instruction practice, sheets... 12

Preliminary practice,¹ cards... 172

Preliminary practice, 2..... 172

Record practice..... 172

Annual target report, sheets... 12

Cards..... 516

The collective score sheet, on the other hand, can be neatly filed in a stiff cardboard binder and become a neat and satisfactory record.

¹ The preliminary course can be fired twice with the present ammunition allowance.

502 Machine-gun Known Distance Practice

Preliminary Record.....	} Practice		1000-inch Range				"A" Range				Total	Remarks
			M. G. Target E				Target E	M. G. Target F	Target E	Target A		
Record Sheet M. G. Qualification Tests192....												
Group or Series.....	G1	G2	G3	G4	S1	S1	S2	S2	S2			
Minimum No. Rounds...	60	90	80	20	30	100	50	50	50			
Elevation Range.....	750	1000 1250	600 700	800 900	600	600	1000	600	1000			

Instruction Practice			1000-inch Range										Stoppages
Record Sheet M. G. Qualification Tests192....			M. G. Target A			M. G. Target B		M. G. Target C		M. G. Target D			
Type of Firing.	Group.	Series.	Grouping			Distr. Fire	Searching		Oblique Traverse'				
Minimum No. Rounds.....	15	30	60	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	
Sight Setting.....	600	1000	1300	750	1200	18m	18m	600	600	1000	1000		

It also lends itself admirably for use as the annual target report.

The practical use of the record sheet is obvious: The names of the members of any one squad are entered in the name spaces, in the sequence of their gun-numbers.

If eight squads are to fire, then eight record sheets will be prepared in advance; each sheet is virtually a squad list.

At the firing point, the recorder will call the first man on the list to the gun and continue until all the names on the list have been called and fired.

New Corps and Army Areas

By Major William Bryden, General Staff

On September 1, 1920, the six familiar territorial departments, into which the continental area of the United States has been divided for some years, ceased to exist, and in their stead are now the nine corps areas shown in the accompanying cut. These corps areas, which the act of June 4, 1920, states shall be formed "for purposes of administration, training and tactical control," are grouped into three army areas of three corps areas each. The general order which directed the establishment of the corps and army areas provided for this grouping into army areas "for the purposes of inspection, or maneuvers, of plans for mobilization war, demobilization, etc." Commanding generals and staffs have been provided for the corps areas, but it is stated in the order that "commanding officers and staffs for army areas will be designated from time to time when the necessity therefor arises." The new corps area commanders have been directed to administer the corps areas just as the territorial departments were being administered at the time of the latter's demise, and this they will doubtless continue to do while awaiting further instructions with reference to the reorganization of the Army. The establishment of the corps and army areas is an important move toward building up the peace establishment of the new Army of the United States, and as such, the following brief notes concerning these areas may be of interest.

The law states that "the continental area of the United States shall be di-

vided on a basis of military population into corps areas." Assuming "military population" to mean the physically fit male population, approximate figures on the military population of the new corps and army areas can be obtained by taking from the Second Report of the Provost Marshal General on the operations of the Selective Service System, the number of draft registrants in the several States during the World War, and reducing these figures by the number of those physically unfit for combat or limited service as determined from the percentages of rejections in the different States found in the report of the Surgeon General on "Defects found in drafted men." For results see table on following page.

The density of population throughout the United States is far from uniform, and corps areas of *equal* military population would be corps areas of very great differences in size. The law merely states that the division into corps areas shall be "on a basis of military population," and if, as appears to be the case, the corps areas are a reasonable compromise between population and area, and if, also, in the allotment of troops to be organized in the several corps areas the differences in population are considered and allowed for, the intentions of the law on this point will undoubtedly have been fulfilled.

The strength of the First Corps area is practically fixed by the geography of the New England States. To have included New York therein would have given the First Corps area a strength of over 3,000,000, while by making it as

Corps and Army Areas	Physically-fit Military Population		
	White	Colored	Total
1st Corps area.....	1,227,351	19,517	1,246,868
2d Corps area.....	2,484,092	79,629	2,563,721
3d Corps area.....	2,065,591	243,854	2,309,445
1st Army area.....	5,777,034	343,000	6,120,034
4th Corps area.....	1,802,822	1,024,121	2,826,943
5th Corps area.....	2,172,577	142,102	2,314,679
6th Corps area.....	2,345,025	59,500	2,404,525
2d Army area.....	6,320,424	1,225,723	7,546,147
7th Corps area.....	2,226,654	65,588	2,292,242
8th Corps area.....	1,317,502	172,386	1,489,888
9th Corps area.....	1,362,394	11,355	1,373,749
3d Army area.....	4,906,550	249,329	5,155,879

it is, the strength is but very little below that of either the Eighth or Ninth Corps areas. The two last-named corps areas make up for what they lack in population by their size, while the First Corps area makes up considerably for its deficiencies in both size and strength by its wealth and industrial importance. At any rate, any one of the corps areas will be found sufficiently populous to produce men of such classes and trades as to permit the organization therein of practically all kinds of troops, and the differences in strength are not so excessive as to preclude a satisfactory adjustment of quotas in the allotment of units of the National Guard and the Organized Reserves.

The peculiar shape of the Second Corps Area was evidently brought about by the fact that New York and Pennsylvania could not be in the same corps area without running up the military population thereof to more than 3,500,000, and also by the desire that, so far as practicable, harbor defenses

be not split by the boundaries of corps areas.

The Fourth Corps area has the greatest military population with more than 1,800,000 whites and over 1,000,000 colored.

Of the army areas, the Second has the greatest military population, while the Third, which comprises almost all of the United States west of the Mississippi River, has the smallest.

Section 3a, of the act of June 4, 1920, undoubtedly had an important bearing upon the delimitation of corps areas. In that section it is stated in part that "in the reorganization of the National Guard and in the initial organization of the Organized Reserves, the names, numbers and other designations . . . of the divisions and subordinate units thereof that served in the World War between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918, shall be preserved as such as far as practicable . . ." and the fulfillment of this provision will be greatly facilitated if the *areas* which furnished the personnel for these units be kept

intact within a single corps area. A comparison of the new corps areas with the areas which supplied the men for the former National Guard and National Army divisions as originally organized, shows that the number of the division areas which are split by corps area boundaries is as small as could be expected.

From the viewpoint of administration, to have increased by three the number of headquarters with which the War Department will have to deal is not particularly desirable, but a reduction in the number of corps areas would mean corps areas of greater population, and when all units of the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Organized Reserves considered "necessary, as a basis for a complete and immediate mobilization for a national emergency" are organized, as it is hoped they will be within the next few years, the corps area commanders will, doubtless, find that the corps areas are plenty large enough.

The corps areas will necessarily function continuously in both peace and war, and consequently they will have nothing to do, in a strategical or tactical way, with the areas in which the troops raised within them may be called upon to operate. In other words, a corps area of a theater of operations is not a corps area as defined in the above-mentioned order. In fact, both the corps and army areas were evidently laid out primarily for the purpose of

organizing and maintaining therein troop units for the "complete and immediate mobilization." If, however, a critical strategical area should be within a single corps or army area, this would be advantageous in connection with the preparation of defense projects and plans. How well the present corps and army areas satisfy this consideration, each strategist-reader can judge for himself.

In case of necessity a theater of operations can be designated without interfering with the established corps and army areas. An example of this is contained in the above-mentioned order which provides that a certain small part of the State of Arizona be attached to the Ninth Corps area for the purposes of administration and tactical control in connection with the border patrol and field operations incident thereto.

The corps areas are now established and functioning; the army areas are authorized on paper, and again the United States had been divided into military territorial units which will, doubtless, "hold for all time," just as each of the five or six other solutions of the same problem made during the last twenty years have held. But regardless of the question of its permanence, it is believed that, on the whole, the new solution of the problem is based on sound reasoning and will fulfill satisfactorily the legal and military requirements of the present.



Infantry Recruiting

The Chief of Infantry

The Infantry School, Camp Benning, Georgia

29th INFANTRY (MOTORIZED)—947

(Pennsylvania)

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH—110,000 ✓

From the Act of June 4, 1920.

42nd Infantry transferred to Porto Rico to be filled with natives and upon completion of reorganization to be transferred to Panama.

45th and 57th Infantry: Transferred to the Philippine Islands to be filled with Philippine Scouts.

The figures opposite each regimental designation show the strength of the organization on August 31, 1920.

Allocated states are shown in parenthesis.

The location of each headquarters is indicated thus: (Hqs.) Except under Infantry Divisions, the Corps Area designation is arranged geographically.

SERVICE IN INFANTRY DIVISIONS

EIGHTH CORPS AREA

2nd Division

Camp Travis, Texas (Hqs.)

9th Infantry—332
(Texas)

23rd Infantry—343
(Oklahoma)

1st Infantry—373
(Washington)

20th Infantry—629
(Indiana)

SECOND CORPS AREA

1st Division

Camp Dix, New Jersey (Hqs.)

16th Infantry—798
(West Virginia)

18th Infantry—592
(Kentucky)

26th Infantry—711
(Tennessee)

28th Infantry—556
(North Carolina)

NINTH CORPS AREA

4th Division

Camp Lewis, Washington (Hqs.)

39th Infantry—148
(Iowa)

47th Infantry—115
(Wisconsin)

58th Infantry—107
(Iowa)

59th Infantry—130
(Wisconsin)

SIXTH CORPS AREA

6th Division

- Camp Grant, Illinois (Hqs.)
- 51st Infantry—232
(Illinois)
- 53rd Infantry—197
(Illinois)
- 52nd Infantry—209
(Illinois)
- 54th Infantry—231
(Illinois)

FOURTH CORPS AREA

3rd Division

- Camp Pike, Arkansas (Hqs.)
- 4th Infantry—261
(Missouri)
- 7th Infantry—211
(Louisiana)
- 30th Infantry—209
(Arkansas)
- 38th Infantry—295
(Missouri)

FOURTH CORPS AREA

5th Division

- Camp Jackson, S. C. (Hqs.)
- 60th Infantry—226
(Georgia, Florida)
- 61st Infantry—220
(Georgia)
- (6th Infantry—257
(South Carolina)
- 11th Infantry—336
(Alabama, Mississippi)

SEVENTH CORPS AREA

7th Division

- Camp Funston, Kansas (Hqs.)
- 55th Infantry—141
(Nebraska)
- 56th Infantry—131
(Minnesota)
- 34th Infantry—125
(Kansas)
- 64th Infantry—141
(Kansas)

STRENGTH AUGUST 31, 1920—61,208

Strength on June 30, 1920, obtained from Personnel Inventory Report.

Strength on last days of subsequent months obtained by adding the number of enlistments from July 1, 1920, as shown by the enlistment papers received and subtracting the number of losses by discharge, retirement, desertion and death, as shown by the Service Records received; also transfers to and from other Arms and Staff Corps.

