THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

THE MILITARY POLICE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE EVACUATION AND DETENTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR, CIVILIAN INTERNEES, AND MILITARY PERSONNEL RECOVERED FROM THE ENEMY

MISSION: Prepare a Report as to the Responsibility For and System to be Used in the Evacuation and Detention of Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Military Personnel Recovered from the Enemy in a Theater of Operations.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945 and General Orders 312 dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States Forces in the European Theater.

File: 383.6/2 Study Number 103

Property of
Office of the Chief
Military History
General Reference Branch

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT PAGE

CHAPTER 1: Prisoners of War 4

Section 1 - Collection, Evacuation, Detention and Care. . 4
Planned Procedure 4
Evacuation During the Operations 5
General 5
Division 5
Corps 6
Armies 6
Communications Zone 7

Section 2 - Administration of Prisoner of War Inclosures and Collecting Points 7
General 7
Administration 7

Section 3 - Processing 8
Army 8
Communications Zone 8
Prisoner of War Information Bureau 9

Section 4 - Coordination With Other Staff Sections . . . 9
Interested Sections 9

Section 5 - Military Police Units 9
Employment and Allocation 9
Field Forces 9
Communications Zone 11

Conclusions 13

Recommendations 14

Bibliography 17

CHAPTER 2: Civilian Internees 18
Responsibility 18
Evacuation and Administration 18
Processing 18
Interested Sections and Agencies 18

Conclusions 19

Recommendations 19

Bibliography 20

CHAPTER 3: Care and Evacuation of Military Personnel Recovered From the Enemy 21
Responsibility 21
Procedure 21

Conclusions 23

Recommendations 23

Bibliography 25

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

REPORT

ON

THE MILITARY POLICE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE EVACUATION AND DETENTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR, CIVILIAN INTERNEES, AND MILITARY PERSONNEL RECOVERED FROM THE ENEMY

Prepared by:

Colonel Claud E. Stadtman, 04549	Chief, Provost Marshal Section
Lt Col James A. Lewis, 010892	
Lt Col Karl F. Moessner, 0296125	
Major Sidney B. Paine, 0199958	
Captain John G. Allen, 01049047	

Principal Consultants:

Colonel Thomas H. Dameron, 0192414	Chief, Prisoner of War Branch, Office of the Theater Provost Marshal.
Colonel Ottmar F. Kotick, 0220996	G-1 Section, Theater General Board.
Colonel Carey Jarman, 0102205	Executive Officer, Office of the Theater Provost Marshal.

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

THE MILITARY POLICE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE EVACUATION AND DETENTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR, CIVILIAN INTERNEES, AND MILITARY PERSONNEL RECOVERED FROM THE ENEMY

CHAPTER 1

PRISONERS OF WAR

SECTION 1

COLLECTION, EVACUATION, DETENTION AND CARE

1. Planned Procedure.

a. The procedure for the collection and evacuation of prisoners of war is set forth in Field Manuals 19-5, 29-5 and 100-10, as modified in the European Theater by European Theater of Operations Standing Operating Procedure Number 16, dated 21 June 1944, and later superseded by a standing operating procedure dated 3 December 1944, and 12th Army Group Administrative Standing Operating Procedure dated 18 October 1944. These documents direct that companies escort their prisoners of war to battalion collecting points; battalions escort to regiments; regiments escort to division collecting points where military police take charge; that the army evacuate from division collecting points to army prisoner of war inclosures; and that the communications zone evacuate prisoners of war from the army inclosures to the central inclosures. The planned procedure further provided that a corps, part of an army, not being normally a link in the chain of evacuation of prisoners, should, however, normally establish a collecting point to handle stray prisoners of war captured in the corps rear area or required for interrogation purposes.

b. The planned procedure contemplated that routes for the evacuation of prisoners of war by companies and battalions should follow the lines of evacuation of wounded or the lines of natural drift. In all higher elements the routes should follow the supply line in order to use supply transportation, motor or rail, for the evacuation of prisoners of war. Accordingly collecting points and inclosures should be established along supply routes.

c. This procedure also provided that interrogation of prisoners should be carried on throughout the route of evacuation by the various command echelons only to the extent essential to the particular command. Corps, not normally a link in the chain of evacuation, should keep interrogation teams at division collecting points, or escort certain prisoners of war with corps military police to corps headquarters for interrogation purposes.

d. All the above planned procedure set forth in field manuals and other documents were followed whenever practicable in the European Theater. There were, however, many variations which will be discussed later in this study. In the evacuation of prisoners of war, experience in the European Theater has verified that command responsibility for the

accomplishment of this mission is essential. In echelons having provost marshals the details of evacuation rested with the provost marshal sections. Experience dictates the necessity for clear and concise statement of command responsibility for the evacuation from area to area and for the handling of prisoners of war enroute. In the European Theater this command responsibility was placed on division commanders from the point of capture to include the division collecting points; on army commanders from division collecting points to include army inclosures; and on the communications zone commander from army inclosures to the rear thereof.[14] There were many instances when this responsibility was decentralized to subordinate elements.[2] Often this decentralization was caused by a lack of means provided for handling prisoners of war, thus forcing the use of combat troops.[14]

2. Evacuation During the Operations.

a. General. Every effort had to be made by each echelon of command to relieve the next lower echelon of command of its prisoners of war with the least delay. The movement of prisoners of war to the rear was closely associated with the movement of supplies to the front. There was no transportation specifically provided in tables of organization and equipment for the movement of prisoners of war and transportation had to be diverted at times from its primary mission for this purpose. Operations in the European Theater have proved that empty supply vehicles and trains are the only transportation that can be depended upon to be available daily over long periods of operation. In order to use supply transportation for evacuation of prisoners of war most effectively it is necessary for collecting points and inclosures to be established along the supply routes and in the vicinity of class 1, 3, or 5 dumps.[4,5]

b. Division.

