ORDERS

COURSE IN TACTICS

Lecture by

Maj. EBEN SWIFT

12th Cavalry

NOVEMBER - - - 1905

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART & & INFANTRY AND CAVALRY SCHOOL, AND STAFF COLLEGE & & & &

Staff College Press

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The importance of the subject of orders is becoming so well appreciated in our service that I have concluded to rewrite the lectures on this subject delivered at the Infantry and Cavalry School, April 2, 1894, and November 22, 1895. While retaining the principles laid down in the Order of Field Service of the German Army and in the writings of von Verdy, I have closely adhered in matters of detail to the methods of Griepenkerl in his studies on Applied Tactics.

EBEN SWIFT.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
September 1, 1905.

Field Orders

It was supposed for a long time that the education of a soldier in time of peace must stop at the drill ground. Recent experience has dispelled that fallacy and taught us that most of the problems of war can be solved in time of peace. So well is this idea established now that a nation cannot hope for success in war unless it has provided an elaborate system of peace training.

Among the important elements to be considered in time of peace are those which concern the leading of troops and the instruction of officers who shall be capable of issuing proper orders in the field. The drafting of orders has been so systematized that it now requires a special art. It can only be learned by practice assisted by intelligence. Those who have the best ideas are often unable to convey them clearly in writing.

I—HISTORICAL

1. The earliest battles were merely the collisions of armed mobs. The leaders exercised little influence upon the action except by personal example. In the course of time it was discovered that drill and discipline on one side or the other would neutralize the effect of individual courage and superiority in numbers of the enemy. Armies remained small, and, although warfare was the favorite occupation of mankind, there were few great leaders, and they made few improvements in their art. Occasionally

some one acquired great success by seizing upon an apparently simple idea. A flank attack, a formed reserve, a rapid march, an ambuscade or stratagem, sometimes a better weapon, sometimes a new maneuver at drill, was sufficient to change the course of history and to make a reputation for a general. But tactical results alone seem to have been sought, and the art of war was limited to the field of battle. In two thousand years it is hard to find cases where the terrane was considered in its relation to the campaign. It seems to have taken all this time to learn that an inferior army directed by a superior intelligence could be maneuvered, out of sight of the battle field, in such a way that victory was practically secured before the battle began. This was strategy, a word derived from the Greek word for general, and first clearly understood by Napoleon Bonaparte. He revolutionized the art of war and overthrew with ease the army which at that day was the foremost example of all earlier systems.

2. In order to succeed, Napoleon had to depend upon the ability of his subordinates to carry out his plans. For this purpose it was his custom to furnish each with carefully worded orders, often in the minutest detail and often attempting to provide for every contingency that might arise. He never succeeded, however, in reducing his orders to a system, as we shall see, and this often caused his plans to miscarry and was an important element in bringing about his final defeat.

3. A few examples of Napoleon's orders will call attention to the defects of his system, and will show the causes of its failure. In the maneuvers prior to the battles of Jena and Auerstädt, Marshals Davout and Bernadotte were detached to the Prussian rear at Naumberg and Dornberg respectively. Each marshal was given a letter of instructions. In

the instructions of Davout the following phrase occurred: "If Marshal Bernadotte is with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the place assigned him at Dornberg." In the instructions of Bernadotte this matter did not appear, and the Marshal interpreted his orders to mean that he should go to Dornberg in any event, although he knew that he could not get there, and, in fact, he did not get there. Davout interpreted the order to mean that if Bernadotte had not already gone to Dornberg he should remain and march from Naumberg with the other command (Davout's). The result was that Davout was left to fight 60,000 of the enemy with less than half that force while Bernadotte did not get into action at all. Instead of one of the most successful campaigns in history it might have been the opposite. It will be seen later how much better than such letters of instructions is the modern form of order which makes clear the spirit as well as the letter of the instructions.

4. At Bautzen Napoleon sent a brief pencil note to Ney, telling him to be at Prietitz by 11 o'clock and to attack the enemy's right. Ney arrived in position at 10 o'clock, when he could have attacked the enemy's rear and probably destroyed the allied armies. He would not attack till 11 o'clock and insisted on attacking the enemy's right according to the letter of his instructions. Ney missed the entire object of the maneuver which he executed but his connection with the whole operation was not explained to him, and the failure was a natural result of the system in use at that day.

5. At Wagram Napoleon's order for the passage of the Danube contained the error of assigning the right corps to the center bridge while the center corps was assigned to the right bridge. The result was a crossing of the lines of march, producing a danger-

ous confusion in the army. The order was quite long, containing thirty-one articles and more than fifteen hundred words. Many copies had to be made as the practice was to distribute orders in this way rather than by detailing representatives of the various commands to go after them. It is easy to see how a word could have been put in the wrong place.

6. In the Waterloo campaign Napoleon dispatched Grouchy in pursuit of the Prussian army which was beaten at Ligny. The written orders to Grouchy, differing materially from the verbal orders, contained the following words:

"It is important to find out what the enemy is intending to do; whether he is separating himself from the English or whether they are intending to unite to cover Brussels or (and) Liege in trying the fate of another battle."

Now that we are able to read these words in the light of subsequent events, it seems impossible to understand why Grouchy obeyed them in the way he did or why the Emperor allowed him to do so. Accustomed to prescribe the minutest details we have now an order in which they are omitted. While Napoleon had always insisted on an elaborate system of communications and frequent reports, he neglects it now, and we find him in ignorance of the positions of his marshal and of the means to communicate with him.

A library has been written on the subject of the Waterloo campaign but some of the ablest military critics such as Hamley, Chesney and Maurice fail to see any particular significance in the words just quoted. It is now evident that Napoleon intended that Grouchy should interpose between the Emperor and the Prussians, and that Grouchy so understood his duty, but it was not definitely ordered. The apologists of Grouchy have found abundant material

in the contradictory and indefinite character of his orders.

7. Our own military history, great as it has been, does not furnish us models to follow in this regard.

8. The inactivity of General Patterson in the first Bull Run campaign was largely due to indefinite orders.

9. In the Manassas campaign of 1862 the Confederates, on several occasions at the beginning of the campaign, lost brilliant opportunities on account of defective orders. On August 7th the faulty orders of Stonewall Jackson caused delays prior to the battle of Cedar Mountain, and resulted in two days being taken to make the march of one day. Ewell's route was changed, but A. P. Hill was not notified and this caused their lines of march to cross so that one division made only eight miles and the other two miles in an entire day. In this order no mention was made of supply trains, and they followed the divisions in column of route instead of in rear as was intended. These numerous faults in a well-planned maneuver probably saved the corps of Banks. Again on August 17th, Lee planned to attack the scattered forces of Pope from behind Clark's Mountain on the Rapidan but he failed because of the faulty orders of Stuart, which were not sufficiently definite to bring up the cavalry to lead the advance.

Later in this same campaign Pope's numerous orders were seldom understood by his subordinates; his position was not stated and he could not be found at important times.

10. Strange ideas on the subject of military orders existed during the Civil War among officers who represented the best trained element of the army. The orders at that time were often filled with insig-

nificant details, useless suggestions, and unwarranted interference with subordinates.

The order for the advance of the Federal army before the first Bull Run warned the army that three things were not pardonable in any commander: First, to come upon a battery or breast-work without knowledge of its position; second, to be surprised; third, to fall back. This order, which directed a movement of more than 35,000 men, prescribed that advance guards, vedettes and flankers were to be used. Brigades were told to sustain themselves as long as possible before asking help of others; it contained directions as to the manner of attacking a battery, and told how camp kettles and mess pans were to be carried. Although the command camped at Centerville for about three days the troops were not placed in position for their subsequent movements, and a force of 20,000 men were practically marched through a defile on the morning of July 21. The order required all the troops to be ready at about 2:00 a. m., placed those troops in front who had the shortest march and necessarily caused a long delay.

11. The order of the Confederate commander for the attack on Grant's army at Pittsburg Landing required some hours for its preparation, and probably many more for its distribution, and now occupies about three pages in the Rebellion Records. It contained about 1500 words. It reminded one major-general, who, by the way, was himself the author of a system of tactics, that he must "make a proper distribution of artillery along the line of battle, remembering that the rifled guns are of long range, and should be placed in commanding positions in rear of his infantry, to fire mainly upon reserves and the second line of the enemy, but occasionaly will be directed on his batteries and heads of columns." Another major-general, a veteran who had served

twenty-five years, was told how to form his regiments into line, but was permitted to place his artillery to suit himself, possibly in deference to the popular idea that his battery had saved the day at Buena Vista, fourteen years previously. The order provided for a number of small detachments, for camp guards, for repair of bridges and roads, and closed with an appeal to the patriotism of the troops, and enjoined them to obey orders, not to waste ammunition, to fire slowly, selecting a mark, and to do much work with the bayonet.