SERVICE IN CORPS AREAS

National Cantonments

FIRST CORPS AREA

- Camp Devens, Mass.
- 13th Infantry—749
(Vermont, Rhode Island, Maine,
New Hampshire)
- 36th Infantry—353
(Massachusetts)

SECOND CORPS AREA

- Camp Upton, New York
- 41st Infantry—255
(New York City)

THIRD CORPS AREA

- Camp Meade, Maryland
- 12th Infantry—552
(Pennsylvania)
- 2nd Battalion
Army Base, Norfolk, Va.
- Camp Lee, Virginia
- 43rd Infantry—313
(Connecticut)
- 62nd Infantry—425
(Virginia)

FIFTH CORPS AREA

Camp Sherman, Ohio

2nd Infantry—454

(Ohio)

3rd Infantry—565

(Texas)

10th Infantry—318

(Michigan)

19th Infantry—516

(Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico)

40th Infantry—518

(Ohio)

REGIMENTS IN POSTS**SECOND CORPS AREA**

63rd Infantry—787

(New York less N. Y. City)

Stations

Fort Ontario, New York

Madison Barracks, N. Y. (Hqs.)

Plattsburg Barracks, New York

22nd Infantry—874

Fort Jay, New York (Hqs.)

Fort Niagara, New York

Fort Porter, New York

SIXTH CORPS AREA

37th Infantry—902

(Texas)

Stations

Fort Wayne, Michigan (Hqs.)

Fort Brady, Michigan

SEVENTH CORPS AREA

49th Infantry—447

(Indiana)

Stations

Fort Snelling, Minn. (Hqs.)

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

NINTH CORPS AREA

21st Infantry—1,068

(Wyoming, N. Dak.,

S. Dak.)

Stations

Butte, Montana

Fort Douglas, Utah

Fort Geo. Wright, Wash. (Hqs.)

(Also see Alaska)

32nd Infantry—572

(Nevada, California, Utah)

Station

Presidio, Calif. (Hqs.)

BORDER SERVICE**EIGHTH CORPS AREA**

17th Infantry—673

(District of Columbia,

Delaware, Maryland)

Station

Fort McIntosh, Texas (Hqs.)

24th Infantry—2118

(Colored)

Stations

Columbus, N. Mex. (Hqs.)

Hachita, N. Mex.

25th Infantry—1644

(Colored)

Station

Nogales, Arizona (Hqs.)

46th Infantry—293

(Pennsylvania)

Stations

Eagle Pass, Texas (Hqs.)

Ft. Sam Houston, Texas

48th Infantry—307

(Pennsylvania)

Stations

Douglas, Arizona (Hqs.)

El Paso, Texas

FOREIGN SERVICE**ALASKA**

21st Infantry—1068

(Wyoming, N. Dak., S. Dak.)

Stations

Anchorage

Fort Gibbon

Fort Liscum

Fort St. Michael

Fort Wm. Seward

CHINA

Tientsin (Hqs.)
15th Infantry—1,348

GERMANY

Coblentz (Hqs.)
5th Infantry—1,980
8th Infantry—3,309
50th Infantry—1,681

HAWAII

35th Infantry—238
(Idaho, Montana, Oregon)
44th Infantry—735
(California)

PANAMA

14th Infantry—263
(Michigan)
33rd Infantry—1,041

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Manila
27th Infantry—2,587
Fort McKinley
31st Infantry—2,049

PORTO RICO

65th Infantry
(Native)

NOTES

Infantry Canvassers Study These Tables And Use Them In The Interests Of Your Service. It gives you six opportunities to sell the Infantry.

Remember your Service School at Camp Benning, Georgia, and its attraction for the man who desires straight soldier duty or fatigue. The 29th Infantry (Motorized), the demonstration unit stationed at the Infantry School, does not perform Guard duty or fatigue. This regiment is in need of a number of high-class men.

Remember your own regiment is only one sample in the Infantry Stock and if your prospect will not buy it, then **Sell** him one of the five other opportunities.

Remember also that the Infantry is only one sample in the Army Stock and if your prospect will not buy it, then **Sell** him one of the other branches.

Remember the Headquarters, Supply and Machine Gun Companies of your regiment and the Machine Gun Battalions of your Division and that they also need men.

Remember that instructions are issued from the Office of the Adjutant General of the Army whenever enlistments for any organization are closed. Get acquainted with the back cover of **RECRUITING NEWS**. It will tell you which regiments are Open or Closed for Enlistments.

Study the strength figures on this chart, for they have a meaning.

Use this chart as a sample board. Show it to the prospect and let him choose for himself.

Cooperate with all other canvassers and the General Recruiting Service and **Boost** your Service to its Authorized Strength, 110,000.

Varied Ground

Infantry Recruiting

1. With reference to the reminder in the INFANTRY JOURNAL regarding special drives for infantry recruiters, the following ideas are suggested for consideration:

(1) To point out to the public by circulars, posters and other publicity, that the Infantry offers as good opportunities for vocational training as the other branches.

(2) Cooperation of regimental commanders in selection of the best personnel for recruiting—Icros 5 parties, etc.

(3) Cooperation of regimental commander in obtaining prospects for recruiting officers to interview with their personnel in all recruiting districts, as follows:

(a) Card indexing the names of friends of infantry soldiers by company commanders, and sending the names of these possible prospects to the district recruiting officers to be visited by special canvassing parties.

(b) The regiments to be canvassed periodically to keep list of prospects up to date.

(c) Letters of organization members to be prepared on multigraph to be sent broadcast by each soldier to his friends to prepare the prospect's mind for the visit of the recruiting canvasser.

(d) Letters to be written to each infantry officer to bring to his attention the duty to talk Infantry, and the opportunities in it for the young man to improve himself. Opportunities to spread infantry propaganda are numerous for all officers in an informal way, viz.: In smoking compartments of Pull-

man cars, while traveling; in clubs; chance conversations here and there where the subject "Army" is discussed.

2. In my opinion, after sufficient publicity is given the vocational and educational, as well as physical, advantages of infantry enlistment, the most prolific source of infantry recruiting will be found to be the individual prospects obtained from the acquaintances of infantry soldiers, who can be canvassed by the recruiting personnel of recruiting districts throughout the country. The recruiting officer is anxious to enlist men for the Infantry and, in addition, has the order to enlist according to the percentage of the strength of the arm. He must seek the prospects in his district by various ways.

3. The above plans, if carefully followed out, will aid him in locating possible recruits. The personnel and authority for canvassing the prospects is already in existence. The work in regiments should be organized in charge of an officer and publicity should be given newspapers in home towns of soldiers, showing the vocational subjects the boys from home are following; also their promotions to different grades from time to time. Any other publicity in regard to the soldier, such as winning places in athletic contests, would be advantageous in spreading the infantry propaganda, always giving the arm as a part of the news.

4. The above ideas are submitted for such consideration in formulating a plan for intensive recruiting for the Infantry. Army prospects who reside in Louisiana and whose names are fur-

nished by the regiment of Infantry, will most certainly be visited by efficient canvassers.

W. S. SINCLAIR,
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry.

* * *

There is no doubt that it would be well to live in a world in which there was no theft, and neither armies nor policemen necessary. It is also certain that we do not live in such a world. More than that, it is almost certain that there are elements in all so-called civilized nations that prefer to live in a world in which international lawlessness has the sanction of international approval.

* * *

Lauds Infantry School

The following extracts are taken from a letter written by an officer of the National Guard who had just completed the special course for National Guard officers at the Infantry School:

There is no "out of the book" tactics in the school. Students "do the real thing" under the watchful eyes of instructors who are men highly trained as specialists in the various departments and men who have played important roles in the gigantic program overseas.

Summed up, the Infantry School is proof of what the Army expects of the National Guard. The interest and enthusiasm with which instruction was imparted to students was the outstanding feature which should make the National Guard class a group of soldiers skilfully trained and prepared to assume assignments as instructors to the units to which they are attached.

The word "intensive" has been used in describing the kind of training and there is no phraseology that could replace it. If there was any time lost in the preparation of the schedules, from the students' standpoint, it was the time set for the "mess hour."

Military tactics from the school of the soldier to tactical terrain maneuvers under the supervision of one of the nation's recognized authorities on military tactics, formed a large part of the course. Money was not spared to teach the guardsmen, and expensive demonstrations were staged and problems held during instruction periods which put the practical side of the theoretical mechanism right before the men who must use the right method when the time comes.

Machine guns, light mortars, 37-mm. guns, automatic rifles, hand grenades, various types of bombs, trench warfare tactics, physical instruction, drill and command, musketry, military law rifle and pistol, and psychology were taught the students.

The instructors did not aim to turn out finished products in the various departments of military methods and weapons, but they are so specialized and so highly informed in their particular kind of study that the student will have a working knowledge of all of the various methods of warfare and a definite knowledge of many of the departments, to which a greater length of time had been allotted.

It was the opinion of the majority of the officers at the school that the instruction given will not only go a long way toward making the National Guard units efficient, but will serve to give the citizen soldier a program that will make an enlistment in the National Guard one of interest and will give him military and physical training that not only will fit him as a soldier, but will make him a better citizen.

A short visit to Camp Benning, this great school of soldiering, proves that the much-advertised phrase that the "Army makes men" is amply exemplified in the splendid types of Americans that are being made through military training. The person whose subconscious mind ever wavered toward the instinct to whistle the slackers' hymn, "I never raised my boy to be a soldier" would cringe in chagrin at the sight of men who are trained in the

ethics and principles of safe democracy. For example, there is a class of 125 West Point officers here for a 9-month course. As a whole, they are the finest type of American manhood I have ever seen assembled in one body.

The work was hard and there was lots of study, but the men were keenly interested and anxious to go home with as high a standing as possible. Each graduate received a certificate from the school showing the subjects covered and the grade he made for his entire course. There is no doubt that the course offered here was as far ahead of the one given to men in the officers' training camps during the war, as the high school is above the eighth grade. This is due to, first, more competent instructors; second, field *vs.* book instruction. There was one full company of the 29th Infantry that was used exclusively as an instruction company. Every student was required to fill every position in the company from private to captain, and to lead detachments of those men in various tactical problems.

A demonstration of a battle was given to us here on the reservation during our work in tactics. It showed how a company of doughboys made a raid on the enemy's trenches for the purpose of taking prisoners. The observers, about 300 persons, and yours truly, took up a position on a high hill overlooking No Man's Land. At H-10 hour (2.50 p. m.) the d— pow-wow I ever heard broke loose. Machine guns which were well concealed behind our own lines laid down a curtain of fire on the enemies' trench, keeping their heads down and preventing observation. Stokes mortars dropped their deadly shell all along the enemies' wire, cutting great gaps for the Infantry to pass through, while 37-mm. guns laid on the enemies' machine-gun nest, putting them out of commission. At a pre-arranged signal the barrage lifted and with automatic rifles, hand grenades, gas bombs, liquid fire, smoke bombs, three platoons of Infantry with fixed

bayonets and two planes, our boys "carried on" over an area of one-half mile, breaking down the enemy wire, jumping down into the enemy's trenches and then after being out of sight for a few minutes, came out again with the "Heines" prancing before them with their hands in the air yelling "Kame-rad."

Our work in scouting and patrolling was most thorough. I never would have believed it was possible for a scout to creep up to within 25 feet of me without seeing him, but they sure pulled that very stunt on the whole bunch of us. For example, we were taken out in the field and the instructor said, "There are eleven men concealed out in front of you, none of them over 300 yards away and some are less than 25. They are all in plain view and they can see you every minute; in fact, you are under their constant observance; see how many you can pick up." I spotted three after about ten minutes of searching, all the other students picked up from one to five. "Now use your field glasses," said the colonel. I did and two out of my three were tufts of grass. Many of the other supposed enemy turned into stumps and horse shavings, etc. At a signal from the colonel, the scouts all made a quick movement and "lo" eight or nine of the real ones were picked up by every member of the class. Some men of our class were sent out and placed in position while the rest of us turned our backs. We then faced about and needless to say the gang was discovered. This demonstration impressed me very much.