(1) Within the division and its echelons the method of collecting and evacuating prisoners of war followed that set forth in the planned procedure in many instances; in many other instances there were variations. In general, companies did escort their prisoners of war to battalion collecting points, although instances are reported in which the battalion collected prisoners of war from companies, using an improvised escort squad. Battalions marched prisoners of war to the regimental collecting point or held them until a truck load could be taken to regiment. Trucks were furnished at times by regiments on call from battalions. In many regiments an improvised military police platoon was formed and the regiment accepted the responsibility of evacuating prisoners of war from battalion collecting points.[12] From regiment to division the same variations of method and responsibility existed. Regiments did evacuate to division collecting points, and divisions, using division military police, did evacuate from regimental collecting points. Other variations from methods set forth in the planned procedure were the bypassing of a collecting point of the next higher echelon because another collecting point was closer; and turning prisoners of war loose on a main supply route and directing them to march to the rear in hopes that the next higher echelon would pick them up. This latter method was deemed necessary by some units in fast moving situations when it was not desired to lose personnel by sending them to the rear

with prisoners of war. The opinion of all officers consulted who have handled prisoners of war in the division and lower echelons favors the procedure that companies evacuate to battalion, and that all echelons above the battalion evacuate from the next lower echelon.[12] It is realized that there will be situations in which this procedure will be varied.

(2) Divisions are practically unanimous in the opinion that a higher echelon should evacuate prisoners of war from division collecting points.[12] A major reason for this opinion is the loss of division military police personnel when they are required to escort prisoners of war to army or corps inclosures. However, there were occasions when necessity forced divisions to evacuate from the division collecting points. There were not always sufficient escort guard companies with armies to handle all evacuation. At times army inclosures were located sufficiently close to division collecting points so as to make it economical in personnel and transportation for division to evacuate prisoners of war from the division collecting point to the army inclosure. However, the principle that army should evacuate from division collecting points is sound and should be followed, except when some local condition forces another solution.

(3) Sick and wounded prisoners of war were evacuated through normal medical channels in the same manner as our own sick and wounded.

c. Corps. Corps established collecting points for prisoners of war for the convenience of units in the corps area that captured prisoners of war and for interrogation purposes. Distances from division collecting points to army inclosures and the number of prisoners of war being captured at times caused armies to decentralize evacuation responsibilities to corps.[24] In such cases armies of necessity furnished the corps with the escort guard units. However, armies did in many instances solve this problem by establishing army advance prisoner of war inclosures in corps areas in the vicinity of class 1, 3, or 5 dumps, and retained the responsibility. In other instances, usually because of rapid and abrupt changes in the army axis of advance, the great number of prisoners of war being taken, and the lack of means with the army, the evacuation of prisoners of war from division collecting points to corps inclosures was decentralized to divisions and corps were responsible for operation of the inclosures. Army evacuated from corps inclosures in these cases. The unanimous opinion of officers consulted is that armies should evacuate prisoners of war from division collecting points and corps inclosures. It was further their opinion that corps should maintain an assisting interest in the evacuation of prisoners of war from division collecting points and that corps should be contacted by division whenever necessary to relieve any congestion of prisoners of war at the division level.

d. Armies. Except as noted under divisions and corps in the preceding paragraphs, armies did evacuate prisoners of war from division collecting points and corps inclosures and did use returning supply transportation for this purpose. Experience in the European Theater shows that detailed planning by the provost marshal, coordinated with G-2, G-3, G-4, Surgeon, Signal, Quartermaster, Engineer and staff sections concerned is necessary to properly distribute the means available,

and if necessary augment these means from other troops, and to properly take advantage of available transportation, if prisoners of war are to be cleared each 24 hours from corps inclosures and division collecting points.[2,4,5]

e. Communications Zone. The communications zone did evacuate prisoners of war from army inclosures.[3] This was accomplished by decentralization to the advance section communications zone and to base sections concerned. Returning supply transportation, motor and rail, was utilized. Responsibility for movement of prisoners of war between base sections rested with the base section in which the movement originated.

SECTION 2

ADMINISTRATION OF PRISONER OF WAR INCLOSURES AND COLLECTING POINTS

3. General.

a. The provost marshals of divisions, corps, armies and communications zone sections were responsible for selection of sites and administration of prisoner of war collecting points and inclosures in their respective commands and the supervision of the actions of the military police escort guard personnel or other troops designated to accomplish:

(1) The reception and detention of prisoners of war.

(2) Operation of inclosure or collecting point in accordance with the provisions of Field Manual 27-10, the Rules of Land Warfare.

(3) Barring and removal of all sightseers from the vicinity of the inclosure or collecting point.

(4) Preparation of prisoners of war for evacuation.

(5) The use of prisoners of war, insofar as possible, for inclosure and collecting point administration.