This order was issued on the 3rd of April, 1862, and directed a concentration of the army at Mickey's, eight miles from Pittsburg Landing, on the next day. The assembly did not take place till twenty-four hours after the appointed time. Delays were caused by the crossing of columns on the march, misunderstandings, failure to distribute the order until after the movement had begun but mainly by the attempt to concentrate 40,000 men into a small space with a single outlet. The delay gave an opportunity to Buell to reenforce Grant's army.

There has been some controversy also as to who should have the credit for this order. The author claimed that he had before him the orders set by Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign. He had distinguished himself in two wars, and was a fine officer.

12. At Frederick, Maryland, on September 13th, 1862, at some time now unknown but probably early in the afternoon, General McClellan came in possession of a copy of General Lee's orders, detailing all his plans for the capture of Harper's Ferry. At 6:20 p. m. McClellan sent a letter of instructions containing more than 550 words to a corps commander. He sent orders to other corps at 6:45, 8:45, 11:30, 1:00 and 9:00 o'clock. The failure to take ad-

vantage of Lee's situation at that time was largely due to slow and verbose methods of issuing orders.

13. At the battle of Chickamauga General T. J. Wood received a brief order in writing from the Commander in Chief to "close up" his division "on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." Wood and Reynolds were in line of battle with Brannan between them. The order was issued on the supposition that Brannan was not in line and that there was a gap between the other two divisions. Wood literally obeyed the order by taking his command out of the line and marching past the rear of Brannan to Reynold's right. In this way occurred the gap in the line into which Longstreet threw his entire command and defeated the Federal Army.

General Rosecrans severely censured Wood for obeying the order under the circumstances. Upon this much mooted point much may be said: the Commander in Chief should ordinarily send his orders through the Corps Commander; if he wants a line *prolonged* in a certain direction he does not use the words "close up" and "support" to express that meaning; the order as sent gave no idea of the general situation, no position of supporting troops, and no correct idea of the mission of General Wood—all of which are necessary when a man is expected to obey the spirit as well as the letter of an order, and all of which are distinctly provided in the modern order.

14. As late as 1871, the orders of the French commanders show these same defects. Page after page of minute instructions were given, many of which were never obeyed. For instance, the "instructions" of General Chanzy, probably their best general, contain such an introduction as this:

"The enemy today attempted to force us from our positions. He attacked in succession at Saint

Laurent-des-Bois and in the direction of Poisly, Cravant and Villorceau. From information received from prisoners we learn that Prince Charles with his entire army was engaged, together with a numerous artillery. Everywhere we have resisted with energy and good order and have remained in possession of the field after having inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy. All should be inspired by this new success and be filled with confidence thereby; we must keep our positions and continue to resist if the Germans make a new attack tomorrow."

And so on for four printed pages. Other paragraphs of the same order contain such instructions as that "Cavalry shall be placed in such a way as to profit by occasions to fall upon the enemy." "Each division commander will point out precisely where his baggage will go in case of attack tomorrow." "All troops who were engaged today will have an extra ration of brandy." The order contains directions about reconnaissance to be made, a promise of additional liquor in case another action is fought, rations and ammunition to be provided, appointments of doctors and others, reports to be sent, and the like.

15. On August 13th, 1870, Marshal Bazaine gave orders for retreat from Metz to the westward on the following day.

"The 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions will march off from their camps in the direction of Verdun, the 1st Division along the road from Gravelotte by Doncourt and Conflans, the 3rd along the road from Gravelotte by Mars la Tour. The 3rd and 4th Corps will take the former, the 2nd and 6th Corps the latter road; the Guard will follow the 6th Corps. The whole army will be ready to march by 5 a. m."

The army consisted of 135,000 men and would make a column nearly 70 miles long. The map shows that the march of the entire army between Grave-

lotte and Metz is limited to a single road. This order was one of the counts in the indictment against Bazaine. He and his chief of staff each tried to put the responsibility on the other.

16. The Germans took up the leading of troops where Napoleon left it, reduced it to a system, and thus made it possible to make combined movements give the best results. They also made it possible to regulate the movements of greater armies than ever before, using weapons of far greater range and power.

As an instance of a modern order, take the following which was issued at 4:30 p. m. on August 12, 1870, from the general headquarters:

"So far as our intelligence enables us to judge the enemy's main forces are in the act of retiring through Metz over the Moselle. His Majesty commands:

"The 1st Army to advance to-morrow, the 13th, towards the French Nied: main body on the line Les Etangs-Pange, and hold the railway station at Courcelles: cavalry to reconnoiter in the direction of Metz and cross the Moselle below it, The 1st army will then cover the right flank of the IInd.

"The latter to march on the line Buchy-Chateau Salins, push its outposts to the Seille and endeavor if possible to secure the passages of the river Moselle at Pont-a-Mousson, Dieulouard, Marbach, etc. Cavalry to reconnoiter beyond the Moselle.

"The III Army to continue the advance towards the line Nancy-Lunéville.

(Signed) V. Moltke."

The battle of Colombey-Nouilly took place in two days, and that of Vionville-Mars la Tour in four days, and the investment of Metz a few days later.

II—DEFINITION

A military order is the more or less strict expression of the will of a chief conveyed to his subordinates. The higher his position, the more general in character will his orders be.

III—LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION

1. At the beginning of operations and from time to time thereafter, the plans and intentions of the supreme authority will ordinarily be issued in the orm of letters of instruction. They will regulate movements over a large area during a considerable time. In this way General Grant directed a million of men over an area half as large as Europe, from his headquarters at City Point. His letters and telegrams were of the most general character and prescribed little else than the hostile armies as a general objective and concert of action in attacking them.

2. It seems appropriate that directions from the headquarters of an army marching on several roads, covering the dispositions for several days at a time, should be issued in the same way, although no uniform practice has obtained. General Sherman's "Orders" from the headquarters of the military division of the Mississippi in his marches from Chattanooga to Atlanta and beyond were almost too general to be called orders, although designated as such. Of the same character were the "Circulars" issued by General Meade before the battle of Gettysburg.

IV—KINDS OF ORDERS

1. *Ordinary Orders*: The orders for regiments and all larger commands, territorial and tactical, as well as for military posts and permanent camps are denominated *general* or *special* orders according to character. General orders are such as apply to a whole command, while special orders relate to individuals and matters not of general application.

2. Orders for smaller units or for detachments are simply called "orders".

3. Each kind of orders is numbered in a single series, beginning with the year, or with the establishment or organization of a new command. Circulars, memoranda and letters are sometimes rather loosely used in place of orders.

4. *Field Orders:* For field service another class of orders is needed, which deal entirely with the tactical and strategical details incident to a state of war and the prospect of contact with the enemy. Orders of this kind are called "FIELD ORDERS" and are numbered serially for each command.

It is to the subject of Field Orders, in whatever form they appear, that I ask your especial attention in this lecture.

V—PLANS

1. Military history furnishes examples of two widely differing plans of preparing field orders. Thus their idea may be:

First: To prescribe a definite line of conduct for a subordinate, both in the details of execution of a particular order and in all the emergencies which seem likely to arise.

Second: To point out only the object to be gained, leaving the method to the judgment of those who are charged with the execution.

The *first* plan was followed by Napoleon and Wellington and many great commanders.

2. Napoleon particularly delighted in minute and voluminous instructions. He would detail the exact duties of every important commander and would attempt to provide for every possible emergency. This was perhaps a necessary part of his system, for his marshals were not men of conspicuous ability, except as fighters, the best of them frequently failing him when removed from his personal

direction. But his instructions were often so elaborate and voluminous that there was not time to study, digest, or learn them. Consequently many were neglected and ignored. In attempting to provide for every contingency, it was impossible for him to foresee all emergencies and thus unexpected conditions came about to which his orders were not applicable. His practice of providing for everything himself also worked to his disadvantage toward the close of his career because he was no longer able to work for twenty hours in a day. This is shown particularly by the failures or inability of his staff to assume the direction of events in his absence or when he was resting. His failure to follow up the victory of Dresden and permitting Vandamme's division to be destroyed at Culm can be explained in no other way. The same thing occurred at critical periods of the Waterloo campaign. His defeat at Leipsic was largely due to the failure of his staff to provide bridges for retreat across a river, a matter which he had expected them to attend to without orders.

3. The plan of Napoleon would not succeed in less skillful hands than his own. It has been superseded by a better and more logical system. What the ordinary mind foresees seldom comes to pass. Few indeed are able to look so far into the future as to provide for every emergency. It is impossible to tell where, in the wide range of military knowledge, it is expedient to begin and where to stop when once you begin to give details. Instances are known of elaborate plans of battle which were never carried out because a single unexpected event occurred. Beauregard's order to turn the Federal left at Centerville was not executed, because the enemy made that identical movement against his own left at an earlier hour. A second order, issued later, also failed of execution because it never reached the officer who was to

begin the movement; no copy of the second order, it may be mentioned, was ever preserved, and it was transmitted by an unknown messenger and by a circuitous route.