The grim realities of war were shown in a tank demonstration which was staged by a tank battalion that has been ordered here for permanent station. It was the combined force of man power, high explosives and heavily armored tanks, enacted in a spectacular demonstration which was witnessed by hundreds of civilians as well as the mass of military stationed here and members of high command. It was a demonstration; so announced; but it

carried a message and an actual example of efficient training in the various phases of military conditions. The ground picked for the demonstration was a plot of terrain, especially adapted to try the genius and tactical powers of the commanders of the various units who were assembled to solve a problem in which the only solution countenanced would be the correct one. Situated on a ridge whose base was dotted with heavy woods and many natural obstacles was the enemy, a Red Army, and the American doughboys' line was to the north 1,000 yards over generally rolling country, but with them an objective is an objective and despite the heavy fire from machine-gun nests and other auxiliary weapons from the enemy trenches, H hour was set and the attack was made with the Infantry following a tank barrage. The first-line tanks, heavily armored and weighing 50 tons, led the way, belching forth machine-gun and 6-pounder fire, keeping the enemy down while the Infantry advanced. At the edge of the woods, the first line was hit and then the spectacular work of the cumbersome land boats was staged. Through the woods, on the slope of the hill, tearing down stately pines, and plowing their way through heavy underbrush, over stumps, the tanks kept on. At the crest of the hill was the objective and in the center of the sector stood a house, which sheltered enemy machine gunners and held up the advance, but only for a moment. Full speed ahead, with one of the tanks and weight of 50 tons, the house was rendered a heap of distorted splinters, while chimneys tumbled into the debris as blocks knocked down by a child. As each objective was reached, the Infantry followed up reorganized, mopped up the trenches and carried on to the next enemy trench in true American style.

Next followed a similar demonstration in which the Whippet tanks were used as supporting units against Infantry temporarily held up by the enemy fire and although much smaller

the little armored tractors demonstrated wonderful mobility and fire power in their work in action.

If ever again I hear one speak of being "in bad" I will know exactly what he means, for one day in our class in "Scouting and patrolling" the writer arose and "suggested" that the class be taken on a night patrol. The "suggestion" must have landed in fertile soil in the brain of Colonel McDermott, the instructor, who used to spend his evenings in France stealing mess sergeants out of the German lines, for within 24 hours an order came down stating that the class would assemble at 7 p. m. At 7 p. m. and several hours thereto a drizzling rain had been falling, but nevertheless the class formed and the kind words fell upon our ears that if everything went well we should finish the task that was outlined by 4 or 5 o'clock a. m. I felt dozens of optical daggers pierce my side, but just as a good soldier should I looked straight to the front.

Without going into detail, suffice it to say that we spent the greater part of the night on our "tummies," creeping noiselessly through wet leaves and sliding down slippery banks, with nothing but the fire of the enemy machine guns and the flares of Very Lights to keep us company. But I felt no loneliness, for I knew that the thoughts of all the other boys were on me. The end finally came and we returned home. But the sad part was the next morning when, sleepy and tired, stiff and droopy-eyed, we were called to do the regular day's work. To attempt to describe the verbal "barrage" that was laid down around my person would be a task that the lack of time and sailors' English renders impossible, but it will be enough to say that had I not been able to secure the services of four or five of my buddies to serve as body guards there would have been about 135 pounds of Colorado flesh gently dropped into the historical waters of the Chattahoochee River, which flows by the camp.

But now that the smoke of the battle has cleared away and we have caught

up with our sleep I feel sure that every one feels that the night was profitably spent.

The association here in our class of men from all walks of life and all parts of the United States has had a very broadening effect on every member of the class. Among its members were several who did gallant service in the war overseas. Their experiences and viewpoint were very helpful.

* * *

That Boston Tea Party of Ponzi frenzied finance moves us to remark that every lost fortune cannot trace its troubles back to that time-honored and national indoor pastime—penny-ante.

* * *

Christmas Service

Let us help you with your Christmas remembrances. There's nothing more appropriate for a Christmas present than a subscription to a standard magazine or a good book. The Book Department of the Infantry Association is prepared to handle this business for you. Here is the scheme: Write us a letter stating the name of the magazine or the title of the book you desire sent and give the name and address of the person to whom you wish it sent. Send one of your visiting cards for each magazine or book. We will enter the subscription to begin with the January, 1921, number of the magazine and will forward to the recipient a nice Christmas card, together with your visiting card, informing him of the fact that you have remembered him this Christmas. This card will be mailed so as to arrive at its destination as nearly as practicable on Christmas Day. In the case of books, your card will be sent right along with the book.

This proposition will save you a lot of trouble and worry over your Christ-

mas presents and insures your wishes carried out exactly as you may direct. We are sure that you will be pleased with the results. We are starting this proposition early in order to be able to handle the rush at Christmas time. Enter your orders as early as possible.

* * *

His Approval.—Up in the Argonne, the Jerries were sending over shells, shrapnel and gas with disconcerting and monotonous regularity. Most of the Yanks had sought whatever meager shelter they could find, but along the road drifted one mule skinner, stolidly driving a load of supplies to the front. From a sheltered dugout a voice hailed him.

"Hey, feller, what d'yer think of the war now?"

The skinner reflected long and carefully and then made up his mind.

"She's a bear," he replied at last. "Giddap!"—American Legion Weekly.

* * *

Spies and Their Work

Quien, the spy who was tried and condemned in connection with Nurse Cavell's execution at Brussels, was one of a very large class. Volumes might be written on the psychology of the spy. They are not all of that adroit class which wears scarlet ribands across white dress shirts and confers with ambassadors. Their motives are as different as their social positions. During the war a great many persons in France committed acts which placed them in dangerous relations with their German invaders out of love for their country. "Pour la Patrie" was sufficient incentive and sufficient reward; they would have scorned any proffer of monetary recompense. There was another type which did dangerous things with splen-

did disregard of personal safety, but was not at all averse from accepting an "acknowledgment." And there was the person who made his definite bargain, looking upon the whole matter as a means to money.

A very useful type was the old villain who, long before the war, had made himself acquainted, for smuggling purposes, with all the ways of crossing frontiers. Some spies were in the dangerous position of working for both sides and receiving double rewards. It is difficult to decide whether these people doubled their danger or made their chances of safety twofold.

It is said by an English paper that there were several beautiful women who, while in occupied France, tried to cross the frontier at Evian-les-Bains in the guise of repatriates. They had been the mistresses of German or Austrian princelings, but the combined French and British Secret Service managed to "mop up" most of them.

During the war, after considerable vexatious experiences of having the enemy obtain most valuable information, it was finally determined by investigators that innocent-seeming small advertisements in the Paris newspapers, inserted mainly by persons who had come into occupied territory after having resided in the invaded zone, meant much to German officials who read them with the enlightenment of a cipher.

* * *

No one but a weak-kneed pacifist doubts the value of military training to the individual who experiences it. It is some time since "Preparedness" was a popular word, and since then the country has fought and won a war. The reaction from that war is upon us now, and we are in grave danger of relaps-

ing once more into the lethargy of pre-war days, which made us the most monumentally unprepared nation that ever entered a modern conflict.—Fall River (Mass.) News.

* * *

Another Recruiting Plan

A recruiting plan that was worked out with excellent results has come to our notice. An officer at the headquarters of the organization kept an accurate card index file of each man joining the regiment. Ten days later the recruit was brought before the officer, who had an intimate heart-to-heart talk with him. During this talk he was asked pertinent questions regarding his personal comfort and welfare since joining the regiment. Among other questions, the following were asked:

Are you getting good and sufficient food? Does your uniform fit, is it comfortable, etc? Have you sufficient blankets, do you sleep warm? Are you treated with impartial consideration in your company?

Is Army life, so far, as you expected? Have preparations been made for the educational instruction that you desire? Are you taking advantage of the athletic and recreational facilities?

The result of such a talk is obvious. It gives the recruit a feeling that he is being looked after, that someone is taking a personal interest in him. If he has a grievance he is given an opportunity to state it, and if legitimate that it will be taken up and corrected.

As a rule, the recruit is content and happy, getting along all right.

The officer then gets him to write a letter to each of three of his friends back home, telling them about the Army life and the advantages that the service offers to a man. The letter concludes with an invitation to the man written

to join the Army and come to that station for duty.

It is a fact that this plan filled up an organization and some to spare; it is well worth a trial in your regiment.

* * *

In the showing of a pictorial news weekly in a movie house in San Diego, the operator flashed on the screen a picture of two distinguished French generals riding in an automobile. Crowds lined the pavements, their umbrellas up and water dripping from their hats. Suddenly from the audience came the awed cry:

"My Gawd, it's still rainin' over there!"

* * *

The Last Night's Patrol

Some sing of the glories, 'tis the theme of their stories,

Of the slashing and crashing advance of the brave,

Of the crude jest outspoken of "Hell or Hoboken,"

Or the wild bayonet charge of the old first line wave.

Those were deeds that were thrillin', but, Pal, if you're willin',

I would just like to add a few names to the roll

Of those rare men, those dare man, those devil-may-care men,

Who bid us good-bye on the Last Night's Patrol.

In the roar and the rattle, the red flame of the battle,

On the slopes of the Argonne, Hill Two Eighty-one,

How we swept the woods singing, mad battle cries ringing,

O, it's "Hell or Hoboken," 'till the victory's won.

But I'd add to the story, just a faint touch of glory,

For the heroes unsung on the war's mighty scroll,

Of those cool men, damn-fool men, those iron-nerved rule men,

Who never came back from the Last Night's Patrol.

—LYLE DAVID.

* * *

A Patriotic Excuse.—Pat Sullivan, the company's star A. W. O. L. artist, had just returned from one of his periodicals. He was lined up before the "old man" for an unpleasant seance.

After the preliminaries the captain inquired, "Now what have you to say?"

"Sir," came the reply, "yesterday afternoon I started home. Arriving at the railroad station I found that I had only a moment to spare," then Sullivan hesitated.

"All right, what happened then?"

"Just then a band struck up 'The Star Spangled Banner' and I stood at attention and saluted."

"All right, what happened then?"

"Then, sir, by that time the train had gone."

* * *

Minor Tactics

There has been such a demand for the problems in Minor Tactics that have appeared in the columns of the INFANTRY JOURNAL in the past year, that we have assembled all of these problems and published them in book form which is now ready for distribution.

These problems were prepared at the Infantry School at Camp Benning and represent the most up-to-date doctrine of Infantry Minor Tactics. In order to keep the cost down the book has been bound with a durable paper cover which will be found to be very satisfactory. The situation with respect to cloth-bound books these

days is positively intolerable. It is almost impossible to produce one and the cost is most excessive. The advertisement for Minor Tactics appears in the advertising section at the front of this JOURNAL.