(6) Investigation of all deaths of prisoners of war occurring at the inclosure or collecting point, where prisoners were in United States custody, and the furnishing of reports of death as required by higher headquarters.

(7) Punishment in accordance with the provisions of Article of War 104. This disciplinary action was of the same type imposed in our own army on our own soldiers.

4. Administration.

a. The selection of sites was in general correct, and these establishments were located along supply routes in the vicinity of class 1, 3 or 5 dumps. When collecting points or inclosures were not so located, transportation for the evacuation of prisoners of war presented a more serious problem, and at times forced the use of other than supply vehicles. Other factors in the selection of sites were a sufficient independent water supply, good drainage, shelter, and in the case of army inclosures, a site suitable for use by communications zone. Although this latter consideration was not of first importance, it did favor more rapid evacuation from the next established army inclosure, particularly

when an equitable division of distance of haul from division collecting points to the communications zone inclosure was made between army and communications zone. In warm weather open fields were used for collecting points and advance army inclosures. In cold weather these establishments were located in buildings. They were secured by wire inclosures or guards or both.

b. Administration at collecting points and inclosures was directed toward the accomplishment of rapid evacuation and the necessary interrogation of prisoners of war.[4,5] At these establishments prisoners of war were searched, segregated into officer, enlisted men and female groups; interrogated, screened, deloused, given medical care and issued rations where practicable. A head count record was kept of the number received and evacuated. Proper reports were rendered on those who died while in these establishments. Whenever practicable collecting points and inclosures of divisions, corps and armies were cleared each twenty-four hours.

c. The number of army inclosures established varied with situations. On relatively narrow fronts and advancing on one axis, usually one inclosure served the purpose. On wide fronts, in fast moving situations with changing directions of advance or advancing on more than one axis, two or more inclosures were often necessary in order to relieve front line elements of their prisoners of war promptly.

SECTION 3

PROCESSING

5. a. Army. During the early stages of operations in the European Theater shipping rosters were prepared on prisoners of war leaving the army inclosures because during this time prisoners of war leaving the army inclosures were evacuated direct to the United Kingdom. The preparation of these rosters was discontinued at army inclosures when advance section communications zone was established and communications zone was given the responsibility for shipping prisoners of war from the continent. Subsequently at army inclosures there was no processing, but only the accomplishment of necessary routine administrative items as given in paragraph 4b above.[1,2] This is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 451 Field Manual 100-10. The processing of prisoners of war forward of the communications zone requires the preparation and transfer of papers under unfavorable circumstances of battle resulting often in the loss of such papers.

b. Communications Zone. After communications zone was established it did process prisoners of war.[3] This was accomplished mainly at central prisoner of war inclosures, however, there were many cases in which processing units had to go to hospitals, prisoner of war labor camps, army installations and other places in order to complete processing. During the early stages of the operation processing did not keep pace with the receipt of prisoners of war. This was not a fault of the system, but because of a lack of prisoner of war processing companies. Based on the principle of relieving armies of the responsibility of all unnecessary administrative functions, the policy of accomplishing complete processing of prisoners of war in the communications zone is sound and should be adhered to in the future.

6. Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

The Prisoner of War Information Bureau, which is the permanent office of record for prisoners of war in the European Theater, is a communications zone activity and should continue to be so. With the processing of prisoners of war taking place in the communications zone, the Prisoner of War Information Bureau is better able to keep in close touch with the installations that do the processing.

SECTION 4

COORDINATION WITH OTHER STAFF SECTIONS

7. Interested Sections.

a. Handling of large numbers of prisoners of war is an impossible task unless it is closely coordinated with other interested staff sections. Provost marshals of all echelons must and did coordinate their plans and operations with other staff sections and did continually cooperate with them in order to accomplish the provost marshal mission.

b. The following are the major items for coordination and the staff section concerned:

Item	Staff Section
Expected flow of prisoners of war	G-2
Searching and interrogation	G-2
Transportation for evacuation	G-4, Transportation Section, Ordance, Quartermaster.
Supplies (rations, clothing, blankets, etc)	G-4, Quartermaster
Communications	Signal
Medical care and delousing	Surgeon
Construction of inclosures and collecting points	Engineers
Water supply	Engineers
Location of sites (near class 1, 3 and 5 dumps)	G-4, Quartermaster, Ordnance
Policies and administration governing prisoner of war labor	G-1, G-4, Surgeon, Ordnance, Quartermaster and any others authorized prisoner of war labor.

SECTION 5

MILITARY POLICE UNITS

8. Employment and Allocation.

a. Field Forces.

(1) The Military Police Escort Guard Company, Table of Organization and Equipment Number 19-47, dated 15 August 1944, was the military police unit used in the European Theater by both the field forces and the