4. An order of the *second* class is based on the assumption that the recipient is familiar with his duties and that he has sufficient military ability to use the advantage of being on the ground. In newly formed armies this fortunate state of affairs cannot exist, and consequently generals have gone to the *opposite extreme* in regulating details, so that field orders are often used as a vehicle to convey instruction to untrained subordinates, a purpose for which *general* orders can always be used.

VI—WHAT THEY SHOULD NOT CONTAIN

Before proceeding to discuss what an order should be, it might be well to mention some things it should *not* contain.

1. Explanations, apologies and guesses are signs of weakness in a commander. Interference with subordinates is unwise, because they have as good opportunities for seeing as their superiors and must be supposed to know their own duties best.

2. Provisions for retreat should never be made in an order for an advance, as it is unwise to anticipate defeat in an order which should contemplate victory only. Arrangements for a possible retreat, under such circumstances, should be communicated to high-ranking commanders of independent units only, and always confidentially.

3. No attempt should be made to provide for events that may never occur and that no man can foresee.

4. Such words as "before", behind", "forward", "rear", "this side", "that side", "great", "little", should never be used in a manner that would admit of an ambiguous meaning. Wherever they can be

given with reference to well-known points, the compass bearings afford a more accurate method of designating the location or direction of positions, places, and forces.

The terms "right" and "left" should not be applied to inanimate objects. They may refer to individuals or bodies of men, or to the bank of a stream, in which case the observer is supposed to be facing down stream.

6. Such modifying expressions as "as far as possible", "as well as you can," "attempt to capture", "try to hold", should be avoided. Such expressions tend to divide the responsibility between the commander and his subordinates instead of placing it where it belongs. Weak and incompetent commanders will often deliberately choose a form of expression that can be interpreted in several ways because they do not themselves know what they want and because they see a chance to shift responsibility in case of failure. Such action points out a man unfit for command. Let all responsibility be boldly assumed or placed where it belongs.

7. All requirements or instructions not directly concerned with the movement at hand should be included in the *general* or *special* series of orders. Such provisions should never be incorporated in *Field Orders*. The practice of mixing up orders for every conceivable detail in service, with orders for the movement of troops, should be most carefully avoided.

VII—MOST IMPORTANT REQUISITES

1. The order in the field is issued under peculiar conditions of emergency and inconvenience. It is received sometimes in the midst of great excitement and danger. Perhaps it must be read in a storm when no shelter is near or at night by a poor light. It must therefore be brief, in short sentences, and clearly expressed.

2. It has been well said that an order which can possibly be misunderstood will infallibly *be* misunderstood. On one occasion, General Sedgwick was asked why he kept a rather dull officer on his staff. The general said, "X is very useful to me. Whenever I issue an order I read it to him first and if he can understand it, I know that any one can."

3. A positive and not a negative form of expression should be used. Such an order as "The baggage will not accompany the command" is defective because the gist of the order depends upon a single word.

4. The writing must be so distinct and clear as to be legible even in a poor light. By resorting to a vertical style of writing the legibility of many hands is greatly improved. In most armies this is a very important matter and an officer *who cannot write legibly, whatever may be his other qualifications,* is seriously hampered if he desires to be selected for the general staff.

VIII—THE FORM

There are good reasons for adopting an almost invariable model for field orders. In this way information may be so grouped that the eye will instantly detect any omission. Although it is permitted to officers of long experience to depart from any models, it is found best to prescribe a form for beginners. It is also found that officers who have once been instructed in this way will, even after long experience, closely follow the accepted model.

IX—AN EXAMPLE

1. To illustrate a simple form of field order, let us suppose that the first Army Corps, encamped at Winchester, Kansas, has a detachment encamped at Easton, Kansas; that this detachment is ordered to proceed to Fort Leavenworth and seize the bridge over the Missouri river at that place. We will sup-

pose that the enemy has been seen, at 1:00 p. m. today, in camp on the Platte river in Missouri, a day's march east of Fort Leavenworth. Suppose that the detachment consists of a regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, a battery of field artillery, a half company of engineers and a detachment of an ambulance company section.

2. The order of the detachment commander would then take some such form as shown in Appendix I.

X—REMARKS

The several subdivisions of this order may be described as follows:

1. *The Caption* is at the beginning where there is always given the official designation of the leader's command, the place of issue, the date, often the hour and minute; the kind of series and the number of the order.

2. *The Margin*, headed "TROOPS", contains a statement of the component parts of the command as well as its subdivision into fractions for information, protection, and various missions. It is ruled to include one half to one third of the page.

3. *The Body of the Order* is divided into numbered paragraphs without headings.

Paragraph 1 contains information of the enemy and so much of the general situation of our own troops as it would be desirable for subordinates to know.

Paragraph 2 contains the objective of the movement or instructions covering as much of the general plan as is considered necessary to insure proper coöperation in the movements of all parts of the command.

Paragraph 3 contains dispositions of the troops adopted by the commander to carry out the second

paragraph, including the tasks assigned to each of the several fractions of the command.

Paragraph 4 contains all necessary orders for the regimental train, care being taken to keep it where it will not interfere with troops or be involved in the confusion of a possible battle.

Paragraph 5 contains necessary information as to place where the detachment commander can be found.

4. *The Ending* contains the authentication of the order by an appropriate signature.

5. *The Notation*, showing how the order is communicated to the troops, is added.

A further explanation of the contents of this order will now be given in the following discussion of the principles involved in its preparation.

It will be assumed that you were in command of this detachment at Easton, Kansas, located there as an advanced post for the purpose of observing the enemy, and keeping in touch with his movements. You were furnished with one squadron of cavalry which kept up a continuous service of reconnaissance in securing information of the enemy.

XI—CAPTION

1. In that part of *the caption* above the date, the issuing officer's command should always be mentioned; for example: Outposts, Advance Guard, Rear Guard, Detachment, Third Battalion, First Squadron, etc. (adding the full official designation of the command); or HEADQUARTERS (such a) Regiment, Brigade, Division, Corps, or Army (giving the designation which the command has in the organization of the forces). Such designations, with numbers and dates, serve to fully identify orders. The word "headquarters" is not used in connection with posts or permanent camps, or with outposts, advance

guards, rear guards, detachments, or tactical units smaller than a regiment.

A "detachment" in foreign armies may be defined to be any aggregation of troops of the line, which does not itself constitute a tactical unit. Thus a brigade, serving by itself, would simply be designated as a brigade, as it is entirely composed of a single arm, but when it has cavalry, artillery or engineers attached, it would be called a "detachment" of the division to which the entire command belongs. In our service, however, no uniform practice has been prescribed or followed. Frequently the officer commanding a detachment when issuing orders to a mixed command, composed of his own and others temporarily attached, retains the official designation of his proper command. Numerous precedents could be quoted where such an order as this would be headed "Headquarters 6th Infantry", "Headquarters, Fort Leavenworth Expedition" or simply "Easton".

2. In foreign service dates are often abbreviated, as 9-1-04, indicating the 9th day of the 1st month of the year 1904, but in our service the usual abbreviation is 8 Jan. '04, and it should be so written. In naming a night, both days should be mentioned, thus: "night 19 | 20 September". The words "noon" and "midnight" should be written. The hour and minute when the order is signed should be given after the date.

3. The character of the order and its serial number are then stated.

XII—MARGIN

1. *The margin* contains the distribution of troops in the order of march. It is that part of the order which is first considered in its preparation and should be carefully tested to see that no part of the

command has been forgotten and not provided for. It is divided into paragraphs corresponding to whatever important parts the command is divided into, as "independent cavalry", "advance guard", etc.

2. After getting into its "order of march", if the command encounters the enemy or halts for the day, the orders issued at such times, and covering the same troops exactly, may omit the distribution of troops in the margin as unnecessary.

3. In naming tactical organizations it is important to follow a uniform rule. For this purpose ordinary abbreviations are selected and retained, so that there may be no possibility of a mistake. In naming organizations from which a portion is detached the rule has recently been changed. Formerly the organization was mentioned by its proper designation, followed by the word "Less" with the name of the portion to be excepted. Thus "1st Cavalry, less one squadron", was the form to indicate a regiment complete except one squadron. If half or more of the regiment were absent the smaller unit would be given first, thus, "1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry", and no exception was stated. In the Field Service Regulations this method is followed.

At present a new method has been adopted which is to name the exact portion of an organization which is present without noting what is absent. Thus in the first case cited, we would say "1st Cavalry, Headquarters, 1st and 3rd Squadrons". If only one troop of the regiment were absent, we would add ¾ 3rd Squadron to the above, which would be stated in abbreviated form "1st Cav. Hdqrs. 1. 2. ¾ 3. Sqd'ns". In designating battalions of infantry and artillery Roman numerals are used, and in giving squadrons, Arabic numerals are used.