* * *

As time goes on we are going to have a considerable percentage of men, who saw active service during the war, in both branches of Congress. Men who know and appreciate the advantages and virtues of Universal Military Training. Men who will not want to see their sons go through the things that they had to endure during their own period of service. When these men get into the legislative branch in such numbers as to make themselves heard we may be assured of a system that will produce real preparedness which has for its inception Universal Military Training.

* * *

The Army's Friend

Our old friend, the Army Mutual Aid like the good soldier, gives honest and faithful service. Brushing aside technicalities of law and tricks of lawyers and speeding at the call of distress, it brings instant help to our widows and orphans.

Its ways are plain and simple. For the Adjutant General gets a wire and sends it to the treasurer a few yards away, who mails the whole benefit or, if preferred, wires half and mails the rest. No surer, swifter way can be found.

In this respect, *so vital*, how great the gulf between it and other companies! For tangled in meshes of legal delays, these limp on leaden feet through wretched months till the last inch of red tape is unwound.

Before the widow can touch the life-saving benefit, she must be put on the witness-stand, be harassed with all sorts of questions about facts and data and, through the slow-grinding mill of legalism, bring forth the utmost grain of evidence to make good her claim, which in justice is already as clear as the noonday sun.

Was she truly married? When, where, by whom? Who were the witnesses—are they still alive—where do they live? Has she her marriage certificate or is it in the strong box across the Pacific? Are the children truly hers and his—when, where, in whose presence were they born? Had she been divorced or separated? etc., etc., ad infinitum.

Letters must be sent to places far away and answers waited for. Cruel waste of precious time; lawyers' fees; mental perplexity; physical weariness; and all heavy burdens are laid upon her. Such are the ways of civilian companies!

It is hoped that Uncle Sam in his War Risk plans will be more prompt, and maybe he will. And yet he will ask for facts and data often hard to give, but without which payment will be delayed many months.

Moreover, inadvertence, lack of forethought, ignorance of legal toils or other venial neglects of her husband, may weave a net of circumstance, which, unseen before but laid bare after his death, will obscure the legality of her claim which, otherwise would be gladly allowed but must now be deferred, maybe, for years.

As to rates per thousand in the Army Mutual Aid and in the War Risk plans, comparison of the following tables shows the difference to be negligible.

It will be agreed, I think, that the extreme limit of 45 years for membership is wise.

Age	Army Mutual	War Risk
21.....	\$13.77	\$13.82
22.....	14.11	14.18
23.....	14.51	14.53
24.....	14.85	14.88
25.....	15.24	15.24
26.....	15.65	15.59
27.....	16.08	15.95
28.....	16.52	16.42
29.....	16.98	16.89
30.....	17.47	17.36
31.....	17.97	17.84
32.....	18.50	18.31
33.....	19.05	18.90
34.....	19.63	19.49
35.....	20.24	20.08
36.....	20.88	20.79
37.....	21.55	21.38
38.....	22.27	22.33
39.....	23.03	22.92
40.....	23.83	23.74
41.....	24.66	24.69
42.....	25.55	25.52
43.....	26.48	26.58
44.....	27.46	27.64
45.....	28.48	28.71

The well-being and morale of the Army in coming years will be helped in no small degree by the prosperity of the Army Mutual Aid. For how many cares, how many worries, how many anxious days will be cast out of its daily life if *all* eligible officers become members? They will then see with their own eyes its deeds of love and hold in their own hands its sure promises of swift charity. There will be more peaceful minds, more cheery hearts, more willing workers, more happy families, more smiling faces, a more thankful and satisfied Army.

Not one sound reason can be given why all eligible officers should not be members, but many can be urged why they should. If "one touch of nature makes the world kin," it will surely make all members of the Association

brothers, and the generous principle of mutual aid, which gives its name and declares its purpose will in time bind together the hearts of the Army in a federation of love.

In all its long life—even in the World War—the Army Mutual Aid has never failed. And yet, like all institutions—*and especially the best ones*—it needs in this cold world the loyal support of friends. Does not nature itself teach us that disloyalty here would be a shameful thing to the whole Army? It would show a narrow selfishness dangerous to the noble spirit that quickens comradeship, morale and esprit. And in view of what is said above, it would in too many instances heap greater distress upon our widows and orphans.

To shun the evil and further the good we have tried to point out, what should hinder a lively, perpetual propaganda to make known the virtues of the Army Mutual Aid and to persuade by clear, logical facts, that all can do good, not only to themselves, but to their comrades also and, above all, to the service, if they will but stand shoulder to shoulder in this organization of mutual kindness.

To educate potential members, let us build up a great academy to have as branches, the War Department itself; all headquarters; all service schools; all service journals; all regiments and corps; all military posts and stations; the patriotic press; and, last but not least, the Military Academy at West Point. But, *best of all*, our women and children.

Its purpose must be to unite in the Army Mutual Aid Association all the eligible officers of the Army. Its fulfillment will create not only the strongest insurance organization in the

world, but also, as a by-product, a spirit of comradeship, a morale, an esprit till then unknown.

As our old friend has given millions in the past, so let us hold up his hands and resolve he shall not be disabled from giving millions in the future.

"I count myself in nothing else so happy as in my soul remembering my good friends."

JOHN C. GRESHAM,
Colonel, U. S. Army, Retired.

* * *

For Emergency.—"In case they send me up for long," said the old offender, facing his steenth court-martial, to his buddy, "look under my mattress and you'll find something I've been saving up for a rainy day. It won't do me no good, where I'm going. You can have it."

He got a six months' sentence and the buddy raced all the way back to the barracks to probe under the mattress. He found—

A shelter half.

* * *

Locates in Washington

Lieut. Col. Jennings C. Wise, who has been a valued contributor to the columns of the INFANTRY JOURNAL during the past year, has been established permanently in Washington as the general counsel of the law firm of Munn, Anderson & Munn, of New York and Washington. Colonel Wise saw active service in France as a battalion commander in the 318th Infantry of the 80th Division. After the armistice he was assigned to duty in the Historical Section at General Headquarters. Since demobilization he has been a member of the War Claims

Board in Washington. Colonel Wise's offices are in the Southern Building.

* * *

Playing Safe.—"Rastus, how is it you have given up going to church?" asked Pastor Brown.

"Well, sah," replied Rastus, "it's dis way: I likes to take an active part, an' I used to pass de collection basket, but dey's give de job to Brothah Green, who just returned from ovah thai-ah."

"In recognition of his heroic service, I suppose?"

"No, sah, I reckon he got dat job in reco'nition o' his having lost one o' his hands."—*The Argonaut.*

* * *

The Reeve Memorial Prize Essay

The Reeve Memorial Prize Essay of the Military Service Institution of the United States, offered by Brig. Gen. C. McC. Reeve in memory of his father, the late Bvt. Brig. Gen. I. V. D. Reeve, U. S. Army, is announced.

Subject: The lessons of the World War as applied to our detailed staff system: and the effect of modifications of this system contained in the Act of June 4, 1920.

The prize is \$70 in gold. The conditions of the contest are:

The essay is to be between 3,000 and 4,500 words.

The Board of Award to consist of three General Officers, the names to be announced later.

The essays are to be submitted not later than March 1, 1921. They are to be submitted in quadruplicate, typewritten, and are to be sent to the Secretary of the Institution, Chaplain Edmund Banks Smith, Governors Island, New York.

The author shall adopt a nom de plume and sign the same to the essay. A sealed envelope bearing the nom de plume of the writer on the outside and

inclosing full name and address should accompany the essay.

The envelopes are to be opened in the presence of the Council after the decision of the Board of Award has been received.

The successful essay will be published in the INFANTRY JOURNAL as soon after the award as practicable.

* * *

Southern Hospitality.—It was in one of those southern cities where the natives outdid each other in hospitality toward the soldiers. A certain captain received the following invitation one morning:

"Dear Captain Smith—May we request the pleasure of your company at dinner this evening at," etc., etc.

The hostess fell in a dead faint that night when 250 pairs of hobbled feet trounded up to the door.

* * *

Army Ordnance

We welcome **Army Ordnance** into the circle of military publications.

This new addition is the organ of the Army Ordnance Association. Handsome and attractive from cover to cover and brimful of matters of interest to its readers, the new magazine makes a splendid showing from the very beginning.

The Army Ordnance Association has for its object the promotion of the industrial preparedness of the United States—a most worthy cause—and its membership is open to all citizens who are available to the Government in connection with ordnance activities.

The headquarters of the Association is in the Munsey Building. The secretary and editor of the magazine is Maj. J. L. Walsh, Ordnance Department, and Mr. Harry P. Taber is consulting editor.

We wish **Army Ordnance** much success and feel confident that the new magazine will receive the hearty support that it so richly deserves.



Editorial Department

War Trophies, Etc.

There appears to be no logical way of accounting for the mental processes of some people. Like the family dog, these processes seem to delight in jumping the beaten track, straying aimlessly afield, and returning from time to time with wagging tail to claim admiring attention. Occasionally it is interesting to submit such processes to analytical consideration, just as it is sometimes interesting to observe the movements of the family dog as he bounds hither and thither and to speculate as to the purpose, if any, that actuates him in his vagaries.

Something of this kind is suggested by the utterances of a contributor to the *Christian Herald*, who finds fault with a lot of us for seeking to perpetuate the memory of our fallen dead through a display of captured trophies and war memorials. He says:

An offense to the eye that we cannot brook is the display of trophies of destruction from the World War. It was a gross act to send to this country, or to any country, relics of the conflict, reminders of only one thing—a vast territory, almost a continent, full of carnage and death. There is no slightest satisfaction in the bosom of any true-hearted human being, especially those who actually won the cause for the world or their relatives, in looking at howitzers or great shells.

We resent and despise guns from the victors or the vanquished. Every time we pass them on common or campus we revolt from the demeaned taste that can find any satisfaction in such pitiless devices of a world's madness. They perform not a single useful purpose, these cruel creations of steel.

We have no doubt that the rude

cannon and cannon balls that are still strewn over this country, tribute from the Civil War, not to mention the sculptured horrors of soldiers in granite that mock the centers of 10,000 cities and towns in this country, had as much to do with the nurture of the militaristic disposition of many of our people as any other factor, including the hateful conceit that we were poisoned in our history books. If our college authorities have the sense and ideals that they ought to have, they will see some way to put these monstrous and suggestive barbarities out of sight. They are a disgrace to liberal education. Bury them deep. Keep them away from the people, the children. Otherwise the attempt to build up a society of nations will be so much impeded. We cannot glorify the engines of war, nor erect bristling statues of warriors in heroic size, and expect the exaltation of brotherhood and peace. We cannot serve Christ and Mars.

One thing is certain—somebody is off the beaten track.

Who is it—the writer of the above quotation, or the rest of the world?

Is it possible that all of the world has been all wrong all of these years since the human breast began to respond to the emotion of gratitude?

Let us reason about this a little,

History leads us to believe that from the beginning of civilization it has been customary for those to whom gratitude is not unknown to pay tribute of respect and admiration to those of their fellow men who have labored unselfishly in the service of right and justice. Further, those who have carried this spirit of self-sacrifice to the point of giving their lives for a worthy cause have generally been regarded as fit subjects for such

forms of veneration as we mortals are capable of contriving.

