THE GENERAL BOARD
United States Forces, European Theater
APO 408

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

MISSION: Prepare a Report and Recommendations on the Organization, Equipment, and Operation of Criminal Investigation Units in the European Theater of Operations.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945 and General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater.

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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

SECTION 1

PROCEDURES DURING OPERATIONS AND THEIR DEFICIENCIES

1. Initial History. Prior to the invasion of the European Continent the Theater Provost Marshal had 236 criminal investigation agents supervised by 20 officers who were also criminal investigators, operating in the United Kingdom. These criminal investigation agents were distributed by unit as needed throughout the Western Base Section, Eastern Base Section, North Ireland Base Section, Southern Base Section, and Central Base Section which was located in London, England. Staff control of these sections was exercised by the Criminal Investigation Branch of the Military Police Division, Office of the Theater Provost Marshal. The units used in the United Kingdom at that time were the Type II (BJ) unit composed of ten agents under the supervision of a first lieutenant, as prescribed in Table of Organization and Equipment 19-500, dated 22 April 1944. In addition to these units, a total of 36 individual agents in criminal investigation detachments were assigned to the various headquarters in the United Kingdom. During the period of May and June 1944, six additional Type II (BJ) units were assigned to the European Theater. The personnel for the units were selected from units and replacement depots in the United Kingdom. The 36 agents attached to the various headquarters were absorbed by these units. This increase made the total investigators in the European Theater 260 agents and 26 officers. In December 1944 the Type II (BJ) units existing in the European Theater were enlarged and converted to 14-man units commanded by a captain. This is the Type III (BK) unit as prescribed in Table of Organization and Equipment 19-500, dated 22 April 1944. Likewise in December 1944 and January 1945, four more Type III (BK) units were activated, deriving their men from the qualified personnel in the European Theater. In March and April 1945 nine additional Type III (BK) units were activated. By the end of April 1945 there were in the European Theater potentially 535 agents headed by 39 officer agents, the commanding officers of their respective units.

2. Supply. The obtaining of operating supplies for military police investigation detachments was found to be satisfactory with the exception of photographic equipment. The equipment provided by Table of Organization and Equipment 19-500, dated 22 April 1944 was adequate, however many units could not obtain this equipment after reaching the European Theater. Many units were forced to turn in their photographic equipment prior to embarkation for the European Theater, since at that time this equipment was on the high priority list. Photographic supplies were unobtainable, and this situation persisted throughout the entire operations.

3. Billets and Messing. Paragraph 98, Field Manual 19-5, dated 14 June 1944, states: "Criminal Investigators should be provided separate billets and separate mess. Living and dining with other troops results in a loss of effectiveness."[1] In many instances agents

in units were required to mess and billet with the enlisted men of military police battalions. This procedure often resulted in the lowering of prestige and loss of efficiency in carrying out an investigation.[8] One criminal investigation unit attached to a military police battalion for quarters, rations and administration practically lost its identity as a separate unit. Agents were required to secure passes[12] from the commanding officer of the battalion to visit nearby towns and were required to mess at certain hours. Little crime prevention work was done under these conditions and the outside contacts with sources of information so necessary to successful work were not made.

4. Uniforms and Credentials.[8] To more readily accomplish their mission agents were given credentials and authorized to wear the standard field uniform (but not the blouse) prescribed for civilians in the European Theater and also to wear civilian clothing (plain clothes).[12] During active operations civilian clothing for the most part was not worn in the European Theater except in the United Kingdom Base Section and in the Paris, France area. When the civilian uniform was worn, "U.S.'s" were prescribed to be worn for collar ornaments. No insignia of rank was worn. Agents when so attired were addressed as "Mister" and referred to as "Agent".

5. Liaison.[15] Cooperation with other agencies was satisfactory for the most part. Joint investigations with some agencies, notably with Counter Intelligence Corps, British Special Investigation Branch, local police representatives (i.e. National Gendarmerie, Surete National) were frequently necessary. It was found that liaison with these agencies was not only necessary at high echelon levels, but was an absolute requirement on the part of each and every agent operating in the field. In cases involving rape and alleged rape it was often necessary for the victims and their clothing to be examined by the personnel of field, evacuation and general hospitals located near the scene of the crime. Agents found it a good policy to maintain close liaison and friendly relations with these hospitals.