4. In the advance guard in the example it is to be observed that the 1st battalion of the infantry regi-

ment is mentioned by name, while the two remaining battalions are marching in the main body.

Ordinarily this detachment would be made by the colonel of the regiment, who in this case, commands the entire force and consequently designates the advance guard battalion by name.

If however a general officer were commanding he would leave such a matter of detail to the colonel and the order would read "one battalion" and not "first battalion." This principle is followed throughout all grades of command, the rule being that it is unwise to interfere with the initiative of subordinates in matters concerning which the latter have the best information.

5. This principle applies to all arms of the service and a scrupulous observance of it is more important than it is sometimes recognized to be. A subordinate who is continually deprived of his prerogatives or discretion is at the same time relieved of all responsibility for results. Higher authority is very likely to make mistakes of judgment about matters concerning which subordinates are in positions affording them superior opportunities for gaining accurate knowledge. Subordinates are not responsible for results when deprived of all discretion in selecting tools. If never called upon to exercise independent judgment or discretion, they become incapable of doing so and lean heavily upon their superiors for specific instructions as to every detail. Such a system soon exercises a very demoralizing influence upon an army. Notwithstanding this fact, the principle above discussed is too often "more honored in the breach than in the observance."

6. An important consideration is to preserve the integrity of the tactical units as far as possible. On this account a battalion of infantry was selected as an advance guard, notwithstanding it might have

been a trifle too large or too small. It would, for instance, be unusual to put three or five companies in an advance guard.

7. Engineers were assigned to the advance guard in order that they might get to work at an early moment.

8. Troops of the Medical department are usually assigned to the rear of the main body, but in expectation of an action a proper proportion of them would march with the advance guard.

9. In explanation of the fact that no commander was designated for the main body, it may be said that the main body should ordinarily be looked upon in the light of a reserve in the hands of the commander of the whole force who rides at its head. In such a case the duties of a separate commander would be nominal. It would be permitted to the officer at the head of the main body, however, to regulate the pace, to order halts and rests, but all independence on his part would cease as soon as he had reported with the command on the field.

10. Artillery is placed sufficiently far to the rear to insure its safety in case of sudden attack. There are many positions affording perfect cover for the enemy's infantry along the line of march and the opportunities for the use of artillery are few until open country is reached. When an enemy is encountered it is better to engage him at a distance than to place the artillery in danger from his skirmishers.

XIII—BODY OF ORDER

Paragraph I

1. A large number of reconnaissance reports were received, some widely conflicting, others vague and improbable. On receiving orders "to proceed to Fort Leavenworth and seize the bridge over the Missouri river at that place", one of your first duties was to sift these reports and to formulate a statement which

was so brief, so plain and so well substantiated as to give the clearest idea you could of the strength, position and intentions of the enemy. Having formulated a statement giving all the reliable information in your possession, you incorporated it, where it belonged, in the first paragraph of the order.

2. From this paragraph it is reasonable to infer that the enemy may be advancing on Fort Leavenworth, because his cavalry is between that place and his main body. That he is in considerable force is indicated by his having artillery with his infantry. He has been seen at 1 p. m. to-day to be in camp on the Platte river, and because of the time of day and his distance away, also because you know that there are no good camping places between the Platte and the Missouri rivers, you can conclude that he will probably not march on Fort Leavenworth, if at all, before to-morrow.

3. Even when the commander, lacking satisfactory reports or accurate knowledge, is unable to give definite information of the enemy, a statement of what seems to him most probable, based on the best information he has, deserves a place in the order, but it should be stated only as a belief or probability and not as a positive fact.

4. If you had no definite knowledge, the information concerning the enemy might, for instance, have been stated in some such form as this: "From reports received it seems probable that the enemy intends such a move" or "The enemy appears to be in such a position." Such conclusions, to be of value, must be based on a system of reports, which requires a free communication with all the fractions of a command and an efficient service of information.

5. It may sometimes happen that a subordinate has no other information of the enemy than that conveyed in instructions received from superior authority.

In such cases, the first paragraph of his order may contain information of the enemy in the exact language of his instructions.

6. It is a remarkable fact that information concerning the enemy was omitted from some of the most important orders of the Civil War, which perhaps may justify the conclusion that scouting and reconnaissance were too often defective and also that the absence of good maps and the peculiar character of the theater of operations made it impossible to locate the enemy until he was actually encountered.

Paragraph 2

7. The provisions of paragraph 2 alone convey little knowledge, but when read in conjunction with the preceding paragraph, the subordinate is able to gather a sufficient idea of the general plan to use his judgment intelligently.

8. It has already been indicated, and will be further explained below, why it is unwise to include too much detail of plans in orders, but it is essential to disclose sufficient to enable subordinates to conduct themselves intelligently. Otherwise they might jeopardize the success of plans by slavish and unintelligent adherence to inappropriate orders—orders, for example, which had been based on incorrect information of the enemy. Under such circumstances subordinates are justified in using their discretion in obeying the most positive order; that is to say, when it has become *perfectly evident* that the order has been based on erroneous ideas as to the strength, position, movements or intentions of the enemy.

9. One of the points of contention in the Fitz-John Porter case was that the orders of General Pope were based on an erroneous idea of the position of Longstreet's corps, and the claim was made that Porter performed a decidedly meritorious act in failing

to obey the order. At the battle of Woerth the Crown Prince, who was not on the field and consequently not familiar with the exact state of affairs, gave orders to break off the action, but his orders were not carried out because the commanders on the field thought that the action had progressed so far as to make such a thing inadvisable.

10. As to the special instructions you have received you have concluded it best to keep them out of the written order, although good reasons can be given for including them. The general rule is to communicate only so much as may enable your subordinates to carry out the operations in hand. In this case you simply have given a general direction to the march and are thus able to discount the effect of any failure or change of plans. Nevertheless, you may have consulted with the engineer officer with regard to the special work of his detachment, and with the cavalry commander with regard to the distance and extent of his operations which would be beyond your immediate supervision. Otherwise none need have been informed of your instructions or intentions except the staff.

11. It would have been unwise to give any detailed plans for operating at the bridge itself. This takes into account matters that can only be settled when you arrive on the ground. In many cases your best-formed plans may be modified and you cannot even be certain of reaching the river without an engagement. An attempt to prescribe beforehand what the troops shall do at a certain time is looking too far into the future. It would also enable the enemy to adopt measures especially designed to prevent the execution of your purpose, should he be fortunate enough to get hold of a copy of your order in any way.

12. Although your instructions point out in this

case the single objective of the bridge, you might have received orders covering several alternatives and detailing your movements for several days. Such things would of course have been kept to yourself.

13. The best road should be used even if it is a trifle longer. On a highway you could march in column of squads or fours, while on side roads you would probably be limited to a column of twos. Highroads would also probably be in better repair; on country roads you are more likely to find bad places which delay the march. Reasons for using a number of roads apply to a large command and not to a small column like this.

Paragraph 3

14. This paragraph is divided into lettered subheads. It is customary to put the most important dispositions first in an order for an attack, and according to the order of marching in an order for a march.

(a)

15. Regarding the use of cavalry, it may be stated in general terms that as much cavalry as possible should be actively employed. Under this rule nearly all of your cavalry should be placed between your command and *the enemy*, whenever the ground admits of its use.

16. It is easy to imagine conditions where cavalry would be placed in rear of your column, as in *mountainous country*. In such a case, where you expect to enter an open country very soon, a part of the cavalry might be at the rear of the infantry of the advance guard.

17. In the present case you have a comparatively *open country* where cavalry may be used as a part of the advance guard or independently. There are good reasons for both. If you had a relatively

weak force of cavalry, you could not give it much independence of action. If you expected an engagement each moment you would not send it far away.

18. Here you have a fair-sized force and it should be used independently for the following reasons: it should not be tied to the infantry, because its rate of march is greater and it would gain considerably in a march of this length; if you give the cavalry to the advance guard commander, that officer would be enclined to use it in the restricted service of securing the safety of the column, and not in the broader and more appropriate duty of reconnaissance; when the independent cavalry meets the hostile cavalry, it can maneuver so as to engage the latter to the best advantage, because neither the direction of its advance nor of its retreat is obligatory, not being tied to the advance guard or to its commander.

For instance, suppose a squadron of the enemy should appear in the direction of Kickapoo, the independent cavalry commander would be free to concentrate and attack it, while if tied to the command he could not do so. In addition to the above the cavalry commander gets his orders direct from you without having them filtered through the minds of intermediate commanders, and the advance guard commander knows that he must take measures for the protection of the column, without assistance from the cavalry, being thus thrown on his mettle at all times.