communications zone for the evacuation and guarding of prisoners of war. Communications zone also had other military police units which will be discussed later, but this type of unit was the only one so engaged by the field forces except during the first three months of operation when two platoons of a military police prisoner of war processing company were also utilized. Although military police escort guard companies were initially planned for the field forces in operation "Overlord", none were made available to armies. All such companies were assigned to the communications zone. Upon organizing the initial army six military police escort guard companies were transferred from communications zone to this army. Subsequently two of these six companies were transferred to the next army formed. Two additional companies were obtained at a later date for assignment to the third army organized for this operation. This number of military police escort guard companies was inadequate and forced the use of many combat troops into the service of evacuating prisoners of war.[2,3] It was estimated during operations that each interior army needed as an absolute minimum military police escort guard companies on the basis of one per each corps in the army, plus one company to operate the army prisoner of war inclosure.[4,5] Due to the shortage of these units in the European Theater, it was possible to so equip only one army. It is felt that if this same allocation could have been made to all armies at the beginning of their operation the handling of prisoners of war would have presented fewer difficulties. On this basis each army provost marshal could assign an escort guard company to support each corps or attach the company to a corps if evacuation was decentralized to corps. When the army prisoner of war inclosure was situated near the front, the escort guard companies used in evacuation operated out of the army inclosure and as the distance between the division collecting points and the army inclosure increased, these companies were able to move up and bivouac at corps inclosures, forward army inclosures, or division collecting points, as the situation dictated. In this manner they were able to maintain close contact and facilitate rapid evacuation. By having these companies under the direction of the army provost marshal, he was able to attach them to his corps in accordance with the need. For instance, if one of his corps was in a situation where it was taking no prisoners of war, the company that usually worked with it could then be assigned to assist the corps that was capturing the bulk of the prisoners of war. Likewise the corps provost marshal could distribute the company among his divisions in accordance with the need. One escort guard company is sufficient to operate an army prisoner of war inclosure, but because it is often necessary for an army to operate two or sometimes three prisoner of war inclosures, two escort guard companies should be provided for this purpose. The operation of armies in break-throughs and other fast moving situations involving long distances and requiring more than one axis of advance proved that one escort guard company per corps was inadequate, and that two such companies per corps should be available to armies in those situations.

(2) Experience has shown that the mission of escorting and guarding prisoners of war most economically can be accomplished by independent companies. Flexibility and mobility are essential and are best obtained in units of company size. The escort guard company organized under Table of Organization and Equipment No. 19-47, dated 15 August 1944, should be equipped so that it can administer and supply an army inclosure with a capacity of from eight to ten thousand and so that sections of this company can be utilized to handle smaller inclosures or collecting points. The table of organization and equipment of this company should be increased to include sufficient truck transportation so that the company will be completely mobile. Six 2½ ton 6x6 cargo trucks in addition to the two presently authorized or a total of eight will accomplish this. During operations this unit is required to move on short notice in order to open a new installation. Dependency on other agencies for transportation caused delay and resulted in excess accumulation of prisoners of war at division collecting points. Then, too, after an escort guard company has moved to a new installation and distributed itself by section to evacuate prisoners of war, the organic transportation can be used to assist in the evacuation of prisoners of war from division collecting points. As stated earlier in this report, an army prisoner of war inclosure should have its own independent water supply. In order to accomplich this, an engineer water purification plant of sufficient capacity to serve an inclosure of from eight to ten thousand should be provided in the table of organization and equipment. In addition the following list of equipment and supplies are considered a minimum total of those items needed by an escort guard company and which is necessary to operate and maintain an army prisoner of war inclosure of from eight to ten thousand capacity.[4,5]

Bag, canvas, water sterilizing, complete w/cover and hanger	12
Can, water, five gallons	50
Telephone	3
Switchboard	1
Power unit, 3 KUA, 115 volts 16 cyc	1
Pump, gasoline, 2½, 3 x 3½, type AB	1
Blankets, wool, o. d.	200
Tents, pyramidal	4
Tents, small, wall	6
Lantern, gasoline	6
Lamp, carbide, floodlight type	8

b. Communications Zone.[3]

(1) The advance section communications zone in order to carry out its responsibility of evacuating prisoners of war from the army inclosures, should have sufficient escort guard companies so that two companies can be assigned to evacuate from each army. During operations in the European Theater the advance section communications zone maintained one and sometimes two of their escort guard companies with each army. One company per army was sufficient during the first part of the

operation but two per army had to be used during most of the operation. These units were bivouaced at or near the army inclosure in order to be immediately available for handling evacuation to the rear. This proved to be the most efficient method for providing guards when and where they were needed. The advance section communications zone escort guard companies were shifted from time to time between the armies, dependent upon which army was taking the most prisoners of war at the time. This link-up between the armies and advance section communications zone for evacuating prisoners of war created an operating team without which expeditious evacuation would have been impossible. Experience shows that communications zone requires at least two military police escort guard companies to operate each standard central inclosure.

(2) The Prisoner of War Overhead Detachment was the unit assigned to administer and operate a prisoner of war central inclosure. This unit, composed of 28 officers and 169 enlisted men, was set up on a European Theater of Operations Table of Distribution and Allowance, dated 3 October 1944, designed to handle inclosures of 20,000 capacity. Experience has shown that this unit was adequate to handle a static installation of this size. It is believed that the varying requirements for personnel and equipment of these overhead detachments can be better met by organization under Table of Organization and Equipment Number 19-500, dated 25 September 1943 rather than by fixed strength tables of organization and equipment. In addition, military police escort guard detachments organized under Table of Organization and Equipment Number 19-500, dated 22 April 1944, were utilized as boat guards for prisoners of war being shipped to the United States and were also used to escort and guard prisoners of war during overland movements in the communications zone when sufficient escort guard companies were not available.

(3) Communications zone sections utilized the military police prisoner of war processing companies, Table of Organization and Equipment Number 19-237, dated 14 August 1944. These companies, which were composed primarily of German speaking clerks and typists, handled the processing which included the documentation at the central prisoner of war inclosures, prisoner of war labor camps, and hospitals. Experience proved that prisoner of war processing companies should be available for assignment at the rate of one company per central prisoner of war inclosure.