6. Assignment and Distribution. Criminal investigation units were distributed by the Theater Provost Marshal where most needed, taking into consideration the crime rate throughout the European Theater and the fact that the number of criminal investigation units was inadequate to handle one hundred percent of the crime situation in the European Theater as reflected in reports rendered to the Theater Provost Marshal's Office.[7] It is believed that approximately 75 agents are required for 200,000 troops. A Criminal Investigation Type III (BK) unit can handle between 30 and 35 cases per month. As of the 26th of September 1944 a total of 20 Criminal Investigation Type II (BJ) units were on the European Continent and were distributed among Communications Zone sections and the armies as follows:

UNITS	LOCATION
5	12th Army Group (at first attached, then assigned to the armies)
2	Loire Base Section
2	Seine Base Section
3	Advance Section, Communications Zone
2	Normandy Base Section
3	Brittany Base Section
1	Oise Base Section
1	Channel Base Section
1	Laboratory - Communications Zone Headquarters, Paris, France (27th M.P.C.I.Sec.)

Six Criminal Investigation Type II (BJ) units remained in the United Kingdom to be utilized in that base section. All of these units were later organized as Class III (BK) units. The five units assigned to the 12th Army Group, subsequently attached and reassigned to the armies, proved to be inadequate. As a consequence in November 1944, the 12th Army Group urged all armies to utilize the organic criminal investigation section within each military police battalion for the investigation of major crimes. Prior to this time the functions of these sections had been limited to the investigation of minor incidents. This shift in the organization augmented the military police criminal investigation sections already operating in the field. It is noted that none of the military police criminal investigation sections were allotted to corps or divisions during active operations. In many instances, however, individuals of the criminal investigation sections were physically attached to corps headquarters by army to operate within the corps area and often in the division area when requests for investigation of crime were made.[15] Experience indicated that the Class II (BJ) and Class III (BK) units functioned generally satisfactory for the investigation of major crimes in the armies and sections of the communication zone, but that they were inadequate in number and distribution.[7] It further indicated that in a normal situation an army will have an adequate number and distribution of these units if it has in addition to the organic sections of three military police battalions, one Class III (BK) unit and each corps has one Class II (BJ) unit. Although nearly all divisions consulted expressed the need for a criminal investigation unit,[15] it is believed that due to their frequent changes of areas, their needs can best be taken care of by the corps unit. Since base sections of the communications zone vary widely in nature it appears that they should have Class III (BK) units as needed and initially at the rate of 75 agents per 200,000 troops.

7. Duties. The duties of military police criminal investigation units are specifically outlined in paragraph 97, Field Manual 19-5,[1] and were sufficiently broad in scope for continued operations in the European Theater. Because of the lack of personnel the duties assumed in the European Theater were for the most part limited to the investigation of major crimes. There were altogether too many petty thefts, minor incidents and lost property cases investigated by criminal investigation agents.[15] This function is a matter pertaining to military police and should be handled by them. These minor investigations had the tendency to detract from the major function of criminal investigation which is the investigation of major crimes. The tendency to assign this type of case to criminal investigation agents was noticeable where a unit was assigned rather than attached to a major subordinate command, where a criminal investigation officer was not assigned to the staff of the headquarters and where the provost marshal was not fully acquainted with the operations and functions of criminal investigation units. Criminal investigation units scattered along the main supply routes did some crime prevention work to the extent that they surveyed supply depots, warehouses, and railway installations. Recommendations for further protective measures as a result of these surveys were made by the agents to the respective provost marshal of the area command. Recovery of property was largely left in the hands of other military police units except in those many instances where the recovery of stolen property was a result of an investigation. This was often the case during the investigation of black market activities. The apprehension of wanted criminals and absentees without leave was largely left in the hands of other military police units.

8. Operations. As a result of Letter, Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, Subject: "Criminal Investigation Reports and Procedures", dated 13 August 1944 and subsequent directives, the operation of criminal investigation units was in general uniform throughout the European Theater. As a rule when a single unit was assigned initially to a headquarters it operated from that headquarters as a base and scattered its agents throughout the area as the crime incidents dictated. Agents normally operated in pairs, drove and maintained their own vehicles, investigated the cases assigned to them, typed their own case reports, attended court martial trials as required, and rendered daily reports to the commanding officer of their unit, either verbal or written. The wearing of concealed weapons by the agents was prescribed. In the opinion of many commanding officers of criminal investigation units, an agent once assigned a case should stick with it regardless of where it leads him. This often resulted in an agent operating outside his own area in another section of communications zone or army area. The rapid change of army and advance section boundaries during the operations created the problem of jurisdictional responsibility for crimes committed in an area as the responsibility for such areas changed overnight. As a general practice, untouched cases were referred to the command taking over the area to complete the investigation. However, agents assigned to an army usually remained in the area to complete the investigation of those cases they had started. Criminal investigation units were not assigned to an echelon of command below that of an army. However, army criminal investigation agents did operate within corps and division areas when requested and when the operations permitted.[15] The operation of criminal investigation agents within corps and division areas created the problem of jurisdiction and control of the agents' operations. Corps commanders and their provost marshals naturally desired the control of these agents in their own hands, whereas the provost marshal of army was reluctant to do this. Corps provost marshals were charged with the responsibility of keeping their commanding generals informed as to the crime situation within their own area and with this in mind demanded reports of progress and case reports from agents. In one instance hourly reports on progress were required by one corps provost marshal, which report seriously hampered the progress of the investigation. There was also a marked tendency to assign petty larceny cases and special inspector general cases to criminal investigation agents. These difficulties were normally settled through the combined efforts of army and corps provost marshals. Agents in a corps were required to render only a synopsis of a case report to the corps provost marshal for his information and the information of his commanding general. Reports on progress were kept to a minimum and corps provost marshals were more fully informed as to the true function of criminal investigation agents. As a general rule, agents furnished to corps were not sufficient in number to handle all crime occurring within the area.[15]