In one fashion or another, perhaps inadequate and inappropriate, we seek to keep alive their memory and the memory of their deeds as a constant inspiration to the rest of us to emulate their spirit. In this way, we endeavor to give them permanency in the life for which they have labored and suffered. It is, perhaps, a poor and futile way, but it is the best we can do. No memorial, however imposing, can compensate for the sacrifice of a God-given life. No earthly tribute can ever serve as a balm to the hearts that must go on breaking through years of longing for a loved one passed beyond. We can only do our best to show in some material way the gratitude we feel toward those who have gone beyond and the sympathy we extend to those who must carry their sorrow to their graves.

In thus seeking to confer mortal glory on our heroic dead we but follow the teachings of the Bible. That holy Book tells us in effect that he who lays down his life that his fellow man may live shall have eternal life. We seek only to provide temporary glory; the Creator has provided for eternal glory.

After all, it is largely a question of what we feel. Some of us have one way of showing our feelings; others have another way. The important thing is to be sure that we have the right kind of feelings and then to show them one way or another.

How about the practical side of such displays?

Our critic complains that the trophies and memorials of the Civil War scattered over the country had much to do with "the nurture of the militaristic disposition of many of our people."

Considering the situation into which

this country found itself forced on April 6, 1917, it is difficult to conceive of a "militaristic disposition on the part of many of our people" as being exactly a handicap. Indeed, when we think of the deplorable condition in which the country found itself on that memorable day, we might have wished for more trophies and memorials throughout the land or that those we had might have exercised a heartier influence over more of our people.

Again, it is merely a question of our feelings. Some of us feel that this country is worth fighting for in a pinch and we don't mind being reminded of it from time to time.

In plain English, people whose sensibilities revolt at the sight of these pitiful memorials to our fallen heroes ought to take something for it. They need something to build up their red-blood corpuscles and combat the anaemia in their mental processes. Whether they know it or not, they are well on their way toward a disease called pacifism, and, if they hope for relief, they must act promptly.

We are reliably informed that many of our most disagreeable emotions, such as fear, disgust and the like, are wholly psychological, resulting from hyper-sensitive imaginations. The cure recommended is to bring ourselves in contact with the objects of our fear, disgust, etc., analyze them, admit them, look them squarely in the face and, we are told, all disagreeable sensations will disappear.

It might be worth while for some of those who are disagreeably affected by the sight of our war trophies and memorials to try a little experiment in elementary psychology. As a suggestion, they might get out and rub elbows with a few of the chaps who waded in

and dragged some of those same trophies out of the hell of battle and made it possible to send them back here for others to look at. The point of view of those fellows might aid toward clarifying the situation. They would at least, be able to state how they feel about it when they see such trophies scattered around on our commons and campuses.

The foregoing is merely a suggestion. Of course it might not work. We cannot vouch for the unlimited application of this phase of psychology. We have tried it out only in cases like cold baths, castor oil and contact with sweat-grimed soldiers. It works successfully in such cases and it ought to work in the case of war trophies.

①

Disgracing the Uniform

The uniform of the Army is being used to camouflage the operations of swindlers throughout the length and breadth of the land. Many ingenious schemes are being employed to extract money from the pockets of the unsuspecting public. In not one case out of a dozen has the petty swindler who pretends to be a veteran of the war ever been in the service and not one in a hundred of them has seen service overseas in a combat outfit.

The police hesitate to interfere with the operations of the "poor wounded veteran" who is trying to make an "honest dollar" and in many of the rural communities they have no means of checking up on the impostor.

In one case that has been brought to our attention the "veteran" plied his trade as a book agent, distributing a handsome volume of the history of the war. He wears on his chest the American and many of the foreign ribbons,

including the Legion of Honor and the *Croix de Guerre*. He takes orders for the book, extracting from the prospect anything from a deposit of 50 cents up to the full price of the book, which is \$3.00. His neatly printed subscription blanks are duly signed and receipted and the books are supposed to be forwarded direct from the publisher—a fictitious concern—when the balance due is to be paid by the subscriber.

The collections of the lone man in one locality amounted to several thousand dollars, and he has gotten away with it. He has not been apprehended. He is sure to show up again in another locality, when he should be taken in.

Another and more imaginative uniform swindler travels around the country giving lectures on the World War. At the termination of his spill a collection is taken up for the "poor wounded soldiers" who languish in our hospitals. His sad tale of how the Government and the War Risk authorities are so sadly neglecting the men who fought the nation's battles makes a touching appeal and the pocketbooks are dumped into the collection plates. Not a cent of this money ever reaches a wounded soldier. It all goes into the pockets of the swindler.

Up in New York an army of crooks is engaged in distributing soldier joke books. They pass through the subway and elevated trains and hand out the books for examination. They then return on a collection round. If the unhappy victim attempts to hand back the book instead of a quarter he is made the butt of ill-tempered abuse. It is not seen why the railway authorities permit any such practice in their cars, unless it may be that many of the employees, being ex-service men themselves, hesitate to interfere with a

"buddy" who is trying to get along in the world. But this buddy is not a buddy at all. It is more than likely that he has never been in the service.

This same thing is being done right here in Washington and in face of the continued protests of officers of the Army continues. Two of the swindlers operate all over the business and financial district. They sell for 25 cents a copy a soldier booklet of jokes that probably costs about 5 cents to produce. They hold up pedestrians on the sidewalk and ply their trade day in and day out. The attention of the police authorities has been called to these men and means for eliminating them have been suggested, but it is impossible to get action. They have been brought before the courts time and again only to be released.

It is high time we were putting a stop to this nefarious business. The uniform of the Army must not continue to be thus disgraced. The thing has been broken up in Washington except for the case noted above. Efforts have been made and will continue to be made until this last blotch is eradicated.

Officers of the Army throughout the country should be on the lookout for these cases and wherever they are found immediate steps should be taken to compel the police to act. This is the one best means of eradicating the evil.

Ⓢ

Who is Responsible?

That one-horse wagon did not take its deadly cargo of T. N. T. unplanned and undirected to the strategic spot on Wall Street, where it exploded and piled up corpses like cordwood in the streets of our greatest city and wounded and maimed scores of our good American citizens who were going quietly

about their day's tasks, with little thought of their peril.

Who is responsible for this diabolical deed? Who made the plans with such infinite cunning and skill? These are questions that give us food for thought. They again bring us face to face with the signs of the times. To the thoughtful man this last outrage, along with others that have taken place in the recent past, shatters the widespread delusion to the effect that nothing can happen that will injure or destroy this great Republic.

Let us draw aside the curtain from recent world events and see what is revealed! Everywhere today there is revolt, sedition, unrest. Abroad great cities boil with passion. In Russia civilization lies bleeding and half dead at the feet of arch-conspirators who seek to destroy the very fabric of the nation. Look you towards Italy where a class war with its onset of rabid, armed men who spread havoc and destruction. In Ireland the spat of snipers' bullets may ever be heard. Report has it that China is fast coming under the influence of the destroyers of nations and there is danger of a repetition of the outrages of the Boxer rebellion that shocked the civilized world.

Come closer home. After two nights of race riots in the National Capital Federal troops had to be called upon to take charge of affairs. In Chicago, 26 dead were collected one morning within the boundaries of a few city blocks, the results of one night's rioting. Seattle graces the list with a planned revolution that ended in the murder of marching ex-soldiers of the A. E. F. in the streets of Centralia. Boston has had its looting mobs. The mining regions of the Alleghany Mountain system have been in a state

of turmoil which required the employment of troops of the Regular Army on at least two occasions. Then comes the Wall Street outrage last month. All of this has happened within the short period of one year. Where will it end?

Let us confess that our land holds many I. W. W.'s, many Communists, many alien Socialists who preach and want action through the medium of the firebrand, the bullet and the bombshell. The ringleaders of these are aliens, aliens in race and in name, men who have no stake in this country. Aliens who dodged the draft behind the skirts of their alien status when they were called upon to serve in time of need. Aliens who demanded exemption from military service took their discharge and went back to the jobs that our loyal fighting men had vacated.

These are the Bolsheviks of today—the parlor Bolsheviks—the outright murdering Bolsheviks, who, posing as the friends of the millions and millions of their poor, misguided and ignorant countrymen, seek to fire their passions, incite their hate, rouse their jealousy, and finally spur them onto deeds of violence, under the cover of which they themselves may carry on, in security, their nefarious trade of destruction and loot. Their stock in trade is class-hate and class-jealousy. They gain their livelihood by the degradation of their fellowmen and undermining their faith in our free institutions. Their seeds of discontent are sowed broadcast. Every one comes up and bears a fiery coal drawn fresh from the depths of Hell itself. Their influence hangs over the nation with a pall wherever it is permitted to penetrate.

Note you their names. Their origi-

nal birth names. You will find no true American name among them. Where you happen to find one look to the origin of its possessor. He is masquerading under it.

What are we going to do about it? How long will the true American people bear the burden that is being imposed upon them? Will we awake to the peril before it is too late? The day is fast approaching when we Americans must assert ourselves in the declaration that America's free institutions shall be preserved and that this fair land shall not be despoiled by these Twentieth Century barbarians who are today responsible for *the dastardly outrages that are perpetrated.*



Lost Mail

A certain very lively "Weekly," published in New York City and mostly written by one man, takes great delight in publishing tales of delayed delivery of mails said to be due to the inefficiency of a certain Politicomaster General. Follows an experience that we are going to write the "Weekly" about when we get time. During the past month there were handed to us some thirty pieces of mail matter bearing postmarked dates in October and November, 1919. These letters were from numerous friends of the Association who wanted books or information, and at least five of them contained applications for membership and checks in payment of dues. The total value of all the checks inclosed was something over \$200.

Within the year we have had an unusual number of letters from friends saying they had made remittances for books or in payment of accounts only to have them ignored, and some impa-

tient ones have even gone so far as to criticise our lack of promptness and business methods. The delayed receipt of our November, 1919, mail must be our principal apology for any seeming neglect in the past. How much more of our mail is still in transit we do not know. We have written the correspondents whose delayed letters have just been received, and if there are others who have not received answers to letters, it may be their letters are still in transit and in good time will be duly delivered.



The Victory Medal

The War Department made elaborate plans for the distribution of the Victory Medal. It is understood that the applications for that decoration are not forthcoming in the volume that was anticipated. What is the matter with the Medal? Why are the veterans of the war not interested? It may be that a veteran writing to the *American Legion Weekly* has struck the keynote. He says:

The reason why some ex-soldiers are not applying for the Victory Medal goes back to the original mistake in providing for them. There never should have been any difference in these medals, except for those of wounded men. I know dozens of old soldiers who were crazy to get in the fighting, after years of peace-time service, who were compelled to soldier in the United States while newly drafted recruits were sent, often against their wills, direct to the fighting front. Can you blame these old heads for not wanting a medal which publishes their hard luck?

This may explain the reason why the veterans who did not get to the battle front are not taking their medals, but it does not explain why the thousands who were with combat divisions do not take

the trouble to apply for them. Perhaps some of our readers can supply the answer. If so, let's have it!



Professional Baseball

Professional baseball has thrived in this country because the people thought it was an honest, square game where the best team won. If, in the light of recent events, they are convinced that it is crooked or that it has been used by crooks to further their own designs, interest in the game will cease.

There is no sport in a game that has been "fixed" or has been bought. It must be straight or the people will not patronize it. If there is one crooked club in the league it will affect all the other clubs because the interest in the game is two-fold—the individual game and the pennant race.