(4) It has been suggested that consideration be given to the organization of escort battalions each being composed of elements which could perform all duties in connection with escorting, guarding, processing, and administering prisoners of war. Experience shows that these duties vary within a particular area as well as between areas. It is, therefore, believed that separate units to perform the above duties, where required, are the more feasible.

9. Conclusions.[19]

a. That the procedure for the handling and evacuation of prisoners of war as set forth in Field Manuals 19-5, 29-5 and 100-10, as modified by European Theater of Operations Standing Operating Procedure Number 16, dated 3 December 1944 and 12th Army Group Administrative Standing Operating Procedure, dated 18 October 1944, was followed whenever practicable, and that there were many variations from this procedure.

b. That command responsibility for the handling and evacuation of prisoners of war should be clearly defined and that the command responsibility in a theater should be as follows:

(1) Division: From the point of capture to include division collecting points.
(2) Army: From division collecting points to include army inclosures.
(3) Communications Zone: From army inclosures to the rear thereof.

c. That the policy of evacuating prisoners of war by empty supply transportation was sound and should be followed, but that there were occasions when other transportation was required.

d. That prisoner of war collecting points and inclosures were located at or near class 1, 3 and 5 dumps in order to facilitate the use of returning empty supply transportation, and that whenever collecting points or inclosures were located other than at or near class 1, 3 or 5 dumps, transportation difficulties were encountered.

e. That many regiments organized special platoons and used them as one of their duties to evacuate prisoners of war from battalion collecting points to regiment and then to division collecting points.

f. That the opinion of officers consulted is practically unanimous to the effect that companies should evacuate prisoners of war to battalions and that each echelon above the battalion should evacuate from the next lower echelon, except in the case of the corps when it is not a link in the system of evacuation.

g. That corps did establish corps inclosures for the convenience of units in the corps rear area, and that corps did operate inclosures and were responsible for evacuation and handling of prisoners of war in many instances as directed by armies, and that corps should maintain an interest at all times and should assist, where necessary, to insure the clearance of division collecting points.

h. That in cases armies varied from the planned procedure in handling prisoners of war by decentralizing their responsibility to corps and to divisions, but that the planned procedure was in general sound and that proper means should be available to armies for its execution.

i. That communications zone followed in general the planned procedure and that this procedure was generally sound.

j. That the provost marshals of all echelons in the chain of evacuation of prisoners of war were responsible for the selection of sites for collecting points and inclosures and for the administration of these establishments.

k. That administration of collecting points and inclosures within the army was limited to facilitate rapid evacuation and accomplished only the following: searching, segregation, interrogation, screening, delousing, medical care, feeding, and a head count record.

l. That the number of prisoner of war inclosures operated by an army varied, and that facilities should be available to permit the operation of at least two inclosures per army.

m. That the processing of prisoners of war, except the administration accomplished by armies, was and should be accomplished at central inclosures in the communications zone and, where this was not possible, at such other places where prisoners of war requiring processing were located, and that Field Manual 100-10 and other applicable publications should be so modified.

n. That cooperation and coordination by provost marshals with interested staff sections were vital in handling prisoners of war to insure such matters as correct location of prisoner of war installation sites, the availability of transportation, the obtaining of necessary supplies, medical care, construction and communications.

o. That the number of military police escort guard companies provided for operations "Overlord" was inadequate for the field forces, and that they should have been available for allocation to each army at the rate of two per corps and two for the operation of army prisoner of war inclosures.

p. That Table of Organization and Equipment Number 19-47, dated 15 August 1944, Military Police Escort Guard Company should provide sufficient transportation to make the company mobile and sufficient other equipment for the operation of a prisoner of war inclosure of 10,000 capacity.

q. That communications zone requires two military police escort guard companies per army for evacuation of prisoners of war from army inclosures, and that each section of the communications zone requires two such companies per central prisoner of war inclosure.

r. That overhead detachments for the operation of central prisoner of war inclosures, and units for prisoner of war transportation guards, boat and overland, were generally adequate, and that such units can better be organized and equipped under Table of Organization and Equipment Number 19-500, dated 25 September 1945, than by establishing fixed strength units.

s. That processing companies organized under Table of Organization and Equipment Number 19-237, dated 14 August 1944 were satisfactory, and should be allocated at the rate of one per central prisoner of war inclosure.

10. Recommendations.

a. That command responsibility for the handling and evacuation of prisoners of war be clearly defined and that this responsibility be with divisions from the point of capture to include division collecting points; with corps, only when so decentralized by army, from division collecting points to include corps inclosures; with armies from division collecting points to include army inclosures, except when decentralized to corps; and with communications zone from army inclosures to the rear thereof.

b. That all echelons be required to make the maximum use of empty supply transportation for the evacuation of prisoners of war.

c. That prisoner of war collecting points and inclosures be located along supply routes at or near class 1, 3 and 5 dumps.

d. That companies evacuate prisoners of war to battalions, that each echelon above the battalion evacuate from the next lower echelon, except in the case of corps when it is not a link in the system of evacuation and that sufficient troops, other than military police, be provided for this purpose at regimental and battalion levels.

e. That the corps be not normally a link in the chain of evacuation of prisoners of war but that it maintain interest at all times to insure the clearance of division collecting points and to assist in the latter when necessary.