9. Staff Officer. When two or more units were assigned to a headquarters, one unit normally operated from the headquarters itself and the others were scattered throughout the area as required. The addition of more than one unit to the headquarters created the problem of assignment of cases and the coordination of the units' activities in order to secure the greatest efficiency in their operation. The major commands in the European Theater handled this problem in different ways. Some annexed the commanding officer of one of the criminal investigation units and made him a staff officer to handle this job, and assigned him to the provost marshal's office.[15] This was not entirely

satisfactory, as the commanding officer's time was taken up in the administration of his own unit and the supervision of its activities. Other commands acquired a staff officer, who was a criminal investigator and thoroughly acquainted with the problem that such a job entailed. This officer normally headed the criminal investigation branch of the provost marshal's office of the headquarters. His duties, generally, were as follows:[15]

a. To assign the investigation of all major crimes coming to the attention of the provost marshal and to check each investigation.

b. To keep complete records of all cases.

c. To render periodic reports and other information as required and to keep the provost marshal and the commanding general informed of the crime situation throughout the area.

d. To handle and make distribution on all case reports rendered by the agents making investigations.

e. To render to higher headquarters periodic and special reports on crimes as required.

f. To maintain liaison and cooperation with Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Government, judge advocates, local police, British Special Investigation Branch and all other agencies within the area who may be interested in the investigation of crimes.

g. To maintain liaison with adjacent and higher headquarters of the United States Army.

h. To make special, confidential, or particular investigations when so directed by the commanding general of the area through the provost marshal.

i. To recommend policy, organization, procedure and operations on all matters pertaining to criminal investigation.

10. Reporting of Crimes and Serious Incidents. a. The immediate reporting of serious incidents to the provost marshal was required by standing operating procedure in all armies and in the Communications Zone. Reports were received from units, civilian police, Military Government, Counter Intelligence Corps, allied police agencies, and casuals. Too often the report to the provost marshal was anything but immediate. This was particularly true in the case of offenses which came to the attention of Civil Affairs or Military Government agencies. Difficulty was experienced in maintaining adequate liaison with Civil Affairs and Military Government units because of the lack of adequate communication coupled with the fact that the teams were constantly changing in the area. As a result too many incidents were reported some 20 to 40 days late, too late to conduct much investigation on them. It was apparently a common practice to lump together several reports or incidents occurring in a two-week period and forward them by mail to the provost marshal of the area. If the headquarters was moving forward at the time and the boundaries were to be shifted, the provost marshal might well forward these "cold" incidents to his successor as a means of "getting rid" of them. Experience shows that daily contact is necessary between provost marshals and Civil Affairs or Military Government agencies in order for provost marshals to keep abreast of major and minor crimes in their

respective areas.[8]

b. In addition to the immediate report of major crimes committed a semi-monthly report was required showing a brief history of all cases and their present status.

11. Case Reports. The case report rendered by all agents was prescribed by Letter, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, Subject: "Criminal Investigation Reports and Procedure", dated 13 August 1944, and revised 20 February 1945. Distribution was made in accordance with the revised letter of the 20th of February 1945 as follows:[9,10]

"Original to:	Unit, organization, or staff section which may draw the charges and specifications against the accused.
1st Copy to:	Same as above.
2nd Copy to:	Provost Marshal, Army or Base Section concerned.
3rd Copy to:	Theater Provost Marshal, European Theater of Operations, Hq., ETOUSA, APO 887.
4th Copy to:	Provost Marshal, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in cases wherein Air Corps personnel are the accused.
5th Copy to:	Be retained in C. I. Detachment files."

This case report and its distribution was generally satisfactory for operation in the European Theater.