19. Small detachments are, however, made from the cavalry for various purposes. These details should be confined to the smallest limits possible in order to save the cavalry from one of the worst abuses. The following would be sufficient: for maintaining order in the train, a few troopers whose horses were not in good condition could be detailed

by the cavalry commander; for the advance guard four troopers; as orderlies, a non-commissioned officer and eight troopers.

(b)

20. Ordinarily each officer would regulate his distances according to circumstances. In the case before us, the Commander was supposed to command the main body and designated an hour for starting. Although it is strictly a part of the duty of the advance guard to take its proper position it is not unusual to prescribe the distance at which it would precede the main body. In fixing this distance a wide latitude is permitted owing to the great variety of circumstances and conditions which may be encountered soon; the country is full of defensive positions where a small force could delay another for a long time, or the reverse. If the main body is eight hundred yards in rear of the advance guard an order could be sent to the rear and the artillery could be brought up at a trot in ten minutes, or the leading companies of the main body could be brought up in about the same time. These considerations led to the use of that distance in this particular case.

21. It is not sufficient to prescribe that the command will start at a certain hour. The troops would be camped over a considerable area, depending upon the size of the force. Before marching, it is necessary for them to get into the proper order of march, but as it is always desirable to avoid wasting time, it is not usual to consume any in regularly forming the column in a formal manner. If all marched at the same moment, however, some would be too late and some too early to fall into the column in proper order. To avoid delay and confusion, it is customary to designate an "Initial Point" or place which a certain part of the column will leave at a fixed time. This point might be given as the point of departure of the

advance guard, in which case the main body would have its distance given, or it might be the point at which the head of the main body would start, in which case the orders should state the distance at which the advance guard would precede the main body. The various fractions of the command can then calculate the time when it will be necessary to leave their camps or bivouacs in order to take their proper positions, and follow promptly as the column forms while marching away.

22. To afford sufficient room for all parts of the command, it is generally advisable to designate an initial point a short distance in advance of the main part of the camp or bivouac. In this order the "Initial Point" is the eastern edge of Easton, which the head of the main body is supposed to leave at 6:00 a. m.

23. The duties of the several fractions of the command are not specified in detail. They are merely given a general direction in order that subsequent developments may shape themselves, but the cavalry, which is somewhat out of hand, is limited in its movement. Commanders of advance guard and cavalry are not told how to march their commands. The order of march of the main body is given and the name of its commander is omitted, because as elsewhere stated it is supposed to be under your immediate command. All other details are left to the subordinate commanders.

Paragraph 4

24. In considering the disposition of the train numerous alternatives are presented. It may follow the main body; it may move with trains of the entire army; it may remain at Easton; it may follow to a certain point and stop there to await orders.

25. The last disposition seems to be the best. The train is ordered to "Frenchman's" where it may be

held at the cross-roads, ready to march in any direction. It is near enough to receive orders quickly. It will not be in the way if you are defeated. It can join you easily, when sent for, at your camp for the night. Its location points to a general principle for the disposition of a large train.

26. As far as guarding the train is concerned, a detail is made to preserve order only. There is usually a sufficient number of men with the train to protect it from any small enterprises of the enemy.

Paragraph 5

27. Under ordinary conditions the commander rides out to the front. His object in going there is to form his estimate of the situation and not to interfere with the commander of the advance guard, to make his plans in good time and to send his orders to the rear. Ordinarily he would not ride with the advance cavalry and it would not be necessary for him to start out with the advance guard. It would be better for him to remain at Easton until all the troops have left. It is a good idea for a commander to see his command march by him each day, after the manner of an informal review. For these reasons the last paragraph was written as it is.

XIV—ENDING

The Ending should be authenticated in the usual way either by the signature of the officer in command, by his chief of staff or by some other authorized staff officer. A practice in other armies, which has also been partially adopted by our chief of staff, is to sign the surname only.

XV—NOTATION OF METHOD OF ISSUE

The Notation should always be appended, at the lower left-hand corner, and on a level with the signature, showing how the orders were issued and to whom the copies have been furnished. This

order announces that it has been "Dictated to adjutants, battery commander, etc.

XV—GENERAL REMARKS

1. Ordinary abbreviations are used in the caption, margin, ending and notation, but no abbreviations whatever should be made in the body of the order except a. m., and p. m., for morning, and evening. Abbreviations of tactical units and arms of the service should be begun with capital letters.

2. A road is always designated by naming several places along its line, such as the LEAVENWORTH-LOWEMONT-ATCHISON pike.

3. It is very important that the names of persons and places should be correctly understood when they appear in the body of an order. For this reason it is advisable to emphasize proper names by inserting them in CAPITAL letters. When writing orders by hand, proper names should be printed out in capitals in order to guard against indistinct or illegible hand-writing. It will often be a useful precaution to give, in parenthesis, immediately following them, the phonetic spelling of the local pronunciation of proper names; for example: DUQUESNE (Dewkane), SAULT (Soo), OPEQUON (Opeckan). Such a simple word as Antietam has been mistaken for Anty Tam.

4. A standard map is usually furnished by the general staff. In case names are used which are not on the map in general use, a reference should be made to the map on which they are to be found. When several names are alike in a neighborhood they must be located by reference to other points. Thus in the Atlanta campaign there were two places designated as Howell's Mills, one on Peach Tree Creek and the other on Nancy's Creek, about two miles apart. A misunderstanding as to these points caused a wide gap in General Sherman's lines closing on Atlanta, which might have caused serious results.

5. No provision was made in this order for guarding the flanks as the cavalry could be counted upon to attend to this. Though there be several parallel roads, a command of this size can protect its flanks better by keeping together than by making detachments.

6. When we begin to consider the distances which would be occupied on the road by this command, disposed in the usual manner, and find how great they are in comparison with the actual length of the column closed up, the question naturally occurs whether this is not a case where one of the subdivisions of the advance guard may be dispensed with. As we decrease the size of an advance guard, it is evident that we will sooner or later reach such a case. In this instance it might appear that the safety of the command would be better secured by leaving out the reserve of the advance guard, but this is a matter for the advance guard commander to decide and it was therefore omitted from the order.

7. The question of the necessity for a rear guard naturally arises. In a forward march the duties of a rear guard are insignificant, and as the train was disposed of by halting it at Frenchman's it is thought that a detachment for the purpose of guarding it was not necessary.

8. Peculiar and exceptional circumstances might possibly arise, justifying the prescribing in orders, especially with small commands, the amounts of ammunition, rations and forage to be carried, but in well-regulated, well-instructed, experienced commands, all such provisions would ordinarily be omitted from orders for the movement of troops. Similarly all matters pertaining to the domain of drill, instruction and discipline would be excluded, Whenever it becomes necessary, all such matters can be covered in verbal instructions, or preferably in separate

orders (general or special), circulars or letters of instruction.

9. It should be borne in mind that ordinary exertions of troops are alone considered in this order. In the usual course of events the command would not be expected to march before morning. Night marches are exceptional, are not easily executed, and take more time than marches by day. They are never made except for specific reasons or purposes. The time of starting is therefore fixed at 6 a. m. when it is broad daylight.

10. An important point for all commanders to bear in mind, in the preparation of orders, is that the situation must be accepted as it is prescribed in their instructions from superior authority. Whether the view of the situation, which has evidently inspired the instructions received, is logical or not, is hardly a question to be worried about by a right minded subordinate. He must also try to avoid conjuring up difficulties outside of the situation which is placed before him. He should think of his own obligations alone and not bother about those properly resting upon others. These peculiarities were so highly developed in an otherwise excellent corps commander as to cause General Grant to justify his being relieved on the field.

Information, Messages, Reports, War Diaries

1. Closely connected with the subject of Orders is that of information of the enemy, because upon this depends the correctness of the whole. This information may be obtained from a variety of sources, among which would be higher authority, neighboring troops, spies, but principally the reports of small parties which send in their observations from many points at the same time. These advanced detachments have the double duty of collecting information and of transmitting it promptly. It is with the latter subject we are principally interested now, because the entire work is valueless unless the information is quickly and accurately transmitted to the highest authority, It is sent in the form of messages written on regulation blanks, which are folded once and fit envelopes which are provided. (See Appendix II).

2. The address is written briefly, as

Commanding General,
1st Army Corps.

The sender fills in the hour and minute of dispatch and indicates the rate of travel by, * for a gait of six miles per hour, the trot and walk alternating; ** for a rate of eight miles per hour, or a continuous trot; *** for a gait of twelve miles per hour, or as fast as is consistent with the powers of the horse.

It is usual to leave the envelope open in order that commanders along the line of the messen-

gers' routes may read the contents. If desirable that the contents be unknown, the envelope should be marked "personal".

The receiver fills in the time of receipt and returns the envelope to the messenger.