f. That administration at collecting points and inclosures within the army be limited to necessary searching, segregation, interrogation, screening, delousing, medical care, feeding and a head count record of those received and evacuated.

g. That the processing of prisoners of war, except the administration accomplished by armies (see paragraph 9 k), be the responsibility of the communications zone, to be accomplished mainly at central prisoner of war inclosures, but whenever necessary, at hospitals and such other places prisoners of war requiring processing may be, and that Field Manual 100-10 and other applicable publications be so modified.

h. That provost marshals be required to cooperate and coordinate with interested staff sections to insure such matters as correct location of prisoner of war installation sites, the availability of transportation, the obtaining of necessary supplies, medical care, construction and communications.

i. That military police escort guard companies be made available for assignment to armies at the rate of two per corps and two for the operation of army inclosures.

j. That Table of Organization and Equipment Number 19-47, dated 15 August 1944, be changed to provide items of equipment in the amount specified as follows:

Truck, cargo, 2½ ton, 6 x 6	8
Bag, canvas, water sterilizing, complete w/cover & hanger	12
Can, water, five gallon	50
Telephone	3
Switchboard	1
Power unit, 3 KUA, 115 volts, 16 cyc	1
Pump, gasoline, 2½, 3 x 3½, type AB	1
Blankets, wool, OD (over & above organization equipment)	200
Tents, pyramidal	4
Tents, small wall	6
Lantern, gasoline	6
Lamp, carbide, floodlight type	8

k. That communications zone be allotted military police escort guard companies at the rate of two per army and that each communications zone section be allotted two such companies per central prisoner of war inclosure.

l. That overhead detachments for the operation of central prisoner of war inclosures and units for prisoner of war transportation guards, boat and overland, be organized and equipped under Table of Organization and Equipment Number 19-500, dated 25 September 1945.

m. That processing companies organized under Table of Organization and Equipment Number 19-237, 14 August 1944, be allocated to communications zone sections at the rate of one per central prisoner of war inclosure.

Bibliography

Chapter 1

1. 12th Army Group Prisoner of War Files.

2. Third United States Army After Action Report.

3. Operational History, Advance Section Communications Zone.

4. Third United States Army Prisoner of War Report.

5. Ninth United States Army Prisoner of War Report.

6. Fifteenth United States Army Prisoner of War Report.

7. 12th Army Group After Action Report.

8. Field Manual 19-5.

9. Field Manual 27-10.

10. Field Manual 29-5.

11. Field Manual 100-10.

12. Questionnaires from Echelons of Command: Theater Provost Marshal, Base Sections, Armies, Corps, Divisions, Regiments, Battalions.

13. European Theater of Operations Standing Operating Procedure Number 16, dated 3 December 1944.

14. Headquarters 12th Army Group Administrative Standing Operating Procedure - Short Title ADSOP, dated 18 October 1944.

15. Military Police Escort Guard Company Table of Organization and Equipment 19-47, dated 15 August 1944.

16. Military Police Prisoner of War Processing Company Table of Organization and Equipment 19-237, dated 14 August 1944.

17. Prisoner of War Overhead Detachment, European Theater of Operations Table of Distribution and Allowances, dated 3 October 1944.

18. Military Police Escort Guard Detachments Table of Organization and Equipment 19-500, dated 22 April 1944.

19. Report of Provost Marshals Conference representing five military police battalions communications zone, five military police battalions army, and the provost marshal sections of the European Theater, one port, the air force, two armies, three corps and eight divisions.

CHAPTER 2

CIVILIAN INTERNEES

11. Responsibility. Civilian internees were generally of three categories; (1) those who had been captured while serving with the enemy forces and who had assimilated rank, (2) war criminals, (3) security suspects. The handling of persons in category (1) was the responsibility of the provost marshal of each echelon of command, of those in category (2) was primarily the responsibility of the Judge Advocate, and of those in category (3) was primarily the responsibility of G-2, but the provost marshal detained such persons in categories (2) and (3) when requested by the responsible staff section. Civilian internees falling in category (1) were collected with the prisoners of war and all details relative to the care, guarding, evacuation and administration were identical to that used in handling prisoners of war. The common practice, and the most practical, was to detain these individuals in separate compounds of the prisoner of war collecting points or inclosures, if in a division or corps, until evacuation to the army inclosure, where they were again screened and detained in either compounds in the army inclosure or in separate inclosures.[1,2,4] During the last stages of the operations the apprehension of war criminals and security suspects in large numbers made it necessary to establish separate civilian internee camps. No persons in categories (2) or (3) were evacuated or moved without the concurrence of the staff section concerned.

12. Evacuation and Administration. Although standing operating procedure called for a careful screening of civilian internees at division and corps levels,[1] it was found that in rapidly moving situations this practice was impracticable and therefore these persons would pass to army inclosures for thorough screening for either release or evacuation. The civilian internee camps mentioned in the preceding paragraph were erected at the insistence of G-2, who had anticipated a much greater civilian internee take than was encountered during the operation. The need for these camps in army areas did not exist until the later stages of the war and after the cessation of hostilities. When civilian internees were moved or evacuated, normal prisoner of war channels were used and found generally adequate. Frequently civilian internees were released before a thorough check had been made and as a result a second apprehension of the individual was necessary. This proved in the majority of instances to be almost impossible.