SECTION 2

PERSONNEL AND RATINGS

12. a. Two types of criminal investigation units were used during the operations, the Type II (BJ) or 11-man unit and the Type III (BK) or 15-man unit, as provided in Table of Organization and Equipment 19-500, dated 22 April 1944. The experience of commanding officers indicate that these units were deficient in personnel and ratings in that they did not provide personnel for clerical work and maintenance of transportation and adequate grades and ratings for investigators.[8,15]

b. In the opinion of many commanding officers of units, one clerk should be provided in addition to the men who are agents. The clerk in one of these units has a full time job handling correspondence and the necessary clerical duties of the unit. It is the general opinion that this man's rating should be a technician grade four, MOS Number 405.[15]

c. In addition to the above, the units operating within army areas, where roads were often in poor repair, found that vehicles were difficult to maintain. Ordnance units were often difficult to contact or reach within the area. A mechanic, rating of technician grade five, or four, MOS Number 014, assigned to the unit is necessary for the proper maintenance of motor vehicles.[15]

d. Criminal investigation agents in the normal course of their business often contact high ranking officers in the army. They are sometimes required to investigate officers of different ranks, take their statements, and gather information from them. It is more desirable, therefore, that the agent meet these individuals on a more

equal basis of rank.[3,15] Criminal investigation is a highly responsible job. The agents are dealing with the lives of men and in work that may seriously affect the future of the suspects. It is expected that they will exercise judgment beyond that of the ordinary enlisted man. Once an agent is assigned to a case, he is required to follow through with it until the criminal is brought to trial, tried and convicted. His army training has been specialized to this end as has his experience. To conduct successfully investigations it is necessary to acquire and uphold a certain prestige, a prestige that is very difficult to acquire and more difficult to support as an enlisted man. Prestige is necessary to secure cooperation and assistance of personnel contacted during the course of an investigation. Cooperation with criminal investigation units on the part of officers in the European Theater has been very good in those instances where the rank status of the agents was unknown. However, when the status became known there was in some instances a definite letdown in cooperation which resulted in embarrassment on the part of the agent and on the part of the officer(s) involved. The opinion of all commanding officers of criminal investig tion units is that the agents doing the same work in the field should all have the same ratings. The table of organization prescribes enlisted ratings ranging from technician grade five to master sergeant. These men all did the same job of investigating crimes and as they did the same work they should have had the same ratings. If they couldn't do the work, they were transferred to another unit (i.e. Infantry, Quartermaster, Engineers, etc.) more suitable to their capabilities. All commanding officers of criminal investigation units operating in the European Theater were of the opinion that the grades and ratings of the personnel in these units were inadequate for the type of job and for the results that were accomplished. It is the opinion of all agents that the rating of all criminal investigators should be not less than that of a master sergeant, and preferably at least that of a warrant officer.

e. Men for criminal investigation units were selected on the basis of their general intelligence, past education and general aptitude for the job to be done. It was generally considered that a criminal investigator should have a minimum army general classification test score of 110, should have a minimum of a high school education, should have had a minimum of two years experience in an investigation field (i.e. police investigation, insurance investigation, etc.) or should have in place of this experience, a law degree in an accredited college. Many of the men who made excellent investigators did have a law degree.[15]

SECTION 3

EQUIPMENT

13. Deficiencies. The equipment prescribed in Table of Organization and Equipment 19-500, was, in the opinion of the agents operating in the field, deficient in many respects.[15]

a. The Table of Organization and Equipment for the Type III (BK) unit provides three ¼-ton, 4 x 4, trucks, and one ¼-ton trailer, 2-wheel cargo, to each unit. This transportation equipment is inadequate. One vehicle for transportation purposes should be furnished each two agents working as a team. During active operations, organic transportation was frequently supplemented by captured enemy vehicles. For moving the unit as a whole, opinions vary. Some commanding officers of the units have requested that a 3/4-ton weapons

carrier be used for this job. Others felt that three ¼-ton trailers should be provided each unit. This latter opinion was voiced by members of army units where it was apparent that during periods of rapid movement, transportation other than that organically supplied was difficult to acquire. In the opinion of commanding officers of units, the unit should supply its own transportation and not have to rely on outside sources. This situation was peculiar to units situated in forward areas, attached to army headquarters. Some units found a 3/4-ton weapons carrier useful for the transportation of recovered property and the accumulated material evidence impounded during the course of their investigations.

b. Many agents felt that the single portable typewriter for the unit was inadequate for the job. In their opinion a portable typewriter, or preferably a standard typewriter should have been provided for each two agents. Agents operating on cases were often separated from the unit, and in some cases did not see the unit for a period of possibly weeks. Contact with the unit was often made only by rendering daily reports, written or verbal (telephone), and possibly both. During the meantime, the investigation and the case report writing, taking statements, etc., necessitated constant use of a typewriter in the field for each team of agents. The standard upright machine with an 11 inch carriage proved to be more desirable than the portable, because of the number of copies of the case report normally required. The machine will handle six copies of the case report with ease. The single typewriter provided by the table of organization and equipment was supplemented by captured enemy typewriters taken in the field or requisitioned from army depots or headquarters.