There was a time, years ago, when the game came under suspicion. Gamblers followed the game and made pools on the results. A suspicion was voiced that everything was not as it should be. An investigation was had and some of the players were punished. The sport was purged of the taint and the national game restored. Up until recently there has never been a word of suspicion. But now charges have been made. It is alleged that certain teams have been playing crooked games at the behest of professional gambling interests. It is even charged that last year's World's Championship series was "fixed."

A court inquiry has been invoked in Chicago. It should cut to the bone. No stone should be left unturned to ferret out the guilty parties. The scandal must be cleared and baseball purged, even though it may cost the services of some of the most skillful players

of the game. Any man who is found guilty should be forever debarred from the diamond. The results of the investigation should be published in detail. If it is found that the charges are unfounded baseball should be given the benefit of such a finding by the press of the country. If it is found that the charges are sustained and baseball takes the necessary steps to apply an efficacious remedy the people should know it. In any event the matter should be given due publicity whatever the finding of the court.

If professional baseball is to endure the whole thing must be settled now.



None So Deaf . . .

“. . . Moreover, just now our readers would seem especially to lack interest in that (the military) field.”

This comes from the editorial office of one of our most widely read publications. It is a fair sample of the reports from other editorial offices. It should be conclusive evidence with regard to the attitude of the reading public for the reason that our editors are, of necessity, keen interpreters of the trend of public interest. They have to be because their success depends upon knowing what their readers want and supplying just that and nothing else.

Accepting it as a fact that the people of the country lack interest in military matters to the point where they do not care even to read about them, we are presented with food for serious thought.

The world has never known a more generally unsettled period than the present. Actual war prevails over an appreciable fraction of the globe. Domestic unrest, amounting in some cases to open insurrection against established

forms of government, is rife in other considerable sections of the world. Social unrest of serious proportions and potentialities appears almost universal. Diplomatic relations over the world are by no means free from strain. In a word, no country on earth is today immune from the possibilities of trouble of one kind or another.

In our own case, we have just emerged from an experience whose chief moral points to the ease with which we may become involved in serious trouble not of our own making—yet on top of all that, past, present and prospective, our reading public is not interested in topics of a military character!

What can the answer be?

One possible answer is that the people of the country do not care particularly what becomes of the country. In the light of what they did two years ago, it is difficult to believe such a thing.

Another answer is that the people do not think, and this seems to be more probable.

Why do they not think?

Primarily because they are too busy taking stock of their private concerns and, in going about the operation, they are making use of the wrong end of the telescope. Because private concerns are pressing, they make the mistake of glueing their noses to them, ignoring the fundamental principle that private affairs are merely a tiny reflection of the affairs of the nation.

Another reason why they do not think is that the national thought-habit does not incline that way. Because our people are open and aboveboard in all of their dealings, they assume that everybody else is the same.

Finally, they do not think, because

ever so often somebody comes along with a proposed peace panacea to lull any possible awakening on their part and coax them back to unwary slumber.

Of course, the people of this country are fed up with war, and with good reason. We are ourselves. All of us have had enough war for a lifetime. We are hoping and praying that we may never have another war—all of which is a mighty good reason why we ought to sit up and take a particularly active interest in doing all that we can to prevent war.

From time to time various schemes designed to do away with war have been brought forward. Up to date, none of them has operated with conspicuous success. So far, the best prophylactic for war appears to be preparedness for it.

However, admitting that all of this is an open question, the only way to get at the truth is to study the subject pro and con, analyze it, sift it down to bed-rock facts and come to a decision one way or the other. Ignoring the whole business will never get us anywhere.

No American, with the real interests of the country at heart, will question the vital importance of arriving at some solution that will insure the peace and safety of this country and, incidentally, a measure of tranquility for ourselves.

It is an open question—How?

It seems only square to make it a subject for debate in open forum.

Some of us may have something to suggest toward a solution.

Lend us your ear, Mr. Fellow Citizen.

We promise to play the game fairly.



Vacancies at Soldiers' Home

Information has been received that there are a number of vacancies at the

National Soldiers' Home at Washington, D. C., available for deserving soldiers whose service qualifies them for entrance.

Army Regulations provide that the following classes of soldiers—men who are now in the service or who have been honorably discharged—are entitled to admission to the Home:

(a) Any soldier who has served honestly and faithfully twenty years or more.

(b) Any invalid or disabled soldier who has had service in war.

(c) Any soldier rendered incapable of earning a livelihood by reason of disease or wounds incurred in line of duty and not the result of his own misconduct.

Men of class (b) and (c) are not entitled to remain in the Home after their disabilities are removed or they have become able to earn a competency by their own labor, if under 50 years of age.

Paragraph 179 of the Army Regulations indicates the procedure to be employed for the admission of a soldier who is now in the service.

When a former soldier who is eligible under the classification noted in (a), (b) and (c) desires admission to the Home, he should make application direct to the Board of Commissioners, National Soldiers' Home, Washington, D. C.

In the application he should give a full statement of his service, showing dates of enlistment and organizations in which he has served and indicating what part of this service has been in the war.

If the application for admission is based on disability, the applicant should furnish evidence of the nature and de-

gree of the disability. This should be in the form of a certificate of an officer of the Medical Corps or a reputable physician in civil life.

Infantry officers should take advantage of this opportunity to fill these vacancies at the Home with deserving infantry soldiers whom they may know. When the opportunity offers, the Soldiers' Home feature of the Military Service should be employed as recruiting arguments. Here is an institution that provides the man who has served the country with a place where he will be taken care of when he needs it—a place where he is entitled to go to.

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Infantry Journal Prize

Sergt. John F. Schaub, 61st Infantry, won the \$50 INFANTRY JOURNAL prize for allocated recruiters. Canvassing in the Atlanta District he secured the greatest number of applicants for the Infantry during the month of September. Seventeen prospective recruits were started for the depots as a result of Sergeant Schaub's efforts.

Sergt. J. J. McMahan, 9th Field Signal Battalion, was second with 13 applicants secured in the Des Moines District. Sergt. Jim Bobo, allocated to the Nashville District, was third.

The conditions surrounding the contest provided that the total number of actual enlistments should not be less than 80 per cent of the applicants and that the total number of Infantry applicants should not be less than 40 per cent of the total number of applicants

forwarded from the district. These provisions aided the winners, as Corp. Felix Olino, 45th Infantry, of the Harrisburg District, sent 19 applicants to the Recruit Depot, but only 73 per cent of these were enlisted. Sergt. Major Healey, 2d Infantry, and Private Treadwell, 60th Infantry, sent 15 and 14 applicants respectively, but did not comply fully with the terms of the contest.

The total number of applicants accepted for all arms during the month of September was 16,239. The Infantry received 6,360, about 39 per cent.

Col. Charles H. Martin, officer in charge of Recruiting Division is of the opinion that the INFANTRY JOURNAL prize has stimulated the interest in Infantry recruiting to such an extent that canvassers will continue to make special efforts to fill our arm. He has written a letter of congratulations to the winner of the contest expressing his appreciation of the efforts of Sergt. Schaub and of the generosity of the INFANTRY JOURNAL.

Colonel Martin believes that while 6,360 applicants is an exceptionally high number, continuous efforts on the part of all Infantrymen will be necessary if the authorized strength is to be reached speedily. The figures for September showed that there were 59,401 men in the Infantry, including the Tank Corps. This is about 55 per cent of the authorized strength. Disregarding discharges and desertions, 50,600 men are necessary to fill the ranks, but Colonel Martin is sanguine that by January 1 prospects will look very much brighter.

Reserve Officers' Department

Minor Tactics

PROBLEM NO. 10—ATTACK OF MACHINE-GUN NEST

Special Situation No. 1:

SOLUTION

Using arm signal I halt my platoon. Send scout back to join line of scouts. Send runner back to leader of 1st section directing leader of section to join me. With leader of 1st section I move up to a position near edge of woods where crest at 443 can be clearly seen. The section leader and I, by the use of field glasses, make a systematic search for the enemy position.

DISCUSSION

My reasons for halting the platoon was to prevent the platoon coming under effective hostile fire, without first having sufficient knowledge of the enemy target to enable the platoon to return the fire with fair results.

The scout who gave me the information is returned to his position in the line of scouts, that being his proper place when not on more important missions. His presence with me would be of little value at this time.

I order the leader of the 1st section to join me in order that he may be present when the target is located. I will employ his section for fire on the target. By seeing the target and receiving the fire order from me personally, better results will be obtained.

It is not necessary to have the 2d section leader present at this time. The 2d section would not be employed against the target until after the 1st section has begun to develop the enemy position.

Special Situation No. 2:

SOLUTION

I point out the target to the section leader. I call to one of the scouts, firing tracer ammunition, for his range, providing his shots are striking near the target. If unable to obtain the range by the above method the section leader and I will estimate the distance, taking the mean of the estimates. I then issue the following order to the section leader:

Go back to your section, deploy it in line of skirmishers, and advance to a fire position on this line of scouts. Range 500 yards. Each

squad will cover the entire target. I then send a runner back to the 2d section directing section leader to hold his section in present place and for the section leader to report to me. I send a message to the captain telling him that my platoon is attacking an enemy machine gun nest on crest at 443.

DISCUSSION

In pointing out the target to the section leader I assure myself that he fully understands the extent of the target. Little difficulty should be experienced in locating the target from tracer ammunition. The range is easily obtained where a scout is firing tracer ammunition and hitting near the enemy position.

The section is deployed in line of skirmishers under cover of the woods. To move up to the line of scouts in small columns would perhaps prove fatal, a machine gun could destroy a squad column with a short burst of fire.

I direct that each squad cover the entire target, this assures that in case of an advance on the part of a single squad no part of enemy target would be left uncovered.

I remain in position of observation, send for the leader of the second section in order to familiarize him with the situation. I will also have the 2d section leader at hand if it becomes necessary to employ his section.

Special Situation No. 3:

SOLUTION

Having pointed out to the leader of the 2d section the target and also the firing line of the 1st section, I then direct the leader of the section as follows:

Take your section around the immediate left of the 1st section and, by infiltration, form a firing line on that road (pointing to the cut). When your line has formed, work a squad around to the left, in order to bring flanking fire, particularly of the automatic and rifle grenades on the enemy's right. With the remainder of your section open a heavy fire on the enemy position. When your section has opened fire I will direct the 1st section to begin advancing to the

road on your right. When the 1st section has reached the road you will then advance your section to the left around the enemy's right and when within assaulting distance advance on the position using marching fire. The 1st section will not advance beyond the road until the enemy position is occupied by you.

DISCUSSION

The 2d section of an infantry platoon is a reinforcing and maneuver unit. To capture a machine-gun nest one must combine fire and movement. One section beating down the enemy's fire while the other is attempting to get forward, or to get on the flank of the enemy position. The capture can not, as a rule, be made until you have reached the enemy position. To reach the position a well directed rifle fire must be used. One or two automatic rifles must attempt to reach the flank of the position. Troops must close to a position (150 to 200 yards) where rifle grenades may be used. When within assaulting distance one section advances using marching fire while the other section covers by fire their advance up to an area where such fire would endanger the advancing troops. It is also wise for a part of the attack to be in position ready for immediate action in case the assaulting troops are driven back or otherwise fail.