13. Processing. The processing of civilian internees consisted of such documentation as was necessary to maintain a proper location record of the internee.[1] At civilian internee camps a card index of each individual was maintained for ready reference. An arrest report form was accomplished on each civilian internee either before he was committed for detention or after he arrived at a prisoner of war inclosure or at a civilian internee camp. Other interested agencies interrogated internees and maintained necessary case records. This was not a function of the provost marshal.

14. Interested Sections and Agencies. In the handling of civilian internees the coordination with other staff sections and agencies was identical to that necessary in the handling of prisoners of war.[3] See paragraph 7, Section 4, Chapter 1, above.

15. Conclusions.

a. That civilian internees were handled for the most part through the same channels as prisoners of war and that they were detained either in separate compounds of prisoner of war collecting points and inclosures or in separate civilian internee camps.

b. That prisoner of war channels were adequate to handle civilian internees during the operation.except for the later stages and after cessation of hostilities when it became necessary to establish separate civilian internee camps because of the large numbers involved.

c. That it was impossible to accomplish thorough screening for either release or evacuation at division and corps level and in the forward areas because of the large numbers involved and the shortage of screening personnel. As a result, final screening had to take place in army prisoner of war inclosures and army civilian internee camps.

d. That in the evacuation or movement of civilian internees, normal prisoner of war channels were used and found generally adequate.

e. That processing consisted of such documentation as was necessary to maintain a proper location record of the internee and that other interested agencies maintained their own case records.

16. Recommendations.

a. That whenever possible civilian internees be detained in separate compounds of prisoner of war inclosures thereby obviating the necessity of establishing separate civilian internee camps and making necessary the employment of additional guards and administrative personnel for their detention and evacuation.

b. That when the number of civilian internees apprehended reaches such proportions that it is impossible to detain them in separate compounds of prisoner of war inclosures, separate civilian internee camps be established in the vicinity of prisoner of war inclosures.

c. That sufficient screening personnel be furnished corps and divisions so that thorough screening of civilian internees can be done at those levels thus obviating the necessity of evacuating harmless individuals back to army.

d. That the evacuation and movement of all civilian internees be handled through the same channels as prisoners of war insofar as practicable.

e. That processing of civilian internees by the provost marshals be limited to such documentation as necessary to maintain a proper location record and that other interested agencies maintain their own case records.

Bibliography

Chapter 2

1. 12th Army Group Prisoner of War Files.

2. Third United States Army After Action Report.

3. 12th Army Group After Action Report.

4. Headquarters 12th Army Group Administrative Standing Operating Procedure - Short Title ADSOP, dated 18 October 1944.

CHAPTER 3

CARE AND EVACUATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL RECOVERED FROM THE ENEMY

17. Responsibility. The care and evacuation of military personnel recovered from the enemy were handled in general as outlined in "Eclipse" Memorandum Number eight of Supreme Headquarters and in Standing Operating Procedure Number 58 of the European Theater.[3] The responsible staff section in Supreme Headquarters was G-1 which had a prisoner of war executive branch. This branch not only formulated policies but also sent representatives to the army group headquarters and armies for operation. In European Theater Headquarters the staff responsibility was assigned to the European Theater Provost Marshal. In the field forces the general staff responsibility for handling this personnel was placed in the G-1 sections,[6] however in many headquarters those sections also retained the responsibility for operation and organized special staff groups for the purpose. In others the provost marshal sections were made responsible for operations in whole or in part.[1] Similarly, in the sections of the communications zone the staff section responsibility was not uniform.[4] This lack of uniform placing of staff responsibility in the various echelons of the European Theater tended to cause confusion in staff supervision and coordination. It appears that efficiency would have been furthered had the G-1 sections of all echelons been given the general staff responsibility for handling recovered allied military personnel but the provost marshal sections been given the principal special staff responsibility for operation.

18. Procedure. The armies were responsible for command, administration, supply and evacuation of recovered allied military personnel found in their areas. This personnel consisted of escapers and evaders and those found in overrun camps. They were generally handled as follows:[2,5,6]

a. The escapers and evaders, those who found their way to allied controlled territory by escaping after being captured by the enemy or by evading such capture, were generally directed to the rear by forward echelons and collected at places designated by the armies, frequently at prisoner of war inclosures, where there were G-2 facilities for their interrogation and identification. They were kept unguarded and provided proper care and treatment separate from the prisoners of war by the provost marshals. When properly identified United States and British Commonwealth escapers and evaders were either returned to their units, if they had not been in enemy captivity for a period exceeding two months, or evacuated to the communications zone if they had been in captivity exceeding two months. Those not returned to their units by the military police were handled by the replacement system. Other nationalities were handled by G-5 as displaced persons. The procedure for handling escapers and evaders was generally adequate for the number that came under these classifications.