c. The hand irons furnished many units were the British type and were cumbersome and difficult to operate. Many agents used these for chaining steering wheels of vehicles while leaving the vehicles parked, and provided their own Peerless handcuffs, using their own funds to purchase them.

d. Many agents felt that the automatic pistol, caliber .45, M1911A1, was cumbersome particularly in base sections or advance sections where conditions were more static. They felt that a smaller firearm such as the caliber .32 Colt, equipped with shoulder holster, or caliber .38 Colt Official Police, or caliber .38 Colt Detective Special would have been more satisfactory and more suited to the needs of the agents. In army areas, however, the caliber .45 automatic was satisfactory since conspicuous display of firearms was not unusual. Many agents owned and used firearms that they had brought with them to the European Continent and in many instances, small caliber, light, enemy firearms were secured and used as concealed weapons.

SECTION 4

THE MILITARY POLICE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION LABORATORY

14. Operation. Examination of physical evidence taken in criminal investigations was handled initially by local police departments and properly qualified civilians. This method of procedure was not satisfactory. In June 1944, one ten-man unit, the 27th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section was organized under special authority as a criminal investigation laboratory. It was designed and equipped to perform expert examination in ballistic, photographs, blood, fingerprints, handwriting, chemical analysis, and to render

expert testimony in all cases in the European Theater where such testimony was required. Personnel for this unit were selected on the basis of their civilian occupation and experience in these specialities. Equipment for the criminal investigation laboratory was rather difficult to secure, but once secured, proved satisfactory for the work that was to be done. In September 1944 the laboratory was moved to Paris, France, which point was considered the most centralized to which physical evidence could readily be brought from all parts of the European Theater. It was standard procedure for the agents working on a case to personnally bring physical evidence to the laboratory and have it examined. This procedure was found to be satisfactory when the distance to the laboratory was not too great and the time consumed in the examination was held to a minimum.

15. Mobile Laboratory. a. In view of the travel distances and poor communications, it was decided that a mobile laboratory was necessary to service the forward areas.[11] During the first week in April 1945, a mobile criminal investigation laboratory was placed in operation in Germany to service all of the criminal investigation units operating with the armies in Germany, including as well the corps and service units with the armies.[7] This laboratory was at Advance Section Communications Zone in Bonn, Germany in April 1945, and later transferred to Fulda, Germany, and then to Weisbaden, Germany, where it operated from the 12th Army Group Headquarters. The officer and agents responsible for the operation of this laboratory, while assigned to the 27th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section were on temporary duty with the 12th Army Group.

b. (1) The laboratory was installed in an ordnance small arms repair truck upon which certain minor alterations were made. Water tanks having a capacity of 120 gallons were mounted over the cab of the truck and piping was installed into the forward section of the truck. A partition of plywood closed off the front part of the truck body to provide a photographic dark room. The benches in the truck which are standard equipment provided adequate working space and the large number of drawers and shelf space under the benches provided adequate storage space for supplies and also a secure means for packing fragile equipment for travel over rough terrain.

(2) The forward portion of the truck was used as a photographic dark room and the standard blackout curtains proved very efficient as a means of sealing off outside light while handling sensitive photographic materials. A small amount of taping was necessary to seal slight light leaks. Water supply from the tanks was piped into the dark room for processing photographs and a small sink with drains through the floor boards was also installed. The piping was so arranged that continuous water supply could be used by connecting a hose to a source of water supply, and using the water from the tanks only when other water supply was not available or when the water supply was cut off. Also located in the forward section of the truck as standard equipment is a built-in gasoline heater unit that operates from the six-volt vehicle battery or from outside source of 110 volt current. This heating unit provides heat, or, when the heating unit is not in use, provided a system of forced ventilation for the interior of the truck. This feature was important so that temperature of photo solutions could be maintained at even temperature, particularly during cold weather operation, and also provided a means of ventilating the dark room as well as aiding in the drying of films and prints and keeping the interior warm and dry.