Special Situation No. 4:

SOLUTION

I direct the leader of the 1st section to move his section forward at once. The section to remain deployed as skirmishers and to be preceded by the scouts of the section. To pass

through the position formerly held by the enemy and continue to advance as the assault section.

I now move rapidly up to the 2d section and direct the section leader to send the prisoners to the rear under guard of one man to each five prisoners. I further direct him to reorganize what remains of his section and to follow as the support section of the platoon. I then take my proper place, following the scouts of the 1st section.

DISCUSSION

The section engaged in cleaning up the enemy position is doubtless more disorganized and is performing more important work than the section on the road. It is essential that the advance continue without further interruption. After the capture of a position it is the first duty of a platoon leader to reorganize his troops and continue the advance. To continue the advance at the earliest practicable moment direct the advance of that section best prepared to do so.

To prevent unnecessary guards going to the rear with prisoners I caution the section leader to see that this is properly attended to.

I see that the 1st section is pushed rapidly through the position formerly held by the enemy. I follow my scouts, leaving the reorganization of the 2d section to the section leader. Machine guns are usually echeloned in depth and it is reasonable to believe that my platoon will soon meet with further resistance. In an advance the platoon leader must be in a position where he can first see the situation. From looking at the terrain I next expect resistance from the high ground near 421.



PROBLEM NO. 11

A COMBAT PATROL

Map: Emmitsburg 3-inch Sheet¹

General Situation:

A Blue army advancing west has been driving a Red army slowly before it. The Blue advance has reached the eastern edge of the Emmitsburg sheet. The Red Army has been contesting stubbornly the Blue advance.

Special Situation No. 1 (Blue):

The 60th Blue brigade is attacking on a front of 1,200 yards with its left on the main road into Emmitsburg from the east. Each regiment is

attacking with one battalion in assault and two in reserve.

The 1st Battalion, 29th Blue Infantry is the assault battalion of the left regiment of the brigade. It is disposed as follows: Companies C and D are the right and left assault companies, respectively, and are deployed from roadfork 404 to cross roads 421. Companies A and B are the reserve companies and are 400 yards east of the assault companies. Company A is on the right.

¹Copies of the Emmitsburg Sheet, on which this problem is based, may be obtained from the U. S. Infantry Association at 10 cents each.

You command the 1st Platoon of Company A. You were present when the major of your battalion issued his order 300 yards northeast of 421 at 9.00 p.m., August 31, for the advance the next day.

Extract of Major's Order:

The enemy has apparently organized positions immediately in our front. Our division continues the advance tomorrow. The 28th Infantry will be on our right. The 42d will be on our left. The 2d and 3d Battalions of our regiment will be in reserve.

This battalion will advance at 5:00 a.m. on a front of 600 yards with its left on the 421-422 road to TOMS CREEK and thereafter with its left on a straight line in prolongation of that road. Magnetic azimuth of advance 303 degrees.

Companies will advance in the order in which the battalion is now deployed. Each assault company will attack on a front of 300 yards with two platoons in assault and two in support. Company D is the base company. The reserve companies will follow the assault at 400 yards.

The two machine gun platoons now supporting the assault companies will continue in that capacity. The other platoon will follow the reserve companies and provide anti-aircraft protection.

The light mortar and 1-pounder section will support the advance from between the assault and reserve companies.

The 1st Platoon, Company A, will protect the right flank of the battalion and will maintain contact with the assault battalion of the 28th Infantry during the advance.

.....

I will follow the assault companies in the center of the battalion sector.

Your platoon is located 800 yards northeast of 421 along the creek on the boundary between your battalion and the battalion on the right, slightly in advance of the reserve companies. Your platoon is in section columns with 75 yards distance between sections. You have sentinels, who are not scouts, posted to observe to the front and flanks. You have learned that the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry is the assault battalion of that regiment.

Required:

The order which you give to your platoon and the method by which you give it.

Special Situation No. 2:

At 5.00 a.m. your platoon was located 800 yards northeast of 421 along the creek, with the scouts forward observing the assault companies. You were 100 yards south of your platoon watching the progress of the attack. When the assault companies of both battalions advanced west of the 452-404-421 road you moved your platoon forward to 404. You have one pair of scouts 150 yards southwest of 404 observing your battalion; one pair 100 yards west of 404 observing up the draw to the west; and have ordered one pair to the house 500 yards northwest of 404 to report on the progress of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry. You are 150 yards northeast of 404 observing the progress of the attack.

You observe that the left assault company of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry gives way to the right, avoids the crest west of you and leaves a gap of about 200 yards between battalions. You see your own battalion held up in front of the woods east of hill 466. Your right pair of scouts reports that the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry has advanced about 600 yards west of the 452-404-421 road and is attacking the woods 300 yards north of hill 466.

Required:

Your action. Give reasons.

Special Situation No. 3:

You moved your platoon northwest up the creek to the house 500 yards northwest of 404, thence southwest in the direction of hill 466 to the wire fence corner 600 yards north 30 degrees west of 404. Your advance up the slope was in skirmish line in two waves preceded by scouts. As your scouts reach the crest 75 yards northeast of the wire fence corner they are fired on from hill 466. They drop to the ground and return the fire with tracer ammunition.

Required:

Your action with reasons.

Special Situation No. 4:

Your platoon is deployed along the crest near the wire fence corner 600 yards north 30 degrees west of 404 facing hill 466. The enemy has retired from hill 466. You see the scouts of your battalion reach the crest of the hill. The enemy in the woods 300 yards north of hill 466 is holding out. The left company of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry is about 200 yards

northwest of you facing southwest and firing on the woods 300 yards north of hill 466.

Required:

Your action.

Special Situation No. 5:

Your entire platoon is at the wire fence corner 600 yards north 30 degrees west of 404. The advance of your battalion has forced the enemy out of the woods 300 yards north of hill 466. The 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry has just entered the woods.

Required:

Your action. Give reasons.

Special Situation No. 6:

Your platoon is at the wire fence corner 600 yards north 30 degrees west of 404. Your scouts are forward observing the assault companies. Your scouts report that the leading waves of both battalions have crossed the unimproved road west of hill 466 and are advancing into the valley of Toms Creek.

Required:

Your action.

Special Situation No. 7:

You moved your platoon forward to the western edge of the woods north of hill 466 on the boundary line between battalions and remained there until you saw the assault companies of both battalions approaching close to Toms Creek. You then moved your platoon to the spur 550 yards south of 437.

You observed that the progress of the assault companies was uniform until the battalion on the right started to move up the hill west of Toms Creek when its advance was held up by heavy fire from the direction of hills 567 and 589.

Your own battalion continues its advance.

Required:

Your action.

Special Situation No. 8:

You started your platoon forward to fill the

gap between battalions. When you reach the vicinity of 485 you learn from your scouts that the right of your battalion is 500 yards south of hill 567, that the assault companies are at the west edge of the woods south of that hill firing to the west; and that one of the reserve companies is starting an attack north through the woods in the direction of hill 567, across the front of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry.

The 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry is held up 200 yards west of Toms Creek by fire from hill 567, hill 589 and the woods southeast of hill 589.

Required:

Your action.

Special Situation No. 9:

Your platoon is deployed in the road cut at 485 firing on hill 567. You observe a counter attack coming over hill 589 straight toward you—estimated strength one battalion.

Required:

Your action.

Special Situation No. 10:

The counter attack was repulsed. The battalion on the right followed the repulse by pushing on through the woods south of hill 567.

On being informed by your scouts that the advance was being resumed from the woods south of hill 567 you have started your platoon forward to the western edge of these woods when you receive at 4.30 p.m. the following message from your battalion commander:

The advance for the day has been stopped on the line 488 (1 mile northeast of Emmitsburg)—385 (at eastern edge of Emmitsburg). You will take a position in the western edge of the woods about 500 yards south of hill 567 to repel any enemy incursions along the boundary line between battalions and any penetrations of the front line of our battalion or the battalion on the right.

Required:

Position you select and dispositions.

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The Drillmaster

(Continued)

To Deploy as Skirmishers

Paragraphs 124-125 *Q. Being in any formation, assembled, how is a line of skirmishers formed?*

A. The command is **1. As skirmishers, 2. March.**

The corporal places himself in front of the squad if not already there.

Moving at a run, the men place themselves abreast of the corporal at 5-pace intervals, Nos. 1 and 2 on his right, Nos. 3 and 4 on his left, rear rank men on the right of their

file leaders, extra men on the left of No. 4; all then conform to the corporal's gait.

Q. When the squad is acting alone, how is the skirmish line formed?

A. It is formed in a similar manner on No. 2 of the front rank, who stands fast or continues to march as the case may be.

Q. When the squad is acting alone and deployed, what is the post of the corporal?

A. He is in front of the squad when advancing and in rear of it when the squad is halted.

Q. When deployed as skirmishers, how do the men march?

A. They march at ease, pieces at the trail unless otherwise ordered.

Q. Who is the guide of the squad when deployed as skirmishers?

A. When the corporal is in line, he is the guide; otherwise, No. 2 of the front rank is the guide.

Q. What is the normal interval between skirmishers?

A. Five paces.

Q. How wide is the front of a squad when deployed?

A. About 40 yards.

Drill It is best to first teach the squad

Hints to deploy on the corporal. This is the way in which they will ordinarily do it and they should be accustomed to the ordinary way first. When they have once learned this, they are easily taught to extend on No. 2 of the front rank.

You must remember that when they extend on the corporal, he is in front of the squad a pace or two and, if at a halt, this means that the skirmish line will be a corresponding distance in front of the position of the squad before the movement. In other words, the skirmish line will be in front of the line occupied by the squad.

However, when extending on No. 2, who stands fast, the skirmish line will be on the same line as that occupied by the squad before the extension.

In the beginning, step off the distances and mark the point which each man will occupy in the skirmish line and have them move into their new positions singly and look about them to see where they are with respect to the other members of the squad.

After they have learned their positions, insist on their moving into them on the jump.

Drill As I told you a short time ago, in

Talk extended order, the formations are looser, that is, you are separated by greater intervals than in close order, and the movements are ordinarily at ease.

There is a reason for this. To begin with, in close order, you offer a better target to the enemy. This squad in close order is a very good target for any sort of fire, but if you are scattered out in a single line with intervals of four or five paces between you, you are not a very good target.

Moreover, in order to fire, all of you must be on the same line. The rear rank can't fire over the front rank. Each man must have enough elbow room to fire comfortably in. This means that you must all be abreast of you and far enough apart to have room in which to fire.

Now, the farther apart you are, the less of a target you make for the enemy. On the other hand, the farther apart you are, the harder it is to keep control, keep in touch, and give and receive orders. Scattered out at intervals of 5 paces, this squad will have a front of about 40 yards, and in the noise of battle, or in woods and brush, that is about all that one man can oversee with any certainty.

So, five paces is the interval that has been adopted for ordinary purposes. This gives you plenty of room, makes a thin target out of the squad and, at the same time keeps the squad within reasonable control.

To form this skirmish line, as it is called, the command is 1. **As skirmishers**, 2. **MARCH**.