3. In the message blank, the heading "Sending Detachment" should be filled in with the name of the body of troops with which the writer is on duty, as "Picket of Company A, 20th U. S. Infantry," or "Officers' Patrol, 7th Cavalry".

If several messages are sent during the day from the same source to the same person they should be numbered consecutively below the heading "Sending Detachment".

A message which does not give the place and hour is usually of no value. The signature should simply be the writer's surname and rank.

For the use of staff officers, blocks with carbonized paper are recommended.

4. The *message* or *dispatch* resembles a telegram in its clearness and brevity and in the absence of official formalities.

5. The utmost care should be observed in its preparation, remembering that *facts* are wanted and that they must be clearly separated from what has been surmised or received at second hand. The source of information should be given and the reasons for surmises.

6. Most of the rules adopted in the interest of the clearness and brevity of orders apply to *messages.*

7. Remembering the importance of an exact knowledge of the situation, it is the duty of those who are charged with reconnaissance work to report frequently and fully, As these *messages,* from many points, are to be considered as a whole, it will be frequently as important to report where the enemy is *not* as where he *is,* if the aspect changes or remains

the same, if previous information is confirmed or not.

The accurate statement of numbers, time and place is valuable. The arms of the service observed will be the basis for important deductions as to the size and intentions of a force. For instance, the information that infantry was in front was sufficient to stop the last advance of Lee at Appomattox because Lee then knew that he was no longer opposed by a delaying force of cavalry, and that if a small body of infantry could get there the probabilities were that a large force of the same arm was at hand. Exact information as to the commands of the enemy observed, will permit a commander, who has studied the organization of the enemy, to make deductions as to the distribution of forces and the numbers in his front.

If a subordinate is well informed of the intentions of his superiors he will be better able to select the class of information that is needed.

Too much information should not be forwarded and great care should be observed in deciding upon what is really important. A message which explains the situation clearly and enables a conclusive decision to be reached, is what is wanted. Meckel says that "a consciousness of duty well done is the best guarantee for the contents of a message or report".

The fight itself gives the best opportunity for judging the situation. The commander must therefore be kept continually informed by messages from the troops engaged. This was so persistently ignored during the Civil War that General Grant concluded that it was impossible to secure information in the ordinary way so he was in the habit of sending staff officers with details of orderlies to important points, with orders to keep him informed. Napoleon kept

a number of his best young generals at his headquarters for similar duties and each was provided with a dozen horses.

8. In urgent cases it is necessary to send information not only to the next superior, but also to higher commanders, as well as to neighboring troops. A message sent thus to several authorities should have the fact noted upon each copy sent. An omission to send a message to the ordinary recipient should be repaired and explained at the earliest possible moment.

9. The back of the *message* blank is ruled in squares so that it may be used to make a simple sketch of positions, roads or other features of importance. The sketch gives a graphic representation of things which it sometimes takes long to describe. It may not only save time but add to the clearness of a written report even when it is defective in technical skill and roughly executed.

10. The field *message* is then a brief communication which passes from one part to another of an army on service. It is entirely different from the *report*, which is a more elaborate statement prepared at leisure, giving a complete narrative of a campaign, battle or other important event. This distinction should be clearly defined, as it has not always been observed in our service. It has been customary to use the word *report* to cover both terms.

11. Many of our records are full of *reports* of over-whelming forces of the enemy, of uniform valor on the part of the writer, indiscriminate praise of subordinates and loud calls for reinforcements. This tendency to magnify the size of an enemy, to call a defeat a victory, and to award perfunctory praise, is perhaps natural, but it is reprehensible in official communications. Such information is of course val-

ueless to a commander who looks for the exact truth from his subordinates.

12. At the headquarters of each command a war *diary* is kept in which a complete record is made as soon as possible. At the main headquarters an officer is charged with this duty alone.

How Issued and Transmitted

1. Orders may be issued either verbally or in writing. The difficulty of providing a large number of copies on short notice makes the latter method difficult to use in the field. When a definite hour can be fixed, representatives of the different organizations should be assembled, the orders dictated by a staff officer and written out by those sent to receive them. Such an assembly may be made at the close of a day's march, in the evening and even in the morning just before starting out. The custom of Napoleon was to take his rest early in the night and to wake sometime after midnight, when most of the reports from distant points had been received, and to spend the balance of the night in visiting troops, reconnoitering and issuing his orders for the day.

2. Verbal orders may be given directly or by messenger. They may be issued directly when the necessary officers to receive them can be assembled to hear them, in which case they should be dictated and written down, *if of any length.* For simple details or a single service, a verbal order may be reduced to a word of command.

3. The danger of issuing the verbal order directly has many examples in history. There are ten different versions of the verbal orders of Napoleon to Grouchy when the latter was detached to pursue the Prussians in the Waterloo Campaign.

At Shiloh General Lewis Wallace was six miles away and was personally ordered to hold himself in readiness to move to reinforce the main army. General Grant says that he sent him a verbal order to

march by the road nearest the river. General Wallace says that the order he received was to join the right of the army. The marches and countermarches of the division in obeying the two versions of the order kept the command out of action on the first day, when its presence would have been decisive.

At Fair Oaks in 1862, General J. E. Johnston seems to have had a good opportunity to destroy a portion of McClellan's army. His orders to Longstreet and D. H. Hill, who were to make the main attack, were given verbally. General Johnston's own account of them is contradictory and he has left no record of what they were. It is certain however, that Longstreet did not execute them as intended, that he took the wrong road and that the lack of decisive results was due to this fact. Johnston's action was probably due to the realizing sense that he was himself to blame in not making himself understood.

At Spring Hill, before the battle of Franklin, General Hood has claimed that General Cheatham did not obey a positive verbal order to attack the Federals. General Cheatham has, with equal earnestness, denied that such an order was ever given. Great events and several military reputations depended upon that small point.

4. Verbal orders delivered by messenger should be avoided as much as possible. In matters of importance they should be used only under urgent necessity. Bearing in mind that there is always a possibility of controversy as to their purport, such orders should not contain more than one well-determined point, as "the division will march to the village of X". The bearer of a verbal order should repeat it correctly before going away.

5. Orders and messages are transmitted, when the person to whom they are addressed is not present,

by messenger, or by some of the methods employed by the Signal Corps.

6. Very much depends upon the correct and rapid expedition of orders, almost as much as upon their being well drawn up. Great disasters and difficulties may arise through false transmission or by a mistake that is of little importance in itself.

7. When the subject is important and the way insecure it is well to employ several means of transmittal.

In 1807 the capture of the officer charged with the orders to Bernadotte delayed the arrival of his corps two days and kept him out of the battle of Eylau, which was indecisive for this reason. So often did this occur in Napoleon's campaigns that he sent almost all his orders in cypher by several routes.

In the advance from Beaumont in the Waterloo Campaign the center column composed of half of the army was delayed several hours by the failure of the leading corps to move. Vandamme was without orders because the single officer who bore them had fallen on the way. This delay was one of the causes of the failure of the campaign, and is generally ascribed to the inexperience of Marshal Soult as Chief of Staff. The same carelessness characterized all the communications with Grouchy during the campaign, and was largely responsible for the wanderings of D'Erlon's Corps between Ligny and Quatre Bras, which was another of the fatal mistakes of that time.

8. Copies of written orders are always sent to higher authority whenever they involve the carrying out of instructions or orders previously received from that source.

9. Rapid transmission, when the signal corps is not available, and when the distances are considerable, will be secured by small detachments placed as relays at proper intervals.

APPENDIX I.

DETACHMENT, 1st DIV., 1st ARMY CORPS,
CAMP AT EASTON, KANSAS,
19 Sept., '05, 3 p. m.

FIELD ORDERS,)
No. 1.)
TROOPS.

1. Independent Cavalry:
~~Maj. A.~~
5th Cav., 1st Sqd'n

2. Advance Guard:
~~Maj. B.~~
4 troopers 1st Sqd'n
5th Cav.
6th Inf.. I Batt'n,
1st F
1-..

3. Main Body:
~~in order~~ of march;
1 n.c.o. 8 troopers 1st
Sqd'n 5th Cav.
6th Inf, II Batt'n.
F. A., 1st Battery.
6th Inf. III Batt'n.
Det. 1st Field Hosp.

1. Cavalry patrols of the enemy have been ~~seen east of the~~ MISSOURI river. His infantry and artillery are reported one day's march east of FORT LEAVENWORTH. Our main body is at WINCHESTER 8 miles west of EASTON.

2. The detachment will march tomorrow toward ~~FORT LEA~~VENWORTH.

3. (a) The independent cavalry will move at 5.30 a. ~~m., by the EASTON~~-FRENCHMAN'S-FORT LEAVENWORTH road.

[illegible] bridge over the MISSOURI river and will send patrols to the eastward.

(b) The advance guard will precede the main body ~~at a distance~~ of 800 yards.