(3) The rear section of the truck was used for bal-

listics examinations, fingerprint work, handwriting examination and general office space, and some of the bench space was often used for some of the photographic processes. The comparison microscope was mounted on the bench top and operated well from that position, although a lower position so that the operator could be seated would have been more desirable. Again the large number of drawers under the bench tops allowed for plenty of storage space for instruments, ammunition and supplies of all kinds and some of the bench space was used for general office work, writing reports and so on.

c. Standard equipment with this vehicle is a small gasoline driven motor generator of the "Homelite" type, which generates one and a half kilowatts of 110 volt alternating current. The output of this generator was barely adequate for the needs of the laboratory. The generator uses a two cycle motor which operates at 3600 revolutions per minute and it is believed that a generator using a four cycle motor and delivering about five kilowatts would give more even and dependable power. In this installation also was added a heavy duty transformer capable of converting 220 volts to 110 volts and which was bolted to the running board of the truck. In this manner it was possible to run an extension wire from the truck to any source of 110 volt current, if available, or to 220 volt current and operate the laboratory at 110 volts as all equipment was for 110 volt alternating current. In cases where there was no local source of power, or the power supply failed, the motor generator furnished current to operate the equipment.

d. When the laboratory arrived in the forward areas in Germany fully equipped, it was possible to operate independently for a period of approximately a week without additional water supply other than that carried in the tanks. By using the gasoline generator for electric power supply the unit was completely independent of any outside connections and could operate efficiently under any and all circumstances.

e. Due to the rapid movement of the armies in the field, this method of operation, for the assistance of criminal investigation units which accompany the armies as well as for the assistance of investigating officers and the trial judge advocates, appears to have been of great value. From the first week in April 1945 until 5 July 1945 this laboratory had completed scientific examination of evidence on 91 major crimes, which involved the testing of 238 firearms of different types, 228 evidence bullets submitted for tests, and 749 cartridge cases which were tested to locate specific arms which had been implicated in crimes. Photo-micrographs were made of 25 bullet comparisons in which suspected arms were positively identified and 28 cartridge cases were likewise photographed in which the firing weapons had been positively identified. A total of 578 photographic prints were made during the same period.

f. By the operation of the mobile criminal investigation laboratory in the forward areas, a great many major crimes have been solved and trial of the culprits by courts martial have been successfully accomplished, largely because of the scientific crime detection facilities in the immediate vicinity. In most cases handled in the forward areas it was physically impossible to transport evidence the great distance to the rear echelons because of transportation difficulties encountered on war damaged highways that already were taxed to capacity with vital materials for the troops at the front.

g. This laboratory consisted of two vehicles, the labora-

tory truck, described in detail in the foregoing paragraphs, and one ¼-ton 4 x 4 (jeep) for utility use. This unit operated with a personnel of three persons, including an officer in charge of the laboratory. The personnel and their duties are listed as follows:

(1) One officer, in command of the laboratory, was qualified in civil and military courts in ballistics, fingerprints, photography and handwriting. He had a background of civil police experience in that field and was formerly in charge of the Criminal Investigation Laboratory in the North African Theater.

(2) One agent was qualified in photography, fingerprints, handwriting and had a working knowledge of ballistics. He had a background of civil police experience and was last connected with the Criminal Investigation Laboratory in Naples, Italy.

(3) One agent was used for general utility. He had mechanical and electrical ability and had a general background and knowledge of criminal investigation work. He also aided in keeping the equipment in proper order.

SECTION 5

CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION[8,15]

16. Background. A centralized criminal investigation organization, assigned for operation in England in 1942 and in the early part of 1943, was controlled by the Criminal Investigation Division of the Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, European Theater of Operations, United States Army. Control of criminal investigation personnel was later decentralized to the provost marshals of armies and base sections following protests on the part of base commanders that criminal investigation agents were investigating cases within their area without informing their provost marshals of the fact. As a consequence criminal investigation at theater level retained but staff supervision of criminal investigation units and their activities and made field inspections only to better formulate policies governing their operations.

17. Discussion for Centralization. The conception of centralized control of the criminal investigation detachments is patterned after the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States. The commanding officers of criminal investigation units in the European Theater, and the agents are almost unanimous in the opinion that there should be centralized control of units and give their reasons as follows:

a. Personnel may be more expeditiously shifted to areas of increased criminal activities as required. This could be accomplished with the minimum of red tape with or without the consent of provost marshals of the areas concerned. Concurrence with the provost marshal is however most desirable and amicable relations should be strongly encouraged. During the European operations, agents were shifted by units only and not as individuals. This system lacked flexibility and it is conceivable that if an area required eight additional agents, an addition of a Type III (BK) unit (14 agents) to the area is certainly not the most economical use of these men.

b. The operations of the criminal investigation detachments would be more uniform and not subject to the whims of the local

provost marshals. Investigation of cases could be made without interference and would be completely unbiased when freed from local direction. Likewise activities of agents would be strictly limited to their duties as stipulated in paragraph 9[illegible] of Field Manual 19-20

c. Cooperation and coordination between agents of field offices and the other base sections would be more uniform and more easily secured and maintained. Crime recognizes no army or base section boundaries.

d. Centralized control of criminal investigation personnel was very successful in the North African Campaign.

e. In November and December 1944, in order to break the black market activities along the railroad lines of supply, it was necessary to place units in Normandy, Loire, Seine and Oise Base Sections directly under the control of the Director of Criminal Investigation Detachments, Theater Provost Marshal's Office in Paris, France. This control was exercised only for the investigation of this particular activity.