As I give the command march, I will always step out in front of the squad. Nos. 2 and 3, front rank, move off to the right of me, and Nos. 3 and 4 of the front rank move off to the left. Rear rank men move off with their front rank men and when the latter are in place, each rear rank man takes his post 5 paces to the right of his front rank man.

I will now take my post and mark it. I am then going to pace off the distances to each man's place in the skirmish line and call you out, one at a time, to take those posts. When you are all on the line, I want you to look around and see just how you are located with respect to each other.

Now, having seen where your places are, come back here and form the squad again, keeping in mind where you were when in the skirmish line.

Now, we will try it by command, each man moving to his post in quick time.

Now that you know your places and how to get to them, we will try the movement on the run which is the ordinary gait for deploying, as this extension is called.

Now, when the squad is acting alone, the corporal is not in ranks and the deployment is made on No. 2 of the front rank instead of the corporal. No. 2 will stand fast and you will have to move straight off to the right and left in order to get to your places.

In all of these movements, you will carry your pieces at the trail unless I tell you otherwise.

In all of the movements in extended order, you march at ease.

To Increase or Diminish Intervals.

Paragraph 126 *Q. How are the intervals in the skirmish line increased or diminished?*

A. The command is **1. As skirmishers, (so many) paces, 2. MARCH.**

If assembled and it is desired to deploy at other than the normal interval, intervals are taken at the indicated number of paces.

If already deployed, the men move by the flank toward or away from the guide.

Drill Don't neglect to give the men some drill in extending and decreasing the intervals in the skirmish line.

Hints You will find that they will quickly become accustomed to the normal interval and will take it fairly accurately but, unless they have had some practice, the moment you attempt to decrease or increase the interval, they will either crowd up in a bunch or will scatter out beyond control. Try and get them accustomed to the idea of two or three pace intervals and of eight or ten pace intervals.

Drill You have been told that the normal interval between skirmishers in line is five paces. It sometimes happens that we want to make it more or less. The command for doing so is **1. As skirmishers, (so many) paces, 2. MARCH.**

Talk For example: I may give the command **1. As skirmishers, two paces, 2. MARCH.** If you are assembled, you deploy just as you have been taught to do, except that you take two-

pace intervals instead of five paces. If you are already deployed at five-pace intervals, you merely close in toward No. 2 until you have an interval of two paces. If at a halt, you move in by the flank; if marching, you move in obliquely.

On the other hand, suppose I had said ten paces instead of two paces; if assembled, you move by the flank and deploy taking ten-pace intervals instead of two-pace. If deployed, you move away from No. 2 until you have increased the interval to ten paces. No. 2 is the guide for increasing or diminishing the intervals, that is, he marches straight to the front, or stands fast if halted, and the others move accordingly.

The Assembly

Paragraph 127 *Q. How is the assembly executed?*

A. The command is **1. Assemble, 2. MARCH.**

Being deployed, the men move toward the corporal in double time and take their proper places.

If the corporal continues to advance, the squad follows him at three paces.

The assembly while marching to the rear is not executed.

Drill Get your men into the habit of assembling on the jump. Teach

Hints them to assemble on you, but ordinarily take your post in front of No. 2. Have them understand that they always assemble toward you and on No. 2. Instruct No. 2 to follow you at 3 paces.

Drill Now, being deployed as you are, to get back into the squad formation, the command is **1. Assemble, 2. MARCH.**

At the command **march**, close in at double time on No. 2 front rank and take your proper places in the squad. I will ordinarily take my post in front of No. 2 before giving the command or signal for assembling. If I give the command and stand fast, No. 2 will stand fast, and you must assemble on him. If I give the command and keep on moving, No. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ will follow me and you will form on him and continue the march as in **FOLLOW ME.**

Organization of the Reserve

The plans for the reorganization of the Army contemplate that there will be two or more Reserve divisions in each of the nine Corps Areas in the United States. The old National Army divisions from the 76th to 91st will be reconstituted with their original units. Each officer of the Reserve Corps will be assigned to a definite unit so that in case of mobilization he will have a definite place in the organization. This will permit many reserve officers to be assigned to their old regiments and battalions with which they served during the war. For the present it is contemplated that only the officer, noncommissioned officer and specialist cadres will be included in the reconstitution of the units. The progress and success of this reorganization program will depend to a great measure upon the interest and enthusiasm of Reserve officers in the project. It will be accomplished under the direction of corps area commanders and the detailed plans will be given wide publicity in the press when the proper time comes.

The prospects for training camps for Reserve officers next summer are excellent. The magnitude of the program to be carried out will, of course, depend upon the funds made available for the purpose by the Congress, which convenes in December. It is too early to state just what the course of training will consist of, but Reserve officers may be assured that everything possible will be done to make it interesting and of material benefit to those who attend the camps.

Officers who contemplate attending the camps next summer will do well to get a little ahead of the game by some

home study this winter. The following subjects are suggested (an officer will certainly not waste his time by putting it in on them): Map Reading (an officer has use for a knowledge of this subject in almost every line of military endeavor; he cannot know too much about it); Minor Tactics (this subject will probably be covered at the training camps by a series of talks, tactical walks, map problems, and tactical exercises. *(Note: The excellent problems in Minor Tactics that have appeared in the INFANTRY JOURNAL in the past year have been assembled in book form and are now available. In order to keep the price down within reasonable limits the volume is bound in durable paper; the price is \$1.25 per copy)*); Infantry weapons; musketry; field fortifications; and company administration.

Many desirable men who saw service during the World War have not come into the Officers' Reserve Corps. It has been brought to our attention that many of these are holding off on account of the fact that the War Department has not announced a definite policy with respect to just what service the members of the Reserve Corps are subject to call. While no definite policy has been announced it may be inferred from the contemplated reorganization of the Army. The Regular Army is the first line of defense and will be able to take care of minor emergencies that may arise; the National Guard is the second line of defense and augments the Regular Army in emergencies too great for it to handle alone; the organized reserve is the third line of defense and would only be called to service in the event of a national emergency where

the resources of the nation must be placed at the disposal of the Government. In this latter case the use of the Reserves is contemplated and all members of the Reserve Corps subject to a call to duty. Under such an emergency the Government would probably again resort to the draft, as in the case of the World War, to fill up the several elements of the Army. The proposition of appointing a certain number of warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army to commissions in the Reserve Corps will insure a supply of officers for minor emergencies such as that on the border in 1916, so that Reserve officers need have little fear of being called from their business pursuits for service except in the event of a major emergency. Officers of the Reserve Corps should bring these statements to the attention of desirable men of experience and make an endeavor to get them to apply for commissions in the Reserve Corps.



Book Reviews

Days of Glory, by Frederick Villiers. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1920. 213 pages. Price \$5.00.

A handsome book of war sketches made by the celebrated war correspondent and artist, Frederick Villiers. A picture record of the battle fronts of France. The war artist-author has put down in black and white in vivid, visible truth what the war correspondent and writer of the great conflict have tried, in vain, to picture in words. The details of the conduct of the war are presented in a way that the average man can see and understand. The sidelights of the soldier's life in the field and especially in the trenches flash out from every page of this wonderful book.

Take the sketch on page 25, which shows the crude loopholes which cost the life of many a British soldier. Again note that on page 173, which shows the expedients to which the British and French had to resort to overcome the grave deficiencies in machine guns. The sketch of the preparation of improvised gas masks on page 189 carries with it a pathetic appeal for preparedness for the future. The attack on the Labyrinth on page 133 could never be described by mere words. This will some day be hailed as the greatest battle picture that has ever been produced. One could go on and on. A full review of the book would entail a description of its every page. To omit a single one would make an incomplete story.

Each sketch is prefaced by a note of explanation that adds interest to the work. For example, relative to his sketch of "The First Poison Gas Cloud" on page 93, the author has this to say:

The gallant Canadians were the first to bear the brunt of the enemy's poison

gas at Ypres. Many suffered a terribly painful death while hardly understanding what had really happened to them. In spite of this mysterious death trap set by the Germans, they never swerved from their duty. It was for this plucky determination to hold their ground at any cost and in any stress of circumstances that the Canadians will be remembered to the end of time.

The book will be found to be a most valuable addition to any library—one that will grow more popular as time goes on.

The American Red Cross in the Great War, by Henry P. Davidson. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920. 8 vo. 292 pages. Price, \$2.00.

A readable and interesting account of the many activities of the Red Cross in the World War. An authoritative statement by the head of the organization of what the Red Cross accomplished and how it was done.

Any American who has any doubts about how his Red Cross donation was spent has but to read Mr. Davidson's book. He will there learn. He will marvel at the wonderful world-wide accomplishments of the organization.

The ramifications of the work were innumerable. They included everything from handing out a cup of hot coffee to the tired "doughboy" on the battle front to the feeding and clothing of a whole nation of homeless and starving people.

Mr. Davidson has done well to preserve to posterity in lasting form the operations of the great organization of which he was the head. The American people owe to him a debt of gratitude that can never be paid.

The book is shorn of all semblance of dry official reports. It is full of human interest and altogether readable. It will and should find a place in every

library throughout the land. The author has stipulated that all royalties on the book are to go to the Red Cross, so when you purchase the book you not only add a valuable contribution to your own library, but you add a few cents to the ever-needed Red Cross fund.

My Three Years in America, by Count Bernstorff. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920. 8 vo. 415 pages. Price, \$5.00.

An account of the diplomatic relations of the United States and Germany from the outbreak of the World War in 1914 to the severance of relations in April, 1917. The personal story of Count Bernstorff, in which he discusses from a purely German point of view the incidents of the times.

The subject matter of this book and the source from which it comes gives it a definite place in the literature of the World War.

Count Bernstorff was, during his stay in the United States, the fountain of knowledge concerning the projects and plans of Germany, if not the center of German activity, in this country.

The outstanding feature of the book is the frankness with which he discusses the various events that led up to the severing of diplomatic relations and our entrance into the war on the side of the Allies.

In this spirit he reviews the relations existing between his own country and the United States prior to the war. From this point he passes immediately to the beginning of war and its effect in this country by way of German propaganda, with which he deals in an inclusive and detailed fashion. Then come the discussions, from his own point of view—a German standpoint—of the various "incidents" covering the fate of the *Lusitania*, the *Arabic*, the

Sussex. The "so-called" German conspiracies are gone into with something of the gesture of the magician whose object is dissipation, evanishment.

The book as a whole is interesting, though in places it is difficult reading, and many of us will not agree with the views expressed. There are many elaborate explanations on certain well-known events that happened in these trying days; the author's interpretation of American psychology, which is not complimentary—to say the least; and from time to time a discussion of American politics as they appear to the alien.

The author minces no words in his criticisms of those at the helm in Germany. In the composition of this book it must have been a great novelty to him to indulge in the freedom of expression. On page 229 we find the sentence: "There could be no doubt that the United States could, as a neutral power, have brought about a better peace than they have done as the decisive combatant power." But the author does not go further and state that this would have been a German dictated peace. Anyone who knows the situation knows how much influence the United States as a neutral would have had on German's peace terms to the Allies had she won the war. The record reads along in a plain and self-contained fashion, dealing on the surface with familiar events. Its inspiration, subtly expressed, is, however, contempt for America and hatred of England. A most interesting study of the writer's own mental and spiritual outlook.

The book deserves a place in the library of World War literature and will be valuable as a reference, remembering always the source from which it comes.

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