(c) The main body will march at 6 a. m. from ~~the eastern~~ exit of EASTON.

4. The regimental train will follow as far as ~~FRENCHMAN'S~~ escorted by a few troopers.

5. The detachment commander will be with the ~~main body until 7 a.~~ m. and after that with the advance guard.

A.,
Colonel, 6th Infantry.

Dictated to Adjutants, Battery Commander, Commander of Engineers, and Staff.
Copy to Div. Com'dr, by Lt. B.

APPENDIX II.

Following are samples of the message blank and envelope, reduced:

SENDING DETACHMENT.	LOCATION.	DAY.	MONTH	HRS. a. m. or	MIN. p. m.
	Received.				

To

7 inches.

$5\frac{1}{2}$ inches.

TO

DEPARTURE	ARRIVAL
RATE OF SPEED	

This envelope will be returned to bearer.

4 inches.

$5\frac{3}{4}$ inches.

APPENDIX III

FOLLOWING ARE MODELS OF SOME OF THE MOST COMMON FORMS OF ORDERS

NOTE:

An effort has been made throughout this lecture to show the importance of excluding details as far as possible from field orders. The simplicity of the case selected made it a fit example. In a model however, which is designed to cover a general case, it is necessary to supply instructions in much more detail, as will be found in the following:

1. ORDER FOR A MOVEMENT TO THE FRONT.

Field Orders
Number ( ).

Official designation of issuing officer's command.

Place, Date, Hour.

TROOPS:

1. *Advance Guard*, (name of commander and troops).

1. *Information of the enemy and of our supporting troops.*

2. *Objective of the movement*, (stated in general terms).

3. (*Disposition of troops.*)

(a) *Orders for the advance guard* [distance at which it should precede main body or place and time of departure (when not prescribed for main body instead), road, extent of security and information service to be required, any special mission].

2. *Main Body*, in order of march, (generally as follows:
Cavalry as messengers,
Infantry,
Artillery,
Infantry,
Machine gun detachment,
Engineers,
Field Hospital troops.)

(b) *Orders for the main body* (distance from advance guard or initial point and time of departure).

(c) *Orders for flank guard*, [similar to (a) when required, especial attention being given to reconnaissance. When necessary indicate where the flank guard leaves the main column].

3. *Right* (or *left*) *Flank Guard*, (name of commander and troops).

(d) *Orders for the outposts*, (how they enter the column on being relieved).

4. *Orders for the regimental train* (escort, distance in rear and destination when different from that of main body).

5. *Place of commander*, (or where to send reports).

Manner of communicating the order.

Signature.

REMARKS:

If the Cavalry is used independently, instead of being attached to the advance guard, it should appear at the beginning of paragraph 1 of the margin as follows: *Independent Cavalry* (name of commander and troops). Paragraph 3, (a) of the body of the order will then read:

3. (a) *Orders for independent cavalry* (hour and place of departure, direction of march, extent of security and information service required, special mission).

In this case sufficient cavalry would be attached to the advance guard to secure it from surprise.

Paragraph 3 (d) will be omitted in case it is not applicable.

A certain hour may be fixed for the main body to start, or the distance at which it is to follow the advance guard may be prescribed. In the latter case, it is necessary to designate the time at which the advance guard shall start. A principle of minor tactics requires that the advance guard shall generally regulate its advance on the movements of the main body, and in small commands where there would be no difficulty in keeping contact with the main body, this rule usually governs. But when the advance guard is very large or moves a very considerable distance in advance of the main body (sometimes one day's march), the main body would not be expected to regulate its progress on that of the advance guard.

Sometimes the main body and the advance guard start from different rendezvous, far apart and not in sight of each other. In such cases, and also when the advance guard is very large, it is better to arrange to start both the advance guard and the main body by prescribing a definite time of starting for each.

The two paragraphs regulating the movements of the advance guard and the main body should never be inconsistent.

"Train" is a general term which describes all the transportation attached directly to troops and differs in this from the "ammunition or supply column" whose wagons are united into independent units. The "train" is divided into "light" and "regimental". The former carries the essential requisites for battle and follows immediately after the troops to which it is attached. It consists of ammunition, medicine and tool carts and officers' led horses. It is not mentioned in the order. The latter (regimental train) consists of ration, baggage and cook wagons, which are united in each division under an officer and follow the troops at a greater or less distance and must be promptly distributed among the troops to which they belong upon arrival at the camp or bivouac. At the beginning of an engagement the regimental train must be halted at once and faced to the rear.

2. ORDER FOR A RETREAT.

Field Orders
Number ( ).

TROOPS:

1. *Advance Troops*, (name of commander and troops).

2. *Main Body*, in order of march, (generally as follows:
Field Hospital troops,
Engineers,
Infantry,
Artillery,
Infantry,
Cavalry).

3. *Rear Guard*, (name of commander and troops; usually strong in cavalry, artillery and machine guns).

4. *Right* (or *left*) *Flank Guard*, (name of commander and troops).

Manner of communicating the order.

Official designation of issuing officer's command.

Place, Date, Hour.

1. *Information of the enemy* and of our supporting troops.

2. *Mission of the command*, (plan of the commander).

3. *Orders for the regimental train*, (place and time of departure, road and escort. Usually sent well in advance).

4. (*Disposition of troops*).

(a) *Orders for the advance troops*, (place and time of departure, road, special instructions. Preparations for destroying and obstructing road).

(b) *Orders for the main body*, (place and time of departure).

(c) *Orders for the rear guard*, (distance from main body, or place and time of departure, examination of side roads, special instructions).

(d) *Orders for the flank guard*, similar to (c).

(e) *Orders for outposts*, (how and when withdrawn and joined to column).

(5) *Place of the commander* (or where to send reports).

Signature.

REMARK:

In a retreat the terms "right" and "left" are used as if the detachment were facing the enemy. The commander may either use the cavalry as "rear guard cavalry" under the orders of the commander of the rear guard as in the case supposed or he may keep it in his own control.

3. ORDER FOR AN ADVANCE GUARD.

Field Orders
Number ( ).

TROOPS:

1. *Advance Guard Cavalry*, (name of commander and troops).

2. *Vanguard*,(name of commander and troops).

3. *Reserve*, in order of march, (generally as follows:
Cavalry,
Infantry,
Artillery,
Infantry,
Machine gun detchm'nt
Field Hospital troops).

4. *Right* (or *Left*) *Flank Guard*, (name of commander and troops).

Manner of communicating the order.

Official designation of issuing officer's command, (Advance Guard of such a command).

Place, Date, Hour.

1. *Information of the enemy* and of our supporting troops.

2. *Mission of the advance guard.*

3. (*Disposition of troops.*)

(a) *Orders for the advance guard Cavalry*, (place and time of departure, road, service of security and information, special mission).

(b) *Orders for the vanguard*, (similar to (a).

(c) *Orders for the reserve*, (distance from vanguard or the place and time of departure).

(d) *Orders for the flank guard*, (similar to (a).

(e) *Orders for the outposts*, (how and when withdrawn and joined to column).

4. *Orders for the regimental train.*

5. *Place of commander* (or where to send reports).

Signature.

REMARK:

The distribution of troops in the margin is not necessary in the order for a small force, in which case the body of the order would contain all the details concerning the force.

In case a flank guard is furnished from the main body it is best to detail the flank guard in the margin as above. On the other hand if the advance guard furnishes this force it would not be mentioned in the margin and the body of the order would contain the necessary instructions about sending it out.

4. ORDER FOR A REAR GUARD.

Field Orders
Number ( ).

Official designation of issuing officer's command.

Place, Date, Hour.

TROOPS:

1. *Reserve*, in order of march, (generally as follows:
Field hospital troops,
Engineers,
Infantry ,
Artillery,
Infantry,
Machine gun detachment,
Cavalry as messengers.)

2. *Rear guard cavalry*, (name of commander and troops).

3. *Right* (or *left*) *flank guard*, (name of commander and troops).

1. *Information of the enemy* and of our supporting troops.

2. *Mission of rear guard.*

3. *Orders for the regimental train.*

4. (*Disposition of troops.*)

(a) *Orders for reserve*, (place and time of departure, places selected for defense, troops sent ahead, distance from main body not definitely prescribed).

(b) *Orders for rear guard cavalry*, (place and time of departure of support, special orders).

(c) *Orders for flank guard*, (place and time of departure, road.)

5. *Place of Commander*, (or where to send reports).

Manner of communicating order.

Signature.

REMARK:

The above case supposes that the rear party and support are composed of cavalry which furnishes its own outpost. If however it is necessary to attach infantry to the support and rear party the distribution will be given in the margin under appropriate headings.

5. SINGLE ORDER FOR OUTPOSTS.

Field Orders Number ( ).

Official designation of issuing officer's command.

Place, Date, Hour.