18. Discussion for Decentralization. a. The opponents of centralized control, namely the provost marshals and commanding generals of armies, base sections, and advance sections have the following reasons as objections to centralized control:

(1) Discipline of troops within their respective area is a command function, therefore the investigation of crimes occurring within the area should be the function of the provost marshal having the jurisdiction over the area. As one provost marshal put it: "I am unalterably opposed to a Gestapo organization coming into my area and investigating crimes and incidents within this command."

(2) Provost marshals should have jurisdiction over criminal investigation agents to check [illegible] their efficiency of operation, because they must keep their commanding generals informed of the status of crimes within the area. Close contact and control of criminal investigation agents, therefore, is a prime necessity.

b. Questionnaires answered by base sections and armies, corps and divisions are practically unanimous in the opinion that criminal investigation units should be organic within their respective provost marshal sections. In several instances it is reported by corps and divisions that such units were organized by detail of selected personnel. In one base section a platoon of investigators was organized to handle criminal investigations for the area.

19. Organization for Centralization. a. Advocates of the centralized control have made the following proposal as being desirable. Diagram of the proposed organization follows:



b. It is proposed that the chief of criminal investigation, a director, head the criminal investigation division at theater level and should be responsible to the theater commander. Officers would be located in all major headquarters. The chief agent, a captain, would be directly responsible to the director but would have the additional responsibility of maintaining close liaison with the provost marshal of the headquarters in which the field offices are located. His duties would be very similar to those outlined for the criminal investigation staff officer listed in paragraph nine. The number of agents assigned to each field office would vary according to the number of crimes occurring in the area. Chief agents would have control over all agents within the area.

NOTE: Upon completion of this study and after it was initially submitted for approval, the new Table of Organization and Equipment, dated 25 September 1945 was received at this headquarters. Such deficiencies in table of organization and equipment as noted in this study and which have been corrected in the new table are shown as corrected after the appropriate conclusion and no recommendation is made.

20. Conclusions.[16]

a. That photographic equipment as provided in Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500, dated 22 April 1944, was adequate, however, there was such a critical supply shortage of this type of equipment that many units were forced to give up their photographic equipment prior to embarkation. That photographic supplies were very difficult to obtain and this situation persisted throughout the operations.

b. That the billeting and messing of criminal investigation agents with other troops were not desirable because it reduced efficiency.

c. That liaison and cooperation with other agencies, such as Counter Intelligence Corps, judge advocates, inspector generals, British Special Investigation Branch, local authorities and other agencies interested in criminal investigation were satisfactory.

d. That the number of criminal investigation agents pro-

vided for the theater of operations was inadequate to handle the investigation of all major crimes in the European Theater and to perform the functions of criminal investigation units prescribed in Field Manual 19-5, and that criminal investigation agents should be available at the rate of 75 agents for 200,000 troops.

e. That the Team BJ, Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500, dated 25 September 1945, is a generally satisfactory type unit to handle the investigation of major crimes within an army, and that an army in a normal situation requires at least one of these units.

f. That the Team BI, Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500, dated 25 September 1945, is a generally satisfactory type unit to handle the investigation of major crimes within a corps, and that a corps in a normal situation requires at least one of these units.

g. That the Team BJ, Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500, dated 25 September 1945, is a generally satisfactory type unit to handle the investigation of major crimes within a section of the communication zone and that the allocation should be as needed and initially on the basis of approximately 75 agents for 200,000 troops.

h. That the duties of criminal investigation agents as outlined in paragraph 97, Field Manual 19-5, were adequate for field operations and need no changes but that there was a tendency to use criminal investigation agents for work that was not within the scope of their activities.

i. That agents, once assigned a case, should remain with that case until completed, regardless of change of command, and that the success of the investigation was jeopardized if agents were changed.

j. That the control of criminal investigation units in the investigation of crimes should be by the command to which the unit is assigned or attached; and that when criminal investigation units or agents are assigned cases in areas of subordinate elements they should be attached to the subordinate element for operational control during the period of the investigation.

k. That the addition of a criminal investigation officer to the staff of the provost marshal section in base sections, armies and corps headquarters was a distinct advantage and insured the smooth operation of criminal investigation activities.

l. That reports required for efficient operation are:

(1) Immediate report of all major crimes by the fastest possible means to the nearest headquarters having criminal investigation operating personnel.

(2) Semi-monthly reports to show commanding officers the status of crime in their areas, in order to permit proper command action. Copies of these reports should also be forwarded through command channels to the Office of the Theater Provost Marshal.