b. Allied personnel who were found in overrun camps were required to remain ("stay put") in those camps and became the staff responsibility of G-1. Those who failed to do so automatically became displaced persons and the staff responsibility of G-5. When a camp was overrun a Prisoner of War Executive (PWX) officer from Supreme Headquarters, who had been attached to the army, had the duties of entering the camp to enforce the "stay put" policy and coordinating administration and evacuation under army direction. However, frequently by the time this officer reached the camps he found that the

inmates had dispersed. This could have been avoided had combat units overrunning the camps enforced the "stay put" policy and adequate troops and supplies planned in advance been echeloned forward as soon as the camps were uncovered. When a camp remained intact, a commander and staff usually selected from the recovered personnel, controlled and administered it under army direction. Some difficulties in the control of recovered personnel, particularly eastern Europeans, were encountered which could have been avoided had there been sufficient liaison officers of the same nationality as the recovered personnel. Army technical staff sections with the Prisoner of War Executive (PWX) officer determined the maintenance requirements of the camp, such as quartermaster, medical and other supplies, and arranged for the necessary supply and administrative services which did not exist at the camp. Initially all recovered personnel were supplied the same ration as their liberators, however, later certain nationalities, particularly eastern Europeans, were supplied with a ration more suitable to their national liking from United States and captured enemy ration components. Medical service was generally provided initially by the attachment of army installations for the initial physical examinations and the evacuation of serious cases. Later the medical care was returned to the camp hospital or dispensary staff. Although the care of the recovered personnel who remained in the camps was generally adequate, experience indicates that efficiency would have been served if the retention of such personnel in camp would have been insured by the units overrunning the camps, and if the necessary service troops and supplies had been planned well in advance and moved to the camps immediately after their capture.

c. The evacuation of such recovered personnel as were to be evacuated was done by air and rail from points arranged by the armies to the communications zone. The United States and British personnel had priority-one air lift from the point of recovery to a destination in communications zone where they received initial documentation prior to return to the zone of the interior. Although directives of the Supreme Headquarters called for initial processing in the army areas, in actual practice the only processing considered essential was a cursory medical examination and delousing. Prior to air movement a complete manifest of evacuees was accomplished by the camp commander. All other processing was disregarded if the expedience of evacuation would be prejudiced by the completion. Western Europeans were given rail transportation and priority-two air lift to communications zone border reception centers operated by the various national governments. These persons were usually processed prior to evacuation since United States responsibility ceased with their receipt at border reception stations.

d. Upon arrival of United States recovered military personnel at their last destination on the continent, they were confronted with a 14 to 45 day delay before proceeding to the United States.[4] This was, no doubt, due in some part to the amount of transportation available. Primarily, however, it was due to the lack of processing personnel to initiate temporary records and also to the lengthy physical examination ordered by the War Department which required much time and personnel to complete. There was considerable difficulty involved in procuring medical personnel in the European Theater at the time and if such examination could have been given in the zone of the interior, delay would have been reduced and maximum use could have been made of existing lift space. The transit camp used was a considerable distance from the air landing field which involved a considerable trip by truck, often under crowded conditions due to insufficient trucks

available. The camp had temporary or canvas housing and was not located near any large towns which could be used for recreation. More careful selection of a transit camp would have furnished greater comfort and more recreation to the recovered personnel during the considerable delay involved.

19. Conclusions.

a. That there was no uniformity in assigning the responsibility for handling recovered allied military personnel to certain staff sections throughout the various echelons of command.

b. That G-1 sections of all echelons should be given only general staff responsibility for handling recovered military personnel and that provost marshal sections should be given the principal special staff responsibility for operation.

c. That the procedure used for handling escapers and evaders was generally adequate for the number involved.

d. That there were insufficient allied liaison personnel of eastern European nationalities to handle the overrun camps in the forward areas.

e. That efficiency in the handling of recovered military personnel would have been increased if their retention in camps would have been insured by the units overrunning the camps and if the necessary service troops and supplies would have been planned well in advance and moved to the camps immediately after their recovery.

f. That processing in the army areas should be restricted to that consistent with speedy evacuation.

g. That there was a lack of processing personnel to complete individual records in the United States transit camp in the communications zone.

h. That the lengthy physical examination ordered by the War Department to be completed on the continent caused considerable delay in evacuating personnel to the zone of interior because of the lack of medical personnel available.

i. That more careful selection of the principal transit camp for staging recovered personnel to the zone of the interior would have furnished greater comfort and more recreation to the recovered personnel during the delay involved.

20. Recommendations.

a. That in the assignment of the staff duties pertaining to recovered military personnel in each headquarters, the G-1 section be the principal section responsible for general staff duties and the provost marshal section be the principal special staff section for operation.

b. That sufficient liaison officers of the same nationalities as the recovered personnel be available for attachment to overrun camps.

c. That units recovering military personnel not permit them to disperse but hold them in place until they are taken over by the responsible higher echelon and that the necessary service troops and supplies,

planned well in advance for the purpose, be available and moved forward to take care of recovered personnel immediately after they are recovered.

d. That sufficient processing personnel be provided transit camps so that evacuation of recovered personnel will not be delayed excessively and that processing in the army areas be limited to that consistent with speedy evacuation.

e. That lengthy physical examinations be given in the zone of the interior or that sufficient medical personnel be made available so that evacuation to the zone of the interior will not be unduly delayed.

f. That transit camps be selected with a view to the greatest possible comfort and recreation consistant with speed in evacuation.

Bibliography

Chapter 3

1. 12th Army Group Prisoner of War Files.

2. Third United States Army After Action Report.

3. European Theater of Operations Standing Operating Procedure Numb 58, Recovered Allied Military Personnel, 3 April 1945.

4. Operational History, Advance Section Communications Zone.

5. 12th Army Group After Action Report.

6. Headquarters 12th Army Group Administrative Standing Operating P cedure - Short Title ADSOP, dated 18 October 1944.