(The distribution of troops is not given).

1. *Information of the enemy* and of our supporting troops,(position of the main body of the command).

2. *Designation of officer to command outposts and troops* under his command.

3. *General statement of the line to be occupied*, (rareiy divided into sections in case of a detachment; places to be held or watched in a special way, conduct in case of attack).

4. *Orders for those troops* which are not assigned to the outposts, (arrangement of interior guards, point of assembly.)

5. *Orders for the regimental train*, (whether it accompanies the outpost troops or not).

6. *Place of the commander* (or where to send reports).

Manner of communicating the order.

Signature.

6. ORDER FOR AN ATTACK BY A COMMAND WHILE ON THE MARCH.

Field Orders
Number ( ).
(The distribution of troops is not given.)

Official designation of issuing officer's command.

Place, Date, Hour.

1. *Detailed information of the enemy* and of our supporting troops.

2. *Plan of the commander* (usually indicating a flank to be attacked). The advance guard is now informed that its functions as such have ceased.

3. (*Disposition of troops*).

(a) *Order for attached machine guns*, (position, target at beginning of fire).

(b) *Orders for the artillery*, (first position, first target, generally the hostile artillery).

(c) *Orders for the infantry*, (indicating the general means to be used in the secondary attack, specifically the direction and objective of the main attack; name of the officer charged with the main attack).

(d) *Orders for the reserve* (giving troops and position).

(e) *Orders for the cavalry* (usually in force on one flank, while the opposite flank is covered by patrols).

4. *Orders for the ammunition wagons*, attached ammunition columns and for the field hospital troops (when early provision can be made).

5. *Orders for the regimental train.*

6. *Place of the commander* (usually near the first position of the artillery).

Manner of communicating the order.

Signature.

REMARK.

The distribution of troops is not given in the margin of this order as it already appears in the order of march. Ordinarily the *distribution* of troops is shown in marching orders only, but it may be convenient to write in the margin a list of the troops employed.

7. ORDER FOR TAKING UP A POSITION IN READINESS.

Field Orders
Number ( ).

(The distribution of troops is not given).

Official designation of issuing officer's command.

Place, Date, Hour.

1. *Information of the enemy* and of our supporting troops.

2. *Plan of the commander*, (point of assembly for the command; dissolution of the order of march).

3. (*Disposition of troops*).

(a) *Orders for the Cavalry*, (divided into contact squadrons, or concentrated with standing and moving patrols).

(b) *Orders for the artillery*, (a position in readiness behind a position commanding the several routes which may be used by the enemy, entrenchments to be constructed; in some cases it may remain with the infantry).

(c) *Orders for the machine guns*, (position, cover).

(d) *Orders for the infantry* (points outlining the position to be occupied, bulk being at point of assembly under cover).

(e) *Orders for placing the position in a state of defense*, (sections to be prepared by troops which are later to occupy them; more difficult tasks assigned to engineers).

4. *Orders for the ammunition wagons, attached ammunition columns and field hospital.*

5. *Orders for the regimental train.*

6. *Place of the commander* (or where to send reports).

Manner of communicating the order.

Signature.

8. ORDER FOR THE OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

Field Orders Number ( )

Official designation of issuing officer's command.

Place, Date, Hour.

(The distribution of troops is not given.)

1. *Information of the enemy* and of our supporting troops.

2. *Plan of the commander*, (position to be defended. Formal dissolution of the order of march).

3. (*Disposition of troops.*)

(a) *Orders for machine guns if present*, (position, target, commencement of fire.)

(b) *Orders for the artillery*, (position, target and amount of intrenching).

(c) *Orders for the infantry* of the first line, (division of front into sections and assignment of troops, amount of entrenching).

(d) *Orders for the reserve*, (troops, position).

(e) *Orders for the engineers*, (defensive works, bridging to be done in the rear).

(f) *Orders for the cavalry*, (usually covering the most exposed wing with the main force, patrols being principally employed on the other flank).

4. *Orders for ammunition wagons*, and field hospital.

5. *Orders for the regimental train.*

6. *Place of the commander* (or where to send reports).

Signature.

Manner of communicating the order.

9. ORDER FOR AN OUTPOST OF ALL ARMS.

Field Orders Number 1.

Official designation of issuing officer's command, (Outpost of such a force).

Place, Date, Hour.

(The distribution of troops is not given).

1. *Information of the enemy* and of our supporting troops, (position of advance guard, main body and neighboring outposts).

2. *Plan of the outpost commander*, (and the general direction of the line of observation).

3. (*Disposition of troops.*)

(a) *Orders for the outpost cavalry*, (contact with the enemy, line to be observed, roads to be specially watched, places to be examined or visited, detachments to be made for service elsewhere).

(b) *Orders for the outpost line*, (assignment to sections).

(c) *Orders for the reserve*,(troops position, interior guards, intrenchment, if necessary).

4. *Orders in case of attack.*

5. *Place of outpost commander*, (usually with the reserve).

Manner of communicating the order.

Signature.

REMARK:

It is usual for the outpost commander to issue two orders. The first order contains the most important measures to be taken at once, the second order is given later after inspection of the first dispositions. The first order would be the same for the entire line. The second can be replaced by a series of separate instructions, but these must be communicated to all parties to such extent that unity of action is assured along the whole line.

9A. ORDERS FOR AN OUTPOST OF ALL ARMS.

Field Orders Number 2.

Official designation of issuing officer's command, (Outpost of such a force).

Place, Date, Hour.

(The distribution of troops is not given).

1. *Information of the enemy* (if anything additional is known).

2. (*Disposition of troops.*)

(a) *Orders for the outpost cavalry*, (degree of readiness for action required, time of withdrawal from the front, camp for the night, duty at night, time for resuming day positions).

(b) *Orders for the outpost line*, (latitude allowed, time for occupation of night positions, routes for night patrols, communication with neighboring troops, time for reoccupation of day position).

(c) *Orders for the reserve*, (latitude allowed, night dispositions, time to form under arms the following day).

3. *Roads upon which examining posts* will be placed (when authorized).

4. *Intrenchments*, *barricades*, etc.

Manner of communicating the order.

Signature.

APPENDIX IV.

SOME CELEBRATED ORDERS.

EXAMPLE OF AN ORDER FOR THE MARCH OF 3 GREAT ARMIES.

Army Headquarters, Saarbrucken,
9th August, 8 p. m.

Reports received lead to the supposition that the enemy has withdrawn behind the Moselle or Seille.

All three armies will follow this movement. The 3rd Army takes the road SAARUNION-DIEUZE and those south; the 2nd Army the road St. AVOLD-NOMENY and those south; the 1st Army the road SAARLOUIS-BOULAY-LES-ETANGS and those south.

In order to cover the march, the cavalry is to be sent forward to a considerable distance, and is to be supported by advance-guards thrown out well to the front, so that, should the necessity arise, each army may have time to close up.

Any deviation from these lines of march will be ordered by His Majesty, as the position or movements of the enemy may demand.

The 10th of August may be employed by the 1st and 2nd Armies in giving the troops rest, or in placing them on the roads designated for them.

As the left wing cannot reach the SAAR until the 12th, the corps of the right wing will have comparatively short marches.

A GOOD EXAMPLE OF ORDERS FOR AN ATTACK:

Southern exit from Britz,
11th September, 1880, 8-3 4 p. m.

I intend to attack the enemy who has occupied Buckow.

1. The advanced guard (13th Infantry Brigade) takes Buckow. It will cover with its cavalry the left wing of the Army Corps.

2. From the main body;

The 5th Infantry Division marches to the west of Buckow and thence marches on Marienfelde.

The 12th Infantry Brigade will be echelonned east of the advanced guard to support its attack on Buckow.

3. The Cavalry Division passes to the west of Buckow to reconnoiter towards Lichtenrade and to cover the right flank of the Army Corps.

4. The trains remain at Britz.

5. The operations will commence at 9 o'clock.

6. Reports will reach me at the mill on the high-road south of Britz.

(Signed) VON SCHWARTZHOFF, General,
Commanding 3d Army Corps.

TO MOVE 200,000 MEN INTO THE FIELD OF GRAVELOTTE THE FOLLOWING ORDER WAS ISSUED:

"According to reports received we can expect that the enemy will take up a defensive position on the plateau between Le Point du jour and Montigny la Grange.

"Four battalions of the enemy have advanced into the Bois des Genivaux. His Majesty is of opinion that it is advisable for the XII and Guard Corps to march off in the direction of Batilly so as to reach the enemy at St. Marie aux Chenes if he marches off to Briey, or to attack Amanvillers in case he remains on the heights. The attacks should follow simultaneously:

By the 7st Army Corps from the Bois de Vaux and Gravelotte.

By the 9th Army Corps against the Bois des Genivaux and Verneville.

By the left wing of the 2nd Army from the north."