(3) Case reports rendered by all agents and distributed as set forth in letter, dated 20 February 1945, from the Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, Headquarters European Theater of Operations.

m. That close liaison between provost marshals and Civil Affairs or Military Government agencies is essential if provost marshals are to keep abreast of crime in their areas.

n. That there is a need for a mechanic, rating of technician grade five, MOS Number C14, for the Team BI and Team BJ, Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500, dated 25 September 1945 for the maintenance of motor vehicles.

o. That the rating of all criminal investigators should be that of warrant officer.

p. That criminal investigation agents should be selected with the following qualifications:

(1) Army general classification test score of 110 and above.

(2) Minimum of a high school education.

(3) Minimum of two years experience in one of the following fields of investigation: police, insurance, or personnel.

(4) If agent has no field investigation experience as set forth in subparagraph (3), above, he should have a law degree in an accredited college.

q. That the Type III (BK) units lacked transportation. This is corrected except in the case of ¼-ton trailers in the Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500, dated 25 September 1945, received after this study was completed.

r. That Type II and Type III units lacked adequate typewriter equipment. This is reasonably corrected in Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500, dated 25 September 1945, received after this study was completed.

s. That the .45 caliber automatic pistol provided for all units was cumbersome in many situations and should be replaced with a lighter weapon.

t. That there was a need for a criminal investigation laboratory in the European Theater of Operations and that the equipment and personnel for criminal investigation laboratory as improvised and operated in the European Theater was adequate to perform its proper function.

u. That there was a need for a mobile criminal investigation laboratory to support the armies.

v. That centralized control of criminal investigation agents in the European Theater was abandoned in 1943 as a result of strong protest on the part of base section commanders.

w. That centralized control of agents is advocated by practically all criminal investigation personnel.

x. That questionnaires answered by base sections, armies, corps and divisions are practically unanimous in the opinion that criminal investigation units should be controlled by their respective provost marshal sections.

21. Recommendations.

a. That billeting and messing of criminal investigation agents be separate from other troops, if at all practicable.

b. That liaison and cooperation with all agencies interested in criminal investigation be maintained.

c. That criminal investigation units Team BJ, Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500, dated 25 September 1945, be available for assignment to armies at the rate of one per army.

d. That criminal investigation units Team BI, Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500, dated 25 September 1945, be available for assignment to corps at the rate of one per corps and that agents be attached by corps to divisions when required.

e. That criminal investigation units Team BJ, Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500, dated 25 September 1945, be assigned to base sections as needed, and initially available for assignment at approximately the rate of 75 agents per 200,000 troops.

f. That criminal investigation agents be given only work that comes within the scope of their activities as set forth in paragraph 97, Field Manual 19-5.

g. That criminal investigation agents once assigned to a case keep that assignment until that case is completed regardless of change of command.

h. That the control of criminal investigation units be by the command to which the unit is assigned or attached, and that when criminal investigation units or agents are assigned cases in areas of subordinate elements, they be attached to the subordinate element for operational control during the period of investigation.

i. That a criminal investigation officer be allotted to the provost marshal section of all echelons of command normally having assigned criminal investigation units.

j. That the following reports for efficient operation of criminal investigation work be required:

(1) Immediate report of major crimes by all elements, by the fastest possible means to the nearest headquarters having criminal investigation operating personnel.

(2) Semi-monthly reports of major crimes for distribution to the commanding officer of the area in which the crime occurred, and to the Office of the Theater Provost Marshal.

(3) Case reports by all agents.

k. That close liaison be maintained between provost marshals and Civil Affairs or Military Government agencies.

l. That Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-500 dated 25 September 1945, be amended as follows:

(1) To provide one technician, fifth grade, (Military Occupational Speciality No. 014, Automotive Mechanic) for each Team BI and Team BJ.

(2) To provide the grade of warrant officer for all investigators.

(3) To provide a trailer, ½-ton, cargo, 2-wheel, for each ¼-ton truck.

(4) To replace the .45 caliber automatic pistol with the .38 caliber Colt Official Police or Detective Special Model complete with shoulder holster.

m. That criminal investigation agents be required to have the following qualifications:

(1) Army general classification test score of 110 or above.

(2) Minimum of a high school education.

(3) Minimum of two years experience in one of the following fields of investigation: police, insurance, or personnel.

(4) If the agent has no field investigation experience, he should have a law degree from an accredited college.

n. That a table of organization and equipment be provided for a theater criminal investigation laboratory to include the personnel and equipment to operate such a laboratory.

o. That a table of organization and equipment be provided for a mobile criminal investigation laboratory to support the armies to include the personnel and equipment to operate such a laboratory.

p. That the control of criminal investigation activities be decentralized and handled through command channels with the assignment of criminal investigation units to base sections, armies, and corps, and that each echelon of command exercise command and staff supervision in accordance with existing doctrine of command and staff responsibilities